the role of target political incentives in the success of foreign policy

440 Pages·2017·4.22 MB·English

University of Iowa
Iowa Research Online
Theses and Dissertations
Summer 2010
Private incentives, public outcomes: the role of
target political incentives in the success of foreign
policy
Amanda Abigail Licht
University of Iowa
Copyright 2010 Amanda Abigail Licht
This dissertation is available at Iowa Research Online: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/700
Recommended Citation
Licht, Amanda Abigail. "Private incentives, public outcomes: the role of target political incentives in the success of foreign policy." PhD
(Doctor of Philosophy) thesis, University of Iowa, 2010.
https://doi.org/10.17077/etd.rqlklrmy.
Follow this and additional works at:https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd
Part of thePolitical Science Commons
PRIVATE INCENTIVES, PUBLIC OUTCOMES: THE ROLE OF TARGET
POLITICAL INCENTIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS
by
Amanda Abigail Licht
An Abstract
Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa
July 2010

Thesis Supervisor: Associate Professor Brian H. Lai
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ABSTRACT
When do foreign influence attempts succeed in obtaining concessions from
targeted states, and why do they so often fail? Powerful states employ a broad range of
foreign policy tools in their dealings with other countries, but their ability to successfully
exert power varies. This project seeks an explanation for the patchy record of foreign aid
and economic sanctions in the political incentives of targeted leaders. Understanding the
process of foreign policy success and failure requires considering both the effect of
intervention on leader survival and the domestic cost of providing concessions. In both
respects, the type of sanction interacts with targets’ domestic context. Dynamic trends in
leadership experience and political support, strength of political opposition, and regime
type condition both the probability of sanctions’ effectively tapping into target incentives
and the difficulty of providing concessions.
My framework and analyses push beyond standard conceptualizations of leader
incentives and foreign policy in several ways. The theory unites positive and negative
strategies rather than treating them as divergent phenomena. I also break the traditional
dichotomy of democratic and autocratic regimes, modeling dynamic political processes
and explicitly incorporating the political opposition. I pursue a multi-stage modeling
technique which more faithfully represents the strategic encounters between sending and
targeted states and furthers our understanding of the interplay between external demands
and domestic political incentives.
The findings suggest many strategies utilized for targeting aid and economic
sanctions may be faulty. Sending states’ best bet for achieving concession may be to
target leaders whose place in office is very secure, yet empirically they pursue the
opposite strategy. Contrary to much theory in the literature, I also find that even
ineffective negative sanctions can achieve success provided the target faces few domestic
challenges. The probability of concession also increases when states demand concessions
of a diffuse and symbolic nature, rather than changes to the status quo which would hurt a
2

private domestic interest. A strong political opposition magnifies the relative ease of
public-costs concessions, suggesting that challenging parties compete for the favor of
elites rather than championing the public interest.
Abstract Approved: _______________________________________
Thesis Supervisor
_______________________________________
Title and Department
_______________________________________
Date
PRIVATE INCENTIVES, PUBLIC OUTCOMES: THE ROLE OF TARGET
POLITICAL INCENTIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS
by
Amanda Abigail Licht
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa
1
July 2010
Thesis Supervisor: Associate Professor Brian H. Lai
Graduate College
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL
_______________________
PH.D. THESIS
_______________
This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis of
Amanda Abigail Licht
has been approved by the Examining Committee
for the thesis requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree in Political Science at the July 2010 graduation.
Thesis Committee: ___________________________________
Brian H. Lai, Thesis Supervisor
___________________________________
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell
___________________________________
Frederick Boehmke
___________________________________
Cameron Thies
___________________________________
Michaela Hoenicke-Moore
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
For listening kindly as I aired my frequent feelings of frustration, confusion and
defeat about this sprawling project, I owe my friends and colleagues Zachary Greene,
Amanda Frost Keller and Vanessa Lefler many thanks. I must also thank Doug for his
refusal to believe things were going as badly as I believed them to be. And without Brian
Lai’s interventions, I doubt that any of these many pages would be intelligible to the
outside world. Though I sometimes complained over the extra work, I greatly appreciate
his efforts. This research would not have been possible without the excellent training and
mentorship which I received from Sara Mitchell and Fred Boehmke. And I sincerely
appreciate the willingness of the entire committee to spend time reading the many pages
below and offering me their helpful and challenging advice.
2

