The Philosophy of History

487 Pages·2001·1.74 MB·English

by  M.A., Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel With Prefaces by Charles Hegel and the Translator, J. Sibree

THE
PHILOSOPH
HISTORY
T-bgr
J. Sibree
GEORG W. E
HEGEL
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The Philosophy of History
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
With Prefaces by Charles Hegel
and the Translator, J. Sibree, M.A.
“The History of the World is not intelligible apart from a
Government of the World.” — W. V. Humboldt
(cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:1)(cid:4)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:10)
Kitchener
2001
Batoche Books
52 Eby Street South
Kitchener, Ontario
N2G 3L1
Canada
email: [email protected]
Table of Contents
Translator’s Introduction ........................................................5
Charles Hegel’s Preface .......................................................11
Introduction. .........................................................................14
Geographical Basis of History. .........................................96
Classification of Historic Data ........................................121
Part I: The Oriental World .................................................128
Section I: China ..............................................................132
Section II: India ..............................................................156
Section II. (Continued). India Buddhism. .....................185
Section II: Persia. ............................................................191
Chapter I. The Zend People........................................194
Chapter II. The Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes, and
Persians. ...................................................................200
Chapter III. The Persian Empire and its Constituent Parts.
.................................................................................206
Persia........................................................................207
Syria and the Semitic Western Asia .........................209
Judaea ......................................................................213
Egypt ........................................................................217
Transition to the Greek World .................................240
Part II: The Greek World ...................................................243
Section I: The Elements of the Greek Spirit. ..................245
Section II: Phases of Individuality Æsthetically Conditioned
........................................................................................258
Chapter I. The Subjective Work of Art ......................258
Chapter II. The Objective Work of Art ......................261
Chapter III. The Political Work of Art .......................268
The Wars with the Persians ......................................274
Athens ......................................................................277
Sparta .......................................................................280
The Peloponnesian War ...........................................284
The Macedonian Empire ..........................................290
Section III: The Fall of the Greek Spirit. ........................294
Part III: The Roman World ................................................296
Section I: Rome to the Time of the Second Punic War...301
Chapter I. — The Elements of the Roman Spirit .........301
Chapter II. — The History of Rome to the Second Punic War
.....................................................................................314
Section II: Rome from the Second Punic War to the Emperors
........................................................................................324
Section III: .....................................................................332
Chapter I. Rome Under the Emperors. .......................332
Chapter II. Christianity. ...............................................337
Chapter III. The Byzantine Empire. ............................353
Part IV: The German World. ..............................................358
Section I: The Elements of the Christian German World.
........................................................................................364
Chapter I. The Barbarian Migrations...........................364
Chapter II Mohametanism. .........................................372
Chapter III. The Empire of Charlemagne. ...................377
Section II: The Middle Ages ...........................................383
Chapter I. The Feudality and the Hierarchy. ..............383
Chapter II. The Crusades. ............................................407
Chapter III. The Transition from Feudalism to Monarchy.
.....................................................................................417
Art and Science as Putting a Period to the Middle Ages
.................................................................................427
Section III: The Modern Time. .......................................430
Chapter I. The Reformation.........................................431
Chapter II. Influence of the Reformation on Political
Development. ...........................................................446
Chapter III. The Éclaircissement and Revolution ........458
Notes ..................................................................................477
Translator’s Introduction
Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History are recognized
in Germany as a popular introduction to his system; their form is
less rigid than the generality of metaphysical treatises, and the
illustrations, which occupy a large proportion of the work, are
drawn from a field of observation more familiar perhaps, than
any other, to those who have not devoted much time to
metaphysical studies. One great value of the work is that it
presents the leading facts of history from an altogether novel
point of view. And when it is considered that the writings of
Hegel have exercised a marked influence on the political
movements of Germany, it will be admitted that his theory of the
universe, especially that part which bears directly upon politics,
deserves attention even from those who are the most exclusive
advocates of the “practical.”
A writer who has established his claim to be regarded as an
authority, by the life which he has infused into metaphysical
abstractions, has pronounced the work before us, “one of the
pleasantest books on the subject he ever read.”1
And compared with that of most German writers, even the
style may claim to be called vigorous and pointed. If therefore in
its English dress the “Philosophy of History“ should be found
deficient in this respect, the fault must not be attributed to the
original.
It has been the aim of the translator to present his author to the
public in a really English form, even at the cost of a
circumlocution which must sometimes do injustice to the merits
of the original. A few words however have necessarily been used
in a rather unusual sense; and one of them is of very frequent
occurrence. The German “Geist,” in Hegel’s nomenclature,
includes both intelligence and will, the latter even more
expressly than the former. It embraces in fact man’s entire
mental and moral being, and a little reflection will make it
obvious that no term in our metaphysical vocabulary could have
been well substituted for the more theological one, “Spirit,” as a
fair equivalent. It is indeed only the impersonal and abstract use
of the term that is open to objection; an objection which can be
met by an appeal to the best classical usage; viz., the rendering
of the Hebrew (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3) and Greek (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6) in the authorized version
