The Other Archipelago: Kulak Deportations to the North in 1930

27 Pages·2012·2.35 MB·English

The Other Archipelago: Kulak Deportations to the North in 1930
Author(s): Lynne Viola
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Winter, 2001), pp. 730-755
Published by:
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2697493 .
Accessed: 09/08/2012 08:31
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Slavic Review.
http://www.jstor.org
The Other Archipelago:
Kulak Deportations to the North in 1930
LynneV iola
In a lettero f 23 April 1930, I. A. Serkin,s ecretaryo f the Severo-Dvinskii
county( okrug)p artyc ommittee,w rotet o his superior,S . A. Bergavinov,
secretaryo f the northernr egional (krai) partyc ommittee," In the begin-
ning,w hen the issue of resettlemenft irsta rose, manyo f us did not think
it throught o the end and did not imagine all the complexitieso f the is-
sue.'' The issue to whichS erkinr eferredw as the deportationa nd forced
resettlemento f peasants-so-called kulaks-that accompanied the col-
lectivizationo f agriculturein the SovietU nion in the early1 930s.H e went
on to note thata lthought he basic occupationo ft hes petspereselenotrs syp e-
cial settlersa,s theyw ere euphemisticallyca lled, would be agriculturen, o
one had conducted the necessarys tudieso f land and soil conditionsa nd
some of the land tractsm apped out for the settlersw ere uninhabitable,
completelyi naccessible,a nd located on marsh land or in dense woods.
Geographicals urveysw ere urgentlyn eeded, but snowb lanketedt he ter-
rain,h inderingo n-sitew ork.I n addition,t he land requireda n enormous
amount of workt o prepare even elementaryc onditionsf or agriculture.
Serkinw arned Bergavinovt hati t would be unrealistict o expect any in-
come fromt he special settlersa' griculturapl ursuitsi n the firsty ear.2
Serkinc ontinuedh is letterb yn otingt hatt he county'se conomic ad-
ministrativoer gans( khozorgan-yin) thisc ase, thef orestriyn dustry-were
completelyu nprepared to build the special villages (spetsposelkwi) here
the settlersa nd theirf amiliesw ould livea nd fromw hicha largep arto ft he
able-bodied populationw ould commutet o works easonallyi n thef orestry
industryT. he forestryin dustryin stead complained, "we haven'tr eceived
The researchf ort hisp rojectw as carriedo ut under the auspices of the Stalin-EraR esearch
and ArchivesP rojecta t the Universityof Toronto,f undedb y the Social Sciences and Hu-
manitiesR esearchC ouncil of Canada and the ConnaughtF und. I would liket o thankR .W.
Davies,J .A rch GettyP, eterH olquist,T racyM cDonald, Elena Osokina,Y uri Slezkine,a nd
AmirW einer,a s well as Diane Koenker and her anonymousr efereesa t SlavicR eview,f or
theiri nvaluable feedback on this article.I n the archivalc itations,I have identifieda ll
fonds;g ivens pace limitationsI, identifyd ela and individuald ocumentso nlyi n rare cases
when it seemed absolutelyp ertinent.
1. Vologodskiio blastnoia rkhivn oveisheip oliticheskoiis torii( VOANPI), f.5 (Severo-
Dvinskiio kruzhkomV KP), op. 1, d. 275,1. 3.
2. Ibid. Until1 938, the special settlerws orkedi n neustavnyaeg riculturaal rtels,m ean-
ing collectivef armsw ithoutt he chartersa nd limitedr ightsa nd privilegeso f regularc ol-
lectivef armsT. hese artelsr eceivedc hartersi n 1938.The artelsw ere intendedt o make the
special settlerss elf-sufficienwt,h ile providinga work force for regions and industries
sufferingfr oma shortageo f labor. In the NorthernR egion, the special settlers'c ollec-
tive farmsn ever attained self-sufficiencSye.e , for example, the 8 October 1951 report
prepared by the regional leadership for G. M. Malenkov, in Gosudarstvennyair khiv
obshchestvenno-politicheskikdhv izheniii formirovaniAi rkhangel'skooi blasti (GAOPDF
AO), f. 296 (Arkhangel'skioib kom), op. 2, d. 1086,11.6 3-65.
