THE ROMAN ARMY'S EMERGENCE FROM ITS ITALIAN ORIGINS Patrick Alan Kent A dissertation ...

248 Pages·2012·1.08 MB·English

THE ROMAN ARMY’S EMERGENCE FROM ITS ITALIAN ORIGINS

Patrick Alan Kent

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Department of History.

Chapel Hill
2012

Approved by:

Richard Talbert

Nathan Rosenstein

Daniel Gargola

Fred Naiden

Wayne Lee
ABSTRACT

PATRICK ALAN KENT: The Roman Army’s Emergence from its Italian Origins
(Under the direction of Prof. Richard Talbert)

Roman armies in the 4th century and earlier resembled other Italian armies of the day.
By using what limited sources are available concerning early Italian warfare, it is possible to
reinterpret the history of the Republic through the changing relationship of the Romans and
their Italian allies. An important aspect of early Italian warfare was military cooperation,
facilitated by overlapping bonds of formal and informal relationships between communities
and individuals. However, there was little in the way of organized allied contingents. Over
the 3rd century and culminating in the Second Punic War, the Romans organized their Italian
allies into large conglomerate units that were placed under Roman officers. At the same
time, the Romans generally took more direct control of the military resources of their allies
as idea of military obligation developed. The integration and subordination of the Italians
under increasing Roman domination fundamentally altered their relationships. In the 2nd
century the result was a growing feeling of discontent among the Italians with their position.
Indeed, the vital military role of the Italians was reinforced by the somewhat limited use
made of non-Italians in Roman armies. By the late 2nd century, the Italians were vestiges of
past traditions that no longer fitted into a changing world. Feelings of discontent grew
stronger and, eventually, led to widespread revolt in the Social War. As the Romans became
masters of vast empire, they became increasingly divorced from their Italian origins and
subjugated their once allies.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter
I. WARFARE IN EARLY ITALY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Warfare and Military Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Allies, Mercenaries, and Communities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
An Italian Army on Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
II. FORMAL AND INFORMAL INTERACTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
The Instability of Community Relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Formal and Informal Relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Military Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
III. THE INTEGRATION OF ROME’S ITALIAN ALLIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
The 3rd Century to 216 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Military Crisis: The Battle of Cannae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
After Cannae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
IV. MILITARY OBLIGATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Anachronistic Obligations of the Latins and Hernici . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Polybius’ Catalogue in 225. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Foedera, Formulae, and Military Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
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Recruitment and Discharge of Allies in the 2nd Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
V. IMPERIAL ARMIES OF THE REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Early Use of Non-Italians in Roman Armies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
The Effects of Empire on Rome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Non-Italians in Roman Armies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Roman Armies from the Second Punic War to the Social War . . . . . . . . . . 170
Italians vs. Non-Italians in Roman Armies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
VI. VESTIGES OF THE PAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Political Subordination of Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Romanization and Military Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Italy vs. the Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Buildup and Outbreak of the Social War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
APPENDICES
I. List of Latin Colonies in the Revolt of 209. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
II. List of Prefects and Allied Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
III. The Socii Navales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
IV. List of Non-Italians in Roman Armies beyond their Homelands. . . . . . . . . 229
REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIL Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.

FC Degrassi, A. Fasti Capitolini. Turin: G.B. Paravia & Co., 1954.

MRR Broughton, T.R.S. The Magistrates of the Roman Republic. Vols. 1 and 2.
New York: American Philological Association, 1951-1952.

