The Native Races Volume 3 Myths and Languages by Hubert Howe Bancroft

323 Pages·2021·3.22 MB·English

The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, Volume 3, by
Hubert Howe Bancroft

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or
re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org

Title: The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, Volume 3
The Native Races, Volume 3, Myths and Languages

Author: Hubert Howe Bancroft

Release Date: July 7, 2013 [EBook #43123]

Language: English

Character set encoding: UTF-8

*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WORKS OF HUBERT BANCROFT, VOL 3 ***

Produced by Melissa McDaniel and The Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
(1st-hand-history.org)

Transcriber's Note:

Obvious typographical errors have been corrected. Inconsistent
spelling and hyphenation in the original document have been
preserved.

Italics in the footnotes citations were inconsistently applied by the
typesetter.

Footnote II-11: "Reads" should possibly be "Reade."

Footnote VI-43: "por bien de abirle los ojos, y darle luz, y abridle

... " should possibly be "por bien de abrirle los ojos, y darle luz,
y abrirle ..."

Footnote IX-7 is missing a starting quote.

Footnote X-65: "rook" should possibly be "rock."

Footnote XI-5 is missing a starting quote.

Footnote XII-75: The ending page should possibly be 302.

Footnote II'-29: "queer" should possibly be "quer."

Footnote II'-60 is missing a starting quote.

Footnote III'-2: "îsles" should possibly be "îles."

Footnote III'-7: "Kaigáni" or "Kaigani" may be spelled incorrectly.

Footnote IV'-16: "Entferten" should possibly be "Entfernten."

Footnote V'-7: "Schlusstein" should possibly be "Schlussstein."

Page 569: "Irritilia" should possibly be "Irritila."

Page 634: The periods after "from us", and "masahchie" are

possibly typos.

Page 703: "kiokame" is a possible typo for "hiokame."

Erman, Archiv is variously numbered with Roman and Arabic

numbers.

Title Page

THE WORKS

OF

HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT.

VOLUME III.

THE NATIVE RACES.

VOL. III. MYTHS AND LANGUAGES.

SAN FRANCISCO:

A. L. BANCROFT & COMPANY, PUBLISHERS.

1883.

Entered according to Act of Congress in the Year 1882, by

HUBERT H. BANCROFT,

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.

All Rights Reserved.

CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME.

MYTHOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

SPEECH AND SPECULATION.

PAGE.

Difference between Man and Brutes—Mind-Language and Soul-Language—Origin of

Language: A Gift of the Creator, a Human Invention, or an Evolution—Nature and
Value of Myth—Origin of Myth: The Divine Idea, a Fiction of Sorcery, the Creation
of a Designing Priesthood—Origin of Worship, of Prayer, of Sacrifice—Fetichism
and the Origin of Animal-Worship—Religion and Mythology
1

CHAPTER II.

ORIGIN AND END OF THINGS.

Quiché Creation-Myth—Aztec Origin-Myths—The Papagos—Montezuma and the

Coyote—The Moquis—The Great Spider's Web of the Pimas—Navajo and
Pueblo Creations—Origin of Clear Lake and Lake Tahoe—Chareya of the
Cahrocs—Mount Shasta, the Wigwam of the Great Spirit—Idaho Springs and
Water Falls—How Differences in Language Occurred—Yehl, the Creator of the
Thlinkeets—The Raven and the Dog
42

CHAPTER III.

PHYSICAL MYTHS.

Sun, Moon, and Stars—Eclipses—The Moon Personified in the Land of the Crescent

—Fire—How the Coyote Stole Fire for the Cahrocs—How the Frog Lost His Tail
—How the Coyote Stole Fire for the Navajos—Wind and Thunder—The Four
Winds and the Cross—Water, the First of Elemental Things—Its Sacred and
Cleansing Power—Earth and Sky—Earthquakes and Volcanoes—Mountains—
How the Hawk and Crow Built the Coast Range—The Mountains of Yosemite
108

CHAPTER IV.

ANIMAL MYTHOLOGY.

Rôles Assigned to Animals—Auguries from their Movements—The Ill-omened Owl—

Tutelary Animals—Metamorphosed Men—The Ogress-Squirrel of Vancouver
Island—Monkeys and Beavers—Fallen Men—The Sacred Animals—Prominence
of the Bird—An Emblem of the Wind—The Serpent, an Emblem of the Lightning—
Not Specially connected with Evil—The Serpent of the Pueblos—The Water-
Snake—Ophiolatry—Prominence of the Dog, or the Coyote—Generally though not
always a Benevolent Power—How the Coyote let Salmon up the Klamath—Danse
Macabre and Sad Death of the Coyote
127

CHAPTER V.

