THE PROPOSED U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENT TO IRAQ: WHAT WILL BE IN IT AND SHOULD IT BE ATREATY?

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by  Committee on Foreign Affairs

THE PROPOSED U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENT TO
IRAQ: WHAT WILL BE IN IT AND SHOULD
IT BE A TREATY?
JOINT HEARING
BEFORETHE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT
ANDTHE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OFTHE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JANUARY 23, 2008
Serial No. 110–151
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
(
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TOM LANTOS, California, Chairman
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American DAN BURTON, Indiana
Samoa ELTON GALLEGLY, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
ADAM SMITH, Washington MIKE PENCE, Indiana
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GENE GREEN, Texas J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California CONNIE MACK, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
RUBE´N HINOJOSA, Texas MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York TED POE, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina LUIS G. FORTUN˜O, Puerto Rico
LINDA T. SA´NCHEZ, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JIM COSTA, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
ROBERT R. KING, Staff Director
YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director
(II)
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts, Chairman
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
CLIFF STAMMERMAN, Subcommittee Staff Director
NATALIE COBURN, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
PHAEDRA DUGAN, Republican Professional Staff Member
ELISA PERRY, Staff Associate
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York, Chairman
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
JIM COSTA, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
RON KLEIN, Florida J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
BRAD SHERMAN, California JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas VACANT
DAVID ADAMS, Subcommittee Staff Director
HOWARD DIAMOND, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
GREGORY MCCARTHY, Republican Professional Staff Member
DALIS BLUMENFELD, Staff Associate
(III)
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C O N T E N T S
Page
WITNESSES
Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D., Specialist in Middle East Affairs, Foreign Affairs,
Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service ......................... 12
Michael Rubin, Ph.D., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Sen-
ior Lecturer, Center for Civil Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate
School .................................................................................................................... 36
Michael J. Matheson, Esq., Visiting Research Professor of Law, The George
Washington University Law School.................................................................... 41
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 15
Michael Rubin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 39
Michael J. Matheson, Esq.: Prepared statement .................................................. 44
(V)
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THE PROPOSED U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENT
TO IRAQ: WHAT WILL BE IN IT AND
SHOULD IT BE A TREATY?
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2008
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT
AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST
AND SOUTH ASIA,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William D.
Delahunt (chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organi-
zations, Human Rights, and Oversight) presiding.
Mr. DELAHUNT. The joint hearing of the Subcommittee on Over-
sight and the Subcommittee on the Middle East will come to order.
I would like to thank my distinguished colleague, Chairman Acker-
man, for agreeing to this joint hearing, and on behalf of myself and
my good friend, the ranking member from California, Mr. Rohr-
abacher, I welcome the gentleman from New York and his distin-
guished ranking member, Mr. Pence, who I understand is on his
way.
I would also note the presence of the gentlelady from Con-
necticut, Ms. DeLauro, who has introduced legislation dealing with
the subject of this hearing, and I ask unanimous consent that she
and any other Member attending today’s hearing be permitted to
act as a member of the subcommittee for the purpose of taking tes-
timony and asking questions. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
The multitude of potential commitments embraced by the so-
called ‘‘Declaration of Principles’’ signed by President Bush and
Prime Minister al-Maliki on November 22nd of last year have pro-
found consequences for the United States and the American people.
This hearing will, in part, examine those proposed commitments
and assess whether congressional approval is required in order for
them to become legally binding.
However, let me be perfectly clear. The White House should be
on notice that, as a prerequisite to any agreement making the kind
of commitments enumerated in the Declaration of Principles, Con-
gress must be an integral part of the discussions and negotiations
from the beginning.
What we have heard from the administration regarding the proc-
ess by which the United States would make such momentous com-
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mitments; well, the only comment to date has come from a re-
sponse to a question at a press conference by General Douglas
Lute, the deputy national security adviser for Iraq and Afghani-
stan. General Lute said that he does not, and these are his words,
‘‘anticipate now that these negotiations will lead to the status of a
formal treaty, which would then bring us to formal negotiations or
formal inputs from the Congress.’’
I, for one, could not disagree more. Where have we ever entered
an agreement to defend a foreign country from external and inter-
nal attack that was not a treaty? This could very well implicate our
military forces in a full-blown civil war in Iraq.
If a commitment of this magnitude does not rise to the level of
a treaty, then it is difficult to imagine what could. Now, I have tre-
mendous respect for General Lute. He and his family have served
this country well, and that is why I invited him, as well as other
witnesses from the Defense and State Department, to be here today
to explain the administration’s position, but I am cognizant of the
fact that General Lute is a soldier and not an international treaty
attorney and that there are others above his pay grade that are re-
sponsible for ultimate decisions.
