The Paradoxes of Action: Human Action, Law and Philosophy PDF
Preview The Paradoxes of Action: Human Action, Law and Philosophy
THE PARADOXES OFACTION Law and Philosophy Library VOLUME67 Managing Editors FRANCISCOJ. LAPORTA, DepartmentofLaw, Autonomous University ofMadrid, Spain ALEKSANDERPECZENIK, DepartmentofLaw, University ofLund. Sweden FREDERICKSCHAUER, John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A. Former Managing Editors AULIS AARNIO, MICHAELD. BAYLESt, CONRAD D. JOHNSONt, ALANMABE EditorialAdvisoryBoard AULIS AARNIO, Research Institute for Social Sciences, University ofTampere, Finland ZENONBANKOWSKI, Centrefor Law and Society, University ofEdinburgh PAOLOCOMANDUCCI, University ofGenua, Italy ERNESTO GARZONVALDES, Institutfiir Politikwissenschaft, Johannes Gutenberg Universitiit Main: JOHN KLEINIG, DepartmentofLaw,Police Science and Criminal Justice Administration,John Jay College ofCriminalJustice, City University ofNew York NEIL MacCORMICK, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium WOJCIECH SADURSKI, European University Institute, DepartmentofLaw,Florence, Italy ROBERT S. SUMMERS, School ofLaw, Cornell University CARLWELLMAN,DepartmentofPhilosophy, Washington University THE PARADOXES OF ACTION Human Action, Law and Philosophy by DANIEL GONzALEZ LAGIER Professor ofLegal Theory, University ofAlicante, Alicante, Spain Springer-Science+Business Media, B.~ AC.LP.Cataloguerecordforthisbookis availablefrom the LibraryofCongress. ISBN 978-90-481-6443-1 ISBN 978-94-017-0205-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-0205-8 Translatedfrom the Spanish byRuth Zimmerling Printedonacid-freepaper All RightsReserved ©2003 SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht OriginallypublishedbyKluwerAcademicPublishersin2003. Softcoverreprintofthehardcover1stedition2003 No part ofthis workmay bereproduced,stored inaretrieval system,ortransmitted inany form orbyanymeans, electronic,mechanical,photocopying,microfilming,recording orotherwise,withoutwrittenpermissionfrom thePublisher,with theexception ofanymaterial suppliedspecificallyforthepurposeofbeing entered and executedon acomputersystem,forexclusiveuseby the purchaserofthework. For Merche TABLEOFCONTENTS FOREWORDby ManuelAtienza PREFACE 7 CHAPTERI.PRELIMINARIES 1. The ConceptofAction andtheTraps ofLanguage 11 2. The RelevanceoftheConceptofHuman Action forEthics and theLaw 13 3. Human FreedomasaPrerequisite 15 CHAPTERII:OURINTUITIONSANDTHE PARADOXESOFACTION 1. Introduction 17 2. FirstParadox: AreActionsNatural PhenomenoaorProductsofOur Worldview? 19 3. Second Paradox:AreActionsBodilyMovementsorDescriptionsof Bodily Movements? 19 4. Third Paradox: Can WeBeMistakenAbout OurOwn Actions? 20 5. Fourth Paradox: DoWePerform SeveralActions With One Single Bodily Movement?(The 'AccordionEffect' ofActions) 21 6. Fifth Paradox: WhatArethe Limits ofOurActions? 22 CHAPTERIII:THEDEBATEINTHE PHILOSOPHYOFACTION 1. The ControversyAbout theIndividuationofActions 23 I.Theminimizingposition24/2.Themaximizingposition26 2. IndividuationFromtheAgent's PointofView (G.H.von Wright) 30 3. Individuation as Imputation (H.L. A.Hart) 32 4. Some Conclusions 36 VII viii TABLEOFCONTENTS CHAPTERIV: THEDEBATEINCRIMINALLAW 1. Introduction 39 2. TheDefinition of'Action' inCriminal-LawDoctrine 40 I.Thecausaltheoryofaction.Thetrilemmaofcausalism40/2.Theteleologicaltheoryof action.Thepartialabandoningofteleology43/3.Thesocialtheoryofaction.Its insufficiency44/4.Anewversionofthesocialtheory:thetheoryofactionasmeaning46 3. The TreatmentofAction inAnglo-SaxonLaw 49 I.Actrequirementandactusreusrequirement.Theorthodoxtheoryofaction50/2. Objectivismvs.subjectivism52 4. Conclusions 53 CHAPTERV:THEDEBATEINTHE PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE 1. Introduction.GoodTimesfor Pragmatics 55 2. LanguageGames(Wittgenstein) 56 3. An IntentionalTheoryofMeaning(H. P.Grice) 58 I.Thereconstructionofsemanticconceptsfrompragmaticconcepts58/2.Theroleof conventionsinthedeterminationofmeaning60/3.Searle'scritiqueoftheconceptionof Grice61 4. HowTo Do Things With Words(1.L.Austin) 62 I. 