The Recognition of the Republic of Biafra

50 Pages·1968·1.698 MB·English

by  coll.

THE RECOGNITION
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA
OFFICE OF THE HEAD OF STATE AND
COMMANDER -IN -CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES
REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA
DT
515,61
R34
1968

Contents
Chapter Page
I. Introductory 1
...
II. Some notions and arguments dispelled and clarified 3
...
III. An appeal for a realistic approach to the resolution of the
Nigeria /Biafra conflict 19
IV. Conclusion 23
... ...
Appendix
I. The Attitude of Northern Nigeria to “Keeping Nigeria One" 25
...
II A. British Involvement in the Nigeria/Biafra Crisis and Conflict
1966–68 34
II B. Extract from the Hansard of the British House of Commons,
March 5, 1968: Nigeria 40
IIC. Statement by a Correspondent of the London “ Observer”,
March 11, 1968 42
ER
STANFORD LIBRARIES
INSTITUTION
܀
ܝ ܪܨܬܐ
Introductory
THE GENOCIDAL atrocities being perpetrated by Nigerians against Biafrans are
now stirring the conscience of mankind. Biafrans are deeply touched by the
sympathy and understanding which their cause is now gaining in your country
and other parts of Africa. Biafrans express their profound appreciation of all
the encouraging gestures hitherto made by your country and those other African
countries which have translated their sympathy and understanding into friendly
action.
Nigeria has however succeeded in prolonging the war and in bringing great
suffering and misery to Africa chiefly because the support which Biafra has re:
ceived so far has fallen short of Diplomatic Recognition. Such concrete action
is necessary if Nigeria's war of extermination is to be brought to an immediate
end. Biafrans appeal to your country and to those other countries in Africa
which believe that it is morally wrong for one group of people to seek to wipe
out another entirely from the face of the earth to come forward in the interest
of humanity and accord recognition to the Republic of Biafra, The justice of
Biafra's case amply warrants such a course of action.
Genocide expelled Biafrans from Nigeria
Biafrans are thoroughly convinced that only their separate political existence
can guarantee their basic needs of survival and security of life and property.
This conviction is the result of the bitter experience of over fifty years of close
association between Biafrans and Nigerians. In the colonial era, when Biafrans
(then Eastern Nigerians) relied on the might of Britain, they were massacred
and maimed and their property expropriated by Nigerians on several occasions
--the most terrible being those of 1945 and 1953.
In the Independence Constitution of Nigeria were incorporated the “Funda.
mental Rights” of citizens to freedom of movement and residence; of speech,
belief and association; of lawful ownership of property; and, above all the right
to safety and security of life. Independent Nigeria, as a member of that world
organization, also acceded to the United Nations Charter, the United Nations
Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on Genocide.
As a contracting party to the Charter of the Organization of African Unity,
Nigeria expressed consciousness of the fact that freedom , equality, justice and
dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations
of the peoples of Africa. Yet, in the six years of Nigerian independence and
three years of Nigeria's signing of the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity, Biafrans were denied many of these rights. In 1966, over 30,000 Biafrans
were massacred, maimed and molested, their property expropriated by Nigerians
with unexampled ferocity and periodicity — in May-June, July-August, and
SeptemberOctober, 1966. Two million deprived and dejected Biafrans were
forced to seek refuge in their homeland.
On none of these occasions did Biafrans obtain from the Central Government
of Nigeria protection of life and property or redress for wrongs suffered. Nor
did the perpetrators of these crimes express remorse or regret.
On May 30, 1967, Eastern Nigeria was proclaimed the sovereign and inde
pendent Republic of Biafra. As a signatory to the Charter of the Organization
of African Unity, Nigeria had expressed her conviction that it is the inalienable
right of all peoples to control their destiny. Yet, on July 6, 1967, Nigeria opened
hostilities against Biafra, It was, as Biafrans had feared, a continuation of the
earlier genocide. Although Nigeria subcribed to the Geneva Convention on the
Conduct of War, there have been wholesale massacres of Biafran civilians— men,
women and children — whereverNigerian soldiers have set foot in Biafra or in places
with Biafran sympathies. Numerous Biafran civilians in hospitals, churches, schools
and market places have been killed and wounded by the indiscriminate bombing and
strafing of non-military targets by Nigerian war planes. Nigerian soldiers have
abducted Biafran women and children from their homes to concentration camps
outside Biafra. Statements emanating sometimes from Lagos but more often
from the Northern Nigerian capital of Kaduna, the real seat of power in Nigeria,
clearly demonstrate that the purpose of the war is the extermination of Biafrans.
