The Purge of Dutch Quislings: Emergency Justice in the Netherlands

207 Pages·1952·4.492 MB·English

by  Henry L. Mason (auth.)

THE PURGE OF DUTCH QUISLINGS
THE PURGE OF DUTCH QUISLINGS
EMERGENCY JUSTICE IN THE NETHERLANDS
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY, IN THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
BY
HENRY L. MASON
•
THE HAGUE
MARTIN US NljHOFF
1952
Copyright I95z by Martinus Nijholf, The Hague, Netherlands
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
ISBN 978-94-011-8704-6 ISBN 978-94-011-9532-4 (eBook)
DOl 10.10071978-94-011-9532-4
TO THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE RESISTANCE
IN THE GELDERSE ACHTERHOEK
PREFACE
This study is based on research which I conducted in the
Netherlands in 1948 and 1949. In addition, I was able to rely on
experiences and impressions of the 1944-1946 period, when I
was stationed in the Low Countries as a United States Army
Military Intelligence Officer. In my description of Dutch purge
measures I have attempte~ to be as unbiased a judge as possible;
whenever I was unable to arrive at a definite conclusion I con
tented myself with describing the opposing points of view. I am
quite aware that this attitude of "neutrality" may be criticized,
not only by many ex-Resistance men who have become dis
gusted with the alleged softness of the purge, but also by many
others who appear equally dismayed about its severity.
For purposes of comparison, readers who are familiar with
action against collaborators in other countries - such as France,
Italy, or the Balkans - may note that the Dutch purge was not
dominated by considerations of party politics. All Dutchmen -
employers and workers, Protestants and Catholics, Conservatives
and Socialists - had been united in their resistance against the
enemy. Consequently, disagreements about purge measures did
not follow class, religious, or party lines. The few Dutch Commu
nists had never been able to dominate the Resistance; neither
were they able to exploit the purge for their purposes. Thus, in
Holland problems of collaboration and purge could be studied
in their purest form, without consideration of other factors.
Outside the Netherlands, this was only possible in Denmark
and Norway.
Unfortunately, two extremely important publications appeared
too late to be incorporated in this book. One of these, the fifth
report of the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, deals among
other things with problems of the first days after Liberation, and
with conditions in internment camps. The other, the report of
the Donner Commission, contains suggestions for changes in
x PREFACE
the Dutch Penal Code to provide for proper punishment of
crimes of collaboration in the event of a new occupation.
I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. J. M. van Bemmelen
and his assistants at the Modderman Institute of Leiden Uni
versity; to Prof. W. P. J. Pompe and Prof. G. Th. Kempe of
Utrecht University; to librarians at the Palace of Peace at The
Hague and the Netherlands State Institute of War Documenta
tion at Amsterdam; and to various government officials at The
Hague. This study could not have been completed without
their cooperation. Furthermore, I am especially indebted to
Mr. J. Le Poole, formerly Director of the Stichting Toezicht
Politieke Delinquenten, and to Mr. L. H. C. Hulsman, of the
Netherlands War Department; these two jurists were kind
enough to comment on my manuscript. My particular thanks
also go to Miss A. Adama van Scheltema, of Leiden and The
Hague, whose secreterial assistance was skillful and devoted.
Finally, I am deeply grateful to Prof. F. L. Neumann, of Colum
bia University, not only for his assistance with the writing of
this dissertation, but also for his lectures, which his former
students will not easily forget. Needless to say, none of the
above persons are responsible for any of the facts or opinions
expressed here 1.
This study is dedicated to the men and women of the Re
sistance in the beautiful region of the Netherlands known as the
Gelderse Achterhoek. The knowledge of their loyalty and
heroism in the struggle against the Nazi type of totalitarianism
is but one of many reasons why I will always be devoted to the
land of Grotius and Rembrandt.
Washington, D. C., August 1951. HENRY L. MASON
1 Similarly, the author is responsible for the translation of all quotations which
were onginally in Dutch, Flemlsh, French, or German.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pg.
I. THE PATTERN OF COLLABORATION. . . .
THE SPIRIT OF JUNE 1940. . . . . . . . . . . .
POLITICAL COLLABORATION: THE DUTCH NATIONAL
SOCIALIST PARTY (N.S.B.) • • • 6
MILITARY COLLABORATION. 20
ECONOMIC COLLABORATION. 26
COLLABORATION BY CIVIL SERVANTS 34
II. THE MASS ARRESTS OF COLLABORATORS
AFTER THE LIBERATION .... 40
REASONS FOR THE MASS ARRESTS • • • • • • 41
CATEGORIES OF COLLABORATORS AFFECTED BY THE
MASS ARRESTS.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 43
AGENCIES PERFORMING THE ARRESTS • • • • 45
THE INTERNMENT CAMPS FOR COLLABORATORS 48
RULES FOR PRE-TRIAL RELEASE OF ARRESTED COLLAB-
