The rationalism in Anil Gupta's Empiricism and Experience

15 Pages·2010·0.16 MB·English

PhilosStud(2011)152:1–15
DOI10.1007/s11098-009-9436-0
The rationalism in Anil Gupta’s Empiricism
and Experience
Karl Schafer
Publishedonline:1October2009
(cid:2)SpringerScience+BusinessMediaB.V.2009
Abstract In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist
account of the epistemic role of experience that Anil Gupta develops in his
Empiricism and Experience. First, I discuss the motivations Gupta offers for the
claimthatthegiveninexperienceshouldberegarded asreliable.Second, Idiscuss
two different ways of conceiving of the epistemic significance of the phenome-
nologyofexperience.Andthird,IdiscusswhetherGupta’saccountisabletodeliver
the anti-skeptical results he intends it to. I close by suggesting that, once fully
fleshedout,Gupta’saccountisbestunderstoodintermsofthefusionofcertaincore
ideas within both the empiricist and the rationalist traditions.
Keywords Gupta (cid:2) Empiricism (cid:2) Experience (cid:2) Epistemology (cid:2) Phenomenology (cid:2)
Skepticism
Surveying the literature on perceptual epistemology, it is easy to feel a sense of
intellectual exhaustion. Haven’t all of the options for thinking about these issues
already been enumerated? And haven’t they all been shown to have, if not fatal
flaws, then at least serious philosophical costs? Perhaps, as Hume suggested long
ago, the only solution to the challenge of perceptual skepticism lies in a certain
degree of careless inattention?
Anil Gupta’s Empiricism and Experience demonstrates that this sort of
philosophical fatigue is quite unwarranted.1 In its pages, Gupta develops a highly
1 Gupta(2006).
K.Schafer(&)
DepartmentofPhilosophy,1001CathedralofLearning,UniversityofPittsburgh,Pittsburgh,
PA15260,USA
e-mail:[email protected]
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2 K.Schafer
original and sophisticated account of the epistemic significance of experience—an
approach that deserves to be added to the inventory of basic alternatives that are
available to us in confronting them.
Fundamental to this approach is the idea that the epistemic contribution of an
experience is a conditional requirement to form certain beliefs given certain
background views. Thinking of experience in this way allows Gupta to preserve
manyofthekeycommitmentsoftraditionalformsofempiricism,whileresistingthe
pressure these commitments tend to generate towards a choice between skepticism
andidealism.Thus,thereisnothingexcessiveinGupta’sclaimtohavedevelopeda
new and attractive way of thinking through the epistemic consequences of these
basic empiricist ideals.
Because of its novelty, it is not always obvious how Gupta’s account relates to
morefamiliaraccountsoftheseissues.Thus,oneofmyaimsinthesecommentswill
be to explore the relationship between Gupta’s account of the epistemic role of
experience and other accounts of a generally empiricist spirit. In doing so,
inevitably I will suggest some ways in which Gupta’s account may not achieve
everything he claims it does. But whether or not the precise account offered in
EmpiricismandExperienceissuccessfulineveryrespectis,intheend,asecondary
issue. WhatismostexcitingaboutGupta’sworkisthemannerinwhichitexpands
the space of basic possibilities available to us as philosophers for thinking through
these questions.
1 Motivations for reliability
One of the core elements of Gupta’s empiricism is the requirementthat experience
be regarded as Reliable, or, in other words, that we accept that:
... the given in experience does not yield anything false or erroneous.2
The‘‘given’’isGupta’stermfortheepistemiccontributionofanexperience.So
Reliabilityisaverypowerfulprinciple,onethatmanyepistemologistswoulddeny.
Thus it is important to ask what motivates it.3
Traditionally,thedemandthattheepistemiccontributionofexperienceshouldbe
Reliablehasoftenbeenmotivatedbythe‘‘Cartesian’’thoughtthatthefoundational
elements of one’s system of beliefs should be beyond doubt. But Gupta, quite
rightly to my mind, is skeptical that the foundations of a rational system of beliefs
must have this character. Rather he believes that Reliability can be motivated
withoutanyappealtoaconnectionbetweenrationalityandcertainty.Thus,thefirst
thing I want to examine are the alternative motivations Gupta provides for this
principle.
