The New Jewel Movement: Grenada's Revolution, 1979-1983

115 Pages·1985·5.797 MB·English

by  Gregory Sandford, Diane B. Bendahmane

CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
THE NEW JEWEL
MOVEMENT
Grenada's Revolution, 1979-1983
by
Gregory Sandford
Edited by
Diane B. Bendahmane
1985
OC\16 g:;
FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
-
;lost
-t
.SJ-1
/113~
M of Luckey Bernard,
In emory ada Police Service.
Deputy Commzsswner, Gren .
A Grenadian Patnot
The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Center
for the Study of Foreign Affairs or the Department of State.
Library of Congress Number: 85-600547
Department of State Publication
Foreign Service Institute
Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs
Released july 1985
··:.
VI Foreword
In the years after Grenada's 1979 "rev," its citizens left in
large numbers-statistics are imprecise, but today probably
more Grenadians live on the nearby island of Trinidad, or m
Ontario or New York, than on Grenada's own territory. As
Grenadians left, and Cubans, Russians, East Germans, Libyans,
and North Koreans arrived to buttress the New JEWEL Move
ment's graduated move toward a communist society, Grenada's Contents
relations with the United States became strained. So did our
ability to learn what was happening. Bright and, for the most
part, relatively junior Foreign Service officers assigned to our
embassy in Barbados visited the island, took the measure of the Foreword by Charles A. Gillespie· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ~
People's Revolutionary Government, and stayed in touch with
Preface ........................... · .. , .....•... , , • X1I
Grenadians and foreign residents. Gregory Sandford was one
I. Background to Revolution · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
of those officers. He and his colleagues could not, however, talk
to the hundreds of Grenadians in prison on Richmond Hill, nor The Crown C o Io ny S ys t e m · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ...........4 1
were they received by important government officials, and the Gairy's Rise to Power· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·8
i
inner workings of the New JEWEL Movement remained hidden Maurice Bishop's Early Career . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
from scrutiny. Only the unanticipated disintegration of the New The New JEWEL Movem~nt Is Formed.············ 1
JEWEL Movement in the fall of 1983 gave the possibility of fully The Independence Question· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 13
15
understanding the movement and Grenada's evolution under The New JEWEL ~a?,ife~to · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·::::::: l8
its rule.
The First "Revolution Fatls · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
The NJM Becomes a Vanguard Party ............... 2220
. In the _final months of 1983 and into early 1984, those of
us m~olved m the rescue mission and its aftermath had frequent The NJM Garners Support · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 5
~easton t? ask ourselves what had happened and why, but little The Elections of 1976 · · · ·: · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 227
ttme to_ dtg out the answers. There were also questions about The NJM's Bid for the Umons · · · · · · · · · · ·::::::: :::
revolutionary Grenada's relation to American interests in a Winning Over the ~ou.th · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ........ 28o
~rspective. Wh~n assigne~ 3
broader Greg Sandford, by then to Coard Imposes Dtsctphne · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ........ 31
other duues, suggested. It was not too soon to start seekmg The NJM Prepares for a Break · · · · · · · · · · · ·
answers, h~ g~t our qutck go-ahead. He also received willing
11. The NJM Takes Power · · .......... · · · · .. · · · · · · · · .. \ 7
~nd enthustasuc support from the Foreign Service Institute and
Its Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs. He went to Grenada The Impending Coup· · · · · .... · · .. · .. · .. · · .. · · : : : : ~8
to talk tool~ friend~ and contacts and some new ones, and spent The Coup ... ································ ..... 40
long hours m Washmgton researching the trove of New JEWEL Grenada's Neighbors React · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ... 3
and. People's Revolutionary Government documents discovered First Contacts with the Umted States. · · · · · · · · · · · · 4
dun~g The Roots of NJM Foreign Pohcy .................. 5450
the rescue mission. This study is the result. The sorry
tale It tells .. of a popu!ar groundswell harnessed, then hijacked The PRG Establishes a Monopoly of Power· · · · · · · · · ·
~y 57
calculatmg, secreuve men and women steeped in an alien The PRG Cracks Down · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
~or ~t
Ideology, speaks itsel.f. holds lessons worth review as we
III. The Domestic Policies of the People's .......
watch the unfoldmg of stmtlar revolutions elsewhere today. Revolutionary Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6643
Charles A. Gillespie The Social Program · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · . . . . . 64
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Public Health · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · . 69
for the Caribbean School and Home Repair · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · . : 70
Education . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ..
