The Principle of Non-Contradiction in Plato’s Republic: An Argument for Form

271 Pages·2017·1.31 MB·English

by  Laurence Bloom

The Principle of Non-contradiction in
Plato’s Republic

The Principle of Non-contradiction in
Plato’s Republic
An Argument for Form
Laurence Bloom
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Table of Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction xv
I.TwoProblems xv
II.TheIntentionbehindThisBook xxix
III.Aristotle xlii
IV.ConclusionoftheIntroductionandChapterSummaries xlvii
1 KindsofKnowingandKindsofBeing 1
I.FirstPrinciples 1
II.ThePrinciple’sScope 5
III.HypotheticalKnowledge 7
IV.TheSoulThatKnows 13
V.TheUnityoftheSoul—AFirstLook 16
VI.TheInsubstantialityofSensibleThings—AFirstLook 18
VII.TheRationalPart—AFirstLook 22
VIII.KnowingandBeing 23
IX.Self-samenessandJustice—AFirstLook 26
X.AWayBeyondtheHypothesis? 28
XI.Transition 29
2 TheUnityoftheSoulinRepublicIV 31
I.TheProblemoftheSoul’sDivision 31
II.JusticeandtheQuestionof“ToorfromPrinciples” 36
III.TheLead-uptotheArgument 40
IV.TheArgumentDistinguishingDesireandReason
(438e10–439d9) 54
vii
viii TableofContents
V.ReasonandUnity 60
VI.Spirit 68
VII.DesireandContradiction 71
VIII.Akrasia 73
IX.TowardJustice’sInternalEnd 78
3 TheInsubstantialityofSensibleThings 81
I.The“Contradictory”NatureofSensibleThings 81
II.Heraclitus(OnSamenessasSelf-sameness) 85
III.TheWaytoaPlatonicSolution,ofSorts 94
IV.TheDividedLine:ATextualClue 99
V.ImitationI:DoxaandtheUnderlyingThing(Being) 103
VI.TowardanInternalEndorGoodinGeneral 111
VII.ImitationII:DianoiaandtheOrderorStructure(What-it-
is-to-be) 114
VIII.NegativeForms 125
IX.PureMathematics 128
X.TheInsubstantialityofSensibleThings 132
4 TheSoulasGoodinItselfinRepublicX 135
I.Introduction:The“Forms”ofArtifacts 135
II.ArtifactsandOrder 138
III.ArtifactsandExternalEnds 143
IV.TheImmortalSoul 156
V.TheEmbodied(Mortal)Soul 166
VI.Soul,State,andCosmos 169
Conclusion:BeyondtheHypothesis 173
I.Form 173
II.ThePrincipleofNon-contradictionI 177
III.Wholeness 180
IV.Soul 183
V.ThePrincipleofNon-contradictionII 187
VI.Conclusion 190
Notes 193
Bibliography 209
TextsandTranslations 209
Books,Articles,andCommentaries 209
Index 213
About 219
Preface
We use reason to view the world. We call into question our own and one
another’s reasons for believing in things. Using reason, we prove and dis-
prove, agree and disagree, discuss and persuade; in short, we use reason to
argue points. Perhaps most importantly, we use reason in our attempt to
arrive at truth. But what happens when we call reason itself into question?
Fromwhere,onemightask,doweevenderivetheabilitytoreason?Canwe
argue for attributing a special status to the claims of reason? Does reason
examineitself?Ifnot,whatfacultycouldbeusedtoexamineitanddoesthat
facultyexamineitself?InthisbookIarguethattheclaimsofreasonandtheir
justification are central concerns for Plato. This in itself is not a new claim.
However, I argue that Plato is able to make sense of and justify the use of
reason—anditsprivilegedroleinourlives—inamuchdeeperwaythanhas
been recognized. I attempt to show how he does so by examining his use of
andattitude toward afundamental principleof reason:thePrincipleof Non-
contradiction(PNC).
Even though hisisthefirstknownfullformulation of theprinciple,little
attention has beenpaidto Plato’sstatementof andattitude toward thePNC;
even less to any possible connection between this issue and the justification
of first principles. It is likely that part of the reason for this is the attention
paid to Aristotle’s longer and more thorough treatment of the principle in
Metaphysics Γ. Yet, we have much to gain from looking into Plato’s treat-
mentoftheprinciple.Indeed,thetwotreatmentsshedinterestinglightonone
another,aswewillsee.PerhapsanotherpartofthereasonPlatohasnotbeen
looked to in relation to the PNC and the justification of first principles of
reasoningisthat scholars havetakenthePNCas formulatedin the Republic
as an example of a metaphysical principle and not an epistemological one,
some going so far as to claim that his is not a principle of reasoning at all.
ix
x Preface
Thus, the problem of justification of first principles of reasoning—and the
attendantproblemofcircularity—seemsnottoemerge.Isuggestthatsuchan
attitudeismistaken.However,themistakeisnotintheclaimthatthePNCis
primarily metaphysical, for Plato. On the contrary, on this point I am in
agreement with what seems to be a dominant view in the contemporary
scholarship. Yet, far from this excluding the principle from being a first
principle of thinking—at least, a certain type of thinking—it actually en-
hances it and, in doing so, brings the problem of justification of the first
principles of reasoningto theforefront.Toput thepoint concisely:thoughts
arethingsforPlato.Thus,thePNCisafirstprincipleofthoughts becauseit
is a first principle of things—at least of certain thoughts and certain things.
(We might note that a similar point is suggested in relation to Aristotle
simply by noting that his longest and most thorough treatment of the PNC
occurs in his Metaphysics and not in the organon.) One could add to this
pointbynoticingthatthattheexplicitapplicationofthePNCintheRepublic
is to the soul of the knower. This application already suggests a connection
between thoughts and things as this case—the one in which the knower is
also the object of knowledge—is the case where the two are hardest to
distinguish.
Atanyrate,thebestargumentfortakinghisuseofthePNCseriouslyasa
way into the issue of first principles is to see what is gained from doing so.
For this, at the start, I can only beg the reader’s indulgence as to see what
comesoftheissuewillrequiresomework.Inshort,whatwewillseeisthat
both thoughts and things presuppose and reveal the necessity of unity and,
therefore,ofform.Thatis,thePNC,thoughafirstprincipleofacertainsort
of reasoning, is not actually a first principle in the highest sense for Plato.
Rather, it is grounded in a deeper sort of reasoning, one that does not func-
tiondiscursively.Thus,notsurprisingly,pursuingthequestionoffirstprinci-
plesinPlatoleadsonetotheforms.Framingtheprobleminthiswayallows
ustoseethetextasawholeasprovidinganextendedargument—andoneof
acertaintype—fortheexistenceofforms.Thecertaintypeofargumentthat
wegetissuggestedbytheplaceofthePNCintheinquiry.
Theargumentforformsthatemergesiscomplexanddifficult.Thereason
forthisisinonesenseeasytosee:theargumentcannotbeanormal,discur-
siveargument.Thatis,theargumentcannotbeonethatassumesthePNC,as
ifit did soit would fallinto aviciouscircularity. Rather, as wewill see,the
argument doesn’t rest on the truth of the PNC but, rather, on the very pos-
sibility of our hypothesizing the principle in the first place. Our ability to
hypothesizethePNC—andperhapsourinabilitynottohypothesizeit—isthe
linchpin. When we ask questions such as, “to what objects does the PNC
apply?” or, “how is it possible that we apply the PNC?” we are asking
questionsthatleadustotheexistenceofform.