The Phenomenology of Sociality: Discovering the 'We'

346 Pages·2015·1.558 MB·English

by  Thomas Szanto, Dermot Moran

Phenomenology of Sociality
“Szanto’s and Moran’s volume is a veritable treasure trove that amply documents
the fertility and richness of the phenomenological tradition. Containing contribu-
tions on both familiar and lesser well known phenomenologists, Phenomenology
of Sociality: Discovering the ‘We’ is mandatory reading for anybody working on
sociality and collective intentionality.”
—Dan Zahavi, University of Copenhagen
“This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the phenomenological founda-
tions of the social mind and our experience of living together in a common world of
the ‘We.’ It brings together eminent scholars and talented young researchers to evalu-
ate the relevance of a phenomenological theory of sociality in contemporary philo-
sophical and interdisciplinary discussions, thereby revitalizing lesser-known voices
from the tradition as well as exploring new directions of phenomenological research.”
—Thiemo Breyer, University of Cologne
“A groundbreaking collection of fresh insights into the nature of the social self.”
—James Mensch, Charles University, Prague
Phenomenological accounts of sociality in Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre,
Scheler, Schütz, Stein, and many others offer powerful lines of arguments to recast
current, predominantly analytic, discussions on collective intentionality and social
cognition. Against this background, the aim of this volume is to reevaluate, critically
and in contemporary terms, the rich phenomenological resources regarding social
reality: the interpersonal, collective, and communal aspects of the life-world (Leb-
enswelt). Specifically, the book pursues three interrelated objectives: it aims 1.) to
systematically explore the key phenomenological aspects of social reality; 2.) to offer
novel, state-of-the-art assessments of both central and lesser-known proponents of the
phenomenology of sociality (Gurwitsch, Löwith, von Hildebrand, and Walther), and
3.) to contextualize this elaborate body of work in light of contemporary social cog-
nition research, the growing literature in analytic social ontology, and current trends
in moral psychology, moral phenomenology, and social and political philosophy. The
collection brings together original work by a host of prominent scholars and upcom-
ing young talents to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of the topic.
It will be essential reading for those studying phenomenological accounts of inter-
subjectivity, empathy, and community, including analytic, social, moral, and political
philosophers, and will also be of interest for social scientists and social psychologists.
Thomas Szanto is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Center for Subjectivity
Research (CFS), at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
Dermot Moran is Professor of Philosophy at University College Dublin, Ireland and Sir
Walter Murdoch Adjunct Professor in the Humanities at Murdoch University, Australia.
Routledge Research in Phenomenology
Edited by Søren Overgaard, University of Copenhagen, Denmark,
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, University of Nottingham, UK, and
David Cerbone, West Virginia University, USA
1 Phenomenology and the Transcendental
Edited by Sara Heinämaa, Mirja Hartimo and Timo Miettinen
2 Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology
Conceptual and Empirical Approaches
Edited by Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou, and Walter Hopp
3 Phenomenology of Sociality
Discovering the ‘We’
Edited by Thomas Szanto and Dermot Moran
Phenomenology of Sociality
Discovering the ‘We’
Edited by Thomas Szanto and
Dermot Moran
First published 2016
by Routledge
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and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Phenomenology of sociality : discovering the we / edited by Thomas Szanto
and Dermot Moran. — 1st [edition].
pages cm. — (Routledge research in phenomenology ; 3)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Intersubjectivity. 2. Phenomenology. I. Szanto, Thomas, editor.
B824.18.P44 2015
142'.7—dc23 2015031324
ISBN: 978-1-138-91879-5 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-68826-8 (ebk)