'Constativeutterances'and'performativeutterances'62/2.'Locutionaryacts', 'illocutionaryacts',and'perlocutionaryacts' 64 5. An IntegrativeTheoryofSpeechActs (1.Searle) 69 I.Introduction69/2.Rulesandspeechacts.ThestructureofiIIocutionaryacts70/3.'A taxonomyofillocutionaryacts'72/4.IntentionandiIIocutionaryacts76 6. Conclusions 77 CHAPTERVI: THEPARADOXES DISSOLVED 1. Recapitulation.The AspectsofAction 79 I.Naturalistic,subjectivist,andsocialtheoriesofaction79/2.Thecomplementarinessof thethreegroupsoftheories.Basicact,result-actandconsequence-act. Actandaction80/3. Theaspectsofactionandthedistinctionbetweenlocutionary,iIIocutionary,and perlocutionaryacts81/4.Criteriaforthedistinctionbetweenthethreeaspectsofaction82 2. The ParadoxesofAction Reconsidered 85 I.Solutionofthefirstparadox86/2.Solutionofthesecondparadox86/3.Solutionofthe thirdparadox86/4.Solutionofthefourthparadox87/5.Solutionofthefifthparadox87 TABLEOFCONTENTS IX CHAPTERVII:THESTRUCTUREOFACTION 1. Introduction 91 2. The SequenceofBodilyMovements 91 I.Theroleofbodilymovements91/2.Anybodilymovement?92/3.Limitsofbodily movements93 3. Changesinthe World 93 I.Doallactionsbringaboutachangeintheworld?93/2.'Action-internal'change93/3. Naturalchangesandinstitutionalchanges94/4.Fromoneworldto theother94/5.Any change?94 4. The LinkBetweenaBodilyMovementand aChangeinthe World 96 I.Causalrelations96/2.Conventional relations97/3.Relationsofimplication?97 5. Intention 98 I.IntentionalityandIntention98/2.Dointentionsexistinthemind?Volitionistsandanti volitionists99/3.Intentionsandwants 101/4. Intentionpriortoaction,andintentionin acting 103/5.Internal(subjective) intentionandexternal(objective)intention 104/6. Voluntarinessandintention 106 6. The InterpretationorMeaningofan Action 107 I.Whatdoes'meaningofanaction' mean? 107/2.Theintentionalinterpretationofbodily movements 109/3.Thenon-intentionalinterpretationofbodilymovements 112 CHAPTERVIII:OTHERKINDSOFACTIONS 1. Introduction 115 2. InstitutionalActions 115 I.JohnSearle'sdistinctionbetweennaturalandinstitutionalactions 115/2.Twokindsof institutionalactions 116 3. Remarks onOmission 117 I.Omissionandbodilymovements 118/2.Omissionandchangesintheworld 119/3. Omissionandlinks119/4.Omissionandintention 120/5.Omissionandinterpretation120 EPILOGUE 123 BIBLIOGRAPHY 127 INDEXOFNAMES 135 FOREWORD Through the combined effects ofcertain natural facts (connected with the passage of time), institutional acts (performed at various points within the university system) and bondsoffriendship(forged overquiteanumberofyearsofacademic life),Ihavelately become an occasional writer of forewords. It is certainly not a kind ofwork that dis pleasesme;but itwould betoomuchtosaythatIhavelearnedtodoitwithease.Quite tothecontrary! Writingaforeword is,itseemstome,anexampleofarathercomplex action(al though, ofcourse, much lesscomplex than writing the book itaccompanies). Infact,it isnoteven an action; itisrather anactivity, carried outover a more or lessprolonged period oftime and typically including something likethe following stages:deciding to writetheforeword;carefully readingthebook; takingnotes;thinking aboutwhatwould be appropriate aspects to be mentioned; sketching an outline; writing a first draft by hand;writing several corrected versions;typing thelastofthem intothecomputer;dis tributing it to several colleagues to see how they like it;correcting the text once more; sending it to the author ofthe book;delivering itto the publisher. Ineach ofthese ac tions(leaving aside foramomentpurely mentalactionssuchasthinking) wecaninturn distinguish severalcomponents.Theseare,basically:bodilymovements,intentions,and (intentionally orunintentionallyproduced) changes intheworld. Forinstance, theactionofwriting the firstdraft(or,forsimplicity's sake, oneof theparagraphs ofthefirstdraft)ofthepresent forewordconsisted, tobeginwith,incer tain bodily movements (ofmyhand grabbing a pen and gliding over a piece ofpaper) which I carried out voluntarily (no-one guided my hand). Secondly, there are some changes inthe world which Iintended to produce andwhich also seem to formpartof thataction:theappearance onthepaper(following certainlawsofphysics) ofinkspots distributed in a certain pattern; or the production (by virtue of the syntactic and semantic rules ofthe Spanish language) of a text with a meaning (or perhaps even several meanings).And,finally,there may bestillotherchanges which Idid notintend andtheproduction ofwhichIdidnotforesee, butwhich, nevertheless, alsoformpartof thatsameaction.Forexample,because Iconcentrated sohardontheformulationofmy