The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform

326 Pages·1985·44.955 MB·English

by  Edward Luttwak

THE
ANDTHE
WAR
ARTOF
*
WHY OUR OUTMODED MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT IS IN URGENT NEED
OF REFORM *WHY OUR MILITARY POWER
IS SO COSTLY IN PEACETIME AND
CONTINUES TO FAIL IN COMBAT
DESPITE THE ABUNDANT TALENT AND
* * *
PATRIOTISM IN OUR FORCES
THIS BOOK OFFERS A PLAN
FOR DRASTIC* FUNDAMENTAL* REFORM
AUTHOR OF THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE SOVIET UNION
EDWARD 1UTTWAK
IL
Other Books by Edward N. Luttwak
THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE SOVIET UNION
STRATEGY AND POLITICS
Collected Essays
THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
From the First Century A.D. to the Third
THE ISRAELI ARMY
(with D. Horowitz)
THE POLITICAL USES OF SEA POWER
DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR
COUP D'ETAT
The
and
Pentagon
*
The Question ofMilitary
Reform
War
Art
the of
*
Edward Luttwak
N.
A Touchstone Book
Published by Institute for Contemporary Studies
Simon & Schuster, Inc.
New York
Copyright © 1985 by Edward N. Luttwak
All rights reserved
including the right ofreproduction
in whole orin part in any form
FirstTouchstone Edition, 1986
Published by Simon & Schuster, Inc.
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Library ofCongress Cataloging in Publication Data
Luttwak, Edward
The Pentagon and the art ofwar.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. United States—Armed Forces. 2. United States—Military policy. I. Title
UA23.L86 1984 355'.0335'73 84-22120
ISBN: 0-671-52432-1
ISBN: 0-671-61770-2 Pbk.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am deeply grateful to the officers ofall four services with whom I have
worked over the years. From the four-stars to those quitejunior at the
time, many earned my deep respect; but especially in a book often
critical ofthe institutions they serve, only one officer can be mentioned
by name: Major General Don Morelli of the Army's Training and Doc-
trine Command, a brilliant and free-spirited officer prematurely retired
in 1984 because ofinsidious, deadly illness. It was A. Lawrence dick-
ering, moral philosopher and close friend, who encouraged me to con-
solidate in this book my diverse studies ofthe American armed forces;
as executive director of the Institute for Contemporary Studies, he se-
cured a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation which removed
my best excuse for delay. In the attempt to clarify the prose of a text
greatly technical and sometimes statistical, I asked Robert Asahina, my
editor at Simon and Schuster, to truly edit the text; he did so with an
elegant efficiency which I found inspiring.
To my daughter Yael
..
CONTENTS
Introduction 17
1 The Anatomy ofMilitary Failure 23
2. How the Lessons ofDefeat Remained Unlearned 39
3. The Labyrinth: The Enormity ofthe Defense Establishment 68
4. A Greater Enormity: The Military Power ofthe Soviet Union 93
5. The Materialist Bias: Why We Need More "Fraud, Waste,
and Mismanagement" 130
6. The Officer Surplus and the Research Merry-Go-Round 157
7. The Officer Surplus and the Decline ofLeadership 185
8. The Great Budget Game and the Cost ofWeapons 204
9. The Great Budget Game and the Lessons ofHistory 228
10. The Great Budget Game and the Neglect ofStrategy 252
Toward Reform 266
11
Appendix 287
Notes 307
Index 321
11
In bello nihil tarn leve est quod non magnae
interdum rei momentum faciat.
—Titus Livius XXV, 28
The Pentagon and
Mr
the Art of