The Political Economy of Anti-dumping Protection: A Strategic Analysis

176 Pages·2015·2.33 MB·English

by  Patricia Wruuck (auth.)

Contributions to Economics
Patricia Wruuck
The Political
Economy of
Anti-dumping
Protection
A Strategic Analysis
Contributions to Economics
More information about this series at
http://www.springer.com/series/1262
Patricia Wruuck
The Political Economy of
Anti-dumping Protection
A Strategic Analysis
PatriciaWruuck
Frankfurt
Germany
Accepted as a Dissertation at the University of Mannheim under the title
“Antidumping:AStrategicView”in2013.
ISSN1431-1933 ISSN2197-7178 (electronic)
ContributionstoEconomics
ISBN978-3-319-11223-7 ISBN978-3-319-11224-4 (eBook)
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-11224-4
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015931646
SpringerChamHeidelbergNewYorkDordrechtLondon
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Contents
1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 InstitutionsandTradePolicy:AReview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1 InstitutionsShapeCountries’TradePolicies. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . 11
2.1.1 InstitutionsandTradePolicy:OverviewofTheoretical
Arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.2 InstitutionsandTradePolicy:EmpiricalStudies. . . . . . . 17
2.2 InstitutionsandCountries’InteractiononTradeIssues. . . . . . . . 25
2.3 AStrategicPerspectivefortheAnalysisofTradePolicy. . . . . . 29
2.4 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 WinningCoalitionSizeandtheUseofAnti-dumping. . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1 DoestheSizeoftheWinningCoalitionAffectAD?
TheTheoreticalRationale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.1.1 ABriefAccountofSelectorateTheory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1.2 SelectorateTheoryandTradePolicy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 ApplyingSelectorateTheorytoAnti-dumping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.1 AdministeredProtection:ASpecialCase?. . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.2 PublicGoods,PrivateGoodsandAD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.3 Hypotheses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3 DataandEmpiricalApproach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3.1 DescriptionoftheSample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3.2 OperationalisationofExplanatoryVariables. . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3.3 DependentVariable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4 StylisedFactsAboutADUseandDescriptiveDataAnalysis. . . 60
3.4.1 ADUseandtheSizeoftheWinningCoalition:
DescriptiveAssessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 TheEmpiricalModel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.1 TheBasicModellingConcept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.2 AdaptingtheFrameworktoAD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
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viii Contents
3.5.3 AssessingADUse:LogitModelResults. . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5.4 AssessingIntensityofADUse:TobitModelResults. . . . 70
3.6 DiscussionofResults. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4 AStrategicAnalysisofAnti-dumping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.1 DevelopingaStrategicModelofAnti-dumpingInvestigations. . . 80
4.1.1 AssumptionsoftheModel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.1.2 DeterminingthePayoffsintheModel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1.3 SolvingtheGameandDerivingComparativeStatics. . . . 88
4.1.4 ModellingtheEffectofInstitutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.1.5 DiscussionofAssumptionsforExtensionand
Generalization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2 TheEmpiricalModel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2.1 DerivingtheEmpiricalModel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2.2 SpecificationofUtilities.. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . 97
4.3 DataandVariables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.3.1 DescriptionoftheSampleandVariables. . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4 EmpiricalResults. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.4.1 InitialDescriptiveDataAnalysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.4.2 StrategicProbitRegressionResults.. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 112
4.4.3 ExaminationofMarginalEffectsandDiscussion
ofResults. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.5 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5 ConcludingRemarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Appendix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
List of Graphs
Graph2.1 Asimplestrategicmodel........................................... 30
Graph3.1 Relationbetweenwinningcoalitionsizeandtrade
protection............................................................. 45
Graph3.2 Structureofthesamples............................................ 57
Graph3.3 Effectsofcoalitionsize............................................. 71
Graph4.1 ThestylisedADgame.............................................. 81
Graph4.2 TheADgamewithsamplepayoffsandno
uncertainty........................................................... 88
Graph4.3 ExtensionoftheADgamewithinstitutionsandsample
payoffs................................................................ 91
Graph4.4 Summarisingtheimpactofdomesticinstitutions................ 92
Graph4.5 Derivingtheempiricalmodel...................................... 98
Graph4.6 Distributionofoutcomes............................................ 101
Graph4.7 Distributionofoutcomesbycountryandcoalitionsize......... 110
Graph4.8 Effectofcontinuousindependentvariables.Sizeofthe
winningcoalition.................................................... 119
Graph4.9 Effectofcontinuousindependentvariables.Relative
economicsize........................................................ 121
Graph4.10 Effectofcontinuousindependentvariables.Differentlevels
ofdevelopment...................................................... 123
Graph4.11 Effectofcontinuousindependentvariables.Absolute
economicsize........................................................ 124
Graph4.12 Effectofcontinuousindependentvariables.Target’s
GDPp.c............................................................... 126
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