It should be noted for the record that, in addition to General
Lute, invitations to this hearing were extended to Eric Edelman,
the under secretary of defense for policy; John Bellinger, III, the
State Department legal adviser; and Ambassador David Satterfield,
the State Department special coordinator for Iraq. All four invita-
tions were declined.
Now, many of us are aware of the propensity of this administra-
tion to interpret and expand executive power to a point never con-
templated by the Founding Fathers. The voluminous, so-called
‘‘signing statements’’ issued by the White House are testimony to
that attitude.
Senator Hagel, our Republican colleague in the other body, has
said that, during the runup to vote to authorize the invasion of
Iraq, the Bush administration considered Congress to be, and,
again, these are his words, ‘‘an enemy and a constitutional nui-
sance.’’
Well, this is a different Congress. I find it particularly disturbing
that the Bush administration has even ignored State Department
regulations requiring that, and, again, this is language excerpted
from their regulations, ‘‘the appropriate congressional leaders and
committees are advised of the intention to significant new inter-
national agreements, consulted concerning such agreements, and
kept informed of developments affecting them, including, espe-
cially, where any legislation is considered necessary or desirable for
the implementation of a treaty or agreement. These regulations
specifically state that when it comes to questions about whether or
not an agreement is to be considered a treaty, consultations are to
be held with Congress in which . . .’’ and, again, this is language
taken from the State Department regulations, ‘‘every practical ef-
fort will be made to identify such questions at the earliest possible
date so that consultations may be completed in sufficient time to
avoid last-minute consideration.’’
I have inquired of our leadership on this committee and the
House leadership, and I can find no evidence that any of this has
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occurred. This is disturbing, for considerable American blood and
treasure have been invested in this war, a war that has devastated
Iraq, divided America, diminished how we are viewed by the rest
of the world, as well as jeopardized our reputation for decency and
the rule of law.
If you have any doubts about the war’s impact on our economy,
check your stock market portfolio.
As I said before, this is a different Congress. Not just the Bush
administration, but the Maliki government, must understand that
reality and that Congress has a constitutional role to play in inter-
national agreements of such a magnitude and that we intend to en-
sure that our constitutional prerogatives are fully respected.
Furthermore, we are not unaware that many respected experts
on Iraq have characterized the Maliki government as dysfunctional
and beset by corruption and factionalism.
Our hearing in December elicited testimony that the Maliki gov-
ernment secured the extension of the U.N. mandate, which serves
as the legal basis for United States troops to occupy and engage in
combat in Iraq, without receiving the consent of the Iraqi Par-
liament, despite assurances to the contrary.
We encourage the Maliki government to engage the Iraqi Par-
liament fully in deliberations on the so-called ‘‘Declaration of Prin-
ciples.’’ But we recognize that the Parliament is the only directly
elected body in the nascent democracy in Iraq.
Before I introduce our witnesses, let me turn to my ranking
member and the chairman and the ranking member of the Middle
East Subcommittee, as well as our guest, the gentlelady from Con-
necticut, and I note that we are joined by a member of the Middle
East Subcommittee, Mr. Scott, as well, for any opening remarks
they care to make, and the gentlelady from California, who has
also joined us, Ms. Woolsey. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I guess we are surrounded by chairmen
today.
Mr. DELAHUNT. This is the chairmen’s day.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I do not want any of you to mistake me with
Ron Paul because of the sign here.
Mr. Chairman, welcome back. It is always an interesting and, I
might say, pleasant experience for those of us who like to play
mental chess, coming to hearings under your leadership. Two
months ago, President Bush and Prime Minister al-Maliki signed
a document called the ‘‘Declaration of Principles for Long-tern Re-
lationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of
Iraq and the United States of America,’’ and that pact states that,
by July 31st of this year, Iraq and the United States will have an
agreement that will detail the relationship between our two coun-
tries.
The Declaration of Principles makes it clear that such an agree-
ment will involve a commitment on the part of the United States
to defend Iraq against internal or external attack on its security
and its democratic government. The question that we will address
in today’s hearing is, does such an agreement rise to the level of
a treaty, which would need the ratification, legally require the rati-
fication, by the United States Senate, as well as the Counsel of
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Representatives in Iraq, or would this simply be a bilateral agree-
ment, and thus solely an executive branch function?
So we are talking about the legal realities, which would mandate
certain legal prerequisites in terms of actions taken by the legisla-
tive branch versus the executive branch.
Let me note, I will be looking closely at what we are hearing
today, in terms of the argumentation, on this specific issue, and I
think it is good that you brought this up, and it is something that
we need to discuss, especially considering the nature of governance
of this particular administration.