Typeset in Sabon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
Contents
Introduction: Phenomenological Discoveries Concerning
the ‘We’: Mapping the Terrain 1
THOMAS SZANTO AND DERMOT MORAN
PART I
Historical and Methodological Issues
1 Locating Shared Life in the ‘Thou’: Some
Historical and Thematic Considerations 29
JAMES RISSER
2 Hannah Arendt’s Conception of Actualized Plurality 42
SOPHIE LOIDOLT
3 Habermas and Hermeneutics: From Verstehen to Lebenswelt 56
RICHARD WOLIN
4 Second-Person Phenomenology 70
STEVEN CROWELL
PART II
Intersubjectivity, the “We-World,” and Objectivity
5 Concrete Interpersonal Encounters or Sharing a
Common World: Which Is More Fundamental
in Phenomenological Approaches to Sociality? 93
JO-JO KOO
6 Ineinandersein and L’interlacs: The Constitution of
the Social World or “We-World” (Wir-Welt) in
Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty 107
DERMOT MORAN
vi Contents
7 Davidson and Husserl on the Social Origin
of Our Concept of Objectivity 127
CATHAL O’MADAGAIN
PART III
Social Cognition, Embodiment, and Social Emotions
 8  From Types to Tokens: Empathy and Typification  143
JOONA TAIPALE
9 An Interactionist Approach to Shared Cognition:
Some Prospects and Challenges 159
FELIPE LEÓN
10 “If I had to live like you, I think I’d kill myself”:
Social Dimensions of the Experience of Illness 173
HAVI CAREL
11 Shame as a Fellow Feeling 187
CHRISTIAN SKIRKE
12 Relating to the Dead: Social Cognition and
the Phenomenology of Grief 202
MATTHEW RATCLIFFE
PART IV
Collective Intentionality and Affectivity
13 Affective Intentionality: Early Phenomenological
Contributions to a New Phenomenological Sociology 219
ÍNGRID VENDRELL FERRAN
14 Love and Other Social Stances in Early Phenomenology 234
ALESSANDRO SALICE
15 Gurwitsch and the Role of Emotion in Collective Intentionality 248
ERIC CHELSTROM
16 The Affective ‘We’: Self-Regulation and Shared Emotions 263
JOEL KRUEGER
Contents vii
PART V
Collective Agency and Group Personhood
17 Husserl on Groupings: Social Ontology and
the Phenomenology of We-Intentionality 281
EMANUELE CAMINADA
18 Collectivizing Persons and Personifying Collectives:
Reassessing Scheler on Group Personhood 296
THOMAS SZANTO
19 Brothers in Arms: Fraternity-Terror in Sartre’s
Social Ontology 313
NICOLAS DE WARREN
Contributors 327
Index 333
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Introduction
Phenomenological Discoveries
Concerning the ‘We’
Mapping the Terrain
Thomas Szanto and Dermot Moran
“[. . .] I, we, and world belong together.”
(Husserl, Ideen II, 288)
“Even the Being-alone of Dasein is Being-with in the world.”
(Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 120)
“[. . .] the I is but a ‘part’ of the We, and the We an essential part of
the I.”
(Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, 225)
I FROM THE SECOND-PERSON PERSPECTIVE TO
THE FIRST-PERSON PLURAL (AND BACK)
What is it to belong to a ‘We’ or an ‘Us’? What is the nature of interpersonal
understanding, social interaction, and social participation? For instance, is
sharing a common socio-cultural environment, a common history, or a com-
mon life-world, prior to, or even a necessary condition for, such understand-
ing, interaction, or participation, or, rather, a result of them? How can we
collectively—rather than just you and me, and others—constitute and share
norms, experiences, or even emotions? Are there any other ‘proprietors’ of
the social domain? Is social reality composed entirely of individuals, or are
there also irreducibly plural subjects or ‘We’ agents?
Curiously, the nature of social and collective identity or plural agency
has not been at the forefront of philosophy over the past hundred years,
although it has been treated in sociology and in those social sciences inspired
by Marxism and, in some more restricted circles, by Hegelianism. As a mat-
ter of fact, the issue of collectivity has only relatively recently been given
serious attention in analytic philosophy, especially in the work of Michael
Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, Philip Pettit, Carol Rovane, John Searle, and
Raimo Tuomela. There is an older tradition especially stemming from the
work of Peter Winch, and Georg Henrik von Wright, which was, in turn,
inspired by Wittgenstein and Collingwood, but this tended towards the