Vtl
viii Contents Contents IX
The Economic Program · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 75 Dissolution · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · .' · · · · · · .' ............. 116644
The Stated Agenda ............ · ·. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ~~ Bishop and Goard: Diametnc Opposztes ........... 166
The Secret A!Jenda : · · · · · · · ·. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 78 Goard Raises the Leadershzp Issue ............... : 172
The Proletananzzatwn of Agnculture ... · .. · · · · · · · · The Central Committee Looks Inward ............. 173
Controlling Trade Unions .............. · .. · · · · · · 8~ The Joint Leadership Proposal.· i983' · · · · · · · ·:::. 176
Monopolizing the Import/Export Trade ....... · · · · · · 8 The Last Act: Events of October ....... .
. c . l' 887;
Constructmg State aptta ISm ............ · . · · · · · ·
VI. Conclusion: A Failure of Communism ........... . 191
Contradictions .............................. · · ·
The Beginning of the End of the PRG Economy .. · · · 9 Appendix: B~ographies of Central ~~~ ........... 20 I
The Political Program ............................ · 93 and PRG Figures · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 205
The Party's Role as Vanguard .................... 94 The Author · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ............ 207
Mobilizing the Masses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 . . . . . . . . .............
.. s Index .... ··················
'l' 00
Worker Educatwn m octa ISm .................. .
The PRG's Consolidation Plans .................. 100
IV. The Foreign Policy of the People's
Revolutionary Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ill
Collaboration with Cuba. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Links with the Soviet Bloc . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Relations with Other Caribbean Nations. . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Ties to Europe and the Socialist International ...... 122
Relations with the U.S.: The Focal Point of
Grenada's Foreign Policy ....................... 125
The Gairy Extradition Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Invasion Scares . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 127
Accusations of U.S. Economic Destabilization ....... 131
The United States and the International Airport
Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2
Hostile Dialogue .............................. 135
V. The Self-Destruction of the NJM ................. 143
Dissent. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . . .. .. . . .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . 143
Conflict with the Clergy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. . .. . 144
Opposition from the "Bwihlall Gang". . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
The "Conspiracy of the Twenty-Six". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . !51
PRG Efforts to Neutralize the Church ...... ....... !55
Decline of the Regime's Popularity ................ 159
Outcry Over the Detainees . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . 160
F~a~ of Foreign Influence. .. .. . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . . . 162
Trr.c Failure of Propaganda ..................... 162
€;•·-----
-z
Preface
The Grenada revolution destroyed itself. This fact is
beyond dispute; the summary execution of Prime Minister
Maurice Bishop and his closest supporters on October 19, 1983,
as well as the indiscriminate massacre of scores of Grenadian
citizens who had gathered to hear him, was accomplished not
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), nor by the bands of
foreign mercenaries and domestic "counters" against whom the
New JEWEL Movement (NJM) had been warning the nation for
four and a half years, but by Bishop's closest comrades in the
NJM leadership itself. By this fratricidal act and by the subse
quent 24-hour, shoot-on-sight curfew they felt compelled to
impose throughout Grenada, the leaders of the NJM revealed
the extent to which they had alienated themselves from their
own people and from the ideals upon which their movement
had been founded.
The reasons for this self-destruction are more controver
sial. Clearly there was a conflict of personalities between the two
main figures in the NJM, the charismatic Bishop and the less
popular but more efficient and forceful Deputy Prime Minister,
Bernard Coard. Less clear is whether or not a deeper ideo
logical rift underlay the personality conflict. Some observers
believe that Bishop and his faction within the party were essen
tially social democrats who had been out-maneuvered and
slated for elimination by a cabal of dedicated Marxists led by
Coard. Others, including the remaining NJM leaders, maintain
that there were never any differences on basic ideology within
the party. They attribute the fatal clash to the overweening
ambition of Coard and his followers, or (in the case of Coard
supporters) to the abandonment of "principle" by Bishop and
his friends. Also, problems and failures in the programs of the
People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) might have fueled
XI
-
xii Preface Preface xtll
microfiche copies of which are now on deposit with the National
t~nsions wi~hi~ .the revol~tionary leadership over varying poli
ctes and pnontles, e~en m the absence of an ideological rift. Archives, were in a state of almost total disorganization when I
. All of these posstble reasons will be considered at length in used them at the beginning of 1984. It was thus necessary to
th~s book; h<;>wever,. the ~ocus here will not be on why the NJM comb through hundreds of document folders and cardboard
f~tled to mamtam Itself mtact and in power. Instead this book boxes to cull and copy the thousand or so individual documents
that were most useful for this account. Among the most impor
wtll focus on. the weal~h of information the NJM and its PRG
tant were minutes of NJM party meetings from the foundation
?ave ~eft beh~nd, showmg how a regime of this kind establishes
of the movement until shortly before the 1979 coup; minutes
ttselft.n a Tht!d-World country, how it uses its power to imple
ment tts.own ~deological program, and how it continues to per and personal notes from meetings of key party and government
organs from 1979 to 1983; Maurice Bishop's personal notes
petuate Itself t~ power and maintain the appearance of popular
support wh t r . £ ., from an ideological study group within the Central Committee
en t s po tctes at and genuine support disappears.