2 Gupta(2006,p.27).
3 GuptabelievesthatevenanepistemologistwhorejectsReliabilityshouldfindhisaccountofexperience
attractive.Thismaywellbetrue,butthereisnodoubtthatReliabilityplaysacrucialroleinmanyof
Gupta’smostforcefulargumentsforhisposition.
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TheRationalisminAnilGupta’sEmpiricismandExperience 3
Gupta’s first motivation for Reliability rests on the claims that (a) experience is
passive and (b) one should never blame something that is passive for one’s
mistakes.4 Some might take issue with these claims, butI won’tpursue this line of
objectionhere.Rather,forthesakeofargument,I’mhappytoagreewithGuptaon
these points.
The question is whether this has the implications Gupta believes it does. In
particular, does the fact that we shouldn’t blame experience for our errors really
mean that experience should never be regarded as the epistemic source of these
errors?Or,inotherwords,ifweacceptthatweshouldn’tblameourexperiencesfor
our mistakes, does this mean that we should accept that the given in experience is
Reliable?
Intuitively,thereisagapbetweentheseclaims.Suppose,forexample,thatIhave
thesortofexperiencethatnormallymakesitseemtomethatthereisachairinfront
of me.5 And suppose that no such chair is in fact present. Finally, suppose that I
havenobeliefsorevidencethatconflictwiththeclaimthatthereisachairinfront
ofme.NormallyIwillrespondtothisstateofmindbyformingthebeliefthatthere
is a chair in front of me—thereby forming a false belief.
I agree with Gupta that I should not blame my experience for this error—for
given the nature of experience, blaming it seems to make little sense. But should I
instead blame my rational faculties or background views for my error? So long as
theythemselvesarerational,itseemstomethatIshouldnot.Rather,itseemstome
perfectly possible that both my views and my response to this experience may be
exactlyinaccordancewiththedemandsofrationality.Thus,fromtheperspectiveof
rationalityatleast,itispossiblethatnothingistoblameformymistakeinthiscase.
Rather,insuchcases,itseemsthatwemaysimplybethevictimofbruteepistemic
bad luck.
This,though,iswhollycompatiblewithviewingourexperiencesasthesourceof
my mistake in this case in the sense that is relevant to identifying the given in
experience.Afterall,asourceofinformationcanbethesourceofamistakenbelief
without being to blame for it.
To see why this is true, it is important to distinguish two different reasons why
somethingmightnotbetoblameforsomeproblemorerror.First,itmightnotbeto
blameforthisproblembecauseitwasnotthesourceofit.And,second,itmightnot
be to blame for this problem because, while it was the source of it, it is simply not
the sort of thing to which blame can reasonably be attached.
Ofthesetwo,passivityismostrelevanttothesecondasopposedtothefirst.6For
example, suppose one of my colleagues drops a piece of chalk out his window,
whichthenlandsonmyheadasIleavetheCathedralofLearning.Surely,itwould
4 Gupta(2006,pp.28–29).
5 Thissomewhattortureddescriptionoftheexperienceinquestionisnecessaryinordertoavoidtakinga
standonwhatexactlythecontentofthisexperiencesis.
6 Ofcourse,thereisasenseinwhichsomethingthatispassivecannotreallybethesourceofanything.
Thisisthesenseinwhich,say,onemightholdthatonlyactivesubstancescanbethecausalsourceofnew
events. But I take it that the sense of ‘‘epistemic source’’ that is relevant to determining the given in
experiencedoesnotcarrywithitthesesortsofdemands.
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4 K.Schafer
be silly of me to blame this piece of chalk for the bump on my head—after all, it
playedawhollypassiveroleintheeventsleadinguptomyinjury.Butthisdoesnot
mean that it was not one of the sources of my injury—rather, the chalk is not to
blameinthiscasesimplybecause,insofarasitispassive,itissimplynotthesortof
thing to which blame can reasonably be attached.
