The Perestroika Deception: Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency

259 Pages·1998·1.49 MB·English

by  Anatoliy Golitsyn

Anatoliy Golitsyn's first book, 'New Lies for Old', caused a long-running sensation when it
was discovered that, unlike most Western analysts, the Author had accurately predicted,
some years ahead of the events, the 'Break with the Past' which took place in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989-91. In his book 'Wedge: The Secret War between the
FBI and CIA' [Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1994], Mark Riebling, who carried out a
methodical analysis of Golitsyn's predictions in 'New Lies for Old', credited the Author with
'an accuracy record of nearly 94%'. This singular achievement puts all other analysts,
including some official services, to shame; and it is precisely because of his record of pin-
point accuracy that Western Governments, policymakers and even some intelligence
services, whose record bears little comparison with Golitsyn's, have competed with one
another over the years to find reasons why Golitsyn's perceptive explanations of Soviet
strategy should be ignored. But events as they unfold are relentlessly proving this
remarkable analyst of Soviet strategy to be right. 'The Perestroika Deception' explains the
devious secret intent behind the Leninist strategy which the 'former' Communists are pur-
suing under cover of fake 'reform' and 'progress towards democracy'. The immediate
strategic objective is 'convergence' with the West - on their terms, not ours. The ultimate
objective is Lenin's: replacement of nation states with collective regional governments as
building blocks of the 'New World Social Order' - World [Communist] Government.
THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION V
In Memory of
Jim Angleton
Founder and outstanding chief
of the Central Intelligence Agency's
Counter-intelligence,
a man of vision and courage,
a warrior and comrade-in-arms,
who recognised the dangers of
the Soviets' new strategic challenge
VI THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Anatoliy Golitsyn was born in the Ukraine in 1926. While a cadet in military school, he
was awarded a Soviet medal 'For the defence of Moscow in the Great Patriotic War'
for digging anti-tank trenches near Moscow. At the age of fifteen, he joined the
Komsomol (League of Communist Youth) and, at nineteen, he became a member of
the Communist Party.
In the same year, he joined the KGB, in which he studied and served until
1961. He graduated from the Moscow School of Military Counter-espionage, the
counterintelligence faculty of the High Intelligence School, and the University of
Marxism-Leninism and completed a correspondence course with the High Diplo-
matic School. In 1952 and early 1953 he was involved with a friend in drawing up a
proposal to the Central Committee on the reorganisation of Soviet intelligence.
In connection with this proposal he attended a meeting of the secretariat
chaired by Stalin and a meeting of the Presidium chaired by Malenkov and attended
by Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Bulganin. In 1952-53 he worked briefly as head of a
section responsible for counter-espionage against the United States. In 1959 he grad-
uated with a law degree from a four-year course at the KGB Institute (now the KGB
Academy) in Moscow.
From 1959 to 1960, at a time when Soviet long-range strategy was being for-
mulated and the KGB was being reorganised to play its part in it, he served as a
senior analyst in the NATO section of the Information Department of the Soviet intel-
ligence service. He served in Vienna and Helsinki on counterintelligence assign-
ments from 1953 to 1955 and from 1960 to 1961, respectively.
He defected to the United States in December 1961. Subsequently, his contri-
bution to the national security of leading Western countries was recognised by the
award of the United States Government Medal for Distinguished Service.
He was made an Honorary Commander of the British Empire (CBE). A
promise of membership of the Legion d'Honneur made when President Pompidou
was in power was not fulfilled owing to the change of government.
Since 1962, the Author has spent much of his time on the study of Communist
and international affairs, reading both the Communist and the Western press. In
1980 he completed, and in 1984 he published, 'New Lies for Old', a study of the Soviet
long-range strategy of deception and disinformation.
For over thirty years, the Author has submitted Memoranda to the Central
Intelligence Agency, in which he has provided the Agency with timely and largely
accurate forecasts of Soviet Bloc developments and on the evolution of Soviet/Russ-
ian/Communist strategy. By applying the dialectical methodology which drives the
strategy, the Author has been able to score innumerable 'bulls-eyes'. This unparal-
leled track record reflects the Author's personal experience of four years in the KGB's
strategy 'think tank', together with his deep understanding of the dialectical nature
of the strategy and the Leninist mentality of its originators and implementers.
