The Role of International Alliances in Civil War Onset

101 Pages·2015·0.63 MB·English

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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School
2015
The Role of International Alliances in Civil
War Onset
Paul Todd Fletcher
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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PUBLIC POLICY

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
ALLIANCES IN CIVIL WAR ONSET

By
PAUL TODD FLETCHER

A Dissertation submitted to the
Department of Political Science
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded:
Spring Semester, 2015

© 2015 Paul Todd Fletcher
Paul Todd Fletcher defended his dissertation on 9 February 2015.
The members of the supervisory committee were:

Mark A. Souva
Professor Directing Dissertation

Johnathan Grant
University Representative

Dale L. Smith
Committee Member

Sean D. Ehrlich
Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and
certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements.
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This dissertation is lovingly dedicated to my mother, Cathy Ozbun Fletcher. As her endless
encouragement has supported me through this dissertation, her constant love has sustained me
throughout my life.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not be possible without the guidance of my committee members, the
encouragement of friends, and the support of family.
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Mark Souva, my committee chairman for
his hours of discussion, reflection, and encouragement throughout the entire process. When I was
most plagued with doubts about the dissertation, it was his positive perspective and support that
provided me with much needed reassurance. I also wish to thank Dr. Dale Smith and Dr. Sean
Ehrlich. From the knowledge and wisdom they imparted in my first classes in graduate school,
through the several research and teaching opportunities offered during my time in the program, to
their sage counsel regarding my dissertation, I offer my sincere thanks to my committee members
who were more than generous with their time and expertise. Special thanks go to Dr. Grant who
was willing to participate in my final defense committee at the last moment.

I would also like to thank my father, Jim Fletcher, who never doubted that I’d finish my
dissertation. I wish to thank my brother, Jace Fletcher, his wife, Laura Fletcher, and my nephew
Aiden Todd Fletcher, their support, encouragement, and friendship was so greatly needed and very
appreciated. Finally, I want to say a heartfelt thank you to my mother, Cathy Fletcher. She read
through countless drafts of my dissertation, always asking the thought-provoking questions, and
providing constructive criticism whenever needed. She pushed me when I needed pushing. She
distracted me when I needed distraction. Outside of my committee members, she’s the only person
I can confidently say has read every page of this dissertation, and that means the world to me.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................................................... vi
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................ vii
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 1: EXPLANATIONS OF CIVIL WAR ONSET ................................................................. 3
CHAPTER 2: DOMESTICALLY MOTIVATED ALLIANCE FORMATION .............................. 15
CHAPTER 3: CIVIL WAR ONSET .......................................................................................................... 26
CHAPTER 4: IRREGULAR REMOVAL OF LEADERS .................................................................... 48
CHAPTER 5: FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................................................................................ 67
APPENDIX A: MODEL WITH LAGGED POLITY ............................................................................ 78
APPENDIX B: COUPS IN ANOCRACIES ............................................................................................ 79
References ......................................................................................................................................................... 81
Biographical Sketch ......................................................................................................................................... 93

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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Civil War Onset among All States (1945-1991) ................. 32
Table 2. Alternative Logistic Regressions on Civil War Onset among All States (1945-1991) ............ 33
Table 3. Logit Comparisons of Civil War Onset Over Time .................................................................... 35
Table 4. List of Civil Wars and Allies of Anocratic Countries at Onset (1945-1991) ........................... 36
Table 5. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Civil War Onset among Anocracies (1945-1991) .............. 39
Table 6. Alternative Logistic Regressions on Civil War Onset among Anocracies (1945-1991) ......... 41
Table 7. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Removal of Leaders among All States (1945-1991) .......... 56
Table 8. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Removal of Leaders among Anocracies (1945-1991) ....... 59
Table 9. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Succesful Coups among All States (1950-1991) ................ 63
Table 10. Regressions on Civil War Onset among Anocracies (1945-1991) with Lagged Polity......... 78
Table 11. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Succesful Coups among Anocracies (1950-1991) .......... 79

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ABSTRACT

While significant scholarly attention has been given to the literatures on civil war and on
alliances, there has not been any exploration of the important role international alliances play in civil
war onset. This dissertation posits that international alliances can greatly decrease the onset of civil
war. Leaders wish to remain in power, and alliances can serve as a means to that end. Allies need
foreign leaders who will ensure that their states can fulfill their alliance obligations. Civil wars
undermine the ability of leaders to meet alliance obligations. Through the formation of alliances,
leaders may be seeking international solutions to domestic problems. This dissertation proposes that
alliances go beyond their written obligations by also providing foreign states with security from
domestic threats. The empirical results of this dissertation demonstrate that powerful states can
substantially reduce civil war onset in their allies. However, further research indicates that this
benefit may come at a cost. By heavily relying on help from a powerful ally, states may be more
vulnerable to irregular removals of leaders, especially in the form of coups. More broadly, this
dissertation also seeks to provide a possible policy prescription for stability and security in the world.
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INTRODUCTION
At the close of the Napoleonic Wars, the small sovereign German states looked for security.
Ravaged by over a decade of war, these states found protection in the German Confederation
established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Surrounded by powerful neighbors, the Germanic
states were encouraged to form an alliance where the “States of the Confederation engage to defend
not only the whole of Germany, but each individual State of the Union, in case it should be
attacked.” As the treaty made a war against any Germanic state a war against all Germanic states,
the clear intent of the treaty was to protect against external threats. Yet, when the second phase of
the treaty was signed by 39 independent Germanic states in 1820, the treaty expanded in scope to
include all threats, both foreign and domestic. Article 26 of the Final Act of the Viennese
Ministerial Conferences stated that:
When domestic peace in a Confederal state is directly threatened by insubordination
of subjects against the authorities, and a dissemination of rebellious movements is to
be feared, or a real rebellion has broken out, and the government itself, after
exhausting constitutional and legal means, calls for the support of the Confederation,
then it is incumbent upon the Confederal Assembly to arrange immediate assistance
for the restoration of peace.1

With relative stability and peace returning to the international order, these leaders logically turned
their attention to other threats to their power – their subjects. While the primary goal of the
German Confederation was to provide security from outside threats, participating states realized that
this alliance could also provide internal stability and security against domestic threats.
It is worth noting that the idea of an alliance helping against domestic threats and rebellions
was not only a consideration for these leaders, but written into one of the most important treaties of
its time. Yet, while modern studies of alliances have extended their data back to 1815, no scholarly

1 German Historical Institute. “Final Act of the Viennese Ministerial Conferences (May 15, 1820).” German
History in Documents and Images. German Historical Institute, Washington DC. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/pdf/eng/1_C_NS4_Vienna%20Final%20Act.pdf Sourced from: Karl Binding, Deutsche Staatsgrundgesetze
[German Federal Laws], Number III. Translated by: Jeremiah Riemerp. 37 ff. (accessed 15 November 2014).
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attention has been given to the idea that leaders may be signing international treaties in order to also
deal with domestic enemies. Likewise, in the extensive literature examining civil war onset, scholars
have overlooked the role of international alliances. As the 20th century shifted from an era of world
wars into an era of civil wars, the role of international alliances in domestic threats pleads for
attention. This dissertation serves as the first examination of how international alliances affect civil
war onset.

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