Slavic Review 60, no. 4 (Winter 2001)
TheO therA rchipelago 731
special funds,"" therea re no buildingm aterials,"o r "therea re no direc-
tives"o n how to proceed, all ofw hichw ere trueb ut needlesslyf ormalistic
fromt he point ofv iewo f a Serkino r a BergavinovA. lthought he majority
of able-bodied settlersw ere now at or near theirf inald estinationst, here
were stilln o special villages: the forestryag encies had not begun con-
structionT. o make mattersw orse,t herew ere not enough skilledc arpen-
ters,t oolsw ere in shorts upply,a nd, apartf roml umber,b uildingm ateri-
als were almost completelyn onexistent.S erkinw arned Bergavinovt hat
theym ighth ave to take the "extremem easure"o f removinga ble-bodied
settlersf romf orestrwy orku ntilS eptemberi n order to constructt he spe-
cial villages.O therwise,h e wrote," thisb usinessw ithr esettlementc ould
lead, withoute xaggeration,t o catastrophe."3
Catastrophe,in fact,w as more thani mpending.I t was present.S erkin
told Bergavinovt hatf ood suppliesw ere extremelylo w. The government
would have to providef ood fort he settlers-at a minimumu ntilN ovem-
ber (an overlyo ptimisticf orecast).G oods were also scarce; the settlers
lackedw interc lothing,a nd some were quite literallysh oeless.A t the tran-
sitp ointsw here the settlersf' amiliesw ere temporarilyh oused, especially
in Kotlas,S ol'vychegodska,n d Ustiug,i llnessa nd death were on the rise.
In Sol'vychegodskS, erkinw rote," tenso f childrena nd adults are dying
daily."S erkinf eared the outbreako f epidemics thatw ould lead not only
to death among settlersa nd possiblya mong the local population, but,
perhapsm ore ominouslyf romh is perspectivew, ould interruptth e timber
floating( splav).4
Serkin'sl etterw as byn o means unusual. The storyh e toldw as unfold-
ing all over the SovietU nion, in the mostr emotea nd desolate places, as
more than a halfm illionp easantsf aced deportationi n 1930.5P rompted
byt he politicala nd economic imperativeso f wholesale collectivization
a statev isiono f classw ar,t he need to providen egativei ncentives( thati s,
the threato f dekulakization)t o forcet he majorityo f peasantsi nto collec-
tivef arms,a nd the goal of using expropriatedk ulak propertiest o offset
the costs of collectivef arm construction-special resettlementw as to
servet he combined and oftenc ontradictoryn eeds of agriculturael xpan-
sion, labor recruitmenta,n d colonization,w hile isolatingw hat the state
perceivedt o be a deadly social enemy.I t was the Stalinists tate'sf irste x-
perimenti n radical social engineering.
Barelyn oted in AleksandrS olzhenitsyn'ms asterfuol pus,6t his "other
3. VOANPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 275,11.3 -7.
4. Ibid.
5. Gosudarstvennyair khivR ossiiskoiF ederatsii( GARF), f. 9414 (OGPU. Osobyi ot-
del), op. 1, d. 1943 (Itogovyem aterialyo provedennoio peratsiip o vyseleniiuk ulachestva
v 1930 godu, tom 1), 1. 101. A total of 112,828 families( 550,558 people) were deported
in 1930. For slightlyla rgerf igures( 113,013 familiesw ith5 51,330 people), see Rossiiskii
gosudarstvennyair khivs otsial'no-politicheskoisit orii( RGASPI), f. 17 (TsKVKP), op. 120,
d. 52,1. 20 (Spravkao khode vyseleniiak ulatskikhse mei).
6. AleksandrI . SolzhenitsynT, he GulagA rchipelagot,r ans.T homas P. Whitneya nd
HarryW illetts3, vols. (New York,1 973-78), 1: 24, 54-57, 538; 2: 305.
