THE RECONSTRUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS Also by Robert Z. Aliber THE FUTURE OF THE DOLLAR AS AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY GUIDELINES, INFORMAL CONTROLS, AND THE MARKET PLACE (co-editor) THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE (editor) THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY GAME WORLD INFLATION AND MONETARY REFORM NATIONAL MONETARY POLICIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (editor) EXCHANGE RISK AND CORPORATE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONETARY REFORM (editor) YOUR MONEY AND YOUR LIFE MONEY BANKING AND THE ECONOMY (co-author) MONETARY REFORM AND WORLD INFLATION THE RECONSTRUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS Edited by Robert Z. Aliber Palgrave Macmillan ISBN 978-1-349-18515-3 ISBN 978-1-349-18513-9 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-18513-9 ©Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1987 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1987 978-0-333-39680-3 All rights reserved. For information, write: Scholarly & Reference Division, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010 First published in the United States of America in 1987 ISBN 978-0-312-66590-6 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Reconstruction of international monetary arrangements. Bibliography: p. l. International finance. l. Aliber, Robert Z. HG3881.R33 1987 332' .042 86-3758 ISBN 978-0-312-66590-6 Contents Notes on the Contributors vii z. Introduction by RoBERT ALIBER I PART I THE RECENT PAST The Evolving International Monetary System: Past Plans and Optimality 7 Herbert G. Grube/ 2 Unexpected Real Consequences of Floating Exchange Rates 21 Rachel McCulloch 3 Toward a More Orderly Exchange Rate System 46 Jacques R. Artus 4 The Wage and Price Adjustment Process in Six Large OECD Countries 70 Robert J. Gordon 5 Fixed Exchange Rates, Flexible Exchange Rates, or the Middle of the Road: a Re-examination of the Arguments in View of Recent Experience 92 Hans Genberg and Alexander K. Swoboda PART II INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AND INTERNATIONAL MONEY 6 Internationally Managed Money Supply 117 George M. von Furstenberg 7 Changing Perceptions of International Money and International Reserves in the World Economy 127 K. Alec Chrystal 8 Gold: Does it Provide a Viable Basis for the Monetary System? 151 Richard N. Cooper v vi Contents 9 Gold in the International Monetary System: a Catalog of the Options 168 Robert Z. Aliber I 0 Gold Monetization and Gold Discipline 183 Robert P. Flood and Peter M. Garber II Gold in the Optimal Portfolio 212 David A. Hsieh and John Huizinga 12 An Analysis of the Management of the Currency Composition of Reserve Assets and External Liabilities of Developing Countries 262 Michael P. Dooley 13 The Theory of the Lender of Last Resort and the Eurocurrency Markets 281 Jeffrey R. Shafer 14 The Endogeneity of International Liquidity 305 Peter M. Oppenheimer Index 324 Notes on the Contributors Robert Z. Aliber is Professor of International Economics and Finance at the University of Chicago. Jacques R. Artus is on the staff of the International Monetary Fund. K. Alec Chrystal is Professor of Economics at the University of Sheffield. Richard N. Cooper is Maurits Boas Professor of Economics at Harvard University. Michael P. Dooley is on the staff of the International Monetary Fund. Robert P. Flood is Professor of Economics at Northwestern University. Peter M. Garber is Professor of Economics at Brown University. Robert J. Gordon is Professor of Economics at Northwestern University. Herbert G. Grubel is Professor of Economics at Simon Fraser University. Hans Genberg is Professor of Economics at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs, Geneva. David A. Hsieh is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. John Huizinga is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. Rachel McCullough is Professor of Economics at Northwestern University. Peter M. Oppenheimer is Reader in Economics, Christ Church, Oxford. Jeffrey R. Shafer is with the Division of Monetary and Fiscal Affairs, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Alexander K. Swoboda is Professor of Economics at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs, Geneva. Georges M. von Furstenberg is the Rudy Professor of Economics, Indiana University. vii Introduction: The Reconstruction of International Monetary Arrangements ROBERT Z. ALIBER The agenda at conferences on policy issues in international finance tend to reflect the concern with the adequacy of existing monetary arrange ments. In July 1972, at the conclusion of the first Wingspread Conference on International Monetary Problems, one participant noted that the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates was breaking down and was beyond repair. Several other participants agreed; one suggested that the only alternative was a system of floating exchange rates. Although the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates had been patched in the context of the Smithsonian Agreement at the end of 1971 and the US dollar had been devalued by more than 10 per cent relative to the currencies of the other major industrial countries, the US balance of payments deficit remained extremely large. The British authorities had ceased supporting the pound at its Smithsonian parity several weeks before the Conference. By the time of the second Wingspread Conference in July 1974, the international economic environment had changed sharply. The cur rencies of the major industrial countries had been floating for more than a year, and the US dollar had depreciated sharply. The market price of gold was more than four times higher than two years before. The world price of oil had increased from $2.75 a barrel to $12.50 a barrel as a result of supply constraints adopted by Saudi Arabia and other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at the end of 1973. There was widespread concern whether many countries would be able to obtain the foreign exchange to finance their imports of oil. The I 2 Introduction United States and other industrial economies were experiencing a more rapid rate of inflation than at any previous time in the post-war period; the term 'double-digit inflation' had become part of the vocabulary. The amplitude of the movement of exchange rates during the first year's experience with the new system was large. Nevertheless, most analysts accepted the view that the adjustments of most countries' payments positions to the sharp increase both in the price of oil and in the foreign exchange cost of oil imports would be easier with floating exchange rates than with parities. After the move to floating rates, the United States eliminated many of the controls and restrictions on international payments that had been adopted in the 1960s to reduce the payments deficits associated with an increasingly overvalued dollar. Some analysts believed that the move ments in exchange rates might be less abrupt as participants in the foreign exchange market gained more experience with the new system. A few skeptics, in contrast, believed that floating rates would be unlikely to work satisfactorily, and that large swings in exchange rates would lead to increased demands for protection in those countries whose currencies were becoming increasingly overvalued. After nearly a decade, however, the sharpness and amplitude of the exchange rate movements has not led to the conclusion that the system of floating exchange rates has been operating effectively. In the late 1970s, the foreign exchange value of the US dollar was extremely low and the dollar was significantly undervalued. Foreign tourists trooped to the United States because of the substantial bargains. Some foreign central banks were reducing the proportion of dollar-denominated assets in their holdings of reserve assets and acquiring reserve assets denominated in some other currency. Considerable support was given to the proposal for a Reserve Substitution Account, which would be attached to the International Money Fund and acquire part or all of the excess dollar holdings from foreign central banks. By the early 1980s, however, the US dollar appeared strong and substantially overvalued. The price of the dollar in terms of the German mark and the Japanese yen had increased by nearly 50 per cent even though the price levels in both countries were rising less rapidly than the US price level. The international competitive position of US firms declined sharply; the US trade balance went from a surplus of $2 billion in 1975 to a deficit of $43 billion in 1982. As the dollar became increasingly overvalued, the demands for protection in the United States increased; monetary issues had important trade consequences. The movements on the foreign exchange value of the US dollar were
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