The Positive School of Criminology by Enrico Ferri

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Title: The Positive School of Criminology
Three Lectures Given at the University of Naples, Italy on April 22, 23 and 24, 1901

Author: Enrico Ferri

Release Date: January 2, 2004 [EBook #10580]

Language: English

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The Positive School of Criminology

Three Lectures

Given at the University of Naples, Italy on April 22, 23 and 24, 1901

By Enrico Ferri

Translated by Ernest Untermann

Chicago

Charles H. Kerr & Company 1908

I.

My Friends:

When, in the turmoil of my daily occupation, I received an invitation, several months ago, from several hundred students of this famous university, to

give them a brief summary, in short special lectures, of the principal and fundamental conclusions of criminal sociology, I gladly accepted, because this
invitation fell in with two ideals of mine. These two ideals are stirring my heart and are the secret of my life. In the first place, this invitation chimed with
the ideal of my personal life, namely, to diffuse and propagate among my brothers the scientific ideas, which my brain has accumulated, not through
any merit of mine, but thanks to the lucky prize inherited from my mother in the lottery of life. And the second ideal which this invitation called up
before my mind's vision was this: The ideal of young people of Italy, united in morals and intellectual pursuits, feeling in their social lives the glow of a
great aim. It would matter little whether this aim would agree with my own ideas or be opposed to them, so long as it should be an ideal which would
lift the aspirations of the young people out of the fatal grasp of egoistic interests. Of course, we positivists know very well, that the material
requirements of life shape and determine also the moral and intellectual aims of human consciousness. But positive science declares the following to be
the indispensable requirement for the regeneration of human ideals: Without an ideal, neither an individual nor a collectivity can live, without it humanity
is dead or dying. For it is the fire of an ideal which renders the life of each one of us possible, useful and fertile. And only by its help can each one of
us, in the more or less short course of his or her existence, leave behind traces for the benefit of fellow-beings. The invitation extended to me proves

that the students of Naples believe in the inspiring existence of such an ideal of science, and are anxious to learn more about ideas, with which the
entire world of the present day is occupied, and whose life-giving breath enters even through the windows of the dry courtrooms, when their doors are
closed against it.

Let us now speak of this new science, which has become known in Italy by the name of the Positive School of Criminology. This science, the same

as every other phenomenon of scientific evolution, cannot be shortsightedly or conceitedly attributed to the arbitrary initiative of this or that thinker, this
or that scientist. We must rather regard it as a natural product, a necessary phenomenon, in the development of that sad and somber department of
science which deals with the disease of crime. It is this plague of crime which forms such a gloomy and painful contrast with the splendor of present-
day civilization. The 19th century has won a great victory over mortality and infectious diseases by means of the masterful progress of physiology and
natural science. But while contagious diseases have gradually diminished, we see on the other hand that moral diseases are growing more numerous in
our so-called civilization. While typhoid fever, smallpox, cholera and diphtheria retreated before the remedies which enlightened science applied by
means of the experimental method, removing their concrete causes, we see on the other hand that insanity, suicide and crime, that painful trinity, are
growing apace. And this makes it very evident that the science which is principally, if not exclusively, engaged in studying these phenomena of social
disease, should feel the necessity of finding a more exact diagnosis of these moral diseases of society, in order to arrive at some effective and more
humane remedy, which should more victoriously combat this somber trinity of insanity, suicide and crime.

The science of positive criminology arose in the last quarter of the 19th century, as a result of this strange contrast, which would be inexplicable, if

we could not discover historical and scientific reasons for its existence. And it is indeed a strange contrast that Italy should have arrived at a perfect
theoretical development of a classical school of criminology, while there persists, on the other hand, the disgraceful condition that criminality assumes
dimensions never before observed in this country, so that the science of criminology cannot stem the tide of crime in high and low circles. It is for this
reason, that the positive school of criminology arises out of the very nature of things, the same as every other line of science. It is based on the
conditions of our daily life. It would indeed be conceited on our part to claim that we, who are the originators of this new science and its new
conclusions, deserve alone the credit for its existence. The brain of the scientist is rather a sort of electrical accumulator, which feels and assimilates the
vibrations and heart-beats of life, its splendor and its shame, and derives therefrom the conviction that it must of necessity provide for definite social
wants. And on the other hand, it would be an evidence of intellectual short-sightedness on the part of the positivist man of science, if he did not
recognize the historical accomplishments, which his predecessors on the field of science have left behind as indelible traces of their struggle against the
unknown in that brilliant and irksome domain. For this reason, the adherents of the positive school of criminology feel the most sincere reverence for
the classic school of criminology. And I am glad today, in accepting the invitation of the students of Naples, to say, that this is another reason why their
invitation was welcome to me. It is now 16 years since I gave in this same hall a lecture on positive criminology, which was then in its initial stages. It
was in 1885, when I had the opportunity to outline the first principles of the positive school of criminology, at the invitation of other students, who
preceded you on the periodic waves of the intellectual generations. And the renewal of this opportunity gave me so much moral satisfaction that, I
could not under any circumstances decline your invitation. Then too, the Neapolitan Atheneum has maintained the reputation of the Italian mind in the
19th century, also in that science which even foreign scientists admit to be our specialty, namely the science of criminology. In fact, aside from the two
terrible books of the Digest, and from the practical criminologists of the Middle Ages who continued the study of criminality, the modern world opened
a glorious page in the progress of criminal science with the modest little book of Cesare Beccaria. This progress leads from Cesare Beccaria, by way
of Francesco Carrara, to Enrico Pessina.