text, I did not realize that I was writing on a piece ofpaper on which my son Miguel had drawn a picture, with the effect that when he discovered my terrible mistake he started crying desperately. Or perhaps (and that is actually partly true) because, although Ihad wanted to write a foreword that would please Daniel and that he could evenregard as a kind ofwedding present (as Ibegantowrite the first draft a fewdays beforetheauthor ofthisbook,inajointaction withMercedes,setout tobringaboutan - institutional- change intheworldconsisting inraising bytwo the numberofmarried persons), what happened was that he was offended by the paragraph in question and decidedthathisbookshouldbepublished withoutaforewordafterall. 2 FOREWORD Seriously speaking, the example ofwriting a foreword can serve perfectly well for a quick review ofthe kinds ofproblems and questions treated in this book: Are actions (writing a foreword) phenomena that exist (and that we can observe)just like physical objects,oraretheyrather a wayofseeingtheworld,a kindofinterpretation? Shouldweregardactionsasbodilymovements(myhandgrabbingthepen),orratheras descriptions of bodily movements (which vary from one observer to the next: destroying a picture, scribbling on paper, writing a foreword, ...)? How could it be possible that someonewhoperforms anaction doesnot know what heisdoing?Or do we always know? How manyactions did Iperform when Iwrote the paragraph? Was offending Danieloneofthem?AnddidIalsoperformtheactionofbringingaboutthat theforeworditcostmesomuchefforttowritewillremainunpublished? Gonzalez Lagier's strategy for answering these questions is, at the same time, simpleandeffective.Hebeginsbygiving asummaryofthecurrent debateinthephilo sophyofaction which leadshimtothe conclusionthatagood part ofthecontroversies inthatfieldaremoreapparentthanreal.Asheseesit,thedifferenttheoriesaboutaction he reviews (and which are, in fact, the most relevant) are not about the same subject; rather,they refereachtoadifferent oneoftheseveralaspectswecandistinguishinac tions,i.e.tobodilymovements(thenaturaldimension),towhat isintentionallydone in carrying out those bodily movements (the subjective dimension), and to the socially relevantconsequencesthismayproduce(thesocialdimension). Ifoneexamines- asGonzalez Lagierdoesnext- thesituationinthefieldofcri minal dogmatics, one can draw an analogous conclusion: the causal theory, the teleo logicaltheory,andthesocialtheoryofactionallsharethecharacteristicofreducingthe phenomenon ofactiontoonlyoneofitsthreebasicelements.Ratherthanasthreerival theories,one can thereforeregard them ascomplementarytheories aboutdifferentsub jects, namely,about whattheauthor callsthe 'basic act', the 'result-act',andthe 'con sequence-act',respectively. Finally,thethirdandlastofGonzalezLagier's theoreticalexplorationsconcerns thephilosophy oflanguage,andinparticularAustin's distinction oflocutionaryact(the actofuttering something:forinstance, 'Danielisgettingmarried onMay I'), illocutio naryact(whatonedoesbyutteringsomething:tellingCarmenaboutit),andperlocutio naryact(the consequencesofuttering something:provoking inCarmen- andmyself a feeling of sadness for not being able to assist at the wedding). In his view, if interpreted ina certain fashion,this distinction canbecarried over fromspeech actsto actions in general, so that in the end we are back again at the distinction between physicalmovements,theirintendedresults,andtheirsocialconsequences. Startingfromthisschema,whichtheauthordevelopswithadegreeofdetailand sophistication that Icannot dojustice to here, theanswer to the questions posedabove isthe following:Ifbyanactionone understands the basic act, then actions are natural phenomena. If, instead,anaction isunderstood asanact-result or anact-consequence, then it is rather an 'interpretive attitude'. And that is why one and the same bodily movement(basicact)cangiverisetodifferentactions(interpretations),andoneandthe same kind ofaction (writing a foreword) can be performed through different bodily movements (the movement of my hand grabbing the pen, or the movements of my fingers hitting the keys ofa keyboard; in other cases, the differences between bodily movements may even be much greater: one can kill another by firing a gun, by
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