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The Politics of Intervention THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF CUBA, 1906-1909 BY ALLAN REED MILLETT • * III 111 I upr ^ $6.50 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909 BY ALLAN R. MILLETT In September, 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt sent 5,000 American troops to Cuba to put an end to insurrection and assumed direct control of the Cuban government. The United States Army occupied the island almost three years in an attempt to restore the status quo ante bellum—to re store, that is, that measure of stability that had been Cuba's following the Spanish- American War. The occupation was based on the assumption that insuring the peace of an area was the purpose of intervention and that stability was the necessary outgrowth of any public order that was established. Although the Army was in Cuba to serve as the instrument of American policy, its officers often favored alternative goals to those prescribed by official policy. Some be lieved that American interests would best be served if fundamental changes in Cuban domestic institutions were encouraged; and although they agreed that supervised elec tions were essential to a graceful withdrawal on the part of the United States, they main tained that elections were not the same as the reforms that they saw as the key to the stability that it was their obligation to assure. Mr. Millett's investigation of the Cuban intervention does much to reveal the larger dimensions of an issue that continues to exer cise our government today. For the question of whether temporary stability brought about by force but unaccompanied by reform can result in lasting peace is one that continues to confront those who formulate our present policy in Latin America and, perhaps, in all other parts of the world as well. Allan R. Millett is assistant professor of his tory at the University of Missouri, Columbia. The Politics of Intervention A PUBLICATION OF THE MERSHON CENTER FOR EDUCATION IN NATIONAL SECURITY The Politics of Intervention THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF CUBA, 1906-1909 BY ALLAN REED MILLETT .. '•> OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS COPYRIGHT © 1968 BY THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number: 68-10270 Preface I N THE YEARS immediately following the Spanish-American War, the realities of Cuban independence weighed heavily on the United States. In Sep tember, 1906, as the result of an insurrection in Cuba, Theodore Roosevelt, citing his responsibilities to Cuba under the Platt Amendment, intervened to end the war and reluctantly as sumed direct control of the Cuban government. Five thousand American troops occupied the island. Until the occupation ended in 1909, the American government attempted to restore the pre-revolt political alignment, although the intervention and occupation had made such a restoration impossible. This policy was determined by some factors that had little relation to Cuban political life: recent civil and military experiences in the Philippines and the public reaction to them, the Ameri can presumption that the occupation was temporary, American assumptions about the efficacy of political parties as a mode of political expression, and the Roosevelt administration's con clusion that popular elections were essential to stable and legitimate government. Political and economic influence in one form or another was the historic state of relations between the United States and Cuba. Constitutionalized as the right of intervention after 1898, this relationship became the promise of active political and administrative control of Cuba by the United States under certain conditions which might threaten Cuba's independence. It was assumed that the United States would be the initiator of such action. The possibility of intervention, however, as pledged in the organic law of both countries was a constant VI PREFACE factor in the plans, fears, and aspirations of Cuba's political leaders as they sought to turn American policy to their personal advantage. Yet United States policy-makers were only half-aware of the implications of their relationship with Cuba. They assumed that the orderly transfer of power in a system of government was the irreducible condition of stability, in American usage, for it represented the violence-free accommodation of com peting interest groups within the body politic. In terms of day-to-day conditions, the absence of politically significant violence was the gauge by which stability was measured. In all, stability was a rather mysterious but prized condition. When applied to Cuba, this definition was a narrow measure of that nation's capacity for peaceful internal change. But in American diplomatic usage, the maintenance of peace rather than the substance of internal change was the criterion for non-intervention. Although this book is a political history, it stresses the use of American armed forces in the Cuban crisis of 1906 and the occupation that followed. It emphasizes the role of officers of the United States Army in the policy-making process and their relations with their civil superiors in determining both the character of the Cuban intervention and the programs of the occupation. In terms of policy the Army officers serving in Cuba during the Second Intervention (as differentiated from the one of 1898) influenced the decisions made within the Provisional Government. More importantly, they favored alternatives to American policy, which were rejected. They differed with the United States political leaders by believing American policy would be best served if basic changes were encouraged in Cuba's domestic institutions. Unenthusiastic about dealing with Cuba's professional politicians and placing little faith in the reforming potential of Cuba's political parties, the officers realized that supervised elections were essential to the grace ful liquidation of the occupation, but doubted the wisdom of both elections and withdrawal. They believed that continued,