732 Slavic Review
archipelago"w as a cornerstoneo f the evolvingg ulag (Glavnoe upravlenie
ispravitel'no-trudovylkaghe rei) order.7S cholarsh ave paid relativelysc ant
attentiont o the special settlementsw, hiche mergedf irstt o isolatea nd ex-
ploitt hel abor of the dekulakizedp easantrya nd withina shortt imew ould
house a varietyo f others tate-definedso cial and ethnica liens throught he
course of the Staliny ears.8Y et the storyo f the special settlementiss fun-
damental to an understandingo f the evolution,d ynamics,a nd contours
of Soviets tatet errorT. he special villagesd eveloped withina nd were de-
finedb yt he confineso fa statea dministrativoer dert hatb alanced precari-
ouslyb etween hypercentralizatioann d a veritablec ult of self-perceived
scientificp lanning,o n one side, and expediency,i mprovisationu, npre-
paredness,e xcessive" tempos,"i nadequate local knowledge,a nd plain (if
not criminal)i ncompetencea nd negligence,o n the other.T o make mat-
tersw orse,t he Stalinists tater elied on an unwieldyp, oorlyd emarcated,
fractiousa,n d underdevelopedb ureaucracyb, oth centrala nd regional,t o
implementi ts overlya mbitiousp lans.9U nclear and contradictoryso cial
engineering" goals"f urtheru nderminedt he state'se ffortsa,s the needs of
colonizationa nd agriculturee xpansion came into conflictw ithd emands
for workersi n territorieasn d industriesw ithouts ufficienlta bor and as
a philosophyo f "rehabilitationc"o llided witht he urge to punish,a t the
worsto f times,a nd simple realitya t all other times.10U nder such condi-
7. Witht he creationo f the Departmento f Special Settlements( Otdel po spetspere-
selentsam,o r OSP) under gulag, the special settlementws ere formallyp laced under the
jurisdictiono f the OGPU beginningo n 1 July1 931. The nomenclaturea lso changed over
time:f rom1 933 spetspereselenbtescyam e trudposelentosry ,l abor settlersr, evertingb ack to
spetspereselenints lyat ery ears.S ee LynneV iola, "The Role of the OGPU in Dekulakization,
Mass Deportations,a nd Special Resettlementin 1930," The CarlB eckP apersi n Russiana nd
EastE uropeanS tudies2, 000, no. 1406:2, 36.
8. On other social aliens, see Paul Hagenloh, "'SociallyH armfulE lements' and the
Great Terror,"i n Sheila Fitzpatricke,d ., StalinismN: ewD irection(sN ew York,2 000), 286-
308. On ethnicd eportationss, ee TerryM artin," The Originso f SovietE thnicC leansing,"
Journalo fM odernH istory7 0, no. 4 (1998): 813-61; and AmirW einer," Nature,N urture,
and Memoryi n a SocialistU topia: Delineatingt he SovietS ocio-EthnicB ody in theA ge of
Socialism,"A mericanH istoricaRl eview1 04, no. 4 (October 1999): 1114-55.
9. David Nordlanderh as exploredi ssueso f centralc ontroli n the constructiono fM a-
gadan, concludingt hatS talin's" sway"t herew as "overwhelmingI." f eart hatN ordlander's
analysisi s somewhatt oo simple,s haped perhaps by his misguideda nd, I think,d ated at-
tack (not to mentionf aultyin terpretationo) n revisionisstc holarshipo f the 1980s,a s well
as his tendencyt o mistake" administrativceh eckups" (801) and centrali nterferencef or
actual control.S ee his article," Originso f a Gulag Capital: Magadan and StalinistC ontrol
in the Early1 930s,"S lavicR eview5 7, no. 4 (1998): 791-812.
10. Peter H. Solomon,J r.,h as documented the transitionin penal policyf romw hat
he viewsa s a "progressivep" olicyi n the 1920s to one based primarilyon economic needs.
See his pioneeringa rticle," SovietP enal Policy,1 917-1934: A ReinterpretationS,"l avicR e-
view3 9, no. 2 (June 1980): 201, 207.J amesH arrish as also discussedl abor as the motivat-
ing factori n spurringo n the policyo f peasant deportationsi n the Urals in "The Growth
of the Gulag: Forced Labor in the Urals Region, 1929-31," Russian Review5 6, no. 2
(April 1997): 265-80. My own research suggestsa blend of motivatingf actorst hat in-
cluded labor (especiallyf or the forestryin dustryw, hose exportsw ere seen to be an im-
portants ource of foreignc urrencyd uringt he firstF ive-YearP lan), colonization,a nd the
"confiscative-repressivasep" ectso f dekulakizationi n 1930 as well as a farf romm onolithic
outlook on the mattera mong officialsin both the centera nd the regions.F or a discus-
TheO therA rchipelago 733
tions,S talinists ocial engineeringc ould not have proveda nythingb ut dis-
astrousa nd, as G. M. Ivanova has argued fort he gulag systema s a whole,
economicallyi rrationalf, eedingi nto a steadyc rescendo of statev iolence
as realitye ndlesslyc onfoundedt he controllinga mbitionso f the totalizing
statea nd the internals ecurityp olice soughte ver more bodies to expend
in itsl abor intensiveb, ut ultimatelyin effectuale,c onomic empire.1"
In thisa rticleI explore the historyo f the othera rchipelagoi n they ear
1930, itsf oundinga nd perhaps mostd ifficulyt ear.T he articlef ocuseso n
the NorthernR egion (Sevkrai),a n administrative-territoruinailt created
in 1929 witht he consolidationo f fivec ounties (Arkhangel'skiVi,o logod-
skii,N enetskii,N iandomskii,a nd Severo-Dvinskiia) nd one autonomous
region (Komi, or Zyrian) and encompassinga land mass of 1,122,600
square kilometersw itha population of 2,376,700 people. Its northern-
most territorielsa yj ust above the ArcticC ircle and bordered the White
Sea and the ArcticO cean.12A gainstt hisi cy backdrop the single largest
contingento f dekulakizedp easant families overa quarterm illionm en,
women,a nd children-would build the specialv illageso f the othera rch-
ipelago fromo ut of the wilderness.
