The Origin of Time: Heidegger and Bergson

302 Pages·2015·4.201 MB·English

by  Bergson, Henri, Heidegger, Martin, Massey, Heath

The Origin of Time
SUNY series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy
——————
Dennis J. Schmidt, editor
The Origin of Time
Heidegger and Bergson
Heath Massey
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2015 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
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Production, Diane Ganeles
Marketing, Kate R. Seburyamo
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Massey, Heath, author.
The origin of time : Heidegger and Bergson / Heath Massey.
pages cm. — (SUNY series in contemporary continental philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4384-5531-0 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-1-4384-5533-4 (ebook)
1. Time. 2. Heidegger, Martin, 1889–1976. 3. Bergson, Henri, 1859–1941.
4. Phenomenology. I. Title.
BD638.M364 2015
115—dc23 2014013136
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To my parents.

Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Abbreviations xi
Introduction: Thinking Through Time 1
Chapter 1
Following Bergson’s Footsteps: Time in Heidegger’s Early Works 11
1. The Question of Time 11
2. The Structure of the Concept of Time 17
3. Life as a Primordial Phenomenon 20
4. To Understand Time in Terms of Time 28
5. The Time That We Ourselves Are 34
6. A More Original Concept of Time 40
7. On the Verge of Being and Time 45
Chapter 2
Dispelling the Confusion: Pure Duration in Time and Free Will 49
1. Heidegger on the Concept of Duration 49
2. Thinking Spatially about Time 52
3. The Confusion of Quality with Quantity and Conscious
States with Objects 55
4. The Confusion of Duration with Extensity and
Time with Space 58
5. The Fundamental Self and the Superficial Self 67
6. Freedom: Getting Back into Duration 71
7. Reversing Kantianism 79
8. Anticipating Originary Temporality 82
Chapter 3
Uncovering the Primordial Phenomenon: Originary Temporality
in Being and Time 87
1. Bergson in Being and Time 87
2. Time and the Question of Being 89
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3. From Being-in-the-World to Temporality 98
4. From Temporality to Time 104
5. The Ordinary Understanding of Time 112
6. The Origin of the Concept of Time 124
7. Temporality and Spatiality 131
8. Temporality and Selfhood 137
9. Heidegger’s Bergsonism 141
Chapter 4
Reversing Bergsonism: Time and Temporality in The Basic Problems
of Phenomenology 145
1. Thinking More Radically about Time 145
2. Destruction of the Traditional Concept of Time 148
3. A Glimpse of Temporality 151
4. Bergson’s Misunderstandings 155
5. De-spatializing Aristotle’s Thinking about Time 161
6. An Inverted History of Time 165
Chapter 5
Challenging the Privilege of Presence: The Ontological Turn in
Matter and Memory 169
1. From Duration to Memory 169
2. The Presence of Images 172
3. The Survival of the Past in the Present: Memory and Habit 178
4. The Survival of the Past in Itself 184
5. The Problem of Existence 188
6. The Movement of Memory 195
7. Rhythms of Duration 198
8. Ecstatic Duration 204
Conclusion: The Movement of Temporalization 209
1. The Swinging of Time 209
2. Rethinking Time 213
Notes 223
Bibliography 259
Index 271
Acknowledgments
My heartfelt thanks to my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy
and Religious Studies at Beloit College: Phil Shields, Matt Tedesco, Robin
Zebrowski, Debra Majeed, and Natalie Gummer. I am grateful to those who
generously gave their time to read parts or all of the manuscript: Karin Fry,
Topper Scott, Len Lawlor, David Morris, Alia Al-Saji, and Michael Kelly.
Thanks also to Scott Lyngaas and Nataša Bašić for their feedback on an earlier
draft of Chapter 2. I owe a great debt to all my professors at the University
of Memphis, and in particular to Tina Chanter, Tom Nenon, Robert Ber-
nasconi, and especially Len Lawlor for guidance on this project in its early
stages. I benefited tremendously from the community of graduate students at
Memphis, including Amit Sen, Chris Fox, Josh Glasgow, Valentine Moulard-
Leonard, Rob Wade, and my dear friend Steve Tammelleo. I appreciate the
participants of the 2003 Collegium Phaenomenologicum for helping to shape
my thinking about Bergson and his relationship to phenomenology. Spe-
cial thanks to John Sallis for sharing a photocopy of Heidegger’s personal
copy of Bergson’s Essai. Many thanks to Dennis Schmidt for supporting this
project; to two anonymous reviewers for providing valuable feedback on the
manuscript; and to Andrew Kenyon, Diane Ganeles, Laura Tendler, and Kate
Seburyamo at SUNY Press for turning it into a book. For assistance and
support at the final stages, my thanks to Becky Moffett, Barb Uebelacker,
and Ann Davies. I could not have finished this project without the generosity
of Kathryn Boone and Elva Tyson. For their friendship and moral support,
I deeply appreciate Charles and Christa Westerberg and John and Ellen
Morgan. Many thanks to Ted Ammon, Michael Mitias, and Steve Smith
for their mentorship and inspiration, and to David Hiley for his guidance.
I am more grateful than I can say to my parents, David and Karen, and my
brother, Seth, for their constant encouragement and support. Finally, words
cannot express the depth of my gratitude to my son, Theo, and my wife,
Elizabeth, for all their love, patience, and understanding.
A version of Chapter 1 appeared as “On the Verge of Being and
Time: Before Heidegger’s Dismissal of Bergson,” Philosophy Today 54 (2010):
138–152.
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