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Introduction

This dissertation argues that the Roman army of the 4th century1 and prior was little
different from other Italian armies of the day. The accepted scholarly view of the Roman
army’s exploitation of Italian allies, which is ultimately based on an anachronistic application
of Polybius’ rationalized model, is in need of revision. The sophisticated use of allied
manpower in the 2nd century, which facilitated the creation of Rome’s Mediterranean empire,
was quite divergent from earlier practices. Italy, in the 4th century, was still a peninsula filled
with communities that were in a constant state of competition and cooperation. The personal
relationships of individuals, which transcended community boundaries, facilitated a close
interconnectedness in the Italian world and, combined with formal relationships, facilitated
military cooperation. An examination of the later ancient sources, such as Livy and
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, reveals that military cooperation was not a unique Roman
attribute, but was a feature of a larger tradition of Italian warfare that included Rome. It was
the conquest of Italy in the early 3rd century and the military pressures of the first two Punic
Wars (264-241, 218-201) that began a process which would propel the Roman army away
from its Italian roots.

1 All dates are BC unless otherwise noted.
Traditional means of military cooperation then broke down as the other communities
of Italy were subsumed within a new Roman military system. The role of personal
relationships was replaced with the idea that formal alliances between the Romans and their
allies obligated military assistance whenever Roman generals required it. Similar changes
were taking place in the political organization of the Republic, as the Senate undertook closer
supervision over annual magistrates, and regions beyond Italy were transformed into
subordinate provinces. The peoples of Italy were placed in a position of increasing
subordination inconsistent with their military importance; it was this shift that ultimately led
to civil war in the early 1st century. Investigation into the development of a Roman army
from the military traditions of early Italy reveals how the Romans with the aid of the other
peoples of Italy succeeded in winning an empire and were transformed in the process.

1. Treaties and Military Cooperation in Modern Scholarship
Scholars’ interpretation of the military relations of the Romans and Italians has
centered on theorizing about the nature of the foedera (treaties) that linked them together. It
is a given fact that the Romans’ success relied a great deal on their use of the military
resources of their Italian allies. While the interpretations have changed over time, the focus
of modern scholarly investigation has remained firmly on these legal relationships.
According to the 2007 Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, “as Rome
expanded and conquered new territories, the places that were absorbed were with a few
exceptions left free to govern their own affairs . . . their only obligation was to contribute
troops.”2 In fact, the characterization of this obligation has remained remarkably constant

2 J. Serrati, “Warfare and the State,” in P. Sabin, et al., eds. Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome,
vol. 1 of The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare (Cambridge: 2007), 485.
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ever since the 19th century. The Romans are seen as systematically demanding the military
resources of their allies. The mechanism for this exploitation was the establishment of
treaties that dictated military obligation on the part of Rome’s allies. However, with this
focus on formal treaties, the importance of informal relationships in the military interactions
of the peoples of Italy has been ignored by and large, making it difficult to gain a full
understanding of the combined role of formal and informal relationships.
Interpretation of the military relationships of the Romans and their allies comes from
the work of historians in the late 19th century. In 1881 Mommsen asserted that “without a
doubt the non-Latin allied communities . . . were registered on the list of contingent-
furnishing Italians (formula togatorum).”3 The Romans thus controlled the military
resources of their allies to supplement their own armies. Mommsen’s interpretation saw
Rome’s allies as subsumed within a Roman state (reichsangehörig), which increasingly took
on a national character during the conquest of Italy.4 As a result of the incorporation of the
peoples of Italy, the Romans gained full control over their military resources. The tool for
doing so was the foedus.5 Beloch (1880) likewise saw foedera as the key institution in
Roman and Italian military cooperation within a confederate system.6 Many of the
controversies of the military obligations of Rome’s allies come from these two authors, who
emphasized the importance of treaties in facilitating Roman use of allied manpower.
Various scholars have expanded on these ideas, emphasizing the role of treaties
(foedera) in the military obligations of Rome’s allies. Täubler (1913) refined Beloch’s

3 “ohne Zweifel auch die nichtlatinischen föderierten Gemeinden. . . in das Verzeichnis der zuzugpflichtigen
Italiker (formula togatorum) eingetragen,” T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte (Berlin: 1881), 1:423.