ORATORS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 53
A BY-PRODUCT OF THE MASS ARRESTS: LOOTING AND
CONFISCATION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 56
III. JUDICIAL ACTION AGAINST COLLABO-
RATORS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 58
THE SPECIAL COURTS AND THE SPECIAL COURT OF CAS-
SATION •••••••••••••••• 59
THE TRIBUNALS 69
THE SYSTEM OF OUT-OF-COURT-SETTLEMENT • 79
IV. THE OCCUPATIONAL PURGE BOARDS 85
THE CONCEPT OF ZUIVERING • • • • • • 85
THE PURGE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. • • 88
XII TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pg
THE PURGE OF JUDGES 93
PURGE BOARDS FOR ECONOMIC COLLABORATION 97
PURGE BOARDS FOR THE PRESS • • • • • 104
PURGE BOARDS FOR ARTISTS • • • • • • • • 112
PURGE BOARDS FOR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS • • 117
OCCUPATIONAL PURGE BOARDS: GENERAL CRITICISM 120
V. REACTIONS TO THE PURGE 123
LEGAL ASPECTS 123
GENERAL CRITICISM. • • • • • • 134
VI. RE-EDUCATION AND RETURN INTO SOCIETY 140
RE-EDUCATION IN INTERNMENT CAMPS • • 140
RETURN INTO SOCIETY 149
VII. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 158
NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES 164
INDEX ................... . 194
CHAPTER I
THE PATTERN OF COLLABORATION
THE SPIRIT OF JUNE 1940
The successful German campaigns of spring 1940 - the Blitz
victories over Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, France, and
the defeat of a large part of the British army - had a tremendous
psychological effect on the populations of the defeated countries.
It is probably not unfair to state that in June 1940 a considerable
part of the public in the occupied areas believed that Germany
had won ultimate victory, and that the only possible policy was
to adapt oneself to the fait accompli of a Pax Hitleriana on the
continent. As Mr. Paul Struye, a post-war Belgian Minister of
Justice observed:
The first contacts between Germans and Belgians, in May
June 1940, in the days following the disastrous Eighteen
Day Campaign and the Fall of France, were characterized by
a general desire to normalize the fait accompli: The tide of
the German motorized armies had swept on so overwhelm
ingly, so irresistibly, the confusion in the minds of the
people was so general and the feeling of powerlessness so
crushing, that for the great majority of the Belgian popula
tion, the Third Reich had irretrievably won an ultimate and
total victory .... It was commonly thought that the war
was finished for Belgium 1.
At the same time, to the surprise of everyone, the behavior of
the first German troops was generally acknowledged to be
excellent:
The behavior of the first occupation troops facilitated the
reconciliation so much desired by the Nazi authorities. The
attitude of the troops toward the Belgians was indisputably
correct. Their discipline was perfect, their conduct sporting.
Dutch Quislings
2 THE PATTERN OF COLLABORATION
The Belgians could not find in these soldiers who were
handsome and spontaneously friendly, who abstained from
any kind of extortion and violence, any resemblance to the
loathsome mercenaries of the Kaiser's army 2.
And a Dutch source attested:
Thus, the Dutch, some of whom had even killed them
selves rather than face the known horrors of Nazi persecu
tion and concentration camps, suddenly found themselves
confronted with the spectacle of orderly, disciplined, and
extremely well-behaved German troops who molested no
one, not even Jews, burned no books, erected no concen
tration camps, and, in fact, avoided unnecessary inter
ference with the ideology, the administration, and normal
day-to-day life of the people .... Thousands of Dutchmen
were forced to confess to themselves that, after all, the Nazis
were not half so bad as they had been painted 8.
Even Dr. Seyss-Inquart, the Reich Commissar for the occupied
Netherlands, sounded not unreasonable in the beginning. He
promised German non-interference in Dutch affairs, except in
strictly military matters. Furthermore, he predicted a new
"Golden Century" for Holland, comparable to its seventeenth
century. There was to be a practically free exchange of goods
between the Reich and Holland. Dutch truck gardening, horti
culture, the cattle and dairy industry, and shipping supposedly
were to face a boom 4.
The apparent certainty of German victory, the witnessed
confusion and suspected bungling of democracy, and the excel
lent first impression of the Germans served to smother thoughts
of resistance. Minister Struye characterized the period of June
1940:
. .. It appeared to be the only realistic ... attitude to
rally quickly around the victor .... Perhaps two-thirds of
the Belgian population gave the impression of agreeing
with the 'New Order', or, at least, of having resigned them
selves to it. It is permissible to believe that if the Germans
had selected this moment to declare solemnly that they
intended to keep the King on the throne, to make peace
with the Belgians, and to grant her a degree of independence
along Slovak lines, the great majority of the public would