The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Volume 8 PDF
Preview The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Volume 8
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy In cooperation with M. BRAINARD, New York • R. BRUZINA, Kentucky S. CROWELL, Houston • A. MICKUNAS, Ohio T. SEEBOHM, Bonn • T. SHEEHAN, Stanford edited by BURT HOPKINS JOHN DRUMMOND □□ VIII - 2008 The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy General Editors Burt Hopkins, Seattle University JohnJ. Drummond, Fordham University Founding Co-Editor Steven Crowell, Rice University Contributing Editors Marcus Brainard, New York Ronald Bruzina, University of Kentucky Steven Crowell, Rice University Algis Mickunas, Ohio University Thomas Seebohm, Bonn, Germany Thomas Sheehan, Stanford University Consulting Editors Pierre Adler, New Paltz, New York Patrick Burke, Gonzaga University, Florence Damian Byers, Sydney, Australia Nicholas de Warren, Wellesley College Ivo de Gennaro, University ofBozen-Bolzano, Italy John Drabinski, Amherst College R. O. Elveton, Carleton College Parvis Emad, La Crosse, Wisconsin Lester Embree, Florida Atlantic University Kathleen Haney, University of Houston, Downtown James G. Hart, Indiana University Patrick Heelan, S.J., Georgetown University Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann, University of Freiburg, Germany Nam-In Lee, Seoul National University, Korea Christian Lotz, Michigan State University James Mensch, St. Francis Xavier University, Canada Dermot Moran, University College, Dublin, Ireland James Risser, Seattle University Hans Ruin, Sodertom University College, Sweden Karl Schuhmannt, University of Utrecht, Netherlands Marylou Sena, Seattle University Panos Theodorou, University of Crete Olav KWiegand, University of Mainz, Germany Dan Zahavi, Copenhagen, Denmark Editorial Assistant Annie Rose Favreau Articles appearing in this journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index. Copyright © 2008 by Taylor & Francis ISSN 1533-7472 ISBN 13: 978-0-9701679-8-9 (pbk) All rights reserved. No part of the material protected by this copyright may be reproduced or trans mitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, or by any information storage or re trieval system, without permission in writing from the Publisher. Aim and Scope: The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy will provide an annual in ternational forum for phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy in the spirit of Edmund Husserls ground breaking work and the extension thereof in the phenomenological tradition broadly conceived. The editors welcome the submission of manuscripts containing original research in phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy, contributions to contemporary issues and controversies, critical and interpretative studies of major phenomenological figures, investigations on the relation of phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy to the natural and human sciences, and historical studies and documents pertaining to phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Translations of classic and contemporary phenomenological texts are also welcome, though translators should make arrangements with the editors in advance. First published 2008 by Noesis Press Published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon 0X14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Page Intentionally Left Blank Contents I. Essays John J. Drummond Moral Self-Identity and Identifying with Others 1 Claudio Majolino Husserl and the Vicissitudes of the Improper 17 Rajiv Kaushik Affectivity and Religious Experience: Husserls “God” in the Unpublished Manuscripts 55 Javier Carreno On the Temporality of Images according to Husserl 73 Filip Mattens Body or Eye: A Matter of Sense and Organ 93 Renaud