The Nature of Philosophy

240 Pages·1980·26.489 MB·English

by  John Kekes

APQ LIBRARY OF
PHILOSOPHY
THE NATURE OF
PHILOSOPHY
JOHN KEKES
1980
ROWMAN AND LITTLEFIELD
TOTOWA, NEW JERSEY
X
©
American
Philosophical
Quarterly 1980
ISBN 0-8476-6247-0
Printed in Great Britain
for
Jean Y. Kekes
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ix
INTRODUCTION
xi
PART ONE: THE PROBLEM
CHAPTER ONE: THE CASE AGAINST PHILOSOPHY
3
I. The Failure of Philosophy 3
II. The Weakness of Excuses 8
III. What is to Be Done? 13
PART TWO: PERENNIAL ARGUMENTS
AND WORLDVIEWS
CHAPTER TWO: PERENNIAL ARGUMENTS 17
Characteristics of Perennial Arguments 17
I.
II. Two Misinterpretations of Perennial Arguments 23
III. Conclusion 27
CHAPTER THREE: PROBLEMS 30
Introduction 30
I.
II. Problems and Theories 31
III. Problems of Life and Problems of Reflection 32
IV. Removable Problems and Enduring Problems 36
V. Enduring Problems and Perennial Arguments 39
VI. Conclusion 42
CHAPTER FOUR: IDEALS 46
Introduction 46
I.
II. A Description of Ideals 46
V
11
THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY
VI
III. Ideals ami Presuppositions 53
IV. Conclusion 56
'
*
CHAPTER WORLDVIEWS AND WISDOM '
FIVE: 58
I. Worldviews 58
Wisdom
II. 65
III. The Autonomy of Philosophy 70
The State of the Argument 73
PART THREE: PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION
CHAPTER six: THE DOMAIN OF JUSTIFICATION 79
Introduction 79
I.
II. The Distinction Between Discovery and Justification 80
III. The First Argument: The Autonomy of Philosophy 81
IV. Criticism of the First Argument 83
V. The Second Argument: Philosophy as Rational 88
Reconstruction
VI. Criticism of the Second Argument 89
VII. Conclusion 92
CHAPTER seven: JUSTIFICATION IN PHILOSOPHY:
THE CONTEXT OF INTRODUCTION 95
Introduction 95
I.
The Background 96
II.
III. The Two Contexts of Justification 99
IV. Justification and the Context of Introduction 102
V. Conclusion 107
CHAPTER eight: JUSTIFICATION IN PHILOSOPHY:
THE CONTEXT OF ACCEPTANCE
1 1
I. Introduction 111
II. The Three Tests of Truth-Directedness 1 1
III. Justification and the Context of Acceptance ' 118
IV. Justification and Truth 121
V. Conclusion 122
The State of the Argument 126
TABLE OF CONTENTS
vii
PART FOUR: PHILOSOPHY AND SOME OF
RELATIONS
ITS
CHAPTER NINE; PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE 131
Introduction 131
I.
II. Basic Beliefs 132
III. Basic Beliefs and Common Sense 135
IV. The Justification of Common Sense 138
V. Common Sense and Worldviews 143
CHAPTER ten: PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 147
Introduction 147
I.
II. Problem-Solving and Science 149
III. Metaphysics and Science 155
IV. Worldviews and Science 158
V. Conclusion 162
CHAPTER ELEVEN: PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY 164
Introduction 164
I.
II. Historical Understanding and Philosophical 165
Justification
III. Historical Understanding and the Improvement of 173
Worldviews
IV. Historical Understanding and Sensibility 174
V. Conclusion 177
The State of the Argument 179
PART THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY:
FIVE:
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER TWELVE: PHILOSOPHY AS THE CONSTRUCTION
AND JUSTIFICATION OF WORLDVIEWS 185
Introduction 185
I.
II. The Ideal of Philosophy 186
III. The Presuppositions of Philosophy 191
IV. Conclusion 200
THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY
viii
CHAPTER THIR-T^EN: PHILOSOPHY AND PERENNIAL
ARGUMENTS
203
Introduction * 203
I.
II. External Perennial Arguments about Philosophy 206
III. Internal Perennial Arguments about Philosophy 213
IV. Conclusion 218
NAME INDEX 219
SUBJECT INDEX 221
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book is a sequel to my A Justification of Rationality (Albany:
Stale University of New York Press, 1976). In the previous book
I
develop a theory of rationality; in this book apply that theory to
I
philosophy. This results in some inevitable repetitions. In Chapters
Three, Five, and Eight draw on material from Chapters Eight
I
and Twelve of the previous book. The two books, however, stand or
fall independently of each other.
In Chapters Two and Five incorporate the partial and revised
