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From The Field: 'Civilianization' Ruining Reserves By Shannon Mathews Following service in the active U.S. Army, I remained in Europe as an Army Reservist, and after returning from Bosnia in 1996, I returned to active duty in the AGR program. My reasons were many, but foremost was that I thought I could help in some part to teach and prepare soldiers in the Army Reserves what the Army and combat were all about. The horror stories of Reserve and National Guard unit failures in preparing for Operation Desert Shield and the many operations that followed were always in the front of my mind. Since I began working with the Reserves, I must say there are no more highly motivated soldiers in the Army. They very much want to learn, grow and be the most professional soldiers that they can be. However, not only are they undermined with poor and unmotivated leadership, but that leadership regularly seems to take active, aggressive steps to ensure that the soldiers will be prevented from achieving anything but failure. There are many factors and aspects to this, but one of the most glaring is the entrenched, overwhelming "civilianization" of that leadership. The Army Reserves are controlled completely - at every level down to company and detachment - by civilian employees who seem obsessed by their own personal empire-building and power struggles, and not in supporting and enabling an effective citizen-soldier Army. I do not believe that this is the sole cause of the problems in the Reserves, but it is one the major contributing factors that create the leadership vacuum that is prevalent here. As I write this, I am trying to take care of my soldiers who have been tasked out to a unit that is absolutely technically and tactically incompetent, with completely inept leadership and a complete lack of concern for these soldiers. My soldiers are supposed to go to combat with this unit - yet that unit and the command cannot figure out how to get them a plane ticket to attend the mobilization briefings, or even how to create a roster of soldiers' phone numbers. A month after having been reassigned to the new unit, not one of these soldiers has ever been contacted directly by anyone in their new chain of command. That does not bode very well for the unit or my soldiers' futures downrange. I have battled constantly with my chain of command for more effective and realistic training opportunities during the 5 1/2 years that I have served at this duty station. When I have not received the support I requested, I have taken the initiative and set up and planned training on my own for my soldiers. There are other NCOs in my unit, both Reservists and Active Duty, who share the same mindset and have tried to do the same. That cannot be said for the rest of the command. The command has regularly curtailed or actively prevented this to the farthest extent possible. My soldiers are not combat-ready, but I can say I have managed to lay a framework and a mindset that will allow them, with effective leadership, to be molded and trained up in the few weeks that would be allowed prior to and during their deployment. I do not believe my experiences are in any way unique. I believe that these problems exist throughout the Reserves. I do not accept that this is a "fact of life" or just an unavoidable part of the Reserve system. I believe they are completely preventable and unacceptable failures due in whole to the shortsighted selfishness of the civilians and senior leaders that this system has produced. I am haunted and terrified by the Army's broken promise during the 1990s drawdown of "No More Task Force Smiths." I have spent my entire career in the Army standing up for what I believed to be the right thing. It has not helped my career or endeared me to many of my superiors, but I can proudly say I did and continue to do what I think is right. For that, I have the respect of my soldiers and fellow NCOs, but most importantly, my own self-respect. I feel that I am sending my soldiers off to die, plain and simple, and that no one cares. The system is sending them without training, support or leadership to do a job that critically depends on all three of those factors. I do not see any recourse within the military system, so I am writing to Col. David Hackworth and DefenseWatch. I am aware that there can be great professional repercussions in what I am doing. But I believe in leading by example: How can I ask my soldiers to risk their lives for me, when I am unwilling to do the same professionally for them? One personal note: I read Col. Hackworth's memoir, About Face, while stationed in Germany attached to a deactivating Pershing missile unit. My initial reaction to his book, supported and inflated by the reactions of many officers in positions far above me, was that the colonel was a bitter renegade and no friend to the Army or its soldiers. The passing years have shown me that I was misguided - dead wrong, in fact - in both my assessment of him, as well as the faith I had long placed in the Army leadership. Let me close by saying that I now understand what Col. Hackworth was saying then, and continues to say now. I have come to understand that the difference between personal integrity and institutional disloyalty is often in the eye of the beholder. I thank him for his time, his service to our county, and his continued service to us as a soldier. Matthews is a staff sergeant in the U.S. Army Reserves.