Enrico Pessina alone remains of the two giants who concluded the cycle of classic school of criminology. In a lucid moment of his scientific

consciousness, which soon reverted to the old abstract and metaphysical theories, he announced in an introductory statement in 1879, that criminal
justice would have to rejuvenate itself in the pure bath of the natural sciences and substitute in place of abstraction the living and concrete study of
facts. Naturally every scientist has his function and historical significance; and we cannot expect that a brain which has arrived at the end of its career
should turn towards a new direction. At any rate, it is a significant fact that this most renowned representative of the classic school of criminology
should have pointed out this need of his special science in this same university of Naples, one year after the inauguration of the positive school of
criminology, that he should have looked forward to a time when the study of natural and positive facts would set to rights the old juridical abstractions.
And there is still another precedent in the history of this university, which makes scientific propaganda at this place very agreeable for a positivist. It is
that six years before that introductory statement by Pessina, Giovanni Bovio gave lectures at this university, which he published later on under the title
of "A Critical Study of Criminal Law." Giovanni Bovio performed in this monograph the function of a critic, but the historical time of his thought,
prevented him from taking part in the construction of a new science. However, he prepared the ground for new ideas, by pointing out all the rifts and
weaknesses of the old building. Bovio maintained that which Gioberti, Ellero, Conforti, Tissol had already maintained, namely that it is impossible to
solve the problem which is still the theoretical foundation of the classic school of criminology, the problem of the relation between punishment and
crime. No man, no scientist, no legislator, no judge, has ever been able to indicate any absolute standard, which would enable us to say that equity
demands a definite punishment for a definite crime. We can find some opportunistic expedient, but not a solution of the problem. Of course, if we
could decide which is the gravest crime, then we could also decide on the heaviest sentence and formulate a descending scale which would establish
the relative fitting proportions between crime and punishment. If it is agreed that patricide is the gravest crime, we meet out the heaviest sentence,
death or imprisonment for life, and then we can agree on a descending scale of crime and on a parallel scale of punishments. But the problem begins
right with the first stone of the structure, not with the succeeding steps. Which is the greatest penalty proportional to the crime of patricide? Neither
science, nor legislation, nor moral consciousness, can offer an absolute standard. Some say: The greatest penalty is death. Others say: No,
imprisonment for life. Still others say: Neither death, nor imprisonment for life, but only imprisonment for a time. And if imprisonment for a time is to be
the highest penalty, how many years shall it last —thirty, or twenty-five, or ten?

No man can set up any absolute standard in this matter. Giovanni Bovio thus arrived at the conclusion that this internal contradiction in the science

of criminology was the inevitable fate of human justice, and that this justice, struggling in the grasp of this internal contradiction, must turn to the civil
law and ask for help in its weakness. The same thought had already been illumined by a ray from the bright mind of Filangieri, who died all too soon.
And we can derive from this fact the historical rule that the most barbarian conditions of humanity show a prevalence of a criminal code which punishes
without healing; and that the gradual progress of civilization will give rise to the opposite conception of healing without punishing.

Thus it happens that this university of Naples, in which the illustrious representative of the classic school of criminology realized the necessity of its

regeneration, and in which Bovio foresaw its sterility, has younger teachers now who keep alive the fire of the positivist tendency in criminal science,

such as Penta, Zuccarelli, and others, whom you know. Nevertheless I feel that this faculty of jurisprudence still lacks oxygen in the study of criminal
law, because its thought is still influenced by the overwhelming authority of the name of Enrico Pessina. And it is easy to understand that there, where
the majestic tree spreads out its branches towards the blue vault, the young plant feels deprived of light and air, while it might have grown strong and
beautiful in another place.

The positive school of criminology, then, was born in our own Italy through the singular attraction of the Italian mind toward the study of

criminology; and its birth is also due to the peculiar condition our country with its great and strange contrast between the theoretical doctrines and the
painful fact of an ever increasing criminality.