that outlined strategies for applying Marxist-Leninist teachings
* * * to Grenada; and scores of party and government reports detail
tions!~~~?~i~~ents the NJM ha~ left behind and the observa ing various aspects of Grenada's development under the NJM
the G d als w?o survtved tts short rule demonstrate that regime. Some of these materials have since been published by
stand::;sata rev~lut.wn was indeed a collossal failure by the the U.S. government in a volume entitled, Grenada Documents:
Gren d 1 dse~ or Itself. It set out to liberate the people of An Overoiew and Selection (Washington, D.C. Departments of
a a, an tt ended up op · h State and Defense, 1984).
vowing to end {: . . pressmg t em. It began its rule
Second and almost equally important were the many inter
tion; it ended ~~h~~~ ~f~ttical, ~conomic, and cultural domina
ideology and u d ':>rt to tmpose on Grenadians an alien views and private documents kindly provided to me by par
ticipants in the events described. The interviews were almost
with a programn";-ante. International allegiances. It came in
all conducted during a research trip to Grenada in April-May
left behind I o naftwnal unification and regeneration and
a egacy o hatred conf · d b · · · 1984. Every effort was made to cover the widest possible spec
ment. The NJM's f . • uswn, e t, and dtstlluston-
1 trum of opinion and experience. Persons interviewed included
tries well beyond t~~ ~e, .~eover,. has implications for coun
NJM party members and sympathizers from every period of the
stances and human fo~~ an. Gtven all the unique circum
party's development, close personal acquaintances of Maurice
situation, the fact remai esh that helped shape the Grenada
Bishop, leading figures of the NJM and the PRG, opponents of
intelligent, and (for th ns t at the NJM was led by dedicated,
the NJM and leaders of other political parties, civil servants,
revolutionaries who so e ~ost ~art, a.t least) well-intentioned
trade union leaders, church leaders, journalists, educators,
regimes around the wo~~ .t an o~tamed the aid of kindred
farmers, workers, businessmen, professionals, young people,
socialism." In the light ofw~a:ftymg the lessons.of "scientific
and non-Grenadians familiar with Grenada under the PRG.
the burden of proof will be on th e Gr~nada expenence reveals,
Some internal State Department papers, including a syn
stra~e that they have not thems:~ kin~red ~egimes to demon
opsis of U .S.-Grenada relations from 1979-82 prepared by Em
achteve the nobler goals of th . ~:s fatled JUSt as dismally to
bassy Bridgetown (Barbados), gave important insights into the
they may be in applying its st etr 1 .eo logy, however successful
foreign policy of the Bishop regime. Finally, I was able to draw
power. rategtes for seizing and holding
on my own personal observations as a U.S. consular officer in
Barbados and Grenada in 1980-81.