4 T. Mommsen, Römische Staatsrecht (Leipzig: 1887), 3:653.

5 Mommsen (1887), 3:672-676.

6 K. J. Beloch, Der italische Bund unter Roms Hegemonie (Leipzig: 1880), 194-227.
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interpretation of foedera into the concepts of equal (aequum) and unequal (iniquum)
varieties.7 Central to the foedus iniquum was the so-called maiestas clause requiring allies to
support the ascendancy of Rome, which Sherwin-White (1973) saw as the clause that
allowed the Romans to exploit their allies for aggressive wars.8 Here Sherwin-White touches
on a fundamental problem: how did the Romans obtain allied assistance in aggressive wars?
Certainly, the foedus Cassianum, the only surviving example of an Italian treaty, makes no
pronouncements on this specific possibility.9
The foedus iniquum solved the problem by supposing that the Romans created
unequal alliances designed to exploit allied manpower in any military situation. Those allies
with foedera aequa were required to help in defensive wars, but retained the right to
participate in any aggressive actions of their own choosing. This concept is pushed to its
limit by arguing that any Italian community with an unequal treaty would have been
presuming on the military control of the Roman state by voluntarily providing military
resources as equal allies did for Scipio for his African campaign.10 More recently, historians
have generally moved away from the idea of Italian foedera iniqua; as Badian (1958) argued,
the evidence for unequal treaties within Italy is very poor.11 Indeed, Mommsen argued that
the maiestas clause was a late development long after the conquest of Italy and only in

7 Beloch (1880), 194-227; E. Täubler, Imperium Romanum (Leipzig: 1913).

8 A. N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship (Oxford: 1973), 113-115.

9 The Cassian treaty stipulates that the Romans and Latins were required to aid each other with all of their
forces in the event of an attack by an aggressor, see Chapter 2.2.a.

10 A. J. Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy (New York: 1965), 1:265; Beloch (1880), 197-198.

11 E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (Oxford: 1958), 25-28. D. W. Baronowski, “Sub umbra foederis aequi,”
Phoenix 44, no. 4 (1990), 345-369 has argued for the existence of distinct equal and unequal treaties but is
unable to prove they were employed in Italy or prior to the Aetolian treaty in 189.
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evidence among extra-Italian allies.12 Nonetheless, the idea of the foedus iniquum speaks to
the difficulty inherent in an investigation of Italian military cooperation that focuses on
foedera.
Despite a movement away from the idea of foedera iniqua, scholars remain trapped in
the same problem of military cooperation due to the focus on treaties. Toynbee (1965) acts
as a kind of bridge; he propounds the idea of the unequal treaties, but also concentrates
heavily on what became the new focus of historians, the formula togatorum.13 Nevertheless,
in Toynbee’s work, Roman-Italian military cooperation is dictated solely by formal treaties.
The idea of the formula togatorum, based on the few references to formulae in ancient
sources, stretches back to Mommsen.14 He believed that the formula was the normal number
of men demanded via treaty obligations from allied communities.15 Beloch argued that it
dictated the maximum number of men the Romans could demand from an ally as well as the
number of men available.16 Baronowski (1984), following Brunt (1971), saw the formula
togatorum as “an administrative device by which the Romans customarily apportioned the
burden of a partial levy among them.”17 As such, the formula was not itself a formal part of

12 Mommsen (1887), 3:664.

13 Toynbee (1965), 1:261-2. Followed by D. W. Baronowski, “The formula togatorum’” Historia: Zeitschrift
für Alte Geschichte 33, no. 2 (1984), 248-252; (1990), 345-369; “Roman military forces in 225 B.C. (Polybius
2.23-4),” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 42, no. 2 (1993), 181-202.

14 For a discussion of the ancient sources on the formula togatorum, see Chapter 4.3.c.

15 Mommsen (1887), 3:672-676.

16 Beloch (1880), 201-210; Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt (Leipzig: 1886), 353-355.

17 Baronowski (1984), 249; P. A. Brunt, Italian Manpower (Oxford: 1971), 545-548.

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