I
contents of two of my articles: both were first published in
Idealistic Studies, one in 1977, the other in 1979. In Chapter Three
I use portions of an article I first published in the Philosophy of the
Social Sciences in 1977. In Chapter Seven I rely on an article first
published in Inquiry in 1979. Finally, Chapter Nine overlaps with
an article first published in the American Philosophical Quarterly
in 1979. I am grateful for permission to make use of these articles.
William Hay, Joel Kupperman, Jack Meiland, and Stephen
Nathanson have read through the penultimate version of the
My
manuscript. debt to them is immense. They commented in
detail, they gave me the benefit of their time, energy, and
judgment, and they encouraged me. I have not always taken their
advice, but the book benefited enormously from the comments
I
have heeded.
I am indebted to Max Black for suggesting the key term,
perennial argument, around which the book revolves, and for
helping me to think along the way. Stuart Brown, Josiah Gould,
and Susan Haack read parts of the manuscript and I am grateful
for their comments and criticisms.
The Research Foundation of the State University of New York
provided two summer research grants, the College of Humanities
and Fine Arts and the Office for Research of the State University
of New York at Albany underwrote typing and duplicating
expenses. gratefully acknowledge their support. Helen Somich
I
typed two versions of the manuscript; her intelligence, patience,
tact, and precision are beyond the call of duty, and I thank her for
everything.
IX
X THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY
dedicate thi? ifook to Jean Y. Kekes, my wife and friend. She
I
is more to me and has done more for me than I could possibly ask.
If this book has merit, it is to a great extent due to her, for she has
not only created the conditions in which 1 can work, but also
helped to do the work by being first an audience, then a critic, and
then an editor.
.
INTRODUCTION
This book is prompted by a concern about the absence of a
satisfactory worldview in contemporary Western society. A world-
view combines a reliable account of the nature of reality and a
system of ideals. Having such a worldview makes the solution of
problems possible, gives meaning and purpose to life, and thus
creates the conditions under which life can be good.
The problem, as I see it, is not about our knowledge of reality.
The growth of scientific knowledge has been steady. As a result, we
live longer, we are in better health, and enjoy higher living
standards than ever before. These improvements, however, merely
create some of the conditions under which life can be good: by
We
themselves, they cannot make it so. also need a rational system
of ideals; and it is this we lack.
Since our society does not provide them with such ideals, and
since they do not generate them for themselves, most people live
hollow lives. To fill them, they turn to mindless entertainment or
drugs, they rediscover the thrills of magic by flirting with
mysticism, witchcraft, astrology, religious revivalism, and other
flowers of unreason. Many, rejecting these unworthy options, are
left with a choice between despair, cynicism, and more or less
obsessive pursuit of some sysiphean activity.
The difficulty is not the absence of ideals. The Western
tradition has ample supply of them. The difficulty is the rational
justification and systematization of those ideals. What we lack is a
coherent system of reasonable ideals. It is this lack which is mainly
responsible for many lives not being good.
The ideals we hold should be rationally justified. If they are not,
we have no way of knowing whether the policies we adopt in
accordance with them can be satisfactory solutions of our
problems. Thus the rational justification of ideals is in the best
interest of those who hold them. And the systematization of
rational ideals is required by the desirability of having a
coordinated policy for dealing with problems, rather than respon-
ding to them piecemeal with the risk that one effort may
jeopardize another.
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