The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9 11

380 Pages·2006·2.63 MB·English

by  John Yoo

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5 The Powers of War and Peace
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john yoo
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The Powers
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the constitution ———
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and foreign affairs * PgEnds:P
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after 9/11 [-3], (3)
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36 the university of chicago press
37 chicago and london
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13 JohnYooisprofessoroflawattheUniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeleySchool
ofLawandavisitingscholarattheAmericanEnterpriseInstitute.From2001
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to2003heservedasadeputyassistantattorneygeneralintheOfficeof
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LegalCounseloftheU.S.DepartmentofJustice,whereheworked
16 onissuesinvolvingforeignaffairs,nationalsecurity,and
theseparationofpowers.
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18 TheUniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago60637
19 TheUniversityofChicagoPress,Ltd.,London
©2005byTheUniversityofChicago
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Allrightsreserved.Published2005
21 PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
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14131211100908070605 12345
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24 isbn:0-226-96031-5(cloth)
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LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
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Yoo,John.
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Thepowersofwarandpeace:theconstitution
28 andforeignaffairsafter9/11/JohnYoo.
p. cm.
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Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
30 isbn0-226-96031-5(cloth:alk.paper)
31 1.Warandemergencypowers—UnitedStates. 2.United
States—Foreignrelations—Lawandlegislation. I.Title.
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kf5060.y662005
33 343.73'01—dc22
34 2005004222
35 (cid:2)(cid:2)Thepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsofthe
36 AmericanNationalStandardforInformationSciences—Permanence
ofPaperforPrintedLibraryMaterials,ansiz39.48-1992.
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5 CONTENTS
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13 preface vii
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Introduction ———
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21 TheEighteenth-CenturyAnglo-American
22 ConstitutionandForeignAffairs
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ForeignAffairsandthePreludetotheConstitution
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WritingandRatifyingaForeignAffairsConstitution
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36 WarPowersforaNewWorld
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InternationalPoliticsasLaw?
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InterpretingandEndingTreaties
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TreatiesandtheLegislativePower
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TheConstitutionandtheMultilateralFuture * PgEnds:Pa
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index 357
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5 PREFACE
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13 As I was finishing the manuscript for this book,controversy arose over
14 the Bush administration’s legal approach to the September 11,2001,at- Lines:57
15 tacks.Thelegalissuesraisedbythewaronterrorismarenovel,complex, ———
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16 andunprecedented.Theyrangefromtheuseofforce,totargeting,tothe
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17 detention and interrogation of enemy combatants who do not fight on
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18 behalf of a nation;this is a conflict that knows no borders.As a deputy
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19 assistantattorneygeneralintheOfficeofLegalCounselattheDepart-
20 mentofJusticefrom2001to2003,IparticipatedindevelopingtheBush
[-7], (3)
21 administration’s legal policies in the war on terrorism.This book,how-
22 ever,does not attempt to mount a specific defense of those policies;in
23 fact,IconceivedofthebookandbeganworkonitwellbeforeIleftfor
24 Washington,D.C.Rather,mypurposehereistoexploretheconstitutional
25 frameworkthatgaverisetothepolicies.Thisisanimportantstepofanal-
26 ysisthatmustoccurbeforeundertakingdiscussionofthesubstanceofthe
27 waronterrorism.WecannotbegintoevaluatetheBushadministration’s
28 legalapproachtothatwarwithoutfirstunderstandingtheConstitution’s
29 distributionoftheforeignaffairspoweramongthebranchesofgovern-
30 ment.
31 Nor can we discuss the legality of theAfghanistan or Iraq invasions
32 withoutfirstidentifyingthescopeofthepresident’scommander-in-chief