The positive school of criminology was inaugurate by the work of Cesare Lombroso, in 1872. From 1872 to 1876 he opened a new way for the

study of criminality by demonstrating in his own person that we must first understand the criminal who offends, before we can study and understand his
crime. Lombroso studied the prisoners in the various penitentiaries of Italy from the point of view of anthropology. And he compiled his studies in the
reports of the Lombardian Institute of Science and Literature, and published them later together in his work "Criminal Man." The first edition of this
work (1876) remained almost unnoticed, either because its scientific material was meager, or because Cesare Lombroso had not yet drawn any
general scientific conclusions, which could have attracted the attention of the world of science and law. But simultaneously with its second edition
(1878) there appeared two monographs, which constituted the embryo of the new school, supplementing the anthropological studies of Lombroso
with conclusions and systematizations from the point of view of sociology and law. Raffaele Garofalo published in the Neapolitan Journal of Philosophy
and Literature an essay on criminality, in which he declared that the dangerousness of the criminal was the criterion by which society should measure
the function of its defense against the disease of crime. And in the same year, 1878, I took occasion to publish a monograph on the denial of free will
and personal responsibility, in which I declared frankly that from now on the science of crime and punishment must look for the fundamental facts of a
science of social defense against crime in the human and social life itself. The simultaneous publication of these three monographs caused a stir. The
teachers of classic criminology, who had taken kindly to the recommendations of Pessina and Ellero, urging them to study the natural sources of crime,
met the new ideas with contempt, when the new methods made a determined and radical departure, and became not only the critics, but the zealous
opponents of the new theories. And this is easy to understand. For the struggle for existence is an irresistible law of nature, as well for the thousands of
germs scattered to the winds by the oak, as for the ideas which grow in the brain of man. But persecutions, calumnies, criticisms, and opposition are
powerless against an idea, if it carries within itself the germ of truth. Moreover, we should look upon this phenomenon of a repugnance in the average
intellect (whether of the ordinary man or the scientist) for all new ideas as a natural function. For when the brain of some man has felt the light of a new
idea, a sneering criticism serves us a touchstone for it. If the idea is wrong, it will fall by the wayside; if it is right, then criticisms, opposition and
persecution will cull the golden kernel from the unsightly shell, and the idea will march victoriously over everything and everybody. It is so in all walks
of life—in art, in politics, in science. Every new idea will rouse against itself naturally and inevitably the opposition of the accustomed thoughts. This is
so true, that when Cesare Beccaria opened the great historic cycle of the classic school of criminology, he was assaulted by the critics of his time with
the same indictments which were brought against us a century later.

When Cesare Beccaria printed his book on crime and penalties in 1774 under a false date and place of publication, reflecting the aspirations which

gave rise to the impending hurricane of the French revolution; when he hurled himself against all that was barbarian in the mediaeval laws and set loose
a storm of enthusiasm among the encyclopedists, and even some of the members of government, in France, he was met by a wave of opposition,
calumny and accusation on the part of the majority of jurists, judges and lights of philosophy. The abbi Jachinci published four volumes against
Beccaria, calling him the destroyer of justice and morality, simply because he had combatted the tortures and the death penalty.

The tortures, which we incorrectly ascribe to the mental brutality of the judges of those times, were but a logical consequence of the

contemporaneous theories. It was felt that in order to condemn a man, one must have the certainty of his guilty, and it was said that the best means of
obtaining tins certainty, the queen of proofs, was the confession of the criminal. And if the criminal denied his guilt, it was necessary to have recourse to
torture, in order to force him to a confession which he withheld from fear of the penalty. The torture soothed, so to say, the conscience of the judge,
who was free to condemn as soon as he had obtained a confession. Cesare Beccaria rose with others against the torture. Thereupon the judges and
jurists protested that penal justice would be impossible, because it could not get any information, since a man suspected of a crime would not confess
his guilt voluntarily. Hence they accused Beccaria of being the protector of robbers and murderers, because he wanted to abolish the only means of
compelling them to a confession, the torture. But Cesare Beccaria had on his side the magic power of truth. He was truly the electric accumulator of
his time, who gathered from its atmosphere the presage of the coming revolution, the stirring of the human conscience. You can find a similar illustration
in the works of Daquin in Savoy, of Pinel in France, and of Hach Take in England, who strove to bring about a revolution in the treatment of the
insane. This episode interests us especially, because it is a perfect illustration of the way traveled by the positive school of criminology. The insane
were likewise considered to blame for their insanity. At the dawn of the 19th century, the physician Hernroth still wrote that insanity was a moral sin of
the insane, because "no one becomes insane, unless he forsakes the straight path of virtue and of the fear of the Lord."