* * *
The research for this book A categorized list of sources follows each chapter. The
sources. First and foremost w drew on several primary
categories used are as follows:
documents of the Grenad as the collection of thousands of
• Books, Pamphlets, and Articles
pa~y members, which wereac~o;ern:ent, the NJM, and NJM
• Periodicals
an temporarily stored in Wash·ure by U.S. forces in Grenada
• U.S. State Department Documents
mgton, D.C. These documents,
-
xzv Preface Preface xv
• Grenadian Documents . d here are enu·r e1 Y my own and_
The conclusions expresse the official views of the De
• Persons Interviewed
do not represent in any resihec: agency of the United States
The Grenadian documents are further divided into sub partment of State or any o e
categories: . . government.
w
Sandford
• Notes and Minutes (arranged by orgamzauon) Gregory . 'I 1985
• Reports and Other Documents (arranged chrono1 o g- Apn,
icall y by year)
• Memoranda
• Letters
• Political Broadsides and Tracts
• Laws
• Radio Broadcasts and Speeches
The Grenadian documents taken into custody by U.S.
forces are labelled "GD." Where possible, these documents a~e
identified by the preliminary catalog numbers assigned by t e
Department of Defense. I' t
Parenthetical citations in the text refer the reader to the
IS
of sources at the end of the chapter. d
Short biographies of the central figures of the NJM an
PRG are included here as an appendix.
* * *
I owe a deep debt of gratitude to the U.S. Department of
State, particularly to the Center for the Study of Foreign Affmrs
of the Foreign Service Institute, for making my research possi
ble. Sincere thanks are also due my colleague Larry Rossm for
his help in procuring declassified versions of key documents
and reviewing the manuscript; to the Hispanic section of the
Library of Congress for their friendly and efficient help m
finding published materials; and to the Library of the Defense
Intelli~ence
Agency for their help in exploiting the invaluable
coll~ctwn
of Grenada doc.uments in their temporary custody
dunng the months followmg the Grenada intervention. I am
equally indebted to the many people in Grenada of all back
grounds and political persuasions who with characteristic hos
~itality, tim~
gave generously of their and effort to help en
~e t~e rece~u
hghten ?bout events in their country. Uoubtless
~1ffer
some wlll With my mterpretation of those events, but I
~nefit
hope all wlll from this contribution to the dialogue. It is
ttoo tbhee uGserefunla.d 1an people, above all, that I would wish this study
_____ .
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L-~~~·L
I
, I
i
I.
Background to Revolution
The Crown Colony System
The "revolution" initiated by the New JEWEL Movement
(NJM) in its coup of March 13, 1979, was the latest in a series
of revolutionary developments in a turbulent epoch for the
West Indies. As the 20th century dawned, Grenada and its sister
islands in the Windward chain of the British Caribbean-St.
Vincent, St. Lucia, and Dominica-were Crown Colonies, sub
ject to direct rule from London and devoid of formal control
over their own affairs. The Crown Colony system had been
imposed by the British government throughout the region dur
ing the latter half of the 19th century to replace the Old
Representation System by which the wealthy plantocracy had
once shared power with the royal governors. The old system
had been appropriate to a society dominated by a few white
slaveowners, but became increasingly anachronistic and ob
structionist when emancipation in the 1830s and the economic
decline of the sugar plantations after the 1840s undermined the
legal, social, and economic basis for the planter oligarchy. While
the Crown Colony of Grenada retained a Legislative Council
appointed mostly from the planter class, real power was vested
in the colonial governor and exercised through his Executive
Council.
The Crown Colony system opened up an opportunity to
implement programs of economic develop~ent and exl!ansion
of social services desired by the more far-s1ghted coloma! offi
cials, but hitherto obstructed by the planter elite. It als_o pro
vided a focal point for growing demands for democratization
and self-determination, as social improvements led to the
I
•
2 Background to Revolution The Crown Colony System 3
emergence of a politically conscious population Th d I dominated by charismatic figures like Eric Williams of Trini
ment of schools h · . . · e eve op
1 dad, Gramley Adams of Barbados, and Norman Manley of
not only laid th~ t~~hlt~ sj ~el~a~e and samtatlon services, etc.,
h 1 d . ~lCa ~SIS 'or a modern soc1ety, but also Jamaica-the Caribbean equivalents of Jawaharlal Nehru and
b~fe~u~:a~~~~~ ~r~~~~c~~j~~~~~;~J _expand~d J omo Kenyatta. Their political opponents tended not to be par
form of an state
ties but instead were individuals who often represented planter
remforced by th II d people. Th1s evolution was
1 and urban middle class interests. After a few years though, the
particularly in ir:p~:~a e evelopment of private enterprise,
export trade and distribution. "first generation" parties were challenged by a second wave of
As e Is ew h ere t h rougho t th B · . h . parties, formed by the educated middle classes or disaffected
West Indies World W u e ntis Emp1re, so in the
younger elements from the older parties. By the late 1950s and
the first big push fo ar ~shook the colonial regime and led to
early 1960s, these new contenders-represented in Grenada by
Marryshow, a Grenadi:~ -:~!e. _Already _in 1914 Theophilus
the Grenada National Party-were beginning to win elections,
Government Association ~hi ~ahst, ?rgamzed a Representative
and to develop thereby a more standard Westminister parlia
to elected representatives in c petltl~ned I:ondon for the right
mentary system of government and loyal opposition in the small
ter the war, soldiers who h ~r~na~ s ~eg1slat1ve Council. Af
Indies' Regiment with t a · oug t s1de by side in the West island dependencies.
