Anatoliy Golitsyn's first book, 'New Lies for Old', caused a long-running sensation when it was discovered that, unlike most Western analysts, the Author had accurately predicted, some years ahead of the events, the 'Break with the Past' which took place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989-91. In his book 'Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA' [Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1994], Mark Riebling, who carried out a methodical analysis of Golitsyn's predictions in 'New Lies for Old', credited the Author with 'an accuracy record of nearly 94%'. This singular achievement puts all other analysts, including some official services, to shame; and it is precisely because of his record of pin- point accuracy that Western Governments, policymakers and even some intelligence services, whose record bears little comparison with Golitsyn's, have competed with one another over the years to find reasons why Golitsyn's perceptive explanations of Soviet strategy should be ignored. But events as they unfold are relentlessly proving this remarkable analyst of Soviet strategy to be right. 'The Perestroika Deception' explains the devious secret intent behind the Leninist strategy which the 'former' Communists are pur- suing under cover of fake 'reform' and 'progress towards democracy'. The immediate strategic objective is 'convergence' with the West - on their terms, not ours. The ultimate objective is Lenin's: replacement of nation states with collective regional governments as building blocks of the 'New World Social Order' - World [Communist] Government. THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION V In Memory of Jim Angleton Founder and outstanding chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's Counter-intelligence, a man of vision and courage, a warrior and comrade-in-arms, who recognised the dangers of the Soviets' new strategic challenge VI THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION ABOUT THE AUTHOR Anatoliy Golitsyn was born in the Ukraine in 1926. While a cadet in military school, he was awarded a Soviet medal 'For the defence of Moscow in the Great Patriotic War' for digging anti-tank trenches near Moscow. At the age of fifteen, he joined the Komsomol (League of Communist Youth) and, at nineteen, he became a member of the Communist Party. In the same year, he joined the KGB, in which he studied and served until 1961. He graduated from the Moscow School of Military Counter-espionage, the counterintelligence faculty of the High Intelligence School, and the University of Marxism-Leninism and completed a correspondence course with the High Diplo- matic School. In 1952 and early 1953 he was involved with a friend in drawing up a proposal to the Central Committee on the reorganisation of Soviet intelligence. In connection with this proposal he attended a meeting of the secretariat chaired by Stalin and a meeting of the Presidium chaired by Malenkov and attended by Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Bulganin. In 1952-53 he worked briefly as head of a section responsible for counter-espionage against the United States. In 1959 he grad- uated with a law degree from a four-year course at the KGB Institute (now the KGB Academy) in Moscow. From 1959 to 1960, at a time when Soviet long-range strategy was being for- mulated and the KGB was being reorganised to play its part in it, he served as a senior analyst in the NATO section of the Information Department of the Soviet intel- ligence service. He served in Vienna and Helsinki on counterintelligence assign- ments from 1953 to 1955 and from 1960 to 1961, respectively. He defected to the United States in December 1961. Subsequently, his contri- bution to the national security of leading Western countries was recognised by the award of the United States Government Medal for Distinguished Service. He was made an Honorary Commander of the British Empire (CBE). A promise of membership of the Legion d'Honneur made when President Pompidou was in power was not fulfilled owing to the change of government. Since 1962, the Author has spent much of his time on the study of Communist and international affairs, reading both the Communist and the Western press. In 1980 he completed, and in 1984 he published, 'New Lies for Old', a study of the Soviet long-range strategy of deception and disinformation. For over thirty years, the Author has submitted Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency, in which he has provided the Agency with timely and largely accurate forecasts of Soviet Bloc developments and on the evolution of Soviet/Russ- ian/Communist strategy. By applying the dialectical methodology which drives the strategy, the