And on this assumption the insane were locked up in horrible dungeons, loaded down with chains, tortured and beaten, for lo! their insanity was

their own fault.

At that period, Pinel advanced the revolutionary idea that insanity was not a sin, but a disease like all other diseases. This idea is now a

commonplace, but in his time it revolutionized the world. It seemed as though this innovation inaugurated by Pinel would overthrow the world and the
foundations of society. Well, two years before the storming of the Bastile Pinel walked into the sanitarium of the Salpetriere and committed the brave
act of freeing the insane of the chains that weighed them down. He demonstrated in practice that the insane, when freed of their chains, became
quieter, instead of creating wild disorder and destruction. This great revolution of Pinel, Chiarugi, and others, changed the attitude of the public mind
toward the insane. While formerly insanity had been regarded as a moral sin, the public conscience, thanks to the enlightening work of science,
henceforth had to adapt itself to the truth that insanity is a disease like all others, that a man does not become insane because he wants to, but that he
becomes insane through hereditary transmission and the influence of the environment in which he lives, being predisposed toward insanity and
becoming insane under the pressure of circumstances.

The positive school of criminology accomplished the same revolution in the views concerning the treatment of criminals that the above named men of

science accomplished for the treatment of the insane. The general opinion of classic criminalists and of the people at large is that crime involves a moral
guilt, because it is due to the free will of the individual who leaves the path of virtue and chooses the path of crime, and therefore it must be suppressed

by meeting it with a proportionate quantity of punishment. This is to this day the current conception of crime. And the illusion of a free human will (the
only miraculous factor in the eternal ocean of cause and effect) leads to the assumption that one can choose freely between virtue and vice. How can
you still believe in the existence of a free will, when modern psychology armed with all the instruments of positive modern research, denies that there is
any free will and demonstrates that every act of a human being is the result of an interaction between the personality and the environment of man?

And how is it possible to cling to that obsolete idea of moral guilt, according to which every individual is supposed to have the free choice to

abandon virtue and give himself up to crime? The positive school of criminology maintains, on the contrary, that it is not the criminal who wills; in order
to be a criminal it is rather necessary that the individual should find himself permanently or transitorily in such personal, physical and moral conditions,
and live in such an environment, which become for him a chain of cause and effect, externally and internally, that disposes him toward crime. This is
our conclusion, which I anticipate, and it constitutes the vastly different and opposite method, which the positive school of criminology employs as
compared to the leading principle of the classic school of criminal science.

In this method, this essential principle of the positive school of criminology, you will find another reason for the seemingly slow advance of this

school. That is very natural. If you consider the great reform carried by the ideas of Cesare Beccaria into the criminal justice of the Middle Age, you
will see that the great classic school represents but a small step forward, because it leaves the penal justice on the same theoretical and practical basis
which it had in the Middle Age and in classic antiquity, that is to say, based on the idea of a moral responsibility of the individual. For Beccaria, for
Carrara, for their predecessors, this idea is no more nor less than that mentioned in books 47 and 48 of the Digest: "The criminal is liable to
punishment to the extent that he is morally guilty of the crime he has committed." The entire classic school is, therefore, nothing but a series of reforms.
Capital punishment has been abolished in some countries, likewise torture, confiscation, corporal punishment. But nevertheless the immense scientific
movement of the classic school has remained a mere reform.

It has continued in the 19th century to look upon crime in the same way that the Middle Age did: "Whoever commits murder or theft, is alone the

absolute arbiter to decide whether he wants to commit the crime or not." This remains the foundation of the classic school of criminology. This explains
why it could travel on its way more rapidly than the positive school of criminology. And yet, it took half a century from the time of Beccaria, before the
penal codes showed signs of the reformatory influence of the classic school of criminology. So that it has also taken quite a long time to establish it so
well that it became accepted by general consent, as it is today. The positive school of criminology was born in 1878, and although it does not stand for
a mere reform of the methods of criminal justice, but for a complete and fundamental transformation of criminal justice itself, it has already gone quite a
distance and made considerable conquests which begin to show in our country. It is a fact that the penal code now in force in this country represents a
compromise, so far as the theory of personal responsibility is concerned, between the old theory of free will and the conclusions of the positive school
which denies this free will.

