(xv) The main features of the TRAIN Project (Sub Project 3) of Swedish National Rail Administation report are as under: • Although the train drivers are satisfied with their jobs, the working hours and the physical work environment (mainly noise level, vibrations, inadequate maintenance and poor cab climate) were seen as a problem. • The working hours intruded upon driver's social lives and led to problems of sleep and fatigue. • Day time sleep following a night shift was associated with a clearly inferior level of recovery and a considerable lack of sleep. • The effect of circadian rhythm on wakefulness and rest must be taken into consideration while planning driver's schedules. • The schedules should be worked out so that these are as regular as possible and not too long (9 hours maximum). The need for an extra long rest period (minimum24 hours) after a night time shift is also stressed upon. • Irregular working hours was perceived as one of the most serious problems at work. • Train drivers suffer from severe fatigue and sleepiness when working at night. The research findings summarized above clearly bring out that: (a) The sleep during the day does not completely compensate the loss of sleep at night. (b) Due to continuous night working, the uncompensated sleep keeps accumulating even though the Running Staff is provided adequate rest during day hours. This sleep debt can only be compensated by providing adequate full nights in bed. (c) This accumulation builds up stress and strain which even though may not be clearly felt by the Running - 123 - Staff at times, affects his reflexes, reaction time and increases sleepiness while on duty. This may result into safety violations in addition to having adverse effects on the health of running staff as well as his family and social life. Appreciating the results/findings of these scientific studies, many of the Railway systems abroad have already revised the provisions for continuous night duties to a level of two to four nights followed by a mandatory longer rest period at home before further night duties. For example, DB in Germany are following a system of maximum 4 continuous nights (extendable to 5 on mutual agreement) and SNCF in France are following a system of 2 continuous nights maximum at present. Federal Rail Road Administration in America have also provided for giving a home station rest of 24 hours when the employee performs a duty starting between 8 pm and 4 am. Civil aviation authorities in India have also brought down the limit to only one night working (for passenger flights) and maximum 2 continuous night working (for Cargo flights) with added provisions for further reduction if the duties/part thereof falls in the window of circadian low (WOCL). Many of these concepts which emerged from the studies by RDSO in early 1980s as well as by the international bodies thereafter (as detailed above) have been an eye opener even for the Committee Members who have had substantial experience in Railway operations during their service - 124 - careers. However, in order to adjudge the efficacy of the concepts as well as remedial measures suggested in the studies, the Committee also took upon themselves the task of analyzing some of the SPAD (Signal Passing at Danger) cases which also include the cases of serious accidents caused by the Running Staff on account of signal passing at danger. For this purpose, the Committee undertook a study of those SPAD cases which occurred during the period falling within committee's tenure (i.e. between 01.04.2011 and 01.09.2012) and are available on IR's safety website. There were total 147 SPAD cases during this period (Annexure VI) and their analysis indicates that: (a) In 15 cases, the time of accident is not available on the website. (b) 27 cases involve motor-men (who normally get full night's rest daily) or these cases have occurred during shunting operations which are carried out on a fixed roster basis. The balance 95 cases were segregated based on the time of occurrence. The Committee found that: (a) In 47 cases, the accidents occurred during the day time (i.e. from 0600 to 2200 hours). (b) In 48 cases, the accidents occurred during the night time (i.e. from 2200 to 0600 hours). (In many of the cases which occurred during the day time, the crew - 125 - (xv) The main features of the TRAIN Project (Sub Project 3) of Swedish National Rail Administation report are as under: • Although the train drivers are satisfied with their jobs, the working hours and the physical work environment (mainly noise level, vibrations, inadequate maintenance and poor cab climate) were seen as a problem. • The working hours intruded upon driver's social lives and led to problems of sleep and fatigue. • Day time sleep following a night shift was associated with a clearly inferior level of recovery and a considerable lack of sleep. • The effect of circadian rhythm on wakefulness and rest must be taken into consideration while planning driver's schedules. • The schedules should be worked out so that these are as regular as possible and not too long (9 hours maximum). The need for an extra long rest period (minimum24 hours) after a night time shift is also stressed upon. • Irregular working hours was perceived as one of the most serious problems at work. • Train drivers suffer from severe fatigue and sleepiness when working at night. The research findings summarized above clearly bring out that: (a) The sleep during the day does not completely compensate the loss of sleep at night. (b) Due to continuous night working, the uncompensated sleep keeps accumulating even though the Running Staff is provided adequate rest during day hours. This sleep debt can only be compensated by providing adequate full nights in bed. (c) This accumulation builds up stress and strain which even though may not be clearly felt by the Running - 123 - Staff at times, affects his reflexes, reaction time and increases sleepiness while on duty. This may result into safety violations in addition to having adverse effects on the health of running staff as well as his family and social life. Appreciating the results/findings of these scientific studies, many of the Railway systems abroad have already revised the provisions for continuous night duties to a level of two to four nights followed by a mandatory longer rest period at home before further night duties. For example, DB in Germany are following a system of maximum 4 continuous nights (extendable to 5 on mutual agreement) and SNCF in France are following a system of 2 continuous nights maximum at