In just the same way, it appears to me that the most the passivity of experience
supportsistheclaimthatexperienceshouldnotbeblamedforourmistakesbecause
it is not the sort of thing to which blame can reasonably be attached. But this does
not mean that experience is not the source of our mistakes in the sense that is
relevant to identifying the given in experience. And so it does not mean that
experience is Reliable in Gupta’s sense.
The second motivation for Reliability that Gupta appeals to is the idea that
empiricists—as opposed to skeptics and rationalists—must accept it.
Gupta’s argument for this claim runs roughly as follows. Suppose we—as
empiricists—accept that experience is the highest epistemic authority. Then we
must either accept that experience is infallible (and soacceptReliability) oraccept
thatthejudgmentsthatoneexperiencesupportsmightsometimescomeintoconflict
withthejudgmentsanotherexperiencesupports.Thus,ifweareempiricistsandwe
reject Reliability, we must give an account of how we are to choose between two
different sets of experiences when they come into conflict in this way.
Why does Gupta believe that providing such an account will be problematic for
the empiricist? Gupta argues that the empiricist who rejects Reliability can only
giveasatisfactoryaccountofhowweshouldrespondtothesesortsofconflictsifhe
helpshimselftoanotionofcoherencebetweenperceptualbeliefsthatgoesbeyond
mere logical consistency. And Gupta worries that to help oneself to such a
‘‘substantive’’ notion of coherence would require one to covertly endorse a
particular substantive view of the world as a priori rational.7 Thus, Gupta suggests
thattheempiricistwhorejectsReliabilityisinafundamentallyunstableposition.In
ordertogiveasatisfactoryaccountofhowweshouldrespondtocasesinwhichour
experiences conflict with one another, he must accept a ‘‘substantive’’ notion of
coherence. But if he does so, he will betray his empiricist convictions.
The question I want to raise about this argument is whether it isn’t in fact
possible for such an empiricist to give an account of cases of experiential conflict
without appealing to a problematically substantive notion of coherence. In
particular, while it is true that giving an account of these cases will require more
than an appeal to coherence qua logical consistency, it appears to me that one can
accept a more robust notion of coherence than this without falling into the sort of
rationalism that Gupta finds problematic.
In particular, any empiricist—Gupta himself included—owes us an account of
the rationality of our general preference for sets of beliefs that are more
explanatorily coherent over sets of belief that are less. Of course, how to provide
suchanaccountisavexedissue.Butoncewehavesuchanaccountonthetable,as
7 Gupta(2006,pp.29–30).
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TheRationalisminAnilGupta’sEmpiricismandExperience 5
itseemswemust,italoneprovidesuswiththetoolsweneedtorespondtoGupta’s
challenge without endorsing Reliability.
Inparticular,supposethatourexperienceconsistssolelyoftwooverlappingsets
of experiences with the following two characteristics: (i) the beliefs each of these
sets justify (on their own) are logically consistent, and (ii) the beliefs that they
justify together are logically inconsistent.8 How should we choose which of these
twosetsofexperiencestoendorse?Well,takethesetofbeliefswewouldformifwe
acceptedthefirstsetofexperiencesandcompareitwiththesetofbeliefswewould
formifwe acceptedthe second.One oftwothings willbetrueofthese twosetsof
beliefs. First,oneofthemmayhave ahigherdegree ofexplanatorycoherence than
the other, in which case, I suggest, it is this set of beliefs we should accept. Or,
second, the degree of explanatory coherence possessed by the two sets of beliefs
maybeequal(orincommensurable),inwhichcaseitseemsplausiblethatweshould
simply suspend judgment concerning the cases in which they conflict.
Of course, this is at best a toy version of would have to be a much more
complicated account of these sorts of conflicts. But it seems to me to indicate that
givensuchanotionofexplanatorycoherence,wehavethetoolsweneedtorespond
to Gupta’s challenge, while staying true to the empiricist ideal, insofar as it is
attractive.