Author has been able to score innumerable 'bulls-eyes'. This unparal- leled track record reflects the Author's personal experience of four years in the KGB's strategy 'think tank', together with his deep understanding of the dialectical nature of the strategy and the Leninist mentality of its originators and implementers. The Author is a citizen of the United States. CONTENTS VII Contents About the Author VI Acknowledgments XVI Foreword by the Author XVII Introduction by Christopher Story, Editor & Publisher, SOVIET ANALYST XXI PART ONE: THE 'PERESTROIKA' DECEPTION 1 The world's slide towards the 'Second October Revolution' ['Weltoktober'] Organisation of the documents 2 About the Memoranda 2 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: March 1989 3 Predicting, understanding and dealing with 'Perestroika' 3 Predictions of 'perestroika' in 'New Lies for Old' 3 Additional predictions on 'perestroika' in Memoranda to the CIA: 8 July 4,1984; July 5,1985; August 1985 8 Winter 1986; March 1987 10 Correct predictions based on the new method of analysis 11 The adoption of the long-range strategy of 'perestroika' 12 Soviet research and preparation for the strategy 13 The KGB's role in the preparation of 'perestroika' 14 Experiments and rehearsals for 'perestroika' 15 'Perestroika', the final phase: its main objectives 17 The essence of 'perestroika': An application of 1920s' Leninism 18 The choice of Party and Government leaders for 'perestroika' 20 Gorbachev as Party Leader and President 20 The choice of Ligachev and Yeltsin as critics from right and left 21 Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister 21 Yakovlev as Head of the Foreign Policy Commission 21 Chebrikov as Head of the Judicial Commission 22 Kryuchkov as Head of the KGB 22 Dubinin as Soviet Ambassador in Washington 23 President Reagan hugs the Bear 23 The Soviet campaign to engage the American elite 24 Dialectics of the strategy and the predictive power of the new method 26 Predictions on the execution of the strategy's Final Phase 27 Increased role of the Communist Party 27 Stronger, maturer ideology 27 An improved, reorganised KGB 28 The new model Soviet regime 28 'Restructuring' in Eastern Europe and China 29 'Restructuring' in Western Europe 29 'Restructuring' in the Third World 30 VIII THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION 'Restructuring' American military-political alliances 31 'Restructuring' in the United States 31 The Soviet campaign against anti-Communists in the West 32 Soviet intentions towards the next elections in the United States and Western Europe: The Radical Left 33 The possible replacement of Gorbachev 34 China: A strategic enemy of the United States 35 Defective Western methods of analysis 36 The defects of Western counterintelligence 39 Fallacies about Gorbachev and 'perestroika' 39 The need for an American counter-strategy 41 The crisis of analysis and measures to improve it 42 Dr Brzezinski's strategy for the West in Eastern Europe 43 The need to improve Western intelligence and counterintelligence 45 The pressing need for public exposure of the strategy of 'perestroika' 45 The advantages of exposure 47 PART TWO: COMMUNIST GRAND STRATEGIES AND WESTERN ILLUSIONS 49 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 4 January 1988 50 An assessment of Gorbachev's visit to the United States in the light of the Grand Soviet Deception Strategy 50 The three Grand Strategies 51 The First Grand Strategy 51 The Second Grand Strategy 52 The Third and present Grand Strategy 54 The Third Grand Strategy's main objectives 54 'Convergence' through tactical changes and disinformation 56 American official tactics versus Soviet bureaucratic strategy 57 Gorbachev's US visit a Trojan Horse to engage the American elite in the strategy of 'convergence' 60 The need for counteraction by the United States 61 The Author's suggestions 63 PART THREE: WESTERN COUNTER-STRATEGY AGAINST 'PERESTROIKA' 65 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: September 1988 66 Western counter-strategy against 'perestroika' 66 Past American strategic mistakes in dealing with the Communist world 66 The mistakes of the Vietnam period 66 The late ex-President Nixon's scenario for dealing with Gorbachev 67 Western counter-strategy against 'perestroika' 68 CONTENTS IX PART FOUR: THE EXECUTION OF THE STRATEGY OF 'PERESTROIKA' AND THE BUND WESTERN RESPONSE TO IT: THE SEVEN KEYS TO UNDERSTANDING 'PERESTROIKA': THE NEED TO RECONSIDER OUR RESPONSE 71 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: March 1990 72 The execution of the strategy of 'perestroika' The blind Western response to it The seven keys to understanding 'perestroika' The need to reconsider our response 72 