Despite differences of origin and social image, there were
empire, came home p roop~ of all races from all parts of the
no serious ideological differences between the original labor
follow Marryshow an;:~:~s ~or a _change and were ready to
parties and their newer challengers. Radical elements of the
found the Grenada ur k" hke him. Marryshow went on to
nor mgmen's A · · party programs of the 1930s and 1940s were smoothed over by
La bour Party, and to Ia . ssocmtwn and the Grenada
the constitutional reforms of the 1950s. Throughout the 1960s
Grenada's legislature rfsp Y a.~~admg role in efforts to make
there was a general consensus favoring parliamentary institu
Butler, a war veteran or on.st e to the electorate. Tubal Uriah
tions of government and state-supported development of pri
Soldiers and a Gre~ad!ai~ed a Gre~ada Union of Returned
vate industry, including tax incentives for foreign investors.
me~t, which staged ntarches a~~ese~tatlv~ Government Move
Even as this parliamentary system was consolidating itself,
SOCial structure. stnkes atmed at reforming the
however, a third wave of political organization was preparing to
. The interwar years were break on the scene, one that would call in question the parlia
~tnkes _and violence in the re~ arked by spora~ic outbreaks of
mentary system itself. This new political movement emerged
eal wnh the immediat · gton as trade umons, formed to
about 1970. Unlike the earlier movements, this one was led by
dentand social polt"u"cale lSsdue of low wages, quickly began to
. . , , an econ . h middle-class, foreign-educated intellectuals who had come. of I
vesugauons by the British omtc c anges. Repeated in- '
age in the time of Vietnam, the Cuban revoluuon, the Algenan !
~ures in I:ondon to liberai~~v~~:~ent led to mounting pres-
war, and various socialist experiments in the newly independem
nally to mtroduce represen . rown Colony system, and
nations of black Africa. As students abroad, some had expen
adult suffrage. These basic re~ttve government and universal
enced first-hand the radical black power movement of the 1960s
~~~ Windward Islands with ~~msCcamc: to _Grenada and the
in the United States in which West Indians such as Stokely
labor y en?ugh, ~e first mass polhlcafnsttt~U~n of 1951. Na-
Carmichael played a ~ole. Others had rankled under the racial
, parues whtch grew out of th parues m the area were
ad as case was h e early t d · discrimination they experienced in London. The1r attempt~ to
United Labo somew at unusual in tha h ra e _umons. Gren- come to grips with these experiences were shaped b~ the soctal
it were bo ur_Party and the rural traJ t e ~ommant Grenada ist theories which dominated the contemporary mtellectual
trade unio~~ :~~~~n:o~sly and quic~l;~~fp~~~t :~ppo~ed scene at the British and North American universities where they
. Typically, these earl ew years before. e ur an completed their education. .
m the broadest sen Yl abor parties wer · The new political moveme!lts t_hese re_turmng students
justice and th se, concerned with iss u:s e socta! movements founded in the early 1970s-Yuhmo 1? St. Vm~ent, the Move
well as narro:e~ene~a.l devolution of of soctal and racial ment for a New Dominica, the Anugua Canbbean Labour
pohucai and tr d P? er to the masses as
aeunton· ' Movement, and so forth--were thus socialist, "anti-imperialist,"
ISSues. They were
I
I
4 Background to Revolution
Gairy's Rise to Power 5
r . . .
pro-black power and .
