The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the Body

301 Pages·1971·10.834 MB·English

by  Richard M. Zaner (auth.)

The Problem of Embodiment
PHAENOMENOLOGICA
COLLECTION PUBLlEE SOUS LE PATRONAGE DES CENTRES
D' ARCHIVES-HUSSERL
17
RICHARD M. ZANER
The Problem of Embodiment
SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY
Comite de redaction de 1a collection:
President: H. L. Van Breda (Louvain);
Membres: M. Farber (Buffalo), E. Fink (Fribourg en Brisgau),
A. Gurwitsch, (New York). J. Hyppolitet (Paris). L. Landgrebe (Cologne).
M. Merleau-Pontyt (Paris), P. Ricoeur (Paris).
K. H. Volkmann-Schluck (Cologne), J. Wahl (Paris);
Secretaire: J. Taminiaux (Lou vain)
RICHARD M. ZANER
Tbe Problem oE Embodiment
SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY
SECOND EDITION
MARTINUS NljHOFF I THE HAGUE I 1971
@ I97I by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands
All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
Softcover reprint o/the hardcover 1st edition 1971
ISBN-13: 978-94-010-3016-8 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-3014-4
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-3014-4
To My Wile, Junanne.
lor her patient and enduring love
PREFACE
Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomeno
logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl
stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with
which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how
it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the
world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it
can become mundanized,
We see straightaway that it can do that only by means of a certain
participation in transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is
manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the
experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become
really human and animal (tierischen), and only thereby does it achieve
a place in the space and in the time of Nature.l
Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied
within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material
Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of
material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly
an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness,
thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now"
(ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its
intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it.
Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a conse
quence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal
body which is for it its own animate organism. Conversely, that
corporeal body becomes a genuinely animate organism (Leib), as
opposed to a mere physical body (Korper), only by means of
1 H usserl, I dcen zu ciner erinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie
Erstes Bueh, Max Niemeyer (Halle a. d. S., 1913), p. 103.
2 We use thc preposition "by" advisedly, especially to avoid the spatial conno
tations of the more usual "in". Spatial determinations arise after, not before, em
bodimcn t.
VIII PREFACE
consciousness' intentiveness to it as its own animate organism -
that is to say, as its own embodiment, or mundanization.
The significance of the animate organism, of the intended
embodiment of consciousness in a world, for the crucial range of
problems relative to the constitution of Objective reality (the
alter ego, physical things, cultural objects, society, and so on) is
thus apparent. As Merleau-Ponty has put it, "Ie corps propre"
is the first stage of this constitution.
While Husserl was thus quite cognizant of the central place of
the animate organism, he did not himself devote much space in
his published writings to the analysis of it; and, what has subse
quently appeared of his unpublished manuscripts contains little
more than highly suggestive dues toward the development of
such an analysis. On the other hand, MMGabriel Marcel, Jean
Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty have each developed
important theories of the animate organism, each of which
purports to be a strictly descriptive explication of this phenome
non. They each, therefore, deserve careful attention. Whether
or not, on the other hand, any or all of these theories may be
called "phenomenological," in the Husserlian sense, is a question
lying outside our immediate concerns, though we shall not be
able to ignore it completely.
Irrespective of how that may be ultimately decided, each of
these theories is highly interesting in itself for the development
of a systematic phenomenology of the animate organism. This
being so, it has seemed advantageous to us to undertake a critical
examination of each of them: first, to determine the major points
of each; second, to examine each critically; finally, to determine
the extent to which each contributes to the phenomenology of
the animate organism.
This, then, is the proposal of this present study. By means of
it, we hope eventually to be able to establish at least the essential
structures of the animate organism, of the order of the consti
tution of the animate organism, and thus to pave the way for a
systematic phenomenological analysis.
A brief note of explanation regarding the considerable refer
ences to the works of the philosophers discussed herein in is
order. In all but a few instances, I have felt it best to render these
