The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights

240 Pages·2009·1.542 MB·English

by  Grégoire C. N. Webber

THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION
In matters of rights, constitutions tend to avoid settling controversies.
With few exceptions, rights are formulated in open-ended language,
seeking consensus on an abstraction without purporting to resolve the
manymoral–politicalquestionsimplicatedbyrights.Theresultingview
hasbeenthatrightsextendeverywherebutareeverywhereinfringedby
legislationseekingtoresolvetheverymoral–politicalquestionsthecon-
stitutionseekstoavoid.
TheNegotiableConstitutionchallengesthisview.Arguingthatunder-
specified rights call for greater specification, Grégoire C.N. Webber
drawsonlimitationclausescommontomostbillsofrightstodevelopa
newunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweenrightsandlegislation.The
legislatureissituatedasakeyconstitutionalactortaskedwithcompleting
the specification of constitutional rights. In turn, because the constitu-
tional project is incomplete with regards to rights, it is open to being
re-negotiated by legislation struggling with the very moral–political
questionsleftunderdeterminedattheconstitutionallevel.
grÉgoire c.n. webber isLecturerinLawattheLondonSchoolof
EconomicsandPoliticalScience.Previously,heservedaslawclerktothe
HonourableJusticeIanBinnieofthe SupremeCourtofCanadaandas
seniorpolicyadvisorwiththePrivyCouncilOfficeinCanada.

THE NEGOTIABLE
CONSTITUTION
On the Limitation of Rights
GRÉGOIRE C. N. WEBBER
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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CONTENTS
Prefaceandacknowledgements pagevii
Introduction:onthelimitationofrights 1
1 Theconstitutionasactivity 13
2 Thereceivedapproachtothelimitationofrights 55
3 Challengingtheageofbalancing 87
4 Constitutingrightsbylimitation 116
5 Thedemocraticactivityoflimitingrights 147
6 Justifyingrightsinafreeanddemocraticsociety 181
Conclusion 213
Bibliography 218
Index 226
v

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book explores the limitation of constitutional rights. In matters of
rights, constitutions proceed largely in abstractions, seeking agreement
on grand formulations that abstract away from the controversies of
specific rights-claims. Yet, until they undergo a process of limitation,
constitutionalrightslackjustificationandsenseasclaims.Thelimitation
clauses of most domestic and international charters of rights make
explicittheprocessoflimitationnecessaryfortranslatingunderdetermi-
nateconstitutionalrightsintodeterminaterightssuitableforapplication.
The argument defended in this book is that the limitation of constitu-
tional rights remains open to re-negotiating by the legislature. It is
argued that constitutions for the most part leave the difficult, contested
andcontingentprocessoflimitationunresolvedwithintheconstitution
itselfandinstead,throughalimitationclause,authorizethelegislatureto
complete the limitation of constitutional rights. In this way, the consti-
tution,andespeciallythelimitationofconstitutionalrights,isconceived
of as an activity. Because the limitation of constitutional rights is pro-
vided by legislation, re-negotiating is always available and may proceed
through regular democratic channels. In this way, the constitution, far
frombeingabstractedfromdemocraticactivity,isforevernegotiableby
thatveryactivity.
Iamgratefultomanypeoplewhohavecontributed,invariousways,to
thedevelopmentofthisbook.Someofthechaptersarerevisedfrommy
doctoral dissertation, others are new. But the general orientation of the
argument was developed during my time at the University of Oxford. I
beginbythankingmydoctoralsupervisor,JohnFinnis,forhisinvaluable
support. He has helped me struggle, far better than I could have done
alone, with the ideas explored in this book. I also owe special thanks to
Chris McCrudden and my two examiners, Richard Bellamy and Leslie
Green,whoencouragedmetopursuemyprojectandwhochallengedme
on some of its core premises. I gratefully acknowledge the support
offered by the doctoral scholarship I received from the Pierre Elliott
vii
viii preface and acknowledgements
TrudeauFoundation, the researchscholarshipfromthe Government of
Quebec’sFondsquébécoisdelarecherchesurlasociétéetlaculture,and
theORSScholarshipfromtheBritishGovernment.
In the course of this project, I have incurred many debts. Many have
read drafts (sometimes multiple drafts) of chapters; others provided
excellentchallengesindiscussions.Iwishtothank,amongmanyothers,
Larry Alexander, Robert Alexy, Jim Allan, Mark Antaki, Nick Barber,
David Beatty, David Bilchitz, François Chevrette, Hugo Cyr, David
Dyzenhaus, Richard Ekins, John Gardner, Kate Hofmeyr, Grant
Huscroft, Vicki Jackson, Jeff King, Matthias Klatt, Hoi Kong, Mattias
Kumm, Roderick Macdonald, Margaret Martin, Bradley Miller, Kai
Möller, Denise Réaume, Owen Rees, Graham Reynolds, Steve D Smith,
Luc B Tremblay, Jim Tully, Jeremy Webber, Daniel Weinstock, Alison
Young, Paul Yowell and Jan van Zyl Smit. I also benefited from the
opportunitytopresentnumerouschaptersatvariousdiscussiongroups,
conferences and workshops and thank all those who participated. I am
grateful to the two anonymous reviewers contacted by Cambridge
University Press for offering excellent comments and suggestions.
Finally, I thank Finola O’Sullivan and Richard Woodham at the Press,
togetherwiththeirteam,fortheirprofessionalismthroughout.
Two special debts are owed. One to Graham Gee for challenging,
clarifying, correcting and strengthening the argument at many stages.
TheothertoStéphanieVigformakingthisprojectmoreexcitingbecause
Icouldshareitwithher.
Introduction: on the limitation of rights
What is the relationship between freedom of expression and libel, por-
nography and political speech? Between the right to life and abortion,
euthanasia and assisted suicide? Between the freedoms of religion and
conscience and State-funding for religious schools, an official State
church, and conscientious objections to military service? With few
exceptions,international,constitutionalandlegislativechartersofrights
leavetherelationshipbetweenrightsandthese(andother)moral–political
questionsopenandunresolved.Itisindeedafeatureofchartersofrights
that they proceed largely in abstractions, seeking agreement on grand
formulationsinawaythatavoidsthegreatdebates(anddisagreements)
animatingrights.Constitutionalrightsareforthemostpartproposedand
adopted without being wholly worked out and with their scope and
contentstilltobedetermined.Theyare,perhaps,examplesofincompletely
theorized agreements on a general principle despite the absence of
furtheragreementonthemorespecificmoral–politicalquestions.1
Constitutionalrightsareformulatedinawaythatfinessesreasonable
disagreementaboutwhatshouldbewithinthescopeandcontentofthe
right.Inthisway,thosewhodisagree,forexample,onthepermissibility
of libel and pornography, abortion and euthanasia, State-funded relig-
ious schools and conscientious objections can nevertheless agree on
freedom of expression, the right to life, and the freedoms of religion
and conscience. Through these underdeterminate formulations, consti-
tutionalrights can betakento represent afree and democratic society’s
commitment to rights all the while concealing the extent of reasonable
disagreement about how to specify these rights in relation to the great
moral–politicaldebatesaliveinthecommunity.
With the notable exception of the US Bill of Rights, most domestic
and international charters of rights mediate (without resolving) the
1 This is one of three genres of incomplete theorized agreements developed by Cass R.
Sunsteinin‘IncompletelyTheorizedAgreements’(1995)108HarvardLawReview1733
andLegalReasoningandPoliticalConflict(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996).
1