Planningn a khodu
At the November1 929 plenum of the CentralC ommitteeo f the Commu-
nistP artyJ, osifS talin quipped, "Do you thinkt hate verythingca n be or-
ganized ahead of time?"13A lthoughh e was respondingt o a speech by
S. I. Syrtsovon disordersi n the rapidlye xpandingc ollectivef arms ystem,
he could well have said the same in regard to the kulak question. The
partyh ad discussedt he issue fory ears,o nlya rrivinga t a Stalinistc onsen-
sus not to admit kulaksi nto collectivef armsi n late 1929.14T he Decem-
ber Politburoc ommissiono n collectivizationf ailed to go much further.
Spurredo n both byS talin's2 7 December 1929 speech at the Conference
of MarxistA gronomistsin whichh e enunciated the policyo f the "elimi-
nation of the kulak as a class" for the firstt ime and by a varietyo f lo-
cal initiativeisn dekulakizationt, he Politburoa nd OGPU (Ob"edinennoe
gosudarstvennoep oliticheskoeu pravlenie,o r internal securityp olice)
onlyt urnedt heira ttentiont o a finalr esolutiono f the kulak question in
sion of the importanceo f the "confiscative-repressivaes"p ectso f dekulakizations, ee V P.
Danilov and S. A. Krasil'nikove,d s., Spetspereselenvt sZyap adnoiS ibiri,1 930-1945, 4 vols.
(Novosibirsk1, 992-96), 1: 14. One of theb est generald iscussionsi s S. A. Krasil'nikove,d .,
"Rozhdenie GULAGa: Diskussiiv verkhnikhe shelonakhv lasti,"I storicheskairik hiv1, 997,
no. 4:142-43.
11. Galina MikhailovnaI vanova,L aborC ampS ocialismT: heG ulagi n theS ovietT otalitar-
ian Systemt,r ans.C arol Flath (Armonk,N .Y, 2000).
12. Administrativno-territoridael'lnenoeieA rkhangel'skgouib erniii oblastvi XiVII-XX ve-
kakh.S pravochni(kA rkhangel'sk1,9 97), 113. The populationf iguresa re based on the 1926
census.
13. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 441 (Stenograficheskioit chet zasedaniia Plenuma TsK
VKP,10-17 noiabria 1929), vyp.1 , 1. 70.
14. See LynneV iola, "The Case of KrasnyiM elioratoro r 'How the Kulak Growsi nto
Socialism,"'S ovietS tudies3 8, no. 4 (1986): 508-29.
734 Slavic Review
January1 930.15F rom thatt ime and well into 1931, the planningp rocess
would be a worki n progress,u ndertakeni n haste-almost as an after-
thoughtt o wholesale collectivization-and more oftent han not as a re-
sponse to problemsa s theya rose in the course of the repressivew hirlwind
of dekulakizationB. ureaucraticc onfusiona nd administrativceh aos char-
acterizedt hism ostm omentousp olicy,a s the centerd rewu p increasingly
intricatep lans thatb ore littler elationt o regionalr ealitiesn ot to mention
feasibility.
On 30 January1 930 a special Politburoc ommission,c haired byV M.
Molotov,s ubmittedit sd ecree, "On Measuresf ort he Eliminationo f Kulak
Farmsi n Districts[ raionyo] fW holesale Collectivization,t"o the Politburo
fora pproval.T he decree adopted a differentiateadp proach to kulaks,d i-
vidingt hemi nto threec ategories,r angingf roma supposed counterrevo-
lutionaryk ulak group (estimateda t 60,000 persons) facinge xecution or
internmentin labor camps and the deportationo f theirf amilies,t o the
less dangerous second categoryo f some 150,000 familiess ubject to de-
portation,t o a finalc ategoryo f kulaksw ho could be more or less safely
lefti n place outside the new collectivef armso n inferiorl and. Deported
kulaks were to go mainly to the Northern Region (70,000), Siberia
(50,000), the Urals (20-25,000), and Kazakhstan (20_25,000).16 (For
precise figuress, ee table 1.)
