Table Of Content

REMARKS ON THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA, AND THE SIEGE OF SEVASTOPOL. BY GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART., G.C.B., G.COM,G., D,EL.,F.R.S. [EXTRACTED FROM THE FOURTH EDITION OF DOUGLAS ON NAVAL GUNNERY.] Second Edition. LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 1855. WORKS BY SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART. A TREATISE ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF GUNNERY. Fourth Edition, revisedandenlarged. Plates. 8vo. 218. <<•Sir Howard hasbroughttohistask an amount of industry, ofpracticalknow ledge,and ofscientificexperience,suchas wehaveseldom seenequalled. Theclear andablemannerin which hisviewsare putforward,andtheperspicuity, terseness, andsoldierlyvigourof his style,—the workmust beatext-bookfortheartilleryist, aslongasthescienceisstudied.”—UnitedServiceMagazine. Bythesame Author, THE PRINCIPLE AND CONSTRUCTION OF MILI TARY BRIDGES, AND THE PASSAGE OF RIVERS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS. Third Edition,revised, withPlates. 8vo. 218. “ Thefruitof manyyears'professionalexperienceand reflectionishereembodied inahighlyimportantandwell-known work. ThefirsteditionofGeneralDouglas's treatise on ·Military Bridges' wasalmostready for publicationnearlyhalfacentury ago,namely, in 1808; butfromprofessional causesthe publicationwas postponed till 1816. Thesecond editionwascalledforin 1829, butelaborated andimproved till 1832,when itappeared; andthepresentedition comes before the publicwith the stillfurther advantage ofother twenty years'experience and wisdom. This may,therefore, wellbea standard work.” — TheBuilder. MILITARY WORKS, AND WORKS RELATING TO THE WAR IN THE EAST. THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. The QUARTERLY REVIEW for January,1853. ThirdEdition. Map. 8vo. 68. RUSSIAONTHE BLACK SEAAND THE SEA OFAZOFF. With someAccountofthe Crimea. ByH.DANBY SEYMOUR, M.P. Map. 8vo. PROGRESSOF RUSSIA INTHEEAST:anHISTORICALSUMMARY, con tinuedtothePresentTime. Third Edition. WithMap. 8vo. 6s.6d. COMMENTARIES ON THE WAR IN RUSSIA AND GERMANY. 1812-13. BythelateGeneralSirGEORGECATHCART. WithPlans. 8vo. 148. THE CAMPAIGN INRUSSIA OF 1812. By GeneralClausewitz. Trans latedfromtheGerman. WithMap. 8vo. 108.6d. THERUSSIANSINBULGARIAANDRUMELIA,duringtheCampaign of theDanube,the Siegesof Brailow,Varna, Silistria, Schumla, and the Passageof theBalkan, 1828–9. By BaronVonMOLTKE, Major on the Prussian General Staff. With PlansofSchumla,Varna,Silistria,& c. 8vo. 14s. HANDBOOK FOR TURKEY,CONSTANTINOPLE, ASIA MINOR, &c. Maps. Post8vo. 10s. THE CONDUCTOF THE WAR. A Speech. BytheRight Hon. SYDNEY HERBERT, M.P. 8vo. 18. PROSPECTSAND CONDUCT OF THE WAR. A Speech. By A. H. LAYARD,M.P. 8vo. 18. JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA. The battle of the Alma, and the powerful attacks sub sequently made by the Russians in the field, together with the vigorous defence of Sevastopol itself, though in every conflict success has crowned the heroic exer tions of the allied armies, have so thinned the ranks of these, that their commanders have been compelled to suspend all active operations, till reinforcements in troops and materials, sufficient to warrant the prosecu tion of ulterior measures, shall be received. The awful effects of the late storm, moreover, by causing the loss of the vessels containing ammunition and stores, of which the troops begin to feel the want, have brought the armies to a very distressing and even perilous con dition. The valour, constancy, physical endurance, and heroism ofthe French and Britishtroops, cannot be too highly estimated ; and it may be permitted the author to enter into an examination concerning the causes of a failure which has so grievously disappointed the san guine expectations which the public had been led to entertain of rapid and complete success in the Expedi tion. A 2 4 The author would not have presumed to make this important matter the subject of a special publication, but having been informed by his bookseller that the work in which he had long previously treated of naval gunnery was out of print, and that it was much in de mand, he could not avoid undertaking a new edition. In so doing he felt himself bound to bring down to the present time, all that relates to naval operations, whether of fleets alone, or in combination with land forces; and this he has done amidst much severe do Finding, after the most mature mestic aflliction. deliberation, that he should be compelled, by his con victions, to treat a part of his subject in a manner which would conflict very much with the prevailing opinion, that the war would be brought to a speedy and successful termination by our vast and noble fleets alone; convinced that this expectation would be disap pointed, and that the country would be involved in a war by land with a colossal military power, for which we were little prepared, he could do no less than con clude this work by re-stating his former convictionsand his apprehensions, the justness of which he has, during the continuance of the strife, found no occasion to doubt, and which he has distinctly avowed as often as his opinion was asked, throughout the operations of the present year. In proof that these are no ex postfacto opinions, the author may appeal to the very numerous persons, of every rank and station,to whom he imparted his apprehension, and stated his opinion ; this he did with a degree of hardihood from which, in other cir cumstances, he would have shrunk, but having stated* * 66Naval Gunnery,” Art. 332. 