2 Phenomenology and the given
One of the virtues of Gupta’s account are the connections it draws between the
epistemicsignificanceofanexperienceandthephenomenologythisexperiencehas
for the subject. In particular, Gupta accepts the following:
Manifestation: The given in any experience must be manifested in that
experience; that is, it must depend systematically upon the subjective
character of that experience.9
Manifestationstatesthatthegiveninanexperienceissystematicallydetermined
by its subjective character. But in order to understand what this means, we need to
understandwhatthesubjectivecharacterofanexperienceis.AndhereGuptamakes
achoicethatsetshimapartfrommanycontemporaryphilosophersofanempiricist
bent.
To understand this difference of opinion, we need to distinguish two different
sensesinwhichwemightspeakofthesubjectivecharacterofanexperience.Or,in
otherwords,weneedtodistinguishtwodifferentsensesinwhichwemightspeakof
the way an experience makes things seem to the subject.
To get a handle on the first of these it is helpful, I think, to reflect on the way
experience seems to present the world to one when one first attends to it. When I
first introspect upon the subjective character of my current experience, it seems to
8 Obviouslymorecomplicatedcasesarepossible,butconsiderationofthiscaseshouldbesufficientfor
ourpurposeshere.
9 Gupta(2006,p.30).
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6 K.Schafer
presentmewitharichexperienceoftheworldaroundme.Forexample,rightnowit
seemstomethatthereisgreenfootstoolinfrontofmeonwhichmyfeetrest.Thus,
there is an immediate and obvious sense in which, given my current experience of
theworld,itseemstomethattheseobjects—footstools,feet,andthelike—arepart
ofmysurroundings.Tofixterms,let’scallthewaysthingsseemtomeinthissense
the Rich Subjective Character associated with my current experience.10
For many contemporary epistemologists, it is the Rich Subjective Character of
myexperience(orsomethinglikeit)thatdeterminesthegiveninexperience.Gupta
disagrees. When Gupta speaks of a connection between the subjective character of
anexperienceanditsgiven,hehasinmindafarthinnerandmoreminimalnotionof
subjective character than this one.
AccordingtoGupta,inadditiontothisrichnotionofthewaythingsseemtoone,
given one’s experience, we can isolate a far more minimal and more fundamental
notionofthewaythisexperiencemakesthingsseemtothesubject.Thisthinnerand
more basic notion of the subjective character of experience is such that it will not
involve it seeming to me that there is a foot or a footstool near me. Rather, the
subjectivecharacterofmyexperienceinthissensewillbeatmatteroftheway,say,
colors, shades, shapes, and the like are distributed in three-dimensional visual
space.11 In this sense, the subjective character of my experience is very limited
indeed.
Call this the Thin Subjective Character associated with my current experience.
AccordingtoGupta,itisthissortofsubjectivecharacteralone,asopposedtoRich
Subjective Character of my experience, that determines what my experience
justifies (i.e. the given associated with it). Thus, according to Gupta, insofar as the
Rich Subjective Character of my experience involves elements that are not
determined by its Thin Subjective Character, these elements are irrelevant to what
the given in this experience is.
AsImentionedabove,thisisacontroversialview,evengivenaninternalistform
of empiricism. For example, consider an epistemologist who believes that the
content of my present experience is a substantive proposition about the external
worldandwhobelievesthatthegiveninanexperienceisidenticalwithitscontent.
According to such an epistemologist, call him the Dogmatist, the epistemic
significance of my experience is determined, not by its Thin Subjective Character
alone, but by its Rich Subjective Character (where this includes elements that are
not determined by its Thin Subjective Character alone).12
In considering the proper development of empiricism in epistemology, it is
important to ask which of these two views of the epistemic role of experience we
shouldprefer.Inparticular,thereareatleasttwoquestionsweshouldaskaboutany
10 Ofcourse,thereisroomforconsiderabledebateaboutjusthowrichtheRichSubjectiveCharacterof
myexperienceis.Forexample,somephilosophersmightdoubtwhetherthefactthattheobjectmyfeet
arerestingonisafootstoolispartofthischaracter.AsmuchaspossibleIwanttoabstractawayfrom
theseissueshereinordertoconsiderthemoregeneraldistinctionbetweentheRichSubjectiveCharacter
ofanexperienceandwhatIwillcallitsThinSubjectiveCharacter.