In the meantime,O GPU had been at work throught he month of
January,c ounting kulaks based on estimatess ubmittedb y its regional
subordinatesa nd planningo perationalm easures.O GPU initiallyp lanned
to send 100,000k ulakf amiliest o then orth,b utB ergavinovt ooki ssuew ith
thesen umbersi n a 14Januaryt elegramt o L. M. Kaganovich,a rguingt hat
the NorthernR egion was able to take in no more than 50,000 to 70,000
families.1I7n a lettero f 27Januaryt o Molotov,B ergavinova gain criticized
the OGPU plan, pointingo ut that such an enormous plan meant that
beginningi n Februaryf, ivet o seven echelons of kulakf amilies,e ach with
5,000 to 7,000 people-in all, approximately3 00,000 people by his cal-
culations-would arrived ailyi nto a county( Arkhangel'skiiw) itha popu-
lation of only 250,000 and a city( Arkhangel'sk)o f 89,000. Even if they
moveda ll the arrivalsin to everyv illage -an impossibilityh,e noted,g iven
the difficultieosf movingw omen and childreni n the dead of winter
15. For furtherin formations,e e Viola, "The Role of the OGPU in Dekulakization,
Mass Deportations,a nd Special Resettlementin 1930," 1-12.
16. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 8 (Protokolyz asedaniia PolitbiuroT sK), 11.6 4-69;
Istoricheskairik hiv1, 994, no. 4:148-49.
17. GAOPDF AO, f. 290 (Severnyik raikom),o p. 1, d. 386,1. 24 (undated). The date
is given in N. A. IvnitskiiK, ollektivizatsiii ra askulachivani(ne achalo3 0-khg odov)( Moscow,
1994), 122. The figureo f 70,000 familiesc ame fromt he NorthernR egional OGPU repre-
sentative's(p olnomochnpyrie dstavitelp')l an submittedt o OGPU fort he exile of 70,000 fam-
ilies. See Viola, "The Role of the OGPU in Dekulakization,M ass Deportations,a nd Spe-
cial Resettlement,a"n d Tsentral'nyair khivf ederativnosi luzhbyb ezopasnosti (TsA FSB),
f. 2, op. 8, d. 504, 11.1 6-18. Documents fromt hisa rchivec ome via the TragediiaS ovetskoi
derevnpir oject( V P. Danilov,R . T. Manning,L . Viola, eds., TragediiSa ovetskodie revnKi: ollek-
tivizatsiiia r askulachivaniDeo. kumentiy m aterialvy 5 tomakh1,9 27-1939 [Moscow,1 999-])
and willb e preceded in citationsb y "Tragediia."
TheO therA rchipelago 735
Table 1
Regions of Exile of Category2 Kulaks (10 December 1930)
From Other Regions WithinR egion Total
Region Familes People Families People Families People
North 46,562 230,065 61 305 46,623 230,370
Urals 16,619 78,431 13,855 66,774 30,474 145,205
Siberia 11,612 49,801 16,025 82,922 27,637 132,723
Kazakhstan 159 197 1,265 7,393 1,424 7,590
Far East 3,796 19,374 447 2,235 4,243 21,609
Aldan 287 2,007 287 2,007
Leningrad 1,540 8,499 600 2,555 2,140 11,054
Total 80,575 388,374 32,253 162,184 112,828 550,558
SourceG: ARF,f .9 414, op. 1, d. 1943, 1. 101. For slightlyd ifferenfti guress, ee RGASPI,f . 17,
op. 120, d. 52,1. 20.
"therew ould stillb e congestion [zator]"( an interestingb, ut revealing,
choice of vocabulary). Bergavinova lso complained that Moscow was
"silent"a bout the absolute necessityo f building barracks,l eaving the
NorthernR egion on its own to deal with the practicalr ealitieso f this
monumental task.18
Stalin called Bergavinovt o task on 16 February,c riticizingt he sup-
posed decision to takeo nly3 0,000 familiesi nsteado f the planned 70,000.