5 that attacks of maritime fortresses by a judicious co operation of military and naval forces are generally successful, he feels bound to show why, with such an army and navy, this great operation should have The actual publication of his obser so far failed. vations he has, however, reserved till this moment, when they can produce no discouraging effects upon the operations of the present campaign; and, by show ing past errors, they may tend to provide for a happier result in that which is to come. At the beginning of the year 1854 there remained little hope that the peace of Europe would be pre served, and it was soon afterwards judged necessary to send a British army to the East, in order to co-operate with one from France. By great exertions, upwards of 20,000 troops, infantry and cavalry, were shipped and sent off; the guns, military stores, and provisions, were to be despatched in proportion as they could be col A few field batteries only, affording, on an lected. average, scarcely one gun for every thousand men, were sent. Gunner-drivers and horses for the train, waggons to carry ammunition, spring carts for the sick or wounded, sappers and miners with their intrenching tools, and bridge equipments, with all the other indis pensable requisitesfor an armyin the field, were scantily supplied, and some were altogether wanting. Thus, on a small peace establishment, the country was caught in a political storm , and involved in a mighty war. There existed some good regiments of infantry, and a fewover-officered squadrons— they could not be called regiments — of well-appointed cavalry; but all were totally unprovided with the means neces sary for enabling them forthwith to take and keep the 6 field. In this state a military force, constitutingnearly the whole of our effective strength, was despatched with wonderful promptitude to the contemplated seat of war; but, lacking the establishments which should have given it vitality, it is not surprising that it was not prepared to enter on a campaign till the season propitious for military operations was near its termina tion. These deficiencies and disabilities cannot, however, with anyjustice,be charged to the present Government of the country, nor could they be provided at the eleventh hour by any administrative talent on the part of the new Department of War. The evils were too deeply seated to be removed on a sudden ; all that zeal, energy, and ability could accomplish, has been done by > the Government to repair the evils, and supply the de ficiencies which resulted from the persistence of Parlia ment, at and ever since the conclusion of the late war, in measures dictated by a reckless spirit of economy, to abolish or reduce the military establishments of the country, as if war were never again to overtake the na All the establishments which are indispensable tion. to enable the army to take the field, of which we now in vain lament the want, had to be restored and re organised. For this, much time must necessarily be lost, and precious opportunities be let slip, ere England can collect and organise her neglected military re sources, and beagain prepared to buckle on her armour and exert the plenitude ofhermilitarystrength, whether for defending her own territories, or to resist aggressions directed against those of her allies. The author feels himself justified in making public the above reflections, because they are consonant with 7 what he has written, published, and on some occasions spoken, since the termination ofthe late war, up to the present eventful period. Now that the evil predicted has overtaken us, it is hoped that the country will take warning, and become convinced that something more than numerical strength and personal bravery is re quired to render an army efficient in the field; and that a nation which had so neglected her military establish ments as to have permitted her army to fall into such a state of inefficiency for immediate service, could scarcely be counted upon as a military power, capable of promptly taking part in a great territorial war, and of immediately sustaining and vindicating the lofty tone which, without reflecting upon our very limited military means, the Government of this country so nobly assumed, and the spirit of the nation so gene rously and congenially re-echoed, at the breakingoutof this great war. Under these very disadvantageous and inauspicious circumstances, with respect to the small amount of our effective military force, and the late period of the sea son at which it was so far equipped as to be able to take the field, the allied army, deeplyimpregnatedwith the seeds of disease, and, had it even been in an effi cient sanitary state, not numerically strong enough, particularly in cavalry, to ensure success, entered on the arduous service in which it is now engaged, the ob ject being to besiege, capture, and destroy the great fortress and naval arsenal of Sevastopol. There never was a case in which a siege required to be undertaken with greater regard to