This is further confirmed by the remarks credited by foreign correspondents to
Nigeria's Field Commanders, who are mostly Northern Nigerians.
It was the prime necessity of survival that compelled Biafrans to seek refuge
in founding the sovereign and independent Republic of Biafra. Manifestly,
Biafrans and Nigerians cannot co-exist peacefully within the same political com
munity. No guarantees given now by Nigeria, either directly or through an
international organization, can assure Biafrans of the security of their funda
mental requirements. The recognition of Biafra will be the recognition of a
people struggling to resist annihilation by an avowed and inveterate enemy. It
will be a highly creditable public condemnation of genocide; a clearly positive
and constructive act in the cause of humanity.
2
Some Notions and Arguments Dispelled and
Clarified
Although many African countries have responded sympathetically to the
appeal of the Government and people of the Republic of Biafra for open support,
some of these countries have, however, sought the clarification of a number of
notions and arguments which are often put forward against the formal recognition
to this Republic.
These notions and arguments are of many kinds. The more important ones
are set out and examined below. It is our hope that friendly African Govern
ments will find that these notions have no real foundation and that they do not
constitute any valid grounds for opposing the formal recognition of Biafra.
A. The Stability of the former Federation of Nigeria
Many Africans were disappointed to see the former Federation of Nigeria
break up. We, Biafrans, were equally disappointed. We had, after all, struggled
over many decades to make the Federation work. Our disappointment is, however,
tempered by our knowledge of the realities of the Nigerian situation, which made
unity in that country impossible. We knew of the radical differences between
its peoples. We knew of the social and political differences between a feudal
Northern Nigeria and a democratic Eastern Nigeria. We knew of the differences
in educational and professional development which also derived in part from
earlier differences. We knew of the incessant struggle for political power at the
Centre with all the attendant conflicts and hostilities, aggravating an already
jaundiced relationship. We knew that the political arrangements bequeathed
to Nigeria by the British would give a section of the population its opportunity
to impose its political will on the rest of the country. It also offered a final
opportunity to that section to attempt the total extermination of another section
which was regarded as egalitarian, republican and "aggressive".
That the Federation of Nigeria survived its independence up to 1966 was
due mainly to the fact that the will to federate was strongest among the then
Eastern Nigerians who made concessions year after year to ward off the secession
ist threats of Northern Nigerians, whose speeches and statements in this respect
will be reproduced later.
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When, between May and September, 1966, Eastern Nigerians were massacred
with impunity on the 29th of every other month on the grounds merely that they
favoured the strengthening of the bond of union within the country, Eastern
Nigerians decided that they would have to look seriously at their own attitude
to an association which the other peoples of the country obviously did not wa
When the rebellious Government of Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon set up in Lagos in
July, 1966 refused even to express regret for the massacres, the will of Eastern
Nigerians to federate was finally killed.
Our disappointment, therefore, at the disintegration of Nigeria is a measured
one, based on our knowledgethat Nigeria was an incongruous political association
which remained so till it broke up.
B. The Origins of the Nigerian Crisis of 1966-67
It has sometimes been suggested that the Nigerian Crisis of 1966-67 had its
origins in the Revolution of January 1966. Nothing can be farther from the
truth. The 1966 Crisis was the culmination of a series of events and circum
stances which were inherent in the Nigerian political association itself. These
included: the absence of common beliefs and traditions, and the absence of a
general sense of community and solidarity; the initial non-voluntary transfer or
delegation of jurisdiction to a central authority; great disproportion in size,
population and development; inequality in status among the component units
and its members; and the Northern Nigerian policy of "domination or secession".
As a result of this inherent situation independent Nigeria was plagued by suc
cessive crises, each presaging the disintegration of the country. Prominent among
these crises were the Tiv Riots of 1960-66, the Western Nigeria Emergency of
1962, the National Census Controversy of 1962-63, the Federal Election Crisis
of 1964-65 and the Western Election Crisis of 1965-66. Indeed Nigeria came
to be notorious for her giddy brinkmanship.