Stalino rderedB ergavinovt o takea ll necessarym easuresf ort he arrivalo f
not less than 50,000 by mid-Aprila, reduction,n onetheless,o f 20,000.19
On 17 FebruaryB, ergavinovs enta telegramt o Stalina nd Molotov,p lead-
ing for financiala nd material aid from the Council of People's Com-
missars,t he Supreme Council of the People's Economy (VSNKh), the
People's Commissariato f Trade, and OGPU, notingt hatl ocal resources
were strainedt o the limit.A t present,h e continued,t heyh ad resources
foro nlys ome 12,000 familiesA. t the same time,h e feltc ompelled to re-
spond to Stalin'sc ommunique of 16 Februaryn, otingt hat Stalin'sr efer-
ence to 30,000 familiesh ad been "based on our seriousa larm thatc entral
institutionhs ad been and were continuingt o relate surprisinglyin dif-
ferentlyt"o the materiala nd financialn eeds of the NorthernR egion. To
preventt he disruptiono f the operation,B ergavinovt old Stalina nd Molo-
18. GAOPDF AO, f. 290, op. 1, d. 386,1. 6.
19. In Bergavinov'sa bsence (he was in Moscow), the NorthernR egion'sp artyc om-
mitteea nd itss pecial commissiono n resettlemenmt et severalt imesi n lateJ anuaryt o be-
gin theirp lanningp rocess.O n 29Januaryt,h e special commissionc oncluded thatt hec on-
structiono f some 800 barracksa ccording to central plans was "unrealistic"g iven local
budget realities.T he issue of temporaryh ousing spilled over into the next meetingo f
31 Januaryw here some memberss uggestedt hatt he norths hould onlyt ake 30,000 fami-
lies if temporaryh ousingw as not available-hence Stalin'sr eferencet o 30,000 families.
Bergavinovs ent a copy of the protocolso f thism eetingt o Molotov,w itha notherc opy to
G. G. lagoda. GAOPDFAO, f. 290, op. 1, d. 378,11.1 1-12, 15-17, 30-32. On Bergavinov's
whereabouts,s ee Rudol'fK hantalin,N evol'nikii b onzy(A rkhangel'sk1,9 98), 54. Stalin'sl et-
teri s in TragediiaT, sA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 204,1. 468.
736 Slavic Review
tov thath e had taken fundsf romt he local budget for capital construc-
tion of factoriesi,n dicatingt hate xportp lans mightw ell be harmed as a
consequence.20
AlthoughB ergavinovf oughtv ociferouslyto defendh is region'si nter-
ests,i t is importantt o note at the outsett hath is motivationws ere purely
utilitarianA. man of overridinga mbitions,B ergavinovd reamed of creat-
ingw hath e called "a wooden Donbas" in the north,b ased on the forestry
industryan d timbere xports.H e viewedt he special settlersa s the solution
to the forestryin dustry'sm ost serious problem: scant labor resources.
And, unlike the regional and republicl eadershipo f Siberia and Kazakh-
stan, both of which balked at takingi n such large numberso f families
withoutt hen ecessaryp reparationi n 1930,B ergavinovw as keen to see this
regiont op the listi n numberso f special settlersg, iven,a s he liked to point
out, the "all-unioni mportance"o f the timbere xportp lan.21
In the end, the NorthernR egion would absorb just under 50,000
kulakf amilies( approximately2 50,000 people based on the standardS o-
viet calculationo f fivem emberst o a family)b y spring,a stillf arg reater
numbert han anyo therr egioni n 1930.
The special settlersin the NorthernR egion came primarilyfr omc en-
tral and southernR ussia (Central Black Earth Region and Lower and
Middle Volga) and Ukraine. They entered into exile witht heirf amilies;
childrenm ade up a littlel ess than 40 percent of all special settlers( see
table 2). Seventeen thousand familiesw ere destinedf or resettlementin
Arkhangel'skicio untyw, itht he remaining2 7,000 familiesr oughlye venly
apportioned between Niandomskii, Severo-Dvinskii,a nd Vologodskii
countiesa nd Komi region.22
Through most of 1930, administrativree sponsibilityfo r the special
settlers-on paper and in practice-was confused and conflict-ridden.
Centrallyt, he OGPU was the most importanta ctor in planning and im-
plementingd ekulakizationf or first-a nd second-categoryk ulaks.23I n
planning for the numericals ize of the contingentso f deportees,t rans-
port, temporaryh ousing, and securitym easures, the OGPU worked
throughi tsr egionalp lenipotentiaryre presentativein; the north,t hist ask
fellt o R. I. Austrin.2C4e ntralr esponsibilitfyo rc oordinatinga ctual settle-
menta nd managingt he special settlerso nce theyh ad moved to theirn ew
20. GAOPDF AO, f. 290, op. 1, d. 387,1. 8.
21. For more informationo n Bergavinov,s ee Lynne Viola, 'A Tale of Two Men:
Bergavinov,T olmachev,a nd the BergavinovC ommission,"E urope-AsiaS tudies5 2, no. 8
(2000): 1449-66. See also Bergavinov'sM ay 1930 memorandumt o his countya nd district
partyc ommittees ecretariesi n whichh e discussesh ow special settlement" willr esolvet he
colonization question and overcome the sharp deficiti n labor power" in the north.