present. Federal Rail Road Administration in America have also provided for giving a home station rest of 24 hours when the employee performs a duty starting between 8 pm and 4 am. Civil aviation authorities in India have also brought down the limit to only one night working (for passenger flights) and maximum 2 continuous night working (for Cargo flights) with added provisions for further reduction if the duties/part thereof falls in the window of circadian low (WOCL). Many of these concepts which emerged from the studies by RDSO in early 1980s as well as by the international bodies thereafter (as detailed above) have been an eye opener even for the Committee Members who have had substantial experience in Railway operations during their service - 124 - careers. However, in order to adjudge the efficacy of the concepts as well as remedial measures suggested in the studies, the Committee also took upon themselves the task of analyzing some of the SPAD (Signal Passing at Danger) cases which also include the cases of serious accidents caused by the Running Staff on account of signal passing at danger. For this purpose, the Committee undertook a study of those SPAD cases which occurred during the period falling within committee's tenure (i.e. between 01.04.2011 and 01.09.2012) and are available on IR's safety website. There were total 147 SPAD cases during this period (Annexure VI) and their analysis indicates that: (a) In 15 cases, the time of accident is not available on the website. (b) 27 cases involve motor-men (who normally get full night's rest daily) or these cases have occurred during shunting operations which are carried out on a fixed roster basis. The balance 95 cases were segregated based on the time of occurrence. The Committee found that: (a) In 47 cases, the accidents occurred during the day time (i.e. from 0600 to 2200 hours). (b) In 48 cases, the accidents occurred during the night time (i.e. from 2200 to 0600 hours). (In many of the cases which occurred during the day time, the crew - 125 - might have signed on /signed off between 2200 and 0600 hours and would have performed a part of his duty during night hours. Though, such cases also may be on account of effects of night duty yet these have not been counted as the cases which occurred during night) (c) Out of 48 cases which occurred during the night time, those which occurred between 0200 and 0600 hours (i.e. during WOCL) are 25 cases. Thus, the Committee observes that over 50 per cent SPAD cases took place during night time and out of these, over 50 per cent took place between 0200-0600 hours (i.e. during WOCL). This broad analysis encouraged the Committee to further study in detail the duty and rest scheduling pattern of 3 sample cases to identify precisely the effect of irregular night work. The cases taken up for such an analysis are: (i) Hampi Express (Train no. 16591) accident on 22-05- 2012 at Penukonda station, Bangalore division, Southern Railway. (ii) Goods train (E-Box) accident on 02-04-2012 at Bilochpura, Agra Division, NC Railway. (iii) Rajdhani Express (Train no. 12424) accident on 11-03- 2012 at Begusarai station, Sonepur division, NE Railway. - 126 - The details of these cases bring out that: (a) Hampi Express (Train No. 16591): (i) At 0310 hours on 22-05-2012, the Loco Pilot of the train passed Down Home signal at danger and hit a stabled Goods train at Penukonda station. 25 persons were killed, 14 grievously injured and 17 had simple injuries. (ii) During the period from 21.04.2012 to 21.05.2012 (i.e. last one month before the accident), the Loco Pilot of Hampi Express made 28 trips (details of the working of the Loco Pilot are given in Annexure VII). Out of these, as many as 23 trips involved night working and as many as 17 trips were made in the Window of Circadian Low (WOCL). (iii) During this period, the Loco Pilot had worked once for 7 continuous nights (5 were in the Window of Circadian Low), once for 5 continuous nights (4 were in the Window of Circadian Low) and once for 3 continuous nights (all were in the Window of Circadian Low). (iv) Immediately before the trip during which he met with the accident, the Loco Pilot worked for 7 nights continuously (5 in Window of Circadian Low) (Full periodical rest was, however, granted to him before he undertook this trip). - 127 - (v) During this period, only 3 periodical rests were granted to the Loco Pilot as against 4. (b) E-BOX Goods train: (i) At 0504 hours on 02-05-2012, the Loco Pilot who was working the train from TKD to AGC, passed the signal at danger at Bilochpura station. No casualities/i nju ries. (ii) During the period from 01.04.2012 to 01.05.2012 i.e. last 30 days before the accident (details of the working of the Loco Pilot are given in Annexure VII), the Loco Pilot of the train made 29 trips (details were not available for 8 working days). Out of these, as many as 16 trips involved night working and as many as 13 were made in the Window of Circadian Low (WOCL). (iii) During this period, the Loco Pilot worked for 4 nights continuously once out of which 2 were in WOOL. (iv) After availing full headquarter rest of 16 hours 45 minutes, the Loco Pilot signed on at 13:45 hours at Agra and arrived TKD at 17:10 hours as spare. He again signed on at 20:10 hours and was booked for duty after availing only 3 hours outstation rest which is not adequate. Thus, his total duty hours work out to 15 hours 19 minutes (including three hours in WOCL) counting the - 128 - outstation rest period also as duty as he could not have used it for the purpose of sleeping/taking rest. This is very high. (c) Raidhani Express (Train no. 12424) (i) At 0505 hours on 11-03-2012, the Loco Pilot of the train entered the sand hump at Begusarai after disregarding the Starter signal. No causalities/injuries. (ii) During the period from 14.02.2012 to 11.03.2012 i.e. last 28 days preceding the accident (details of the working of the Loco Pilot are given in Annexure VII), the Loco Pilot made 26 trips. Out of these, as many as 15 trips involved night working. (iii) During this period, the Loco Pilot worked for 3 continuous nights (including 2 in WOCL) on 2 occasions. (iv) However, during the last 7 days preceding the accident, the Loco Pilot worked in the night on 6 occasions out of which 4 were in the Window of Circadian Low (WOCL). Thus, during the last 7 days, the Loco Pilot was given full night in bed only once. The analysis of these three cases amply brings out that the Loco Pilots operating these trains had been working - 129-
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