The Author is a citizen of the United States.
CONTENTS VII
Contents

About the Author VI
Acknowledgments XVI
Foreword by the Author XVII
Introduction by Christopher Story, Editor & Publisher, SOVIET ANALYST XXI
PART ONE: THE 'PERESTROIKA' DECEPTION 1
The world's slide towards the
'Second October Revolution' ['Weltoktober']
Organisation of the documents 2
About the Memoranda 2
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: March 1989 3
Predicting, understanding and dealing with 'Perestroika' 3
Predictions of 'perestroika' in 'New Lies for Old' 3
Additional predictions on 'perestroika' in Memoranda to the CIA: 8
July 4,1984; July 5,1985; August 1985 8
Winter 1986; March 1987 10
Correct predictions based on the new method of analysis 11
The adoption of the long-range strategy of 'perestroika' 12
Soviet research and preparation for the strategy 13
The KGB's role in the preparation of 'perestroika' 14
Experiments and rehearsals for 'perestroika' 15
'Perestroika', the final phase: its main objectives 17
The essence of 'perestroika': An application of 1920s' Leninism 18
The choice of Party and Government leaders for 'perestroika' 20
Gorbachev as Party Leader and President 20
The choice of Ligachev and Yeltsin as critics from right and left 21
Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister 21
Yakovlev as Head of the Foreign Policy Commission 21
Chebrikov as Head of the Judicial Commission 22
Kryuchkov as Head of the KGB 22
Dubinin as Soviet Ambassador in Washington 23
President Reagan hugs the Bear 23
The Soviet campaign to engage the American elite 24
Dialectics of the strategy and the predictive power of the new method 26
Predictions on the execution of the strategy's Final Phase 27
Increased role of the Communist Party 27
Stronger, maturer ideology 27
An improved, reorganised KGB 28
The new model Soviet regime 28
'Restructuring' in Eastern Europe and China 29
'Restructuring' in Western Europe 29
'Restructuring' in the Third World 30
VIII THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION
'Restructuring' American military-political alliances 31
'Restructuring' in the United States 31
The Soviet campaign against anti-Communists in the West 32
Soviet intentions towards the next elections in the United States
and Western Europe: The Radical Left 33
The possible replacement of Gorbachev 34
China: A strategic enemy of the United States 35
Defective Western methods of analysis 36
The defects of Western counterintelligence 39
Fallacies about Gorbachev and 'perestroika' 39
The need for an American counter-strategy 41
The crisis of analysis and measures to improve it 42
Dr Brzezinski's strategy for the West in Eastern Europe 43
The need to improve Western intelligence and counterintelligence 45
The pressing need for public exposure of the strategy of 'perestroika' 45
The advantages of exposure 47
PART TWO: COMMUNIST GRAND STRATEGIES AND WESTERN ILLUSIONS 49
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 4 January 1988 50
An assessment of Gorbachev's visit to the United States
in the light of the Grand Soviet Deception Strategy 50
The three Grand Strategies 51
The First Grand Strategy 51
The Second Grand Strategy 52
The Third and present Grand Strategy 54
The Third Grand Strategy's main objectives 54
'Convergence' through tactical changes and disinformation 56
American official tactics versus Soviet bureaucratic strategy 57
Gorbachev's US visit a Trojan Horse to engage the American
elite in the strategy of 'convergence' 60
The need for counteraction by the United States 61
The Author's suggestions 63
PART THREE: WESTERN COUNTER-STRATEGY AGAINST 'PERESTROIKA' 65
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: September 1988 66
Western counter-strategy against 'perestroika' 66
Past American strategic mistakes in dealing with the Communist world 66
The mistakes of the Vietnam period 66
The late ex-President Nixon's scenario for dealing with Gorbachev 67
Western counter-strategy against 'perestroika' 68
CONTENTS IX
PART FOUR: THE EXECUTION OF THE STRATEGY OF 'PERESTROIKA'
AND THE BUND WESTERN RESPONSE TO IT:
THE SEVEN KEYS TO UNDERSTANDING 'PERESTROIKA':
THE NEED TO RECONSIDER OUR RESPONSE 71
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: March 1990 72
The execution of the strategy of 'perestroika'
The blind Western response to it
The seven keys to understanding 'perestroika'
The need to reconsider our response 72
The Bush Administration's erroneous assessment of 'perestroika'
and its blind response have led the West astray 72
The seven keys to understanding the strategy of 'perestroika' 75