The immediate cause of the Revolution of 1966 was the Western Election
Crisis of 1965-66. To many Nigerians it was the final test before despairing of
constitutional, political and economic reform. In the event the abuses went far
beyond the worst predictions of pessimists. A correspondent of the African
World, a London monthly, commented (March 1966):
“ The ruling party in the Western Region, by an alliance with its opposite
number in the North, (has) practically ended all hopes of effecting consti
tutional changes in the country by democratic means".
Law and order came to an end in Western Nigeria. The West Africa
Correspondent of the Economist of London summarized in these words the state
of affairs in Nigeria by January 15, 1966:
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" Three months after the disputed election, Western Nigeria shows no sign of
settling down to life under its disputed government, and the situation now
seriously threatens the prosperity of the region, the popularity of parliamen
tary institutions, and even the survival of the federation”.
C. The Nigeria-Biafra Conflict NOT the Internal Affair of Nigeria
Nigerian spokesmen have often asserted thạt the Nigeria - Biafra conflict is the
internal affair of Nigeria. This is a specious argument. The former Nigeria was
a federation of autonomous Regions each of which could resume its separate
political existence when the basis of association no longer existed.
Moreover Nigeria has blatantly violated international laws and conventions
as well as international obligations she voluntarily entered into. By her breach
of these conventions and obligations Nigeria has of necessity invited the attention
and interest of other countries to what has been happening in Nigeria1 and Biafra
over the last two years.
Furthermore, the Nigeria-Biafra conflict has already been internationalized
by the involvement of Britain and Russia. The details of this involvement will
be set out in later sections of this Memorandum.
Finally, the Organization of African Unity has shown such an interest in
the current Nigeria -Biafrawar as to appoint a Peace Mission to look into it.
D. The Attitude of Northern Nigeria to "Keeping Nigeria One"
Anyone who has followed the history of the political development of Nigeria
before and since Independence and is familiar with the Northern Nigerian attitude
towards a united Nigeria can easily see the present slogan of “Keeping Nigeria
One” for what it is: a false front being adopted temporarily to help Northern
Nigerians to consolidate their control of the federal political, military and econo
mic machine. Northern Nigerians mean to “Keep Nigeria One” in the service
of Northern Nigeria. Northern Nigerians will never abandon their traditional
policy of "domination or secession " as is illustrated in the extracts reproduced
in Appendix I.
E. Balkanization of African Countries
An argument often raised against the independence of Biafra is that the
success of this revolution will lead to the break-up of most of the countries of
Africa which, like the former Federation of Nigeria, are made up of several
tribal and ethnic groups. What are the bases of this argument?
(a) The argument assumes that every African country has had a history of
political conflict and tribal animosity such as Nigeria has had.
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COMMENT:
The fact that the boundaries of several African countries were arbitrarily
drawn by European countries and the fact that their populations vary in
ethnic origin and language do not necessarily reflect elements of instability.
Most of these countries have maintained a national outlook because:
(i) they have had a common colonial experience which now unites them
in their pursuit of a common independent future;
(ii) they have had the leadership to realize the necessity for the fullest
co-operation, respect and goodwill among all the groups represented
in the country;
(iii) they have realized that political power should not be used to exter
minate or even oppress a section of their population;
(iv) they do not believe that the unity of the country should be based
on common hatred of one section of the population by all the others.
(b) A second argument assumes that there has been as much breach of faith
in these countries as in Nigeria:
COMMENT:
Political and constitutional arrangements within a country are based on
the premise of good faith, on the assumption that all the sections of the
population will feel bound by the agreed arrangements and will not choose
to abrogate them at their own absolute discretion.
Where bad faith has been proved to be a characteristic habit of a section
of the population which, because of numbers or foreign support, has the
power to enforce its will and to seek to exterminate another section of the
population, the injured section has no other course open to it than a separate
political existence.
(c) A third argument gives the impression that the “ break-up ” of a country
is based on matters of precedent rather than of necessity:
COMMENT:
Political associations are like marriages. They bring with them responsi
bilities as well as advantages. In the case of most African countries the
political associations were “marriages” imposed by colonial powers. Never
theless, with time, these marriages began to have meaning. Over the
years, therefore, most African countries have tended to look more at the
advantages and privileges of the association than at the responsibilities and
difficulties. In the case of Nigeria, the people of present-day Biafra did
everything in their power to make a success of the Nigerian association.
Nigeria failed them.
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