33 powertouseforceunilaterallyandthetoolsatCongress’sdisposaltore-
34 strainhim.Similarly,arguingoverwhethertheGenevaConventionsapply
35 toterroristsmayprovefruitlesswithoutfirstunpackingtheConstitution’s
36 allocationofthepowertointerprettreatiesamongthepresident,Senate,
37 Congress,and the courts.To debate these issues without understanding
vii
viii • preface
1 theirconstitutionalcontextwouldbeakintoarguingaboutgovernment
2 policy toward speech without knowing the standards established by the
3 FirstAmendment.
4 Thisbookproposesaconstitutionaltheoryoftheforeignaffairspower
5 thatdiffers,attimessharply,fromtheconventionalacademicwisdombut
6 thatdescribesmoreaccuratelytheactualpracticeofthethreebranches
7 of government. More than a decade has passed since major legal works
8 aboutthewarandtreatypowersappeared:JohnHartEly’sWarandRe-
9 sponsibility(1993),ThomasFranck’sPoliticalQuestions/JudicialAnswers
10 (1992),MichaelGlennon’sConstitutionalDiplomacy(1990),andHarold
11 Koh’s National Security Constitution (1990).They adopted similar con-
[-8], (4)
12 stitutionalframeworksandrespondedtothesamegeopoliticalenviron-
13 ment.Arguingthatallusesofforceabroad,exceptthoseinself-defense,
14 must be pre-approved by Congress,these scholars,some of the leading Lines:70 to
15 lightsoftheAmericanlegalacademy,criticizedU.S.militaryinterventions ———
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16 duringandintheimmediateaftermathoftheColdWar.Theypositeda
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19 and interpreting treaties.They also argued for an intrusive judicial role
20 inoverseeingthislegalisticarrangementtokeepthepresidencywithinits
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21 restrictedbounds.
22 Iarguethattheconstitutionaltext,structure,andhistoryleadtoadif-
23 ferent approach. Chapters 2–4 reconstruct the historical understanding
24 oftheconstitutionaltextandstructureheldbytheFramersbyexploring
25 theConstitution’seighteenth-centuryBritishroots,thefirststateconstitu-
26 tionsandtheArticlesofConfederation,andthedraftingandratification
27 of the Constitution in 1787 and 1788.These chapters conclude that the
28 Constitutiondependslessonfixedlegalprocessesfordecisionmakingand
29 moreonthepoliticalinteractionoftheexecutiveandlegislativebranches.
30 Itallocatesdifferentpowerstothepresident,Senate,andCongressthatal-
31 lowthemtoshapedifferentprocessesdependingonthecontemporaryde-
32 mandsoftheinternationalsystemandtheirrelativepoliticalposition.The
33 Constitutiondoesnotrequireasingle,correctmethodformakingwaror
34 peace,formakinginternationalagreementsorbreakingthem,orforinter-
35 pretingandenforcinginternationallaw.Rather,itallowsthebranchesto
36 cooperateorcompeteintheforeignaffairsfieldbyrelyingontheirunique
37 constitutionalpowers.Chapter5developsthisapproachinthecontextof
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1 thewarpower,whilechapters6and7applyittothemakingandbreak-
2 ing of peace through the Constitution’s handling of treaties. Chapter 8
3 explorestherelationshipbetweenlawmakingandtreatymaking.Chapter
4 9 concludes with some thoughts about the future.These latter chapters
5 showinmorespecificcontextshowaflexibledecisionmakingsystemal-
6 lowsthepoliticalbranchesofgovernmenttoshapemoreflexiblepolicies
7 fortheinternationalpoliticalsystemoftheirtime.
8 At the time such leading scholarly works as those mentioned above
9 werewritten,thenatureofwarcontinuedtobethoughtofasoccurring
10 solelybetweennation-states.ThePersianGulfWarhadjustwitnessedan
11 American-led coalition’s defeat of Iraq’s grab for Kuwait—a traditional
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12 war over territory fought by the regular armed forces of nation-states.
13 Nation-stateswerepresumedtobebothrationalandsusceptibletovari-
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19 Americanthinkersmaywellhaveassumedthattherewerenosignificant
20 military threats on the horizon.The Soviet Union’s dissolution seemed
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21 torenderhypotheticalwhathadbeenthemostcompellingcaseagainsta
22 requirementofexantecongressionalapprovalformilitaryhostilities:the
23 needforswiftpresidentialactiontorespondtoaSovietnuclearfirststrike.
24 ThedisappearanceofthethreatofawarthatcoulddirectlyharmAmeri-
25 cannationalsecurityallowedpolicymakersandintellectualstheluxuryto
26 envisionafutureinwhichtheycouldreducetheoveralllevelofinterna-
27 tionalarmedconflict.Insuchanenvironment,aconstitutionalmodelthat
28 required the approval of multiple institutions before the United States
29 coulduseforcemayhavemadesomesense.
30 The world after September 11,2001,however,is very different. It is
31 no longer clear that the United States must seek to reduce the amount
32 ofwarfare,anditcertainlyisnolongerclearthattheconstitutionalsys-
33 temoughttobefixedsoastomakeitdifficulttouseforce.Ratherthan
34 disappearing from the world,the threat of war may well be increasing.
35 Threatsnowcomefromatleastthreeprimarysources:theeasyavailability
36 oftheknowledgeandtechnologytocreateweaponsofmassdestruction
37 (WMD); the emergence of rogue nations; and the rise of international