The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law: American, German and Common Market Laws in Comparative Perspective

210 Pages·1967·19.24 MB·English

by  René Joliet (auth.)

THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW
American, German and Common Market Laws
in Comparative Perspective
COLLECTION SCIENTIFIQUE
DE LA F ACULTE DE DROIT DE L'UNIVERSitt DE LlEGE
26
THE RULE OF REASON
IN ANTITRUST LAW
American, German and Common Market Laws
in Comparative Perspective
by
RENE JOLIET
a
Assistant l'Universite de Liege
LL.M.
with a foreword
by
JAMES A. RAHL
Professor of Law, Northwestern University
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V. 1967
ISBN 978-94-017-5640-2 ISBN 978-94-017-5900-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-5900-7
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 1s t edition 1967
FOREWORD
Two great problems of legal theory underlie most questions
of antitrust and anticartel law: (1) how are prohibitions of
restrictive agreements and practices to be tempered, if at all, by
tests of reasonableness, or of public interest? and (2) with what
tests and qualifications shall problems of monopoly, dominant
power and business size be approached? This book examines
the first of these problems in terms of American, German and
European Common Market law, subjecting each to searching
comparative analysis. The book is the work of a highly-qualified
comparative legal scholar, Rene Joliet, who at this writing is
an Associate of the Faculty of Law of the University of Liege,
on leave for the years 1965-1967, as Senior Research Fellow
at Northwestern University School of Law.
In the United States, problems with the Rule of Reason and
its per se rule counterparts are as old as the Sherman Act of
1890. Perhaps no American antitrust doctrine has been more
perplexing and controversial, doubtless in part because most of
the law's hardest problems of policy take shape within the ambit
of the question of how the Rule should be applied in given
cases.
From the moment that Section 1 of the German Anticartel Law
and Article 85 of the Rome Treaty were adopted, both in 1957,
these legal systems became subject to the same kind of difficulty,
and early signs are that this experience will be as intense
and persistent as it has been in the United States. Naturally,
approaches to this common problem have developed subjectively
in Europe and America, in view of different origins, philosophies,
conditions and institutions. The American rule quickly grew
away from its only contemporaneous European analogy, the
English common law. History is now repeating itself; early
suggestions that Article 85 ( 1) should be interpreted like the
VIII
Sherman Act Section 1 model (whic': it almost copies in lan
guage) have been rejected by many commentators because of
seemingly decisive differences in conditions. Indeed, Mr. Joliet
finds that the EEC Commission interpretation of Article 85 has
tended to follow the approach of the German Law, which the
Rome Treaty provision does not really resemble nearly so closely
as it does the American provision.
Given the big differences of opinion within and among these
systems, a comparative approach to them is an enormous under
taking. At the same time, the wide perspective and sharp focus
which comparative study at its best can provide has much to offer.
To our knowlegde, Mr. Joliet is the first scholar on either side
of the ocean to approach the Rule of Reason on this broad scale.
The thoroughness with which he has done this will be sufficient
reward for any reader who seeks basic understanding of the
development of reasonableness tests in any or all of the systems
concerned.
But beyond the expository, what contribution is here made to
the more satisfactory development of the law? For American
law, it is certain that Mr. Joliet's statement is an important one
which, if heeded, promises to remove some very serious and
deep misconceptions and to narrow greatly the area of doubt
and controversy that will remain. To express pleasant surprise
that this could be achieved by a non-American, a Belgian, might
be an appropriate way to show admiration, but it might seem
to overlook the tradition of outstanding work on American
antitrust law by non-Americans already established by such
scholars as Hans Thorelli of Sweden and A.D. Neale of England.
Better it would be to say that Mr. Joliet's work is in this tradition
and that it leads us to hope for more of the same kind of
discerning scholarship at a time when American antitrust law
is at another one of its famous crossroads!
As for European law, we are confident that both German
and Common Market approaches to the reasonableness question
will be much better understood as a result of Mr. Joliet's writing.
It is, of course, possible that his conclusions on European law will
encounter somewhat more disagreement than will his observations
on American law. It would indeed be surprising if it should be
IX
otherwise, for Mr. Joliet has walked boldly into the middle
of a substantial difference of opinion on basic approach which
currently divides the EEC Commission and the Court of Justice.
Further, he has taken sides in the controversy by advocating the
use of a limited reasonableness test for the prohibitions of
Article 85 ( 1), independently of the exculpatory provisions of
Article 85(3). This position was fully developed in his
completed thesis before the Court of Justice decisions in 1966