11 Comparethefootnoteto32.
12 Views of this general flavor have been defended by a number of contemporary epistemologists.
NotableexamplesincludePryor(2000)andPeacocke(2004)
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TheRationalisminAnilGupta’sEmpiricismandExperience 7
view, like Gupta’s, that distinguishes between these two levels of subjective
character and focuses on our attention on the thinner of them:
(i) Do experiences have a Thin Subjective Character in the manner Gupta
suggests they do?
(ii) Iftheydo,isittheThinSubjective Characterofanexperience,asopposedto
its Rich Subjective Character, that determines its given in the manner
Manifestation claims?
Taking these questions in turn, Gupta seems to take it to be obvious that
experiences have a Thin Subjective Character which is distinct from their Rich
SubjectiveCharacter.Butwhilesuchaviewofexperienceisincrediblycommon,it
fitsawkwardlywithmyownfirst-personexperience.AsInotedbefore,whenIfirst
introspect, the subjective character of my own experience seems to me very rich
indeed. This, of course, does not conflict with the claim that my experience also
possesses a more basic sort of subjective character which lacks this richness. But
whenItrytofocusmyattentiononthisthinnersortofsubjectivecharacter,Iamnot
atallsurethatIamabletolocateitinmyownexperience.I,atleast,simplycannot
‘‘stripaway’’therichcontentofmyexperienceinthemannerIwouldhavetodoin
order toisolate itsthin subjectivecharacter. Atmost,Ican pretend tomyselfthatI
am, say, viewing a painting which depicts the scene that occupies my visual field.
ButevenwhenIdothis,thesubjectivecharacterofmyexperiencestillinvolvesthe
presentation of a rich content.
Thus,itseemstomethatinsofarasIhaveinternal,non-inferentialawarenessof
the subjective character of my experience, it only has a subjective character in one
sense—namely, it has a Rich Subjective Character. Of course, one element of this
Rich Subjective Character may be the way in which colors, etc are distributed in
visualspace.ButthisissimplyoneelementofitsRichSubjectiveCharacteramong
many.
Inthisway,thesubjectivecharacterofmyconsciousexperience seemstometo
begin and end with a rich experience of external objects around me (among other
things). Of course, the introspective reports I am making now conflict with the
reports that many philosophers, including Gupta, make about the subjective
character of their experience. So perhaps all that these reports indicate is that my
introspective powers are lacking in certain crucial respects. But I do think there is
somereasontobeskepticalabouttheverynotionofsubjectivecharacterthatGupta
is appealing to in his characterization of Manifestation.13
For obvious reasons, I am doubtful that these sorts of considerations will have
much force for Gupta. So let’s suppose that it does make sense to speak of the
13 Couldn’tweextractanotionoftheThinSubjectiveCharacterofexperiencefromthenotionofthe
RichSubjectiveCharacterofexperiencesimplybydefininganappropriateequivalencerelationonthe
space of Rich Subjective Characters? Of course, we could. In fact, any number of such equivalence
relations are possible. The question here is whether any of them have deep phenomenological or
epistemological significance.In particular,it seemsto me thatany attemptto define a notionofThin
SubjectiveCharacterbysuchmeanswillleaveoutofthepicturesomeelementsoftheRichSubjective
Characterthatmakeanessentialcontributiontothephenomenologyofmyexperience.Soifouraimisto
completelycapturethefirst-personphenomenologyofmyexperience,itisitsRichSubjectiveCharacter,
andnotanysuchthinnernotion,thatweshouldfocuson.
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8 K.Schafer
subjectivecharacterofexperienceinboththesesenses—andconsiderwhichsortof
subjective character should be taken to be directly relevant to the given in
experience.
Inordertothinkaboutthis,consideronceagainanordinarysubjectwhohasthe
sort of experience that would normally make it seem to him that there is chair in
front of him, and whose background views do not give him any reason to believe
otherwise.Aswenotedabove,thissubjectwillnormallycometobelievethatthere
is a chair in front of him in response to this state of mind.
