The Origin of the Arab-Israeli Arms Race: Arms, Embargo, Military Power and Decision in the 1948 Palestine War

300 Pages·1996·28.16 MB·English

by  Amitzur Ilan (auth.)

THE ORIGIN OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS RACE
Also by Amitzur /lan
* BERNADOTTE IN PALESTINE, 1948
AMERICA, BRITAIN AND PALESTINE
* Also published by Macmillan
The Origin of the
Arab-Israeli Arms
Race
Arms, Embargo, Military Power and
Decision in the 1948 Palestine War
Amitzur Ilan
Department of American Studies
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem
--
in association with
MACMILLAN St Antony's College, Oxford
© Amitzur Han 1996
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1996 978-0-333-63240-6
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First published 1996 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
This book is published in the St. Antony's!M acmillan series
General Editor: Alex Pravda
ISBN 978-1-349-13698-8 ISBN 978-1-349-13696-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-13696-4
A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I
05 04 03 02 OJ 00 99 98 97 96
To Shlomit
Contents
List of Tables viii
Preface ix
Main Sources and Abbreviations x1
Introduction 1
1 The Security Council's Arms Embargo of May 1948 and
its Precursors 15
2 The Warring Parties in Palestine at the End of May 1948 25
3 The United States, the War in Palestine and the Embargo,
1947-9 72
4 Britain's Middle Eastern Policies and Military Aid, 1948-9 109
5 Assistance from the Soviet Bloc to the Warring Parties in
Palestine 145
6 Other Arms Sources to Palestine in the 1948 War 181
7 The Value and Effect of the UN Supervision of the Embargo 201
8 Conclusion 218
Notes 245
Bibliography 275
Index 281
vii
List of Tables
Age groups of Jewish immigrants to Palestine, 1928-47
by per cent 61
2 Formal Order of Battle in the Palestine front at the end
of May 1948 67
3 Formal Order of Battle in the Palestine front in mid
October 1948 67
4 Israeli illegal arms acquisition in the USA and Latin
America in 1948, plan and execution 94
5 Supply of British equipment to Iraq in 1948, plan and
implementation (selected items) 120
6 Ammunition committed and not sent to the Iraqi army
in 1948 (selected items) 120
7 Israeli acquisition from British sources 136
8 Czech military assistance to Israel in 1948 173
9 Peace and quantities of Czech small arms and medium
arms supplied to Israel 174
10 Israeli arms acquisition in Western Europe, Australia
and South Africa 195
11 The number of UN personnel and major equipment at
the disposal of the observers corps at selected times 206
12 The establishment of permanent observer posts in sea-
and airports - chronological order 210
13 Major sorts of ammunition in the Iraqi Army, July 1948 228
14 The strength of the Israeli Air Force, mid-October 1948 241
15 The build-up of improvised Foray units in the IDF 243
16 The growing military strength of Israel: implements of
war in the use of the IDF, April 1948-July 1949 244
viii
Preface
This book is a study in the interdiscipline of military logistical studies
and international relations. It deals with the provision of military aid
to the rival parties of the 1948-9 Palestine war.
The 1948 war brought about a revolutionary and durable change in
the status and future of Palestine, which was to have a lasting effect
on the future of the Middle East and the world at large. No wonder
that so much has been written on it since. However, its historiography
has suffered from a deep schism emanating, in the first place, from
disagreement over the evaluation of the moral and political consequences
of the war.
Supporters of Zionism regard the outcome of the war as a divine
redemption of the Jewish people from the curse of dispersion and per
secution; supporters of the Arabs, on the other hand, view it as a co
lossal blow both to the Palestinian Arabs and to the Arab cause in
general. This historiographical schism is partly due to the fact that,
unlike most other conflicts of this century, the cleavage between Arab ism
and Zionism today is almost the same as it was then, and partly due to
the lack of sufficient documentary sources. Historians can hardly avoid
taking sides, although many pretend that they do not. This schism is
also manifest in a mutual suspicion between historians about the value
of the sources used by those with whom they disagree. In consequence,
various interpretations are given to the same events, to the point where
there is not even agreement as to what had actually happened. As
E. H. Carr pointed out with regard to another historical dispute, 'It is
the argument over the priority of causes about which the historical
argument revolves.'* My issue is not the consequences of war but its
course. More particularly, it is about the moulding of the warring par
ties' military power, seen in relation to the crucial turning-points in
the war where the outcome was decided. By arguing my case I hope
at least to set up a more correct order of the priority of the causes
which affected the course of the war.
This book originated from research carried out at my suggestion in
the History Department of the Israeli Defence Forces between 1990
*E. H. Carr, What is History? (London, 1961) p. 90.
ix
X Preface
and 1993, which aimed, at the outset, to explore the impact of the arms
embargo on the course of the war. It gradually gained a somewhat
wider outlook. I am grateful for the hospitality and the assistance given
to me by that Department, both financially and in access to documen
tary sources. I am grateful to General Doron Rubin and Colonel Benny
Michelson who approved my project, and to Lt Cols Noah Hershkovitz,
Elhanan Oren, Ze'ev Lachish and Zvi Offer, and to Major Avi Cohen,
who were ready to listen to my ideas, read sections of the work while
still in crude form and often helped me find a lost track. I am also
grateful to the above Department for giving me the opportunity to test
my ideas before a wider audience. While I did not always meet with
full approval as to my conclusions, I never sustained any doctrinaire
pressure in drawing them. It goes without saying that these conclusions,
for good or bad, are mine and I alone bear the responsibility for them.
I am also grateful to colleagues in academia, particularly to Pro
fessors Yehoshua Ariely and Uri Bialer of the Hebrew University, to
Dr Derek Hopwood of St Antony's College, Oxford, and tQ Professor
Aharon Shai of Tel Aviv University, who were aware of and support
ive of my research and who inspired me with confidence. I acknowl
edge with thanks the help received from the staff of various Israeli
Archives, particularly from Mr Mickey Kaufman, Mr Morris Kantor
and Dr Yehoshua Freundlich and to the helpful staff of the British
Public Record Office at Kew, London, the USA National Archives in
Washington, DC, and Suitland, Maryland, and the UN Archives in New
York City. I am grateful to Dr Ian Gaskin of St Antony's College for
helping me establish contact with former British and Arab military
personnel, and to the late Mrs Joy Ungerleider Mayerson, Director of
the Dorot Foundation, New York.
Finally, I am grateful for the interest shown in my book by the
Editorial Committee of the St Antony's College Series, by Mr T. M.
Farmiloe of Macmillan and by Mr Simon Winder of StMartin's Press.
I want to thank Ms Grainne Twomey, Commissioning Editor of
Macmillan, for her cordial and efficient work with me. This book was
originally written in Hebrew. I translated into English myself and I
am much obliged to my wife, Shlomit, and to Mrs Valery Rose of
Longworth, Oxford, for their help in this endeavour.
A. I.
Jerusalem