GODS, SUPERNATURAL BEINGS, AND WORSHIP.

iv

Eskimo Witchcraft—The Tinneh and the Koniagas—Kugans of the Aleuts—The

Thlinkeets, the Haidahs, and the Nootkas—Paradise Lost of the Okanagans—The
Salish, the Clallams, the Chinooks, the Cayuses, the Walla Wallas, and the Nez
Percés—Shoshone Ghouls—Northern California—The Sun at Monterey—Ouiot
and Chinigchinich—Antagonistic Gods of Lower California—Comanches, Apaches,
and Navajos—Montezuma of the Pueblos—Moquis and Mojaves—Primeval Race
of Northern California
140

CHAPTER VI.

GODS, SUPERNATURAL BEINGS, AND WORSHIP.

Gods and Religious Rites of Chihuahua, Sonora, Durango, and Sinaloa—The Mexican

Religion, received with different degrees of credulity by different classes of the
people—Opinions of different Writers as to its Nature—Monotheism of
Nezahualcoyotl—Present condition of the Study of Mexican Mythology—
Tezcatlipoca—Prayers to Him in the time of Pestilence, of War, for those in
Authority—Prayer used by an Absolving Priest—Genuineness of the foregoing
Prayers—Character and Works of Sahagun
178

CHAPTER VII.

GODS, SUPERNATURAL BEINGS, AND WORSHIP.

Image of Tezcatlipoca—His Seats at the Street-corners—Various Legends about his

Life on Earth—Quetzalcoatl—His Dexterity in the Mechanical Arts—His Religious
Observances—The Wealth and Nimbleness of his Adherents—Expulsion from Tula
of Quetzalcoatl by Tezcatlipoca and Huitzilopochtli—The Magic Draught—
Huemac, or Vemac, King of the Toltecs, and the Misfortunes brought upon him and
his people by Tezcatlipoca in various disguises—Quetzalcoatl in Cholula—Differing
Accounts of the Birth and Life of Quetzalcoatl—His Gentle Character—He drew up
the Mexican Calender—Incidents of his Exile and of his Journey to Tlapalla, as
related and commented upon by various writers—Brasseur's ideas about the
Quetzalcoatl Myths—Quetzalcoatl considered a Sun-God by Tylor, and as a
Dawn-Hero by Brinton—Helps—Domenech—The Codices—Long Discussion of
the Quetzalcoatl Myths by J. G. Müller
237

CHAPTER VIII.

GODS, SUPERNATURAL BEINGS, AND WORSHIP.

Various accounts of the Birth, Origin, and Derivation of the name of the Mexican War

God, Huitzilopochtli, of his Temple, Image, Ceremonial, Festivals, and his Deputy,
or Page, Paynal—Clavigero—Boturini—Acosta—Solis—Sahagun—Herrera—
Torquemada—J. G. Müller's Summary of the Huitzilopochtli Myths, their Origin,
Relation, and Signification—Tylor—Codex Vaticanus—Tlaloc, God of Water,
especially of Rain, and of Mountains—Clavigero, Gama, and Ixtlilxochitl—Prayer in
time of Drought—Camargo, Motolinia, Mendieta, and the Vatican Codex on the
Sacrifices to Tlaloc—The Decorations of his Victims and the places of their
Execution—Gathering Rushes for the Service of the Water God—Highway
Robberies by the Priests at this time—Decorations and Implements of the Priests—
Punishments for Ceremonial Offences—The Whirlpool of Pantitlan—Images of the
Mountains in honor of the Tlaloc Festival—Of the coming Rain and Mutilation of the
Images of the Mountains—General Prominence in the cult of Tlaloc, of the Number
Four, the Cross, and the Snake
288

CHAPTER IX.

GODS, SUPERNATURAL BEINGS, AND WORSHIP.

v

The Mother or all-nourishing Goddess under various names and in various aspects—

Her Feast in the Eleventh Aztec month Ochpaniztli—Festivals of the Eighth month,
Hueytecuilhuitl, and of the Fourth, Hueytozoztli—The deification