PREFACE IX
passages into English myself. Regarding Marcel's works, I have
utilized the generally excellent translations of his Metaphysical
Journal (the translation by Bernard Wall approved by M.
Marcel), and those of Homo Viator (by Emma Craufurd) and
Man Against Humanity (by Donald Mackinnon). In all other
instances I am responsible for the translations.
Regarding Sartre, while I have referred constantly to the
translation of L' Etre et le N cant by Hazel Barnes, all the trans
lations from that work are my responsibility. Regrettably,
neither of Merleau-Ponty's major works have appeared in English
translation.l Thus, all references to these, as well as my references
to M. A. de Waelhens' study of Merleau-Ponty, are my own.
Similarly, regarding the references to Bergson, while there are
good translations available, I have referred constantly to the
French editions of his works and am responsible for the trans
lations into English.
Finally, concerning the works of Edmund Husserl to which I
have made reference, the truly outstanding and remarkably
sensitive translations of Professor Dorion Cairns - evidenced in
his translation of Husserl's Cartesianisch~ Meditationen, and
his as yet unpublis4ed Guide to Translating Husserl, which Dr.
Cairns kindly made available to me in a partially complete
form - have been of immeasurable help to me. Nevertheless,
with the exception of the references to the Cartesian Meditations,
I am entirely responsible for the translations of Husserl into
English.
In view of this, that I have taken on myself the task of trans
lating the majority of references, and in view of the fact that all
but the very best of translations are inferior to the original, I
have felt it only proper to include the original texts in a special
appendix. All the major passages, therefore, are marked in the
text with an asterisk (*); these passages will be found in the
Appendix, with the proper textual references (both to the original
work and to this study).
A final word of acknowledgment is, in my judgment, necessary.
1 Subsequent to the writing of this essay, MerIeau-Ponty's Phenomenologie de la
Perception has appeared in English translation, published by Rutledge and Keegan
Paul (1962), translated by Colin Smith.
x PREFACE
Certainly the indebtedness lowe to others, and particularly to
my teachers, can never be fully expressed. The obligation to do
so, however, far surpasses the difficulty of the task. Without
attempting to determine rank or degree, therefore, I must in
humility and honesty express my profound appreciation and
gratitude to those without whom this study would not have been
possible.
My gratitude and appreciation is expressed to my teachers:
Professors Maurice N atanson, Alfred Schutz, Dorion Cairns,
Aron Gurwitsch, Hans Jonas and Werner Marx - each of whose
influence has been considerable, and whose teachings, I hope,
have to some degree been assimilated in a philosophical manner,
but who can in no way be held responsible for the content of this
study.
I should like to take this opportunity as well to express my
deep appreciation to Mr. Frederick I. Kersten, whose friendship
and discussions have been steady and strong, and whose en
couragement has proved vital.
My gratitude must also be extended to the Graduate Faculty
of Political and Social Science, of the New School for Social
Research, to whom this study in another form was first sub
mitted as my doctoral dissertation, for awarding this dissertation
the Alfred Schutz Memorial Award, and for making available to
so many students a climate of genuine scholarship and a faculty
of truly remarkable dimensions.
Finally, lowe a debt of gratitude to the Research Committee
of Lamar State College of Technology for awarding me the
research grant without which I could not have completed this
work. I must also thank Miss Nancy Darsey, who has exhibited
considerable patience and endurance in typing the final draft of
the study, and whose knowledge of grammar and syntax has
proved to have been of great help.
I can only hope that the study, for all its shortcomings, will
in some part merit the profound trust and faith of all those who
have helped me to bring it about.
T ABLE OF CONTENTS
Pre/ace . ...... . VII
PART I: MARCEL'S THEORY OF THE BODY AS MYSTERY.
Chapter I: Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
(1) Survey of Marcel's Philosophy. . . . . . . . 3
(2) The Genesis of the Problem in Marcel's Thought. 12
(3) Methodological Considerations: The Problem of
System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14
Chapter II: The Theory of the Body-Qua-Mine as Mystery 21
(1) My Body Qua Mine . . . . . . . . 22
(a) The Qui-Quid Relation in Having . . . . 2S
(b) The "Within-Without" Relation. . . . . 27
(c) Having as "Before the Other qua Other" . 28
(2) The Meaning of Sentir . . . . . . . 3S
(3) My Body as Etre-Au-Monde. . . . . 38
(4) My Body as the Repere of Existence. 42
Chapter III: Critical Remarks . . . . . . 44
(1) The Relation Between "Feeling" and "Acting" 46
(2) The Meaning of Bodily Acting. 49
(3) The Meaning of the "Urge/uhl" . . . S3
PART II: SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY OF THE BODY. S7
Chapter I: Introduction. . . . S9
(1) Sartre's Ontology . . . . . . . . . 60
(2) The Theory of the Other . . . . . . 69
Chapter II: The Ontological Dimensions of the Body 81
(1) The Body as Being-For-Itself: Facticity . . . 83