You can find an illustration of this in the eloquent contortions of phantastic logic in the essays on the criminal code written by a great advocate of the

classic school of criminology, Mario Pagano, this admirable type of a scientist and patriot, who does not lock himself up in the quiet egoism of his
study, but feels the ideal of his time stirring within him and gives up his life to it. He has written three lines of a simple nudity that reveals much, in which
he says: "A man is responsible for the crimes which he commits; if, in committing a crime, his will is half free, he is responsible to the extent of one-half;
if one-third, he is responsible one-third." There you have the uncompromising and absolute classic theorem. But in the penal code of 1890, you will
find that the famous article 45 intends to base the responsibility for a crime on the simple will, to the exclusion of the free will. However, the Italian
judge has continued to base the exercise of penal justice on the supposed existence of the free will, and pretends not to know that the number of
scientists denying the free will is growing. Now, how is it possible that so terrible an office as that of sentencing criminals retains its stability or
vacillates, according to whether the first who denies the existence of a free will deprives this function of its foundation?

Truly, it is said that this question has been too difficult for the new Italian penal code. And, for this reason, it was thought best to base the

responsibility for a crime on the idea that a man is guilty simply for the reason that he wanted to commit the crime; and that he is not responsible if he
did not want to commit it. But this is an eclectic way out of the difficulty, which settles nothing, for in the same code we have the rule that involuntary
criminals are also punished, so that involuntary killing and wounding are punished with imprisonment the same as voluntary deeds of this kind. We have
heard it said in such cases that the result may not have been intended, but the action bringing it about was. If a hunter shoots through a hedge and kills
or wounds a person, he did not intend to kill, and yet he is held responsible because his first act, the shooting, was voluntary.

That statement applies to involuntary crimes, which are committed by some positive act. But what about involuntary crimes of omission? In a

railway station, where the movements of trains represent the daily whirl of traffic in men, things, and ideas, every switch is a delicate instrument which
may cause a derailment. The railway management places a switchman on duty at this delicate post. But in a moment of fatigue, or because he had to
work inhumanly long hours of work, which exhausted all his nervous elasticity, or for other reasons, the switchman forgets to set the switch and causes
a railroad accident, in which people are killed and wounded. Can it be said that he intended the first act? Assuredly not, for he did not intend anything
and did not do anything. The hunter who fires a shot has at least had the intention of shooting. But the switchman did not want to forget (for in that
case he would be indirectly to blame); he has simply forgotten from sheer fatigue to do his duty; he has had no intention whatever, and yet you hold
him responsible in spite of all that! The fundamental logic of your reasoning in this case corresponds to the logic of the things. Does it not happen every
day in the administration of justice that the judges forget about the neutral expedient of the legislator who devised this relative progress of the penal
code, which pretends to base the responsibility of a man on the neutral and naive criterion of a will without freedom of will? Do they not follow their
old mental habits in the administration of justice and apply the obsolete criterion of the free will, which the legislator thought fit to abandon? We see,
then, as a result of this imperfect and insincere innovation in penal legislation this flagrant contradiction, that the magistrates assume the existence of a
free will, while the legislator has decided that it shall not be assumed. Now, in science as well as in legislation, we should follow a direct and logical
line, such as that of the classic school or the positive school of criminology. But whoever thinks he has solved a problem when he gives us a solution
which is neither fish nor fowl, comes to the most absurd and iniquitous conclusions. You see what happens every day. If to-morrow some beastly and
incomprehensible crime is committed, the conscience of the judge is troubled by this question: Was the person who committed this crime morally free
to act or not? He may also invoke the help of legislation, and he may take refuge in article 46,[A] or in that compromise of article 47,[B] which admits
a responsibility of one-half or one-third, and he would decide on a penalty of one-half or one-third.

All this may take place in the case of a grave and strange crime. And on the other hand, go to the municipal courts or to the police courts, where the

magic lantern of justice throws its rays upon the nameless human beings who have stolen a bundle of wood in a hard winter, or who have slapped

some one in the face during a brawl in a saloon. And if they should find a defending lawyer who would demand the appointment of a medical expert,
watch the reception he would get from the judge. When justice is surprised by a beastly and strange crime, it feels the entire foundation of its premises
shaking, it halts for a moment, it calls in the help of legal medicine, and reflects before it sentences. But in the case of those poor nameless creatures,
justice does not stop to consider whether that microbe in the criminal world who steals under the influence of hereditary or acquired degeneration, or
in the delirium of chronic hunger, is not worthy of more pity. It rather replies with a mephistophelian grin when he begs for a humane understanding of
his case.

[A] Article 46: "A person is not subject to punishment, if at the moment of his deed he was in a mental condition which deprived him of

consciousness or of the freedom of action. But if the judge considers it dangerous to acquit the prisoner, he has to transfer him to the care of the
proper authorities, who will take the necessary precautions."

[B] Article 47: "If the mental condition mentioned in the foregoing article was such as to considerably decrease the responsibility, without eliminating

it entirely, the penalty fixed upon the crime committed is reduced according to the following rules:

"I. In place of penitentiary, imprisonment for not less than six years.

