The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations PDF
Preview The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations
Despite their increasing importance, thereis little theoretical under- standing of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations offuture con- flict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behavior. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradox- ical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but will rarelysecureconcessions.Allieswillbereluctanttousecoercion,but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically,themostfavorabledistributionofpayoffsislikelytoresult when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distri- butionofgains.Thebook’sargumentispursuedusinggametheory and statistical analysis, detailed case studies of Russia’s relations with newly independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferationontheKoreanpeninsula. daniel drezner is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at theUniversityofColoradoatBoulder.Heistheauthorofanumber of articles in scholarly journals, and has acted as a research consul- tantfortheRANDcorporation. CAMBRIDGESTUDIESININTERNATIONALRELATIONS:65 The Sanctions Paradox EditorialBoard SteveSmith(Managingeditor) RobertW.Cox AlexDanchev RosemaryFoot JosephGrieco G.JohnIkenbery MargotLight AndrewLinklater MichaelNicholson CarolineThomas RogerTooze R.B.J.Walker CambridgeStudiesinInternationalRelationsisajointinitiativeof CambridgeUniversityPressandtheBritishInternationalStudies Association(BISA).Theserieswillincludeawiderangeofmaterial, fromundergraduatetextbooksandsurveystoresearch-based monographsandcollaborativevolumes.Theaimoftheseriesisto publishthebestnewscholarshipinInternationalStudiesfrom Europe,NorthAmericaandtherestoftheworld. CAMBRIDGESTUDIESININTERNATIONALRELATIONS 65 DanielW.Drezner Thesanctionsparadox Economicstatecraftandinternationalrelations 64 VivaOnaBartkus Thedynamicofsecession 63 JohnA.Vasquez Thepowerofpowerpolitics Fromclassicalrealismtoneotraditionalism 62 EmanuelAdlerandMichaelBarnett(eds.) Securitycommunities 61 CharlesJones E.H.Carrandinternationalrelations Adutytolie 60 JeffreyW.Knopf Domesticsocietyandinternationalcooperation TheimpactofprotestonUSarmscontrolpolicy 59 NicholasGreenwoodOnuf Therepublicanlegacyininternationalthought 58 DanielS.GellerandJ.DavidSinger Nationsatwar Ascientificstudyofinternationalconflict 57 RandallD.Germain Theinternationalorganizationofcredit Statesandglobalfinanceintheworldeconomy 56 N.PiersLudlow DealingwithBritain TheSixandthefirstUKapplicationtotheEEC 55 AndreasHasenclever,PeterMayerandVolkerRitteber Theoriesofinternationalregimes 54 MirandaA.SchreursandElizabethC.Economy(eds.) Theinternationalizationofenvironmentalprotection Serieslistcontinuesafterindex The Sanctions Paradox Economic Statecraft and International Relations Daniel W.Drezner publishedbythepresssyndicateoftheuniversityofcambridge ThePittBuilding,TrumpingtonStreet,Cambridge,UnitedKingdom cambridgeuniversitypress TheEdinburghBuilding,Cambridge,CB22RU,UK http://www.cup.cam.ac.uk 40West20thStreet,NewYork,NY10011–4211,USA http://www.cup.org 10StamfordRoad,Oakleigh,Melbourne3166,Australia #DanielW.Drezner1999 Thisbookisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisions ofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmay takeplacewithoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublished1999 PrintedintheUnitedKingdomattheUniversityPress,Cambridge TypesetinPalatino10/12.5pt [ce] AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary LibraryofCongresscataloguinginpublicationdata Drezner,DanielW. Thesanctionsparadox:economicstatecraftandinternational relations/DanielW.Drezner. p. cm.–(Cambridgestudiesininternationalrelations:65) ISBN0531643325(hardback)–ISBN0521644151(paperback) 1.Economicsanctions. 2.Internationaleconomicrelations. 3.Economicsanctions–Casestudies. I.Title. II.Series. HF1413.5.D74 1999 327.1’17–dc21 98–39105 CIP ISBN0521643325hardback ISBN0521644151paperback Thisbookisdedicatedtomyparents, EstherandDavidDrezner. Forfeedingmeasteadydietofcarrotsandveryfewsticks. Contents Listoffigures page xii Listoftables xiii Acknowledgments xv 1 Introduction 1 Ataleoftwocases 1 Theargument 4 Whyeconomiccoercionmatters 6 Theliterature 9 Flawsintheliterature 18 Themethodology 21 Therestofthebook 22 Part I Theoryanddata 25 2 Amodelofeconomiccoercion 27 Theassumptions 28 Themodel 35 Acaveat:switchesinpreferences 47 Anothercaveat:non-negotiabledemands 48 Choosingbetweencarrotsandsticks 50 Conclusionsandimplications 53 Appendix:proofsoflemmas 55 3 Plausibilityprobes 59 Firstimpressions 60 Statisticalstudiesofsanctionsinitiation 62 ix
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