The first key: Lenin's New Economic Policy [NEP]
as a precedent for 'perestroika' 75
The crisis of the Soviet Empire 76
Outline of attempts to cure the crisis in the Soviet Bloc
prior to the adoption of the strategy of 'perestroika' 76
Zhdanov's policy scenario 76
Beria's policies: Personal dictatorship with liberalisation 77
Malenkov's policy: A short-lived but genuine attempt
to 'break with the past' 78
Khrushchev's policies before the adoption of the strategy in 1958-60 79
The principal elements of Lenin's 'New Economic Policy' [NEP] 80
The consequences of Lenin's 'New Economic Policy' 82
Secret research on the lessons of the 'New Economic Policy' 82
Gorbachev on 'perestroika' 84
The second key: Preparation for the use of the Communist Bloc's
full political and security potential 84
The third key: The creation of controlled 'political opposition'
in the Communist countries 85
The fourth key: Lenin's 'forging of old and new forms' for
developing socialism, and Chicherin's idea of false representative
institutions through the admission of non-Communists 86
The fifth key: The deployment of controlled 'political opposition'
in 'democratic' and non-Communisf structures 87
The sixth key: Lenin's use of formal political 'independence'
for the Far Eastern and Georgian Republics 87
The seventh key: The deployment of the Bloc's political and
security potential in the execution of anti-Western strategy 91
Fukuyama and 'the end of ideology' 93
The process of 'perestroika' in the Communist countries:
Common pattern and specifics %
Partnership between the old and new generations of leaders 97
The meaning of the reorganisation of the KGB and
the East European security and intelligence services 98
X THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION
The meaning of the Communist Parties' surrender of their
monopoly and of Party and Government reorganisation 100
The common pattern indicates a 'Revolution from Above' 102
The success of 'perestroika' 103
Specifics in individual Communist countries 104
The specifics of 'perestroika' in Romania 105
The specifics of 'perestroika' in China 107
Selective killing of the unorganised elements in Tienanmen Square 109
The difficulties of the Western media in covering 'perestroika' 110
Comments on an Article by 'Z' in 'Daedalus' 113
Conclusions and the need for reconsideration
of the West's blind response to 'perestroika' 114
The main priorities for re-thinking 115
PART FIVE: EXPOSING 'PERESTROIKA' AS THE SOVIET STRATEGY
FOR A 'SECOND OCTOBER REVOLUTION' ['WELTOKTOBER']
NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTION, CONTROLLED FAKE 'DEMOCRATISM'
AND STRATEGIC DISINFORMATION 119
1. EXPOSING 'PERESTROIKA' AS THE STRATEGY FOR
A SECOND OCTOBER WORLD SOCIALIST REVOLUTION ['WELTOKTOBER']
2. THE NEW PATTERN OF NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTION, NOT BY COMMUNIST PARTIES,
DICTATORSHIPS, THE SOVIET ARMY AND VIOLENCE, BUT THROUGH FALSE REFORM, INFLUENCE AND
THE POLITICAL ACTION OF THE SOVIET FORCES ENGAGED IN PARTY-CONTROLLED 'DEMOCRATISATION'
AND THE SO-CALLED MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IN THE USSR
3. THE PARAMOUNT ROLE OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DISINFORMATION
IN THE SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF THE 'PERESTROIKA' STRATEGY 120
Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency:
September-November 1990 120
Soviet rejection of the discredited pattern of violent revolution
in selected parts of the world 120
Why did the Soviet strategists opt for a non-violent
pattern of World Revolution? 121
The objectives, targets and methods
of the Communist strategy and political offensive 122
The resources for the Soviet political offensive 122
The enhanced role of the Party as the guiding force
behind the strategy 122
The 'multi-Party system' is a fabricated instrument of the KGB 123
The Soviet media as a strategic weapon for the political offensive 124
The success of the Soviet political offensive
against the United States and NATO 124
The Soviet political breakthrough in Germany:
The development of the Soviet-German partnership 125
An assessment in strategic terms of the Iraqi invasion
CONTENTS XI
of Kuwait and Soviet and Chinese condemnation of it 126
The threat of future deniable Soviet military or nuclear action 126
The basic differences between Soviet and
Western concepts of democracy and the market economy 127
Why the West ignores the essence and dangers of
Soviet 'democratisation' 128
Evidence of the strategy 129
The stranglehold of Soviet strategic disinformation 131
The probable outcome 132