Barbaras Life and Phenomenality 127 Sylvain Camilleri A Phenomenology of Death in the Second Person 139 Pierre Adler Situating Frege s Look into Language 157 II. Texts and Documents Gian-Carlo Rota Lectures on Being and Time (1998) 225 Gottlob Frege On the Correspondence of Leibniz and Huygens with Papin (1881) 321 v Dermot Moran and Lukas Steinacher Husserls Letter to Lévy-Bruhl: Introduction 325 Edmund Husserl Letter to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1935) 349 Notes on Contributors 355 VI Moral Self-Identity and Identifying with Others JohnJ.Drummond FordhamUniversity Mostpeopleareotherpeople.Their thoughtsaresomeoneelse’sopinions, theirlivesamimicry,theirpassionsa quotation. –OscarWilde,DeProfundis DespiteWilde’scynicismaboutthemoralcharacterofmostpeople,theepi- graphcapturessomethingtrueaboutallpersonsandperhapsthewholetruthabout some,perhapsevenmost,persons.AsAristotlelongagonoted,ourcharacteris formedbyhabituation,andhabitsareformed,atleastinpart,byfollowingtheex- ampleofotherpersons.Inthedevelopmentofvirtuousagents,ourparentsand themembersofourimmediatefamily,ourteachers,ourfriends,ourcolleaguesat work,alongwiththelawsandtheirenforcement,conformourbeliefs,attitudes, andbehaviorstosociallyacceptednormsbymeansofsystemsofpraiseandblame, rewardandpunishment.Ifthatwereallthatistobesaid,Wildewouldbeentirely correct.EvenWilde’spersons,however,nomatterhowthoroughlyshapedbythe opinionsandpassionstheyquoteandtheactionstheymimic,experiencethese opinions,passions,andactionsasatthesametimetheirown.Anditisjustthisfact thatallowstheemergenceofthefewforwhichWildeleavesroom,thatleavesopen thepossibilityofself-responsibleindividualswhosemoralself-identityisnotsim- plyafunctionofhavingbeenformedbyothersandwhoquestionandtransform thesocialconsensus.Self-responsiblepersons,inotherwords,activelyengagethe viewsofothersinordertoformtheirownmoralopinionsandbeliefs,andthey “test”thoseopinionsandbeliefs—bothothers’andtheirown—againsttheworld astheythemselvesexperienceit. InthisessayIshallexploitsomethemesrootedinEdmundHusserl’sphe- nomenologyinordertosketchbrieflytherelationsbetweenthemoralselfand moralothersunderfourheadings:1)theintersubjectivityofthinking,itspassive formationofthemoralself,anditsinvitationtoself-responsiblethinking;2)self- 2 JOHNJ.DRUMMOND responsiblethinkinginthemoralsphereandtheemergenceofmoralself-identity; 3)moralidentificationwiththeother;and4)respectfortheother. I Inphenomenologicalterms,wethinkoftheprocessofformationtowhich AristotleandWildepointasthepassivitywherein:1)themeaningsthatarecon- stitutedovertimeastheaccomplishmentsofanintersubjectivehumanactivityin aparticularhistoricalandculturalcontextbecomesedimentedintheformofcom- monopinionsandtraditionalbeliefs,and2)thesetraditionalbeliefsarepassedon tosubsequentgenerationsandreceivedbythosegenerationsasmattersoffacttobe takenforgranted.Whilethesetraditionalbeliefscanbepassivelyacceptedsuch thattheyshapeone’sownthoughtsandactionswithoutfurtherreflection,theycan alsobecomeobjectsofacriticalreflectioninwhichtheyarereactivatedandappro- priatedorrejectedbyanindividual.Thisreactivationandappropriationorrejec- tioninvolvesasubject’sactivelythinkingforherselfinthelightofevidence,where evidenceisunderstoodastheparticulartypeofexperienceinwhichobjectsarein- tuitivelygivenandoursenseofthemisrationallyjustified.Thesubject,inother words,inthisreactivationandappropriationorrejectiontakesresponsibilityfor herownbeliefs. Weshouldnotunderstandthesepossibilitiesforreactivationandappropria- tionorrejectiontomeanthatthepassiveandtraditionalcharacterofconsciousness issomethingaccidentalratherthanessential.Thetraditionalcharacterofthinking neithercannorshouldbeentirelyovercome.Eventheself-responsiblethinking thatoccursinthelightofevidenceandjustification—whatHusserlcalls“authen- ticthinking”—isunavoidablysituatedwithintraditions.Theinherentlyandes- sentially