in the cases of Grundig-Consten, Maschinenbau, and the Italian
Government-decisions which rather substantially confirmed his
analysis. Since those decisions, he has revised the work to take
account of them, and also to reaffirm his argument the more
confidently because of them.
We forecast that opponents of his view will find the cogency
of his comparative analysis hard to counter, and that there will
be many who will be persuaded by it. We may further hazard
that in the long run he will be proved substantially right in his
belief that a general prohibition of restrictive agreements cannot
be administered intelligently without some kind of flexible test
to separate the significant from the inconsequential, and thereby
to maximize both efficiency of prohibition and freedom of
enterprise.
It is understandable, therefore, that we await with great
interest the completion of the work in which Mr. Joliet is
presently engaged at Northwestern-a comparative study of the
theories of monopoly and dominant power in antitrust law,
the other of the two fundamental problems of antitrust policy
mentioned above.
Northwestern University, Chicago.
December 1966. James A. RAHL.
PREFACE
« Oui, j'a i une patrie : la langue fran~aise ». When I read
these words of Albert Camus some years ago, my immediate
reaction was the nostalgic thought that even if they were not
meant in that sense, they could serve as a wonderful rallying
cry for all the French-speaking minorities, to one of which
I belong. At that time, I was, of course, completely unaware
that one day, through the fortuity of academic life, I would be
writing a study of a controversial issue of antitrust law in a
language which is not my own. My purpose in recalling this
quotation is not only to reaffirm an allegiance, but also to point
out the difficulties of my venture, and perhaps to ask the reader
for his indulgence insofar as this study was also a philological
exercise.
This study was originally written as a dissertation which was
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of master of laws at Northwestern University in June 1966.
It was revised and completed during the fall of 1966 to accom
modate the latest developments of the EEC antitrust law which
had occurred during the summer.
The idea of a comparative study of the Rule of Reason was
suggested by Professor James A. Rahl of Northwestern Uni
versity and I am very pleased to record here my great debt to
him. It was he who brought me to Northwestern and thoughout
my stay here he has, despite heavy commitments, been a constant
source of advice, inspiration and encouragement without which
this study would never have been completed. To work under
his guidance has been an enriching and unforgettable experience.
Various aspects of my work have also been discussed, always to
my profit, with Professor Dawn C. Netsch who was a member
of my examining committee.
XII
I am grateful to the General Electric Foundation, which,
through a grant to Northwestern University for research in the
field of comparative and international antitrust law, provided
the generous financial support which made this study possible.
I must also express my gratitude to the United States Educational
Foundation in Belgium which recommended me for a Fulbright
travel grant.
At various stages of the drafting of the text, I received from
my friends Timothy Razzall, Philip M. Kayman, Nicholas Wilson
and Andrew Walker invaluable assistance in revising the Ian·
guage and style.
Finally I wish to thank Professor L. Dabin of the University
of Liege who encouraged me to gain the experience of American
antitrust law and granted me leave of absence. I am grateful
to the Law Faculty of the University of Liege which accepted
this volume for publication in its series.
To all these many friends my thanks are due. They are
of course in no way responsible for the shortcomings of this
study.
Northwestern University, Chicago.
December 1966. Rene JOLIET.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1. • American and European Misconceptions about the Rule of Reason . 3
2. · What is Reasonable? Two views . 5
3. - Scope of this Study 7
4. · Trends in EEC Antitrust Policy prior to the Grundig-Consten, Technique
Miniere and the Italian Government Cases • 8
5. · Consequent Need for ,a Comparative Study of the Rule of Reason . 11
6. · German Law as an Influence upon the Development of the EEC Anti-
cartel Law 12
CHAPTER I
RULE OF REASON AND PER SE VIOLATIONS
UNDER SECTION 1
OF THE SHERMAN ACT
1. • The Standard of Reasonableness, Appalachian Coals and the Four Tests
of Article 85(3) of the Rome Treaty . 17
2. - The Origins of the Rule of Reason 20
3. • The Rule of Reason as a Synthesis 23
4. · Transmissouri Freight Association and the so-called Literalist Approach
of Justice Peckham • 25
5. • Taft's Review of the Common Law and his Concept of Ancillary
Restraints • 26
6. - The Foundations of the Modern Rule of Reason: Standard Oil ,and
American Tobacco 29
A. - A Policy Against " Undue Limitations on Competitive Conditions " 29
B. • Loose-Knit Confederations and Close-Knit Combinations 30
C. · No Distinction between Good and Bad Cartels . 32
7. • Justice Brandeis' Version of the Rule of Reason • 35
A. · Regulation and Promotion, as Opposed to Destruction, of Compe-
tition 35
B. · No Adverse Effect upon Market Conditions . 36
C. · Limited License to Cartelize? 37
D. · Chicago Board of Trade: No Deviation from the Main Tradition
of the Rule of Reason • 39