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The Philosophy of Science OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE General Editor: Paul Humphreys, University of Virginia Advisory Board Anouk Barberousse (European Editor) Robert W. Batterman Jeremy Butterfield Peter Galison Philip Kitcher Margaret Morrison James Woodward The Book of Evidence Making Things Happen: A Theory of Peter Achinstein Causal Explanation James Woodward Science, Truth, and Democracy Philip Kitcher Mathematics and Scientific Representation Inconsistency, Asymmetery, and Non- Christopher Pincock Locality: A Philosophical Investigation of Classical Electrodynamics Simulation and Similarity: Using Mathias Frisch Models to Understand the World Michael Weisberg The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Systemacity: The Nature of Science Emergence Paul Hoyningen- Huene Robert W. Batterman Causation and Its Basis in Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary Fundamental Physics Approach to Models and Scientific Douglas Kutach Reasoning Reconstructing Reality: Models, Newton C. A. da Costa and Mathematics, and Simulations Steven French Margaret Morrison Inventing Temperature: Measurement The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the and Scientific Progress Foundations of the Social Sciences Hasok Chang Brian Epstein The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Understanding Scientific Physics 1915– 1925 Understanding Thomas Ryckman Henk de Regt The Philosophy of Science A COMPANION Edited by Anouk Barberousse, Denis Bonnay, and Mikaël Cozic 1 1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Editions Vuibert-Paris 2011 as Précis de Philosophie des Sciences © English translation Oxford University Press 2018 © Oxford University Press 2018 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress ISBN 978– 0– 19– 069064– 9 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America Contents Preface vii Acknowledgments xiii About the Contributors xv Part I | General Philosophy of Science 1. Scientific Explanation— Denis Bonnay 3 2. Confirmation and Induction— Mikaël Cozic 53 3. Causality— Max Kistler 95 4. Metaphysics of Science as Naturalized Metaphysics—M ichael Esfeld 142 5. Theories and Models— Marion Vorms 171 6. Scientific Change— Anouk Barberousse and Marion Vorms 225 7. P hilosophy of Science and Science Studies— Anouk Barberousse 259 8. Reduction and Emergence— Pascal Ludwig 285 Part II | Philosophy of the Special Sciences 9. Philosophy of Logic— Philippe de Rouilhan 319 10. Philosophy of Mathematics— Denis Bonnay and Jacques Dubucs 349 11. Philosophy of Physics— Anouk Barberousse 405 12. Philosophy of Biology— Thomas Pradeu 430 13. Philosophy of Medicine— Élodie Giroux and Maël Lemoine 464 14. Philosophy of Social Sciences— Jon Elster and Hélène Landemore 510 15. Philosophy of Economics— Mikaël Cozic 542 v vi Contents 16. Philosophy of Cognitive Science— Daniel Andler 595 17. Philosophy of Linguistics— Paul Égré 654 Index 727 Preface General Introduction Philosophy of science has the aim of answering those questions raised by scientific activity that are not directly addressed by science itself. Among such questions, we can mention: What are the overall goals of science, as well as the specific goals of its var- ious branches? By what means are these goals pursued? What basic principles does it put into practice? Philosophy of science also tries to understand the relationships that exist between the scientific disciplines. To what extent, and in what sense, are they, and should they be, unified? Also belonging to its domain is the relationship between science and reality. What, if anything, does science tell us about reality? And to what extent is it justified in making the claims it does? Just like the sciences themselves, current philosophy of science is multifaceted and specialized. A philosopher of science may embark on projects as diverse as the develop- ment of a formal analysis of the concept of confirmation using probability theory and the study of the potential contribution neuroscience may bring to our understanding of consciousness. Thus, it becomes difficult for both students and researchers within a given domain to be aware of the advances and challenges arising in any specific area in philosophy of science. The aim of the present book is to expose the main questions, as well as some of the answers, being discussed in today’s philosophy of science. We view it as the “missing link” between introductions and research, and our own goals will have been met if this book successfully bridges the gap between introductions to the philosophy of science meant for a general audience on the one hand, and research articles and monographs vii viii Preface on the other. It is therefore primarily intended for the use of advanced undergrad- uate or graduate students who, after a first introduction to the area, may now wish to deepen their knowledge. We also hope that The Philosophy of Science: A Companion will be useful to both junior and senior researchers in philosophy of science wishing to fa- miliarize themselves with areas outside of their own. Philosophy of science has become too specialized for this goal to be achieved by any one person. Thus, our book is a collective effort. We have nevertheless endeavored to present the basic problems that shape contemporary philosophy of science in a co- herent way. In contrast with encyclopedias, where contributions tend to simply coexist and thus lack organic unity, we have tried to maximize complementarity and cross- referencing between the chapters. Our hope is that this has favored a strong sense of unity, something that is always hard to attain in such collective undertakings. Part I: General Philosophy of Science