traditional aspect of consciousness underlies Husserl’s view of the lifeworldasaworldofsedimentedmeaningstakenforgrantedinourordinaryex- perience.Nothinkerlivesoutsidealifeworldofthissort;nothinkerisfreefrom theinfluenceoflinguisticallytransmitted,sedimentedmeaningsandculturally transmittedsymbols;nothinkeriscapableofthinkingoractingentirelyapartfrom tradition.Theapparentparadoxthatactive,self-responsiblethinkingalwaysoccurs andmustalwaysoccurwithintheconcretehorizonofpre-giventraditionsthat passivelydisposeustothinkincertainwaysrequiresthatwerecastthenotionof self-responsibilityintermsthatrecognizetheintersubjectiveandsocialcharacterof reason.1 Tradition,wemightsay,istheinheritedmeaning-contextinwhichactive thinkingworks.Thiscontextisatonceenablinganddisabling:itenablesustoen- —————— 1.IhavediscussedthisissuemorefullyinJohnJ.Drummond,“Time,History,and Tradition,”inJohnB.BroughandLesterEmbree,eds.,TheManyFacesofTime(Dord- recht:Kluwer,2000),127–47. MORALSELF-IDENTITYANDIDENTIFYINGWITHOTHERS 3 countertheworldinmeaningfulwaysreadyforfurtherthoughtandaction,but itcanalsoblindustowhatistrueandtowhatinourtraditionalbeliefsmustbe questionedorrevised.Insofarasself-responsiblethinkingalwaysoccurswithin thiscontext,wecansaythatauthenticthinkingistothinkforoneself,butnotby oneself.Thereactivationoftraditionalbeliefs,customs,practices,rules,andso forthrequirestheirrationaljustificationintheevidentialexperiencesofindivid- uals.Wheninsuchreactivationthethinkingagentsecurestheevidence,thejus- tification,forthereactivatedbeliefs,shecanbesaidtotakeresponsibilityforher beliefsandpracticesevenwhenthosebeliefsandpracticesareinheritedfromthe tradition.Evenifweassumethatthiscanbedonemoreorlessstraightforwardly inthecaseofcognitivebeliefsaboutthewaytheworldis—beliefsthataretrueor falseaboutwhatisthecase—thisnotionofreactivationandappropriationorre- jectionseemsmuchmorecomplicatedinthecaseofevaluativeandmoralbeliefs aboutwhatisgoodandwhatistobedone.Letusturnourattention,therefore,to whatrationaljustificationinthesphereofthemoral,withitsevaluativeandvoli- tionalcomponents,isfortheself-responsibleagent. II FollowingFranzBrentano2andEdmundHusserl,3Iclaimthatthevalue-at- tributesofobjectsandsituationsarethecorrelatesoffeelingsandepisodicemo- tions4thatareexperiencedbyasubjecthavingaparticularexperientialhistory, —————— 2.SeeFranzBrentano,VomUrsprungsittlicherErkenntnis(Leipzig:Duncker&Hum- blot,1889). 3.SeeEdmundHusserl,VorlesungenüberEthikundWertlehre1908–1914,ed.Ullrich Melle,HusserlianaXXVIII(Dordrecht:Kluwer,1988),andEinleitungindieEthik.Vor- lesungenSommersemester1920und1924,ed.HenningPeucker,HusserlianaXXXVII (Dordrecht:Kluwer,2004). 4.Therearetwodistinctionsimportanttonotehere.Thefirstisthatbetweenfeeling- sensationsandintentionalfeelings;seeEdmundHusserl,LogischeUntersuchungen.Zweiter Band,ersterTeil:UntersuchungenzurPhänomenologieundTheoriederErkenntnis,ed.Ur- sulaPanzer,HusserlianaXIX(TheHague:Nijhoff,1984),401–10;Englishtranslation: LogicalInvestigations,trans.J.N.Findlay(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1970), 569–75.Theformeraremerelysensoryexperiences,e.g.,thevisceralfeelingssuchasthe tighteningoftheabdominalmusclesassociated,say,withanger.Intentionalfeelings,on theotherhand,refertosomethingastheirobject.So,e.g.,likinganddislikingarethelik- inganddislikingofsomething;joyandsadnessarejoyandsadnessinsomething,andso forth.Thesecondisthedistinctionbetweenemotionalepisodesandemotions(oremo- tionalstates);seePeterGoldie,TheEmotions:APhilosophicalExploration(Oxford: Clarendon,2000),11.Anemotionisarelativelyenduringstatethatisbuiltuponpast episodesofsingularandgenerallymoreintenseemotionalexperiencesandthatisdisposi- tionalincharacter.The(relatively)momentaryintentionalfeelingcanforourpresentpur- posesbeidentifiedwithanemotionalepisode.
The list of books you might like