While they esch~wed e~at~onallst m. t.he1r Ideological outlook. Grenadian trade unions had made no effort to organize the
tactical reasons and be ec oraf par.UCipatwn at first, both for rural workers.
the parliamentar s t cause 0 then fundamental rejection of Conditions thus were ripe for a change when Gairy came
the established pini~s ~mh th~y eventuallY began to challenge on the scene. He began by writing letters to government officials
sidered alternatl've s m t e f ustmgs, even as they quietly con- on behalf of aggrieved peasants, then moved to organizing a
means o taki -
successful of these rou s ng power. By far the most political party in March 1950 and a trade union-the Grenada
New JEWEL M g P ' by the m1d 1970s was Grenada's Manual and Mental Workers' Union-by July 1950. A month
ovement (NJM). '
later he called for a 50 percent wage increase for sugar factory
workers, and in October he demanded a 45.5 percent increase
Gairy's Rise to Power in the minimum wage for estate laborers from the Grenada
Agricultural Employers' Society. The society refused even to
To understand the NJM'
recognize Gairy's union. Gairy responded with strikes on select
stand the peculiar circumstan: success: one must first under-
1970s under the political d . es prevallm!l' m Grenada by the ed estates, and finally with a general strike in February 1951. By
a real sense, Gairy's was thm}.nance of Enc Matthew Gairy. In March he had unleashed a campaign of mass demonstrations
Marryshow was typical of the ~rst Grenada revolution. Where and arson that brought the island to a standstill, compelled the
class reformers who h d d e e ucated, brror wn-skinned ' middle- governor to come to terms directly with Gairy, and finally
.. . a evoted th .
po !!tical nghts embod' d · e!r e IOrts to achieving the forced the Agricultural Employers' Society to accept his terms
h le m the 1951 · ·
orne-grown hero of the eco . constltutwn, Gairy was a completely.
By 1949, when Gairy retur ~m!Cally oppressed black masses. Gairy had dramatically demonstrated the power of the
ence as an oil-field worker ned at age 27. from his early ex peri black rural masses. He proved it again when he all but swept the
and Aruba, Marryshow an trade ~mon activist in Trinidad 1951 general election, Grenada's first under universal suffrage,
~~aped the benefit of the c:s . pa~t his political prime. Gairy winning six of the seven seats available. (St. George's, the capital,
IS .generation had fought £ stlt~twnal reforms Marryshow and went to Marryshow.) Holding onto power proved more trouble
pohtical power legally. Alsoo~.. e had the opportunity to gain some for him, however. "Uncle" Gairy's highly personal style of
su~~ort because demand fo IS movell_lent would readily find leadership and his suspicion of potential rivals prevented hi'!l
pohtlcal liberalization had s~·w'dr SOCial justice, which formal from building a proper political organization and ahenated h1s
early lieutenants. His race, background, personal manners, and
mass ~;enada a.ttained unive~~~ :~~1; had not been satisfied.
demagoguery won him the contempt of the middle and upper
in f, Gr~nad1ans were small far age at a time when the
classes and even of the urban workers, while his disregard for
n~o o.~flttance in a rural econo:er~ an~ farm laborers work-
.__IP Yb ackward plantat' Y ommated by large tech- law and propriety brought him into cons.tant con0ic~ with the
to nave small . Ions Even th ' colonial authorities. Finally, the increasmg soph1st1c~uon of
ment th . . pnvate plots of land ose fortunate enough
of theseelr mcomes with work on thwere often forced to supple- Grenadian society and Gairy's own attempts to ascend mto the
estates (th · e great ta propertied bourgeoisie gradually eroded his power bas~ a~o~g
of the land f ose With over 100 es tes. The largest
one percentoof~ island, although~~:~) controlled about half the rural proletariat. He won again with a re~uced maJon~~ m
the elections of 1954 but lost to a loose coahuon of oppos1t10n
were a reactiona e t?tal number of far;epresented less than
parties and independent candidates in 195_7 ..F ollowing the 195 7
managed to h ld ry • If paternalistic tr d. s: The estate owners
68 cents for 0 wages down to s2'c a !tiona! elite who had elections Gairy was disfranchised on conv1ct1on of havmg led a
steel band through an opponent's political rally, but he suc
had been on ':hem~n ':'ntil 1950, even ~~ts per day for men and
ceeded in winning enough public sympathy to carry the 1961
many Grenadians~S:dn the ~arly post-W~~~\~le cost of living
elections. However in 1962 the coloma! admm1strator agam
Aruba and Trinidad dexpenenced high w . ar II years, and
removed him from' power and suspended the constitution fo.l
· unng the war U age~ m the oilfields of
· p until then, the infant lowing an investigation, popularly called the "Squandermama