"II. In place of the permanent loss of civic rights, a loss of these rights for a stipulated time.

"III. Whenever it is a question of a penalty of more than twelve years, it is reduced to from three to ten years; if of more than six years, but not more

than twelve, it is reduced to from one to five years; in other cases, the reduction is to be one-half of the ordinary penalty.

"IV. A fine is reduced to one-half.

"V. If the penalty would be a restriction of personal liberty, the judge may order the prisoner to a workhouse, until the proper authorities object,

when the remainder of the sentence is carried out in the usual manner."

It is true that there is now and then in those halls of justice, which remain all too frequently closed to the living wave of public sentiment, some more

intelligent and serene judge who is touched by this painful understanding of the actual human life. Then he may, under the illogical conditions of penal
justice, with its compromise between the exactness of the classic and that of the positive school of criminology, seek for some expedient which may
restore him to equanimity.

In 1832, France introduced a penal innovation, which seemed to represent an advance on the field of justice, but which is in reality a denial of

justice: The expedient of extenuating circumstances. The judge does not ask for the advice of the court physician in the case of some forlorn
criminal, but condemns him without a word of rebuke to society for its complicity. But in order to assuage his own conscience he grants him
extenuating circumstances, which seem a concession of justice, but are, in reality, a denial of justice. For you either believe that a man is responsible
for his crime, and in that case the concession of extenuating circumstances is a hypocrisy; or you grant them in good faith, and then you admit that the
man was in circumstances which reduced his moral responsibility, and thereby the extenuating circumstances become a denial of justice. For if your
conviction concerning such circumstances were sincere, you would go to the bottom of them and examine with the light of your understanding all those
innumerable conditions which contribute toward those extenuating circumstances. But what are those extenuating circumstances? Family conditions?
Take it that a child is left alone by its parents, who are swallowed up in the whirl of modern industry, which overthrows the laws of nature and forbids
the necessary rest, because steam engines do not get tired and day work must be followed by night work, so that the setting of the sun is no longer the
signal for the laborer to rest, but to begin a new shift of work. Take it that this applies not alone to adults, but also to human beings in the growing
stage, whose muscular power may yield some profit for the capitalists. Take it that even the mother, during the period of sacred maternity, becomes a
cog in the machinery of industry. And you will understand that the child must grow up, left to its own resources, in the filth of life, and that its history
will be inscribed in criminal statistics, which are the shame of our so-called civilization.

Of course, in this first lecture I cannot give you even a glimpse of the positive results of that modern science which has studied the criminal and his

environment instead of his crimes. And I must, therefore, limit myself to a few hints concerning the historical origin of the positive school of criminology.
I ought to tell you something concerning the question of free will. But you will understand that such a momentous question, which is worthy of a deep
study of the many-sided physical, moral, intellectual life, cannot be summed up in a few short words. I can only say that the tendency of modern
natural sciences, in physiology as well as psychology, has overruled the illusions of those who would fain persist in watching psychological phenomena
merely within themselves and think that they can understand them without any other means. On the contrary, positive science, backed by the testimony
of anthropology and of the study of the environment, has arrived at the following conclusions: The admission of a free will is out of the question. For if
the free will is but an illusion of our internal being, it is not a real faculty possessed by the human mind. Free will would imply that the human will,
confronted by the choice of making voluntarily a certain determination, has the last decisive word under the pressure of circumstances contending for
and against this decision; that it is free to decide for or against a certain course independently of internal and external circumstances, which play upon
it, according to the laws of cause and effect.

Take it that a man has insulted me. I leave the place in which I have been insulted, and with me goes the suggestion of forgiveness or of murder and

vengeance. And then it is assumed that a man has his complete free will, unless he is influenced by circumstances explicitly enumerated by the law,
such as minority, congenital deaf-muteness, insanity, habitual drunkenness and, to a certain extent, violent passion. If a man is not in a condition
mentioned in this list, he is considered in possession of his free will, and if he murders he is held morally responsible and therefore punished.

This illusion of a free will has its source in our inner consciousness, and is due solely to the ignorance in which we find ourselves concerning the

various motives and different external and internal conditions which press upon our mind at the moment of decision.