Let me just note that I believe that this administration has been
arrogant. I am a Republican, and, at times, I am embarrassed by
the lack of cooperation that this President and his appointees have
had with the legislative branch. I sat in that chair just a few
months ago, and the lack of cooperation that we had with various
leaders from this administration was overwhelming.
There is a seething resentment by Members of Congress who are
Republicans by the fact that this administration has not even co-
operated with us, much less with you, who represent another party.
So there are ways of doing things, and there are other ways of
doing things, and I think this administration has had its share of
arrogance, and it is something that breeds the type of discussions
that are necessary today. We have to look with a magnifying glass
at what the legal prerequisites are because we do not have a spirit
of cooperation.
I cannot tell you how many times we have had to make requests
on investigations, over the time period when I was chairman of this
subcommittee, and got no cooperation whatsoever and got nothing
but roadblocks in the way of those investigations. That does not
lead one to have faith in the descriptions that are given to us sec-
ondhand and thirdhand, and assurances given to us by senior
members of this administration.
However, with that said, let me note that I do reject the notion
that Congress has not been involved in the debate over what our
Iraq policy should be. There have been numerous votes, numerous
hearings, such as this one. In the United States Senate, there was
vote after vote that has failed in an attempt by the now majority
party in the Senate to remove American military personnel from
Iraq.
I would suggest that the minute that it is possible for us to with-
draw our troops, meaning that the Iraqi people are capable of de-
fending themselves, we should do so. If there is any suggestion that
there is a long-term commitment by the United States to send our
military personnel back to Iraq or to do the fighting for the Iraqi
people themselves, which is what is happening now, and, hopefully,
we are winding that down, and the Iraqi people who believe in a
more democratic society will step up, and are stepping up, to han-
dle that responsibility.
But the minute they can do that, we should be out of there, and
they should be doing their own fighting, and they should not feel
that the United States is on call to send our young people and our
treasure, and put the blood of our young people and our treasure
at their disposal.
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So with that said, I am very anxious to hear the witnesses today,
and I am also jealous of the prerogatives of the legislative branch,
as we all should be, because we are here to fulfill the constitutional
role that was established by our Founding Fathers and the respon-
sibilities that have, of course, been given to us by the voters of this
country to represent their interests.
It is not all in the hands of the President and his appointees. We
play a major role, and, as I say, if there had been a better spirit,
perhaps examining the legal prerequisites would not be as impor-
tant a discussion.
So thank you very much for this hearing today, and I look for-
ward to participating fully.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Now the chair of
the Middle East Subcommittee, Mr. Ackerman of New York.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Please do not mis-
interpret my sliding further away from you as an indication of any
disagreement. It appears that the microphones on either side of
you have both failed.
I appreciate Mr. Rohrabacher’s statement as well. He proves, yet
again, that he is an equal-opportunity attack dog.
I think the very fact that this is a joint hearing of both sub-
committees is indicative of the fact that this is a very important
area of concern to so many Members of Congress. The war in Iraq
remains deeply unpopular with most Americans, as a review of any
number of recent polls will tell you, or perhaps simply a review of
the mail that comes into your office would suggest.
So it strikes me as unwise that the President would want to go
ahead and unilaterally commit the United States to a long-term se-
curity agreement with Iraq without trying to get the support of ei-
ther the American people or the people’s representatives. But true
to form, the President has decided to go it alone on Iraq again, or
so one would believe, if you take the President’s special deputy na-
tional security adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan, General Douglas
Lute, at his word, as you point out, Chairman Delahunt.
General Lute made it clear that the White House would be flying
solo on this question when he said, ‘‘We don’t anticipate now that
these negotiations will lead to a formal treaty, which would then
bring to formal negotiations or formal inputs from the Congress.’’
I do not think we can dispute General Lute’s view that the Presi-
dent certainly has the authority to enter into an executive agree-
ment with the Government of Iraq. Certainly, such agreements are
a commonly used tool in American diplomacy, and such agreements
are not ordinarily subject to congressional approval unless there
are U.S. domestic laws that need to be amended in order for our
nation to comply with the agreement.
No, the issue is not a question of legal authority; it is a question
of political wisdom and sustainability, and I think the President’s
preferred course, as expressed by General Lute, is profoundly un-
wise and unsustainable.
Americans, in vast numbers, want our troops to come home.
They are no longer certain, if they ever were, what we are fighting
for. But I also think that most Americans, if you ask them, would
agree that, even after the United States withdraws its forces from
Iraq, we still need a framework for our relations with Iraq from
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