of the Scriptures. One indisputable instance may suffice in
G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 6
confirmation: “Their horses [i.e., of the Egyptians] are flesh and
not spirit.” (Isaiah xxxi. 3.) It is pertinent to remark here, that the
comparative disuse of this term in English metaphysical
literature, is one result of that alienation of theology from
philosophy with which continental writers of the most opposite
schools agree in taxing the speculative genius of Britain — an
alienation which mainly accounts for the gulf separating English
from German speculation, and which will, it is feared, on other
accounts also be the occasion of communicating a somewhat
uninviting aspect to the following pages.
The distinction which the Germans make between
“Sittlichkeit” and “Moralität,” has presented another difficulty.
The former denotes conventional morality, the latter that of the
heart or conscience. Where no ambiguity was likely to arise, both
terms have been translated “morality.” In other cases a stricter
rendering has been given, modified by the requirements of the
context. The word “moment” is, as readers of German
philosophy are aware, a veritable crux to the translator. In Mr. J.
R. Morell’s very valuable edition of Johnson’s Translation of
Tennemann’s “Manual of the History of Philosophy,” the
following explanation is given: “This term was borrowed from
mechanics by Hegel (see his “Wissenschaft der Logik,” Vol. 3,
P. 104, Ed. 1841). He employs it to denote the contending forces
which are mutually dependent, and whose contradiction forms an
equation. Hence his formula, Esse = Nothing. Here Esse and
Nothing are momentums, giving birth to Werden, i.e., Existence.
Thus the momentum contributes to the same oneness of
operation in contradictory forces that we see in mechanics,
amidst contrast and diversity, in weight and distance, in the case
of the balance.” But in several parts of the work before us this
definition is not strictly adhered to, and the translator believes he
has done justice to the original in rendering the word by
“successive” or “organic phase.” In the chapter on the Crusades
another term occurs which could not be simply rendered into
English. The definite, positive, and present embodiment of
essential being is there spoken of as “ein Dieses,” “das Dieses,”
etc., literally “a This,” “the This,” for which repulsive
combination a periphrasis has been substituted, which, it is
G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 7
believed, is not only accurate but expository. Paraphrastic
additions, however, have been, in fairness to the reader, enclosed
in brackets [ ]; and the philosophical appropriation of ordinary
terms is generally indicated by capitals, e.g., “Spirit,”
“Freedom,” “State,” “Nature,” etc.
The limits of a brief preface preclude an attempt to explain the
Hegelian method in its wider applications; and such an
undertaking is rendered altogether unnecessary by the facilities
which are afforded by works so very accessible as the translation
of Tennemann above mentioned, Chalybseus’s “Historical
Development of Speculative Philosophy, from Kant to Hegel,”
Blakey’s “History of the Philosophy of Mind,” Mr. Lewes’s
“Biographical History of Philosophy,” besides treatises devoted
more particularly to the Hegelian philosophy. Among these latter
may be fairly mentioned the work of a French professor, M.
Vera, “Introduction à la Philosophie de Hegel,” a lucid and
earnest exposition of the system at large; and the very able
summary of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right,” by T. C. Sandars,
late fellow of Oriel College, which forms one of the series of
“Oxford Essays” for 1855, and which bears directly on the
subject of the present volume.
It may, nevertheless, be of some service to the reader to
indicate the point of view from which this “Philosophy of
History” is composed, and to explain the leading idea.
The aim and scope of that civilizing process which all hopeful
thinkers recognize in history, is the attainment of Rational
Freedom. But the very term freedom supposes a previous
bondage; and the question naturally arises: “Bondage to what?”
— A superficial inquirer may be satisfied with an answer
referring it to the physical power of the ruling body. Such a
response was deemed satisfactory by a large number of political
speculators in the last century, and even at the beginning of the
present; and it is one of the great merits of an influential thinker
of our days to have expelled this idolum fori, which had also
become an idolum theatri, from its undue position; and to have
revived the simple truth that all stable organizations of men, all
religious and political communities, are based upon principles
which are far beyond the control of the One or the Many. And in
G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 8
these principles or some phase of them every man in every clime
and age is born, lives and moves. The only question is: Whence
are those principles derived? Whence spring those primary
beliefs or superstitions, religious and political, that hold society
together? They are no inventions of “priestcraft” or “kingcraft,”
for to them priestcraft and kingcraft owe their power. They are
no results of a Contrat Social, for with them society originates.
Nor are they the mere suggestions of man’s weakness, prompting
him to propitiate the powers of nature, in furtherance of his
finite, earthborn desires. Some of the phenomena of the religious
systems that have prevailed in the world might seem thus
explicable; but the Nihilism of more than one Oriental creed, the
suicidal strivings of the Hindoo devotee to become absorbed in
a divinity recognized as a pure negation, cannot be reduced to so
gross a formula; while the political superstition that ascribes a
divine right to the feebleness of a woman or an infant is
altogether untouched by it. Nothing is left therefore but to
recognize them as “fancies,” “delusions,” “dreams,” the results
of man’s vain imagination — to class them with the other
absurdities with which the abortive past of humanity is by some
thought to be only too replete; or, on the other hand, to regard
them as the rudimentary teachings of that essential intelligence
in which man’s intellectual and moral life originates. With Hegel
they are the objective manifestation of infinite reason — the first
promptings of Him who having “made of one blood all nations
of men for to dwell on the face of the earth, hath determined the
times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation, if
haply they might feel after and find him” — (cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9) (cid:11)(cid:6)(cid:12) (cid:13)(cid:6)(cid:14) (cid:11)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:16)
(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:5)(cid:15)(cid:2). And it is these (cid:13)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:1)(cid:8)(cid:14) (cid:1)(cid:12)(cid:8)(cid:7)(cid:3)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:11)(cid:5)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:14), these determined
and organic epochs in the history of the world that Hegel
proposes to distinguish and develop in the following treatise.
Whatever view may be entertained as to the origin or
importance of those elementary principles, and by whatever
general name they may be called — Spontaneous, Primary, or
Objective Intelligence — it seems demonstrable that it is in some
sense or other to its own belief, its own reason or essential being,
that imperfect humanity is in bondage; while the perfection of
social existence is commonly regarded as a deliverance from that