If a man knows the principal causes which determine a certain phenomenon, he says that this phenomenon is inevitable. If he does not know them,

he considers it as an accident, and this corresponds in the physical field to the arbitrary phenomenon of the human will which does not know whether it
shall decide this way or that. For instance, some of us were of the opinion, and many still are, that the coming and going of meteorological phenomena
was accidental and could not he foreseen. But in the meantime, science has demonstrated that they are likewise subject to the law of causality,
because it discovered the causes which enable us to foresee their course. Thus weather prognosis has made wonderful progress by the help of a
network of telegraphically connected meteorological stations, which succeeded in demonstrating the connection between cause and effect in the case

of hurricanes, as well as of any other physical phenomenon. It is evident that the idea of accident, applied to physical nature, is unscientific. Every
physical phenomenon is the necessary effect of the causes that determined it beforehand. If those causes are known to us, we have the conviction that
that phenomenon is necessary, is fate, and, if we do not know them, we think it is accidental. The same is true of human phenomena. But since we do
not know the internal and external causes in the majority of cases, we pretend that they are free phenomena, that is to say, that they are not determined
necessarily by their causes. Hence the spiritualistic conception of the free will implies that every human being, in spite of the fact that their internal and
external conditions are necessarily predetermined, should be able to come to a deliberate decision by the mere fiat of his or her free will, so that, even
though the sum of all the causes demands a no, he or she can decide in favor of yes, and vice versa. Now, who is there that thinks, when deliberating
some action, what are the causes that determine his choice? We can justly say that the greater part of our actions are determined by habit, that we
make up our minds almost from custom, without considering the reason for or against. When we get up in the morning we go about our customary
business quite automatically, we perform it as a function in which we do not think of a free will. We think of that only in unusual and grave cases, when
we are called upon to make some special choice, the so-called voluntary deliberation, and then we weigh the reasons for or against; we ponder, we
hesitate what to do. Well, even in such cases, so little depends on our will in the deliberations which we are about to take that if any one were to ask
us one minute before we have decided what we are going to do, we should not know what we were going to decide. So long as we are undecided,
we cannot foresee what we are going to decide; for under the conditions in which we live that part of the psychic process takes place outside of our
consciousness. And since we do not know its causes, we cannot tell what will be its effects. Only after we have come to a certain decision can we
imagine that it was due to our voluntary action. But shortly before we could not tell, and that proves that it did not depend on us alone. Suppose, for
instance, that you have decided to play a joke on a fellow-student, and that you carry it out. He takes it unkindly. You are surprised, because that is
contrary to his habits and your expectations. But after a while you learn that your friend had received bad news from home on the preceding morning
and was therefore not in a condition to feel like joking, and then you say: "If we had known that we should not have decided to spring the joke on
him." That is equivalent to saying that, if the balance of your will had been inclined toward the deciding motive of no, you would have decided no; but
not knowing that your friend was distressed and not in his habitual frame of mind, you decided in favor of yes. This sentence: "If I had known this I
should not have done that" is an outcry of our internal consciousness, which denies the existence of a free will.

On the other hand, nothing is created and nothing destroyed either in matter or in force, because both matter and force are eternal and

indestructible. They transform themselves in the most diversified manner, but not an atom is added or taken away, not one vibration more or less takes
place. And so if is the force of external and internal circumstances which determines the decision of our will at any given moment. The idea of a free
will, however, is a denial of the law of cause and effect, both in the field of philosophy and theology. Saint Augustine and Martin Luther furnish
irrefutable theological arguments for the denial of a free will. The omnipotence of God is irreconcilable with the idea of free will. If everything that
happens does so because a superhuman and omnipotent power wants it (Not a single leaf falls to the ground without the will of God), how can a
son murder his father without the permission and will of God? For this reason Saint Augustine and Martin Luther have written de servo arbitrio.

But since theological arguments serve only those who believe in the concept of a god, which is not given to us by science, we take recourse to the

laws which we observe in force and matter, and to the law of causality. If modern science has discovered the universal link which connects all
phenomena through cause and effect, which shows that every phenomenon is the result of causes which have preceded it; if this is the law of causality,
which is at the very bottom of modern scientific thought, then it is evident that the admission of free thought is equivalent to an overthrow of this law,
according to which every effect is proportionate to its cause. In that case, this law, which reigns supreme in the entire universe, would dissolve itself
into naught at the feet of the human being, who would create effects with his free will not corresponding to their causes! It was all right to think so at a
time when people had an entirely different idea of human beings. But the work of modern science, and its effect on practical life, has resulted in tracing
the relations of each one of us with the world and with our fellow beings. And the influence of science may be seen in the elimination of great illusions
which in former centuries swayed this or that part of civilized humanity. The scientific thought of Copernicus and Galilei did away with the illusions
which led people to believe that the earth was the center of the universe and of creation.