ii
ABSTRACT
When do foreign influence attempts succeed in obtaining concessions
from targeted states, and why do they so often fail? Powerful states employ a
broad range of foreign policy tools in their dealings with other countries, but their
ability to successfully exert power varies. This project seeks an explanation for
the patchy record of foreign aid and economic sanctions in the political incentives
of targeted leaders. Understanding the process of foreign policy success and
failure requires considering both the effect of intervention on leader survival and
the domestic cost of providing concessions. In both respects, the type of sanction
interacts with targets’ domestic context. Dynamic trends in leadership experience
and political support, strength of political opposition, and regime type condition
both the probability of sanctions’ effectively tapping into target incentives and the
difficulty of providing concessions.
My framework and analyses push beyond standard conceptualizations of
leader incentives and foreign policy in several ways. The theory unites positive
and negative strategies rather than treating them as divergent phenomena. I also
break the traditional dichotomy of democratic and autocratic regimes, modeling
dynamic political processes and explicitly incorporating the political opposition. I
pursue a multi-stage modeling technique which more faithfully represents the
3

strategic encounters between sending and targeted states and furthers our
understanding of the interplay between external demands and domestic political
incentives.
The findings suggest many strategies utilized for targeting aid and
economic sanctions may be faulty. Sending states’ best bet for achieving
concession may be to target leaders whose place in office is very secure, yet
empirically they pursue the opposite strategy. Contrary to much theory in the
iii
literature, I also find that even ineffective negative sanctions can achieve success
provided the target faces few domestic challenges. The probability of concession
also increases when states demand concessions of a diffuse and symbolic nature,
rather than changes to the status quo which would hurt a private domestic interest.
A strong political opposition magnifies the relative ease of public-costs
concessions, suggesting that challenging parties compete for the favor of elites
rather than championing the public interest.
4

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... xi
CHAPTER
1. POWER IS AS POWER DOES: AN INTRODUCTION TO
INFLUENCE ATTEMPTS AND TARGETED LEADERS’
INCENTIVES ...................................................................................................1
2. POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE LITERATURE ..................................12

Power through Coercive Means......................................................................13
Power through Diverse Means........................................................................17
Foreign Aid: Mixed Intentions and Mixed Outcomes ...................................21
Donor Goals .............................................................................................21
Aid Effectivness ......................................................................................24
Linking Effectiveness to Target Incentives .............................................26
Economic Sanctions: Short of War and Short on Results .............................28
Sanction Onset and Outcomes .................................................................28
Linking Sanction Outcomes to Target Incentives ...................................32
Leader Incentives and International Relations ...............................................34
Selectorate Theory ...................................................................................35
Leader Specific Punishments ..................................................................37
Dynamic Processes and Variation in Leader Incentives .........................40

3. PRIVATE INTERESTS, PUBLIC OUTCOMES: DETERMINANTS
AND EFFECTS OF POLITICA INCENTIVES ............................................44

A Theory of Leader Incentives from the Inside Out .......................................45
Tapping into the Survival Motive: Foreign Policy Effectiveness ..........51
Surmounting Domestic Hurdles: The Political Costs of Concession ......63
Targeted Leader Incentives and the Success of Influence Attempts .......77
Leader Incentives and Targeting .............................................................79

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4. RESEARCH DESIGN: MODELING THE TWO STAGES OF
INFLUENCE ..................................................................................................82

Modeling Effectiveness ..................................................................................83
Specification: Selection Stage .................................................................87
Dependent Variables ........................................................................87
Independent Variables ......................................................................88
Specification: Outcome Stage .................................................................89
Dependent Variables ........................................................................90
Independent Variables ......................................................................92
Control Variables .............................................................................98
Effectiveness Datasets ......................................................................98
Constructing the Effectiveness Measures .......................................................99
Selecting a Measure of Effectiveness ....................................................100
Modeling Concessions ..................................................................................105
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