The two parts of The Philosophy of Science mirror the traditional distinction between general philosophy of science and philosophy of the special sciences. General Philosophy of Science (Part I) deals with generic issues raised by scientific activity, independent of specific disciplines. General philosophy of science was the very core of philosophy of science up to the middle of the twentieth century. Philosophy of science itself has dramatically evolved over the last several decades, becoming increasingly devoted to issues raised by specific scientific disciplines. The study of general problems nevertheless remains a highly active element of philosophy of science. Moreover, it is our opinion that the study of these general problems is indispensable to those who focus on the philosophy of some particular scientific discipline or area, since they represent a set of tools invaluable to understanding their own, specific objects of study. The objective of the first part of the book is twofold. We intend to both take stock of the traditional questions which have shaped analytic philosophy of science and to introduce certain problems that have been raised more recently. Thus the first two chapters, bearing upon explanation and confirmation, respectively, tackle issues that were the subject of intense debate in the middle of the twentieth century— notably among philosophers of science influenced by logical empiricism— and which, as we shall see, are still much studied today. With causality, c hapter 3 also focuses on a traditional concept, though one to which logical empiricism has been rather hostile. Causality is now at the epicenter of a very vibrant area, straddling the borders of philosophy of science and metaphysics. Metaphysics is also at the heart of c hapter 4, which deals with scientific realism (an issue that underwent a thorough overhaul during the 1980s) and the metaphysics of science, constituting a topic that is much discussed today. Chapter 5 addresses the issue of knowing how best to analyze some of science’s primary products, namely theories and models. Starting from the “received view” of scientific theories, inherited from logical empiricism, it discusses the objections that have been raised against this view while also looking at alternative conceptions. Lastly, chapter 8 deals with issues surrounding the reduction and emergence of properties Preface ix and/ or theories coming from distinct scientific disciplines. Logical empiricism also contributed greatly to this research area. We shall see that current reflection on the matter is closely related to metaphysics, philosophy of knowledge, and sometimes also to the philosophy of the special sciences (particularly the philosophy of mind). In our view, these six topics—e xplanation, confirmation, causality, scientific realism, the nature of theories and models, and reduction— constitute the core of general philosophy of science, even if they do not exhaust it. This latter consideration in mind, two further issues are also touched on in Part I. Chapter 6 studies the di- achronic dimensions of scientific activity, a topic made famous by Kuhn’s much cel- ebrated book (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962/ 1970). Chapter 7 is more meta- philosophical in character: it reviews the relations between philosophy of science and other approaches (notably historical and sociological) which share in the aim of analyzing scientific activity and which are currently referred to as sciences studies. Although comprehensive, this does not cover all topics having a justifiable claim to the label of general philosophy of science. For instance, the growing literature on statistics and statistical reasoning is not represented. But it is our contention that Part I of The Philosophy of Science will provide the reader with a satisfyingly complete survey of contemporary general philosophy of science. Part II: Philosophy of the Special Sciences For several decades, philosophers of science have increasingly directed their attention toward the finer details of scientific activity, in particular to issues exclusive to specific disciplines. These issues are the object of the philosophy of the special sciences, to which the second part of The Philosophy of Science is devoted. Compared with general philosophy of science, philosophy of the special sciences appears two- sided. Certain problems are essentially instances or applications of issues belonging to general philosophy of science. In this case, more often than not, the targeted area of knowledge requires some reconsideration of the issue on the part of the philosopher. For instance, the issue of justification or confirmation of theories raises specific problems when one studies, let’s say, economic or mathemat- ical theories, as opposed to theories from physics, which often serve to illustrate confirmation theories. By contrast, certain other issues in the philosophy of the special sciences are entirely generated by the specific concepts and methods of a given field. The discussions on the concept of function (in biology) or on the nature of linguistic universals (in linguistics) are two cases in point. The main objective of the second part of this volume is to introduce the reader to a representative sample of the issues that currently structure the philosophy of the special sciences. We have done our best to respect this two- sided character, i.e., to show how some of the issues are very closely linked to the “big” issues in general philosophy of science while others are specific to certain specialized domains of science. The first two chapters of Part II are devoted to the philosophy of the formal sciences. More precisely, chapter 9 is concerned with logic and chapter 10 with mathematics. The