Whatarethegroundsonwhichthisbeliefrests?Anaturalanswertothisquestion
is that this belief is based on the fact that the subject’s experience made it seem to
himthattherewasachairinfrontofhim.Forsurelyifweaskedthesubjecttocite
the grounds on which he formed this belief, he would respond that he formed it
simply because of the way things seemed to him perceptually.
Sofar,thereisnothinginthisresponsethatconflictswithGupta’sunderstanding
ofthiscase.Afterall,accordingtoGupta’sview, themannerinwhich thingsseem
to one in this rich sense is the product of the interaction between one’s experience
(in the thin sense) and one’s background views. Thus, Gupta could accept that the
subjectiscorrectinhisdescriptionofthegroundsonwhichhisbeliefisbased,and
still claim that his belief is ultimately based on both his experience (in the thin
sense) and his background views.
Still, given that ordinary subjects simply cite the Rich Subjective Character of
their experiences as the basis for their beliefs, it is natural to ask why we should
think of the grounds behind their beliefs in the more complicated manner Gupta
suggests.Whatordinarysubjectsseemtotakeasepistemicallysignificantisnotthe
Thin Subjective Character associated with their experiences (plustheir background
views).Rather,whenaskedtodescribethegroundsonwhichtheirbeliefsrest,they
are liable to simply cite the way in which their experiences make things seem to
them, where this is identical with the Rich Subjective Character of their
experiences. So why should we not simply identify the given in their experience
with the Rich Subjective Character associated with them?
Oneanswertothisquestionwouldbethat,byseeingthegivenasdeterminedby
theThinSubjectiveCharacteroftheirexperiences,wecanpreserveReliability.But
whatifwedonotwanttojoinGuptainacceptingReliability,asIhavesuggestedwe
should not?
A further motivation for thinking of the epistemic significance of experience in
the manner Gupta suggests might bethe following.Gupta plausiblyclaims that the
Rich Subjective Character of my experiences is determined in part by my
background views. And of course, it is possible that the relevant elements of my
background views might themselves be irrational. When this is the case, Gupta
might argue, it would be irrational for us to take the Rich Subjective Character of
our experience at face value. For in doing so, we would be implicitly basing our
belief on our irrational background views. And a belief that is based on irrational
beliefs is generally itself irrational. Thus, Gupta might argue, it is important to
separate the given in experience from the contribution that my background views
make to the Rich Subjective Character associated with that experience.
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TheRationalisminAnilGupta’sEmpiricismandExperience 9
The problem with this line of response is that we do not need to separate the
giveninexperiencefromitsRichSubjectiveCharacterinordertoaccommodatethe
phenomenajustdescribed,atleasttosomedegree.Afterall,whileaepistemologist
like the Dogmatist may understand the given in experience to be determined by its
Rich Subjective Character, this need not imply that he believes that we are always
entitled to take the Rich Subjective Character of our experiences at face value.
Rather,anyplausibleviewofthissortwillallowthatthisentitlementisdefeasible.
And one possible source of defeat for this entitlement will likely be the sorts of
considerations we are discussing.
Inparticular,someoneliketheDogmatistcanunderstandthegiveninexperience
tobedeterminedby itsRich Subjective Character,while alsotaking someorallof
thefollowingfactstobedefeatersforone’sentitlementtotaketheRichSubjective
Character of one’s experiences at face value:
(i) This entitlement might be defeated by a (rational) belief that the Rich
Subjective Character of one’s experience is the product of irrational
background beliefs.
(ii) Itmightbedefeatedbythefactthat,givenone’sevidence,oneshouldbelieve
that the Rich Subjective Character of one’s experience is the product of
irrational background beliefs.
(iii) It might even be defeated simply by the fact that the Rich Subjective
Characterofone’sexperiencesistheproductofirrationalbackgroundbeliefs
in certain ways.14
Differentepistemologistsofthisgeneralsortwillbeinclinedtoendorsedifferent
combinationsoftheseclaims,dependingontheirepistemologicalintuitions.Butthe
important point here is that it will be possible to accommodate many intuitions
aboutcasesofthesesorts,inthecontextofaviewthattakesthegiveninexperience
tobedeterminedbyitsRich Subjective Character,bybuildingthese intuitionsinto
one’s account of defeat.