Take Cicero's book de Officims, or the Divina Commedia of Dante, and you will find that to them the earth is the center of creation, that the

infinite stars circle around it, and that man is the king of animals: a geocentric and anthropocentric illusion inspired by immeasurable conceit. But
Copernicus and Galilei came and demonstrated that the earth does not stand still, but that it is a grain of cosmic matter hurled into blue infinity and
rotating since time unknown around its central body, the sun, which originated from an immense primitive nebula. Galilei was subjected to tortures by
those who realized that this new theory struck down many a religious legend and many a moral creed. But Galilei had spoken the truth, and nowadays
humanity no longer indulges in the illusion that the earth is the center of creation.

But men live on illusions and give way but reluctantly to the progress of science, in order to devote themselves arduously to the ideal of the new

truths which rise out of the essence of things of which mankind is a part. After the geocentric illusion had been destroyed, the anthropocentric illusion
still remained. On earth, man was still supposed to be king of creation, the center of terrestrial life. All Species of animals, plants and minerals were
supposed to be created expressly for him, and to have had from time immemorial the forms which we see now, so that the fauna and flora living on our
planet have always been what they are today. And Cicero, for instance, said that the heavens were placed around the earth and man in order that he
might admire the beauty of the starry firmament at night, and that animals and plants were created for his use and pleasure. But in 1856 Charles
Darwin came and, summarizing the results of studies that had been carried on for a century, destroyed in the name of science the superb illusion that
man is the king and center of creation. He demonstrated, amid the attacks and calumnies of the lovers of darkness, that man is not the king of creation,
but merely the last link of the zoological chain, that nature is endowed with eternal energies by which animal and plant life, the same as mineral life (for
even in crystals the laws of life are at work), are transformed from the invisible microbe to the highest form, man.

The anthropocentric illusion rebelled against the word of Darwin, accusing him of lowering the human life to the level of the dirt or of the brute. But a

disciple of Darwin gave the right answer, while propagating the Darwinian theory at the university of Jena. It was Haeckel, who concluded: "For my
part, and so far as my human consciousness is concerned, I prefer to be an immensely perfected ape rather than to be a degenerated and debased
Adam."

Gradually the anthropocentric illusion has been compelled to give way before the results of science, and today the theories of Darwin have become

established among our ideas. But another illusion still remains, and science, working in the name of reality, will gradually eliminate it, namely the illusion
that the nineteenth century has established a permanent order of society. While the geocentric and anthropocentric illusions have been dispelled, the
illusion of the immobility and eternity of classes still persists. But it is well to remember that in Holland in the sixteenth century, in England in the

seventeenth, in Europe since the revolution of 1789, we have seen that freedom of thought in science, literature and art, for which the bourgeoisie
fought, triumphed over the tyranny of the mediaeval dogma. And this condition, instead of being a glorious but transitory stage, is supposed to be the
end of the development of humanity, which is henceforth condemned not to perfect itself any more by further changes. This is the illusion which serves
as a fundamental argument against the positive school of criminology, since it is claimed that a penal justice enthroned on the foundations of Beccaria
and Carrara would be a revolutionary heresy. It is also this illusion which serves as an argument against those who draw the logical consequences in
regard to the socialistic future of humanity, for the science which takes its departure front the work of Copernicus, Galilei and Darwin arrives logically
at socialism. Socialism is but the natural and physical transformation of the economic and social institutions. Of course, so long as the geocentric and
anthropocentric illusions dominate, it is natural that the lore of stability should impress itself upon science and life. How could this living atom, which the
human being is, undertake to change that order of creation, which makes of the earth the center of the universe and of man the center of life? Not until
science had introduced the conception of a natural formation and transformation, of the solar system, as well as of the fauna and flora, did the human
mind grasp the idea that thought and action can transform the world.

For this reason we believe that the study of the criminal, and the logical consequences therefrom, will bring about the complete transformation of

human justice, not only as a theory laid down in scientific books, but also as a practical function applied every day to that living and suffering portion of
humanity which has fallen into crime. We have the undaunted faith that the work of scientific truth will transform penal justice into a simple function of
preserving society from the disease of crime, divested of all relics of vengeance, hatred and punishment, which still survive in our day as living
reminders of the barbarian stage. We still hear the "public vengeance" invoked against the criminal today, and justice has still for its symbol a sword,
which it uses more than the scales. But a judge born of a woman cannot weigh the moral responsibility of one who has committed murder or theft. Not
until the experimental and scientific method shall look for the causes of that dangerous malady, which we call crime, in the physical and psychic
organism, and in the family and the environment, of the criminal, will justice guided by science discard the sword which now descends bloody upon
those poor fellow-beings who have fallen victims to crime, and become a clinical function, whose prime object shall be to remove or lessen in society
and individuals the causes which incite to crime. Then alone will justice refrain from wreaking vengeance, after a crime has been committed, with the
shame of an execution or the absurdity of solitary confinement.

On the one hand, human life depends on the word of a judge, who may err in the ca...