The Nietzschean self : moral psychology, agency, and the unconscious

305 Pages·2016·1.48 MB·English

by  Katsafanas

The Nietzschean Self

The Nietzschean Self
Moral Psychology, Agency, and
the Unconscious
Paul Katsafanas
1
3
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Contents
Acknowledgments ix
List of Abbreviations of Nietzsche’s Works xi
1. Introduction 1
2. The Unconscious 14
3. Consciousness as Superficial and Falsifying 48
4. drives 77
5. Values 108
6. Willing without a Will 135
7. The Unified Self 164
8. Self, Culture, and Society 197
9. The Free Individual 220
10. Nietzschean Moral Psychology and its Competitors 257
References 281
Index 291

Acknowledgments
I presented material from this book at Boston University, Georgia State University,
King’s College London, Leiden University, Oxford University, Temple University, Texas
Tech University, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, University of Southampton, Vassar
College, and various APA meetings. I am indebted to the audiences for their insightful
questions and critiques. I owe special thanks to R. Lanier Anderson, Tom Bailey, Jake
Beck, Jessica Berry, Maudemarie Clark, João Constâncio, Jorah dannenberg, Manuel
dries, david dudrick, Sebastian Gardner, Ken Gemes, Charles Griswold, Robert Guay,
Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Walter Hopp, Andrew Huddleston, Nadeem Hussain, Chris
Janaway, Peter Kail, Brian Leiter, Paul Loeb, Simon May, Matthew Meyer, Bernard
Reginster, Mattia Riccardi, John Richardson, Aaron Ridley, david Roochnik, Amelie
Rorty, Carlos Ruiz, danielle Slevens, daniel Star, and Owen Ware.
Portions of this book incorporate substantially revised material from the following
previously published essays: Chapters Two and Three draw from “Nietzsche’s Theory
of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization,” European Journal of Philosophy 13
(April 2005): 1–31 and “Nietzsche on the Nature of the Unconscious,” Inquiry: Special
Issue on Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology 58 (2015): 327–52. Chapter Four draws from
“Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,” in The Oxford Handbook on Nietzsche, edited
by John Richardson and Ken Gemes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 727–55.
Chapter Five draws from “Value, Affect, drive,” in Nietzsche on Mind and Nature,
edited by Peter Kail and Manuel dries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015): 163–88.
Chapter Six draws from “Nietzsche and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective
Agency,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (July 2014): 185–216. Chapter
Seven draws from “The Concept of Unified Agency in Nietzsche, Plato, and Schiller,”
Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (January 2011): 87–113. I gratefully acknow-
ledge the publishers’ permission to reuse this material.