As such, wehave before ustwobasic views oftheepistemicroleofexperience.
On the one hand, we have Gupta’s view, according to which the given in an
experience is determined by its Thin Subjective Character alone—a view which
leadsnaturallytotheideathatexperiences(ontheirown)generateonlyconditional
entitlements. And then we have views according to which we have a categorical
entitlement to take the Rich Subjective Character of experience at face value, but
wherethisentitlementmaydefeatedbyvariousfurtherfactsaboutourmentalstate.
Which of these views should we prefer? One reason to prefer the latter view,
which we have already noted, is that it appears to fit more naturally with the way
ordinary subjectsconceive of the epistemic role of their experiences. Butthisis, at
best, a fairly weak reason for preferring one of these views to the other.
Abettergroundtopreferoneofthemmightwellbethefollowing.Accordingto
theDogmatist’sview,wemightsay,the‘‘burdenofproof’’restswiththedefeating
14 Including this last option as a possible way in which defeat might function begins to blur the
distinctionbetweenviewsofthissortandviewsofthesortofGuptaendorses.ButI’mnotconvincedthat
thisisunhelpful—sinceitseemstomethatthelinebetweenthesedifferentsortsofviewsisnotasclear
asitmightatfirstseem.
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10 K.Schafer
considerations. Whereas on Gupta’s view, the opposite is the case. In other words,
thesetwoviewstakeopposingviewsofwhatyourdefaultepistemicrelationshipto
the Rich Subjective Character of your experience is. For Gupta, we need to be
positively rational or justified in having the background views we do, in order to
taketheRichSubjectiveCharacterofourexperiencesatfacevalue.Whereasforthe
Dogmatist, we may take the Rich Subjective Character of our experiences at face
value, so long as there is nothing about our background views that defeats this
entitlement. So, structurally, the Dogmatist takes a more permissive view of our
relationship to the way things seem to us in experience
Different epistemologists will have different intuitions about which of these
views is more plausible. One of the main complaints about views of a Dogmatist
stripe is that they make certain kinds of perceptual knowledge too easy to acquire.
So if one takes these complaints seriously, it may seem that Gupta’s view has the
advantage here. On the other hand, if one takes very seriouslythe idea ofa default
entitlement to trust the way things seem to one, then Dogmatism may seem more
attractive than Gupta’s view.
Inanycase,byrequiringthatourbackgroundviewsbepositivelyrationalbefore
we can take the Rich Subjective Character of experience at face value, Gupta is
closer torationalism than the Dogmatist. ForGupta, but for not the Dogmatist, our
entitlement to trust the Rich Subjective Character of our experiences rests on the
positive rationality of our background views.
3 Rationality and convergence
Guptaaimstogiveusanaccountofperceptualjustificationthatisanti-skeptical.In
particular, he wants to give us an account that delivers the result that we have a
rational obligation (under normal circumstances) to respond to experience in a
normal, non-skeptical manner. I agree that this is the proper standard for an anti-
skeptical perceptual epistemology. But does Gupta have the materials to deliver
such an account?
As Gupta recognizes, his account will only be able to deliver an anti-skeptical
result if he imposes some restrictions on where a rational subject can begin the
process of belief revision. In particular, if certain initial views are allowed to be
rational, then even given an infinite sequence of ‘‘normal’’ experiences, it will (on
Gupta’s view) remain rationally permissible to adopt a skeptical attitude towards
one’sexperiences.Andthis,givenhisanti-skepticalambitions,isplainlysomething
Gupta wishes to rule out.15
More precisely, in order for Gupta’s account to generate the desired result, it
mustbethe casethatif westart with anadmissible view and subjectthisview toa
normal sequence of experiences we will (in the long run) be led to a view of the
world that has us respond to experience in a normal, non-skeptical manner. Or, in
otherwords,ifGupta’sviewistodeliverthedesiredanti-skepticalresult,itmustbe
the case that all the revision processes that begin with an admissible view and
15 Gupta(2006,p.103).
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