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Synthese Library 470 Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science María José Frápolli The Priority of Propositions. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Logic Synthese Library Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Volume 470 Editor-in-Chief Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA Editorial Board Members Berit Brogaard, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA Steven French, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK Catarina Dutilh Novaes, VU Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Darrell P. Rowbottom, Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong Emma Ruttkamp, Department of Philosophy, University of South Africa Pretoria, South Africa Kristie Miller, Department of Philosophy, Centre for Time, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia The aim of Synthese Library is to provide a forum for the best current work in the methodology and philosophy of science and in epistemology, all broadly understood. A wide variety of different approaches have traditionally been represented in the Library, and every effort is made to maintain this variety, not for its own sake, but because we believe that there are many fruitful and illuminating approaches to the philosophy of science and related disciplines. Special attention is paid to methodological studies which illustrate the interplay of empirical and philosophical viewpoints and to contributions to the formal (logical, set-theoretical, mathematical, information-theoretical, decision-theoretical, etc.) methodology of empirical sciences. Likewise, the applications of logical methods to epistemology as well as philosophically and methodologically relevant studies in logic are strongly encouraged. The emphasis on logic will be tempered by interest in the psychological, historical, and sociological aspects of science. In addition to monographs Synthese Library publishes thematically unified anthologies and edited volumes with a well-defined topical focus inside the aim and scope of the book series. The contributions in the volumes are expected to be focused and structurally organized in accordance with the central theme(s), and should be tied together by an extensive editorial introduction or set of introductions if the volume is divided into parts. An extensive bibliography and index are mandatory. María José Frápolli The Priority of Propositions. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Logic María José Frápolli Department of Philosophy I University of Granada Campus Cartuja, Granada, Spain ISSN 0166-6991 ISSN 2542-8292 (electronic) Synthese Library ISBN 978-3-031-25228-0 ISBN 978-3-031-25229-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25229-7 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. 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Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland To Fran, Victoria, and Joan Preface What I offer in the following pages is a narrative, one which vindicates the central- ity of logic to philosophy and its study. A narrative aims to provide clues for looking at things with fresh eyes. I aspire to give new life to some older intuitions and apply them to contemporary discussions. I also seek to engage the reader in a conceptual adventure that should change how they see logic and its philosophy. Sometimes, even the smallest change of perspective has the effect of placing worn-out problems under a more favourable light and, if we are lucky, opening unexpected ways of dealing with recalcitrant difficulties. The narrative I propose integrates insights from sources that are sometimes very distant from each other, but I offer it as a coherent general argument for understanding logical issues; for there is indeed a reason for the coherent integration of distant intuitions. As a pragmatist, I have no choice but to think that we all share the most basic insights about the functioning of the concepts that we put to work in discursive actions. And this is so because we share the same kind of brain and the world around us, and we have undergone similar adaptive situations that have resulted in the networking of analo- gous conceptual systems. Philosophers and logicians often disagree about the theoretical system by which they implement those shared basic insights, but this is a different story that does not neutralise the communal background. The Priority of Propositions is not a historical essay; it does not seek to offer a non-committed description of authors and schools. This book is a philosophical essay, intended to be a contribution ‘to that peculiar genre of creative non-fiction’ to which, according to Brandom (1994, p. xi), philosophical works belong. In it, I pour the insights I have gained after decades devoted to studying, thinking, and debating the topics included in it. I am convinced—and am hoping to convince the reader— that what is taught in standard logic courses, and what we publish in journals that include ‘logic’ in their titles, is at most only tenuously connected with the project that Frege initiated in his Begriffsschrift. And nevertheless, it is Frege’s project and what follows from it that explains the relevance of logic to philosophy and science. vii viii Preface My reading of Frege, in particular, and many of the analyses I offer of central topics in the philosophy of logic are largely discordant with the received view. It is this