GAOPDF AO, f. 290, op. 1, d. 331,1. 45. Bergavinov'sse ntimentd irectlyr eflectedt hev iews
of lagoda who had long called for the use of forced labor to open up the vast natural
resourceso f the north.S ee Krasil'nikove,d ., "Rozhdenie GULAGa," 143-46, forf urther
discussion.
22. GARF,f . 9414, op. 1, d. 1943,1. 41.
23. See Viola, "The Role of the OGPU in Dekulakization,M ass Deportations,a nd
Special Resettlementin 1930."
24. Ibid.; TragediiaT, sA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 504, 11.1 6-18.
TheO theAr rchipelago 737
Table 2
Regional Originso f Special Settlersi n the North( 20 May 1930)
From Families Men Women Children Total
Ukraine 19,658 31,956 28,014 33,491 93,461
CentralB lack Earth 8,237 12,288 13,482 17,067 42,837
LowerV olga 7,931 11,417 12,192 16,392 40,001
Middle Volga 5,566 8,394 8,521 12,296 29,211
Belorussia 4,763 7,449 7,347 8,014 22,810
Crimea 407 531 562 652 1,745
Total 46,562 72,035 70,118 87,912 230,065
SourceG: ARF,f . 9414, op. 1, d. 1943,1. 54.
regions belonged to a special commissions et up under the all-union
Council of People's Commissarso n 1 April 1930-four monthsi nto the
operation-under the chairmanshipo fV V. Shmidt.A n additionalc oor-
dinatingc ommissionf ort he RussianR epublic,a special Russian Council
of People's Commissarsc ommissionu nder V N. Tolmachev,t he People's
Commissaro f InternalA ffairfs ort he RussianR epublic,f unctionedf rom
9 March to 13 August1 930, parallelinga nd duplicatingt he worko f the
Shmidtc ommission.2W5 itht he dissolutiono f the Tolmachevc ommission
in mid-August1 930, responsibilityfo r the special settlersi n the Russian
Republic devolved directlyo nto the relevantr epublic-levelc ommissari-
ats; and, although almost everyc ommissariata nd a varietyo f other re-
public-levela gencies had some role in special settlera ffairst,h e twop ri-
maryr oles belonged to the People's Commissariato f Agriculturef ort he
RussianR epublic (land and agriculturails sues) and the Supreme Coun-
cil of the People's Economyf ort he RussianR epublic (industriale mploy-
ment issues).26T he OGPU, in the meantime,r etainedr esponsibilityfo r
supervisiona nd "chekists ervicing."2T7 his structurer emained in place
until 1931 when, on 11 March,i n response to the disastrousf irsty ear of
special resettlementt,h e Politburoc reated the Andreev commissiont o
oversee and coordinate special settleri ssues and, then, on 1 July,t rans-
ferreda ll responsibilityfo r special settlersf romt he regional sovietst o
the OGPU.28
Withint he NorthernR egion (and elsewhere),t he regional sovieta s-
sumed responsibilitfyo rs pecial settleri ssues in 1930. A special troikal ed
25. GARF,f . 393 (NKVIDR SFSR), op. 43a, d. 1796, 1. 232; TragediiaT, sA FSB, f. 2,
op. 9, d. 760,1. 6. Also see GARF,f . 393, op. la, d. 292,11.3 4, 82. For more informationo n
Tolmachev'sr ole at thist ime,s ee Viola, 'A Tale of Two Men: BergavinovT, olmachev,a nd
the BergavinovC ommission,"1 449-66.
26. GARF,f . 393, op. la, d. 292,11.8 2, 450.
27. GARF,f . 9414, op. 1, d. 1944 (Itogovyem aterialyo provedennoio peratsiip o vy-
seleniiu kulachestvav 1930 godu, tom,2 ), 1. 107.
28. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9 (Protokolyz asedaniia PolitbiuroT sK), 11.1 38, 161;
d. 10, 115. 1-54; GARF,f . 9479 (OGPU. Otdel po spetspereselentsamg lavnogou pravleniia
lagerei), op. 1, d. 2, 11.1 0-16; d. 949, 1. 77. Also see Danilov and Krasil'nikovee, ds.,
Spetspereselenvt Zsyap adnoiS ibiri,2 :5, 309nl; and N. A. Ivnitskiain d V. G. Makurov,e ds., Iz
istoriri askulachivanivia K arelii,1 930-31 (Petrozavodsk,1 991), 142- 43.
738 Slavic Review
by the regional sovietc hair withr epresentationf romG PU and the re-
gional land administration(z emleupravleniec) oordinatedw orko n reset-
tlement,p rovisions,la nd, and labor.29R esponsibilityf or agricultureb e-
longed to ther egionala dministrationof m igrationw, hichw orkedt hrough
county-levell and organs (okruzemlupravleniea) nd county colonization
parties and answered to the Main MigrationA dministrationu nder the
Russian People's Commissariato f Agriculturea s well as the regional so-
viet.30T he forestryin dustrya dministrativoer gans- Severoles,K omiles,
Volgokaspiiles,S ewostles, and other organs employings pecial settler
labor-were responsiblef or labor and the constructiono f the special
villages;t hey,i n turn,w orkedt hrought heirl ocal agencies and answered
jointlyt o the RussianS upreme Council of the People's Economya nd the
regional soviet.31T he special villagesw ere subordinatedd irectlyt o the
districts ovieta nd led by a commandanta ppointed by the districts oviet,
confirmedb y the countys ovieta nd GPU, and assistedb y one policeman
per fiftfya milies.32
Throughout 1930 and early 1931, administrativaen archya nd poor
coordinationp lagued special resettlemenatf fairse,x acerbatingw hatw as
intrinsicallya disasteri n the making.33O n 18 October 1930, a Russian
Council of People's Commissarsd ecree entrustedE . G. Shirvindtw ith
overallo bservationo f special resettlemenbt usiness,c allingu pon all Rus-
sian republic-levela gencies to keep him regularlyi nformed.34W ithin
days,h owever,i n a speech to the communistf ractiono f the All-Russian
CentralE xecutiveC ommittee( VTsIK), A. S. Kiselevi nveigheda gainstt he
absence of coordinationa nd responsibilitiyn special resettlementw, arn-
ing that "someone musta nswerf ort his."35M eanwhile,c onstantr efrains
of inadequate personnel, overstrainedl ocal resources,c ommunication
problems,a nd an absence of directionp ercolated up fromt he regions
back to the center.
In the north,e veryonea nd no one answeredf ort hef ateo f the special
settlersI.n spiteo f-perhaps in some cases partiallyb ecause of-a system
of regulara nd minuter eportingf roma nya nd all officialos n worki n spe-
cial resettlementt,h e constructiono f elaboratep lans,c onstantr eminders
of the all-unionp oliticals ignificanceo f special resettlemenitn the North-
ern Region, and endless reprimands,p lanning and worko n special re-
settlemento ccurredn a khodu,o r along thew ay,a ccordingt o regionalo f-
29. GARF,f . 9414, op. 1, d. 1944,11.1 00, 107; f. 393, op. 43a, d. 1796,11.2 -18.
30. Gosudarstvennyia rkhiv Vologodskoi oblasti (GAVO), f. 399 (Vologodskoe
okruzemupravlenie)o, p. 1, d. 192,1. 54; GARF,f . 393, op. 43a, d. 1797,1. 35.
31. GARF,f . 393, op. 43a, d. 1797,11.3 5-36.
32. GARF,f . 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, 1. 100; f. 393, op. 43a, d. 1797,11.3 9a, 44; f. 1235
(VTsIK), op. 144, d. 776, 1.2 ; TragediiaT, sA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 204, 1.5 45.
33. GARF,f . 393, op. 43a, d. 1796,11.2 -18; f. 1235, op. 141, d. 776,1. 66. Also see
0. V Artemova," Spetspereselentsyv Vozhegodskom raione (1930-e gody)," Vozhega:
Kraevedcheskali'im anakh( Vologda, 1995), 172-94.
34. GARF,f . 393, op. la, d. 292, 1.9 0. For more informationo n Shirvindta,n impor-
tanto fficiailn the penal systems,e e Solomon, "SovietP enal Policy,1 917-1934," 201, 207;
and Solomon, SovietC riminalJustiucen derS talin (Cambridge,E ng., 1996), 60, 103, 149.
35. GARF,f . 1235, op. 141, d. 776,1. 6.