PART SIX: THE FAKE 'AUGUST COUP' AND ITS CALCULATED FAILURE
A deliberately engineered 'Break with the Past' 135
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: April 1991 136
A touch of realism in assessing the struggle between
Gorbachev's supporters, Yeltsin's supporters and
nationalists in the Soviet Republics 136
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 19 August 1991 137
Behind the Soviet coup:
Soviet strategy and its development:
The main objectives of the coup 137
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 20 August 1991 139
A further analysis of the objectives of the Soviet 'coup' 139
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 26 August 1991 141
The Author's analysis of the objectives of the
calculated Soviet 'coup' and of its calculated 'failure' 141
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 2 September 1991 145
An assessment of the Soviet decision to suspend
the activities of the Communist Party 145
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 26 March 1992 149
Geopolitical strategies of Russia, the so-called 'Commonwealth ot
Independent States' and China: A comment on
ex-President Nixon's advice on massive aid to Russia 149
The dangerous advice of Mr Richard Nixon 151
Retaining the capacity to think 152
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 28 September 1992 154
Proposed study of the economic intentions of the 'new' Russia
in the light of the political strategy of the
Second October Revolution' {'Weltoktober'} 154
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: February 1993 155
The importance of the strategic factor in assessing developments
in Russia and Communist China 155
Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency: 26 March &12 October 1993 162
Assessment of the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin
and the Congress of People's Deputies:
Observations on the 'Reichstag Fire' episode, October 1993 162
XII THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 30 April 1993 164
A warning of the perils of partnership with
Russian 'reformers' and 'democrats' 164
Golitsyn on political assassination [Note 64] 168
APPENDIX: EXTRACTS FROM ANATOUY GOLITSYN'S MEMORANDA TO THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BETWEEN 1973 AND 1985:
Predicting 'perestroika' 169
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 1973 170
A critical review of three recent books:
Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence, 1973,
by Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure and Richard Soll
Science and Technology as an instrument of Soviet Policy, 1972,
by Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure and Vladimir Prokofieff
Convergence of Communism and Capitalism: the Soviet View, 1973,
by Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, Richard Soll and Annette Siefbold 170
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 1974 174
A critique of Mr James Schlesinger's assessment of the Soviet challenge
and the military potential of detente between the United States
and the Soviet Union and of certain changes in US military strategy -
in the light of inside information on the situation in the Communist Bloc 174
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 15 January 1978 175
The long-range political objectives and intentions of the Soviet leaders:
An assessment of an official report by a Soviet emigre in the light
of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy and its
disinformation offensive 175
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 11 February 1982 179
An analysis of the developments in Poland in the light
of Communist strategy 179
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 12 December 1983 181
The risk to President Reagan's life 181
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 4 July 1984 182
Soviet strategic intentions and the forthcoming U.S. presidential election 182
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: January 1985 184
Understanding the new active methods they are using 184
Communist political activism and new methods 184
The active methods of the KGB 184
Future strategy and its objectives 185
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: April 1985 186
An assessment of the invitation to Billy Graham to preach
in Soviet Churches during his second visit to the USSR 186
Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: August 1985 188
The Danger for the West: An assessment of the rise of
Mikhail Gorbachev, the role of 'liberalisation' in Soviet strategy,
and its implications for the West 188