discordance that encouraged me to write this book, though. Had I had a standard approach to authors and themes, I would not have found the motivation for the long and solitary hours that the writing of a book demands. I have assumed the task of writing it down because the narrative I offer sheds some light on and corrects the distorted perspective derived from an excessive interest in formalism, or so I hope. I owe my position on the philosophy of logic to some of the greatest philosophical minds of the last hundred years or so: Gottlob Frege, Frank Ramsey, Ludwig Wittgenstein, C. J. F. Williams, and Robert Brandom, to name a few. These are my philosophical heroes, but there are many others whose influence will be apparent as the book progresses. Susan Haack deserves a special mention. At the beginning of my career, she planted in me the seed of pragmatism in the philosophy of logic, a pragmatism respectful of the classical tradition in logic. During the many occasions when we have discussed philosophy, she has been an honest mentor, always putting forward the most challenging and insightful questions and never allowing herself to soften a truth. She also conducted her mentoring with immense generosity and per- sonal warmth. These are all philosophical debts that I am proud to acknowledge. As for my comprehensive view, I claim full responsibility. This book is dedicated to my students, to many generations of them, who have encouraged me to be coherent. For a philosopher, no scenario is more terrifying than a classroom full of smart, interested students; none is more challenging and reward- ing, either. I have had the good fortune of finding myself in this situation every single academic year of my career. From my students, I have learned that the story that we tell when we teach logic does not make much sense, even if the technicalities of any logic course are profit- able tools as long as their purpose and scope are clearly delimited. A successful logic course should provide students with the powerful method of conceptual analy- sis. It should explain why what Wittgenstein once called ‘surface grammar’ is not a reliable source of logical knowledge, and that the elements of arguments and infer- ences are propositional contents. It should promote logic among students by show- ing them that there is no method for doing philosophy other than sound argumentation, and that this involves, as an essential condition, substantial knowledge of how lan- guage works. To conclude, a word to my fellow women philosophers, present and future. Academic life is merciless to women. We are too often ‘invited’ to make unaccept- able choices, urged to put up with intolerable treatment, forced to acquiesce to con- descending attitudes, advised to suppress reasonable reactions, and, even when ‘well-behaved’, we are made invisible, our work is ignored, our voices silenced. For all this, my female colleagues deserve my acknowledgement and deepest respect. To my female students, I wish them strength and courage. A professional life devoted to the growth of knowledge and its transmission to future generations is Preface ix enormously fulfilling. Only each woman can decide whether the heroism and pain involved are really worth it. Granada, Spain María José Frápolli Reference Brandom, R. (1994). Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment. Harvard University Press. Acknowledgements I want to express my deepest gratitude to a large group of persons and institutions: To Otávio Bueno, who kindly invited me to submit the project of this book to Synthese Library and encouraged me to take up again a long-cherished project, often initiated and systematically postponed. To an anonymous referee, whose comments compelled me to be extremely accurate and clear in my assertions. To my students, former and present, some of whom are now my colleagues, and to some of my colleagues who never were my students. Juan Acero, Alba Moreno, Llanos Navarro, Eduardo Pérez, Esther Romero, Manuel de Pinedo, and Neftalí Villanueva. To the participants of the Colombian reading group organised by Ángela Bejarano and José Andrés Forero, who were generous enough to dedicate some sessions to the discussion of a draft of this book: Ángela Bejarano, Tomás Barrero, José Andrés Forero-Mora, Miguel Ángel Pérez, and Kurt Wischin. To the organisers and participants of the postgraduate reading group of the Interuniversity PhD Programme on Logic and Philosophy of Science, who eagerly allowed me to explain my take on the philosophy of logic, and who aptly spotted unclear claims and half-baked thoughts: Violeta Conde, José Alejandro Fernández Cuesta, Pedro Antonio García Jorge, José Javier González López, Francisco Javier Gutiérrez Cózar, Tomás Hernández Mora, Rodrigo López Orellana, Eva Martino, José Gerardo Moya, Elberto Plazas, Manuel de la Cruz Recio, Jean Paul Rossi, Roberto Sánchez, Manuel J. Sanchís, Julián Valdés, and Juan Antonio Sánchez Guzmán. The Revista de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España devoted part of its issue n° 66 (January 2022) to this book (https://www. solofici.org/revistas/). The issue includes comments by several colleagues and my answers to them. These colleagues were Juan José Acero, María José Alcaraz, Tomás Barrero, Ángela Bejarano, Cristina Corredor, José Andrés Forero-Mora, Concha Martínez Vidal, Eduardo Pérez Navarro, and Kurt Wischin. To all of them, I am deeply grateful. My gratitude is further extended to the president of xi