the relative strength of the besieged and besieging armies, and to the quantity as well as quality of their siege artillery 8 -never one in which a great superiority of the invest ing army over the forces forming the garrison of the place was so imperative. In estimating the amount of force required to besiege andcapture Sevastopol,regard should have been had to the important fact that, in its local character as a military position, that town is a vast fortress situated on both sides of a long harbour resemblingaverybroad river,and of which the northern side, occupied by the citadel, is elevated above the southern part. The place belongs, therefore, to the category of a fortress divided into two portions by an unfordable river,* in which case the divisions of the investing corps would be prevented from mutually as sisting each other. To invest such a place there is re quired an army twice as strong as would suffice, if no such obstruction to intercommunication and mutual support existed. In this case, also, the enemy keeping the field with a numerous army ofobservation, a strong and very extensive line of circumvallation would be necessary. With respect to the means of defence, with which it is well known that Sevastopol was plentifully provided. -Here is a vast naval arsenal already well fortified, and capable, from the time of being menaced with an attack, of being greatly strengthened in its works and its garrison: it possessed enormous quantities of ord nance and ammunition, which had been accumulated in its magazines; and, exclusive of the artillerymen * “ Une place partagée par une rivière non guéable exige le double plus de forces pour son investissement qu'une place autour de laquelle des communications faciles permettent à tous les corps qui en forment l'investissement de s'entre-secourir promptement." -Bousmard, Essai Général de Fortification, liv. i. chap. ii. p. 65. 9 attached to the ordnance of the place, it had thepower of drawing from the fleet in the harbour vast numbers of well-trained naval gunners, all of whom could be rendered available for manning the artillery during the progress ofthe siege. No operation in war may be depended upon with so much certainty as the siege of a fortress, provided it be undertaken with sufficient means and be skilfully con ducted;* but no measure is so disastrous as the under taking of a siege, as was the case with that of Burgos, at which the author served, in 1812,t without the requisite strength in men and materials. The attacking force should be sufficiently numerousto invest the place on every accessible side, so that nothing may be able to get in or out, and it should be equal in amount to about five, and never less than three times the garrison: there should be, moreover, in thefield a covering army, of which a large portion should be cavalry, in order to protect the operations of the siege, and prevent them frombeing interruptedby an army ofobservation, which the enemymay bring upwhilethey are being carriedon. The allied army in the Crimea found itself manifestly inadequate to the accomplishmentof the object in view, and even the victory on the Alma rendered it still less able to compete with the overwhelming power of its opponents. The allied commanders were then com pelled to come to a determination on which side, the northernor thesouthern, Sevastopolshouldbe attacked: on both at once they could not act. The northern side is strongly fortified; the Russians held a formidable position on theBelbec River, and no shelter fortheships * Napier, “ History ofthe Peninsular War," vol. iv. p. 476. # Ib., vol. v. p. 369. 10 could be afforded on that part of the coast; there was no place, in fact, convenient for landing the siege-train, or for establishing a secure point of communication between the army and the fleet, which at that late season could not be expected long to lie at anchor on theopensea. On these accounts it was promptlydeter mined to abandon the precarious base of operations north of Sevastopol ; and to turn the enemy's positions on the Belbec and the northern heights, by a flank march to the south, in order to establish in Balaklava Bay a new base, from which the attack might be made on the southern heights. Toinvade the Crimea, an integral portion of the Rus sian empire, and lay siege to Sevastopol at that late period ofthe season, and, as has been already observed, with an army deeply impregnated with the seeds of disease, was, in the opinion of the author, a desperate and dangerous operation, undertaken,it is said,contrary to thejudgment of an eminent engineer, whose opinion should have ruled, but who, when that determination was taken, did all in his power to meet the difficulties ofthe case by recommending, as a matter of necessity, to abandon the base northof Sevastopol,whosecommu nications with theseahad at that lateperiod of the year become precarious, and to seizeupon some bay south of the place, in which a secure base might be established -a change of position which, under the difficulties in which the allied army was placed from insufficiency of force, was apparently the best measure that could be adopted under such circumstances; and this very criti cal movement was gallantly and successfully accom plished by a somewhat hazardous march of the whole army.