The Bush Administration's erroneous assessment of 'perestroika' and its blind response have led the West astray 72 The seven keys to understanding the strategy of 'perestroika' 75 The first key: Lenin's New Economic Policy [NEP] as a precedent for 'perestroika' 75 The crisis of the Soviet Empire 76 Outline of attempts to cure the crisis in the Soviet Bloc prior to the adoption of the strategy of 'perestroika' 76 Zhdanov's policy scenario 76 Beria's policies: Personal dictatorship with liberalisation 77 Malenkov's policy: A short-lived but genuine attempt to 'break with the past' 78 Khrushchev's policies before the adoption of the strategy in 1958-60 79 The principal elements of Lenin's 'New Economic Policy' [NEP] 80 The consequences of Lenin's 'New Economic Policy' 82 Secret research on the lessons of the 'New Economic Policy' 82 Gorbachev on 'perestroika' 84 The second key: Preparation for the use of the Communist Bloc's full political and security potential 84 The third key: The creation of controlled 'political opposition' in the Communist countries 85 The fourth key: Lenin's 'forging of old and new forms' for developing socialism, and Chicherin's idea of false representative institutions through the admission of non-Communists 86 The fifth key: The deployment of controlled 'political opposition' in 'democratic' and non-Communisf structures 87 The sixth key: Lenin's use of formal political 'independence' for the Far Eastern and Georgian Republics 87 The seventh key: The deployment of the Bloc's political and security potential in the execution of anti-Western strategy 91 Fukuyama and 'the end of ideology' 93 The process of 'perestroika' in the Communist countries: Common pattern and specifics % Partnership between the old and new generations of leaders 97 The meaning of the reorganisation of the KGB and the East European security and intelligence services 98 X THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION The meaning of the Communist Parties' surrender of their monopoly and of Party and Government reorganisation 100 The common pattern indicates a 'Revolution from Above' 102 The success of 'perestroika' 103 Specifics in individual Communist countries 104 The specifics of 'perestroika' in Romania 105 The specifics of 'perestroika' in China 107 Selective killing of the unorganised elements in Tienanmen Square 109 The difficulties of the Western media in covering 'perestroika' 110 Comments on an Article by 'Z' in 'Daedalus' 113 Conclusions and the need for reconsideration of the West's blind response to 'perestroika' 114 The main priorities for re-thinking 115 PART FIVE: EXPOSING 'PERESTROIKA' AS THE SOVIET STRATEGY FOR A 'SECOND OCTOBER REVOLUTION' ['WELTOKTOBER'] NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTION, CONTROLLED FAKE 'DEMOCRATISM' AND STRATEGIC DISINFORMATION 119 1. EXPOSING 'PERESTROIKA' AS THE STRATEGY FOR A SECOND OCTOBER WORLD SOCIALIST REVOLUTION ['WELTOKTOBER'] 2. THE NEW PATTERN OF NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTION, NOT BY COMMUNIST PARTIES, DICTATORSHIPS, THE SOVIET ARMY AND VIOLENCE, BUT THROUGH FALSE REFORM, INFLUENCE AND THE POLITICAL ACTION OF THE SOVIET FORCES ENGAGED IN PARTY-CONTROLLED 'DEMOCRATISATION' AND THE SO-CALLED MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IN THE USSR 3. THE PARAMOUNT ROLE OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DISINFORMATION IN THE SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF THE 'PERESTROIKA' STRATEGY 120 Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency: September-November 1990 120 Soviet rejection of the discredited pattern of violent revolution in selected parts of the world 120 Why did the Soviet strategists opt for a non-violent pattern of World Revolution? 121 The objectives, targets and methods of the Communist strategy and political offensive 122 The resources for the Soviet political offensive 122 The enhanced role of the Party as the guiding force behind the strategy 122 The 'multi-Party system' is a fabricated instrument of the KGB 123 The Soviet media as a strategic weapon for the political offensive 124 The success of the Soviet political offensive against the United States and NATO 124 The Soviet political breakthrough in Germany: The development of the Soviet-German partnership 125 An assessment in strategic terms of the Iraqi invasion CONTENTS XI of Kuwait and Soviet and Chinese condemnation of it 126 The threat of future deniable Soviet military or nuclear action 126 The basic differences between Soviet and Western concepts of democracy and the market economy 127 Why the West ignores the essence and dangers of Soviet 'democratisation' 128 Evidence of the strategy 129 The stranglehold of Soviet strategic disinformation 131 The probable outcome 132 PART SIX: THE FAKE 'AUGUST COUP' AND ITS CALCULATED FAILURE A deliberately engineered 'Break with the Past' 135 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: April 1991 136 A touch of realism in assessing the struggle between Gorbachev's supporters, Yeltsin's supporters and nationalists in the Soviet Republics 136 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 19 August 1991 137 Behind the Soviet coup: Soviet strategy and its development: The main objectives of the coup 137 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 20 August 1991 139 A further analysis of the objectives of the Soviet 'coup' 139 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 26 August 1991 141 The Author's analysis of the objectives of the calculated Soviet 'coup' and of its calculated 'failure' 141 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 2 September 1991 145 An assessment of the Soviet decision to suspend the activities of the Communist Party 145 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 26 March 1992 149 Geopolitical strategies of Russia, the so-called 'Commonwealth ot Independent States' and China: A comment on ex-President Nixon's advice on massive aid to Russia 149 The dangerous advice of Mr Richard Nixon 151 Retaining the capacity to think 152 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 28 September 1992 154 Proposed study of the economic intentions of the 'new' Russia in the light of the political strategy of the Second October Revolution' {'Weltoktober'} 154 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: February 1993 155 The importance of the strategic factor in assessing developments in Russia and Communist China 155 Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency: 26 March &12 October 1993 162 Assessment of the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the Congress of People's Deputies: Observations on the 'Reichstag Fire' episode, October 1993 162 XII THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 30 April 1993 164 A warning of the perils of partnership with Russian 'reformers' and 'democrats' 164 Golitsyn on political assassination [Note 64] 168 APPENDIX: EXTRACTS FROM ANATOUY GOLITSYN'S MEMORANDA TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BETWEEN 1973 AND 1985: Predicting 'perestroika' 169 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 1973 170 A critical review of three recent books: Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence, 1973, by Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure and Richard Soll Science and Technology as an instrument of Soviet Policy, 1972, by Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure and Vladimir Prokofieff Convergence of Communism and Capitalism: the Soviet View, 1973, by Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, Richard Soll and Annette Siefbold 170 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 1974 174 A critique of Mr James Schlesinger's assessment of the Soviet challenge and the military potential of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union and of certain changes in US military strategy - in the light of inside information on the situation in the Communist Bloc 174 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 15 January 1978 175 The long-range political objectives and intentions of the Soviet leaders: An assessment of an official report by a Soviet emigre in the light of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy and its disinformation offensive 175 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 11 February 1982 179 An analysis of the developments in Poland in the light of Communist strategy 179 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 12 December 1983 181 The risk to President Reagan's life 181 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 4 July 1984 182 Soviet strategic intentions and the forthcoming U.S. presidential election 182 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: January 1985 184 Understanding the new active methods they are using 184 Communist political activism and new methods 184 The active methods of the KGB 184 Future strategy and its objectives 185 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: April 1985 186 An assessment of the invitation to Billy Graham to preach in Soviet Churches during his second visit to the USSR 186 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: August 1985 188 The Danger for the West: An assessment of the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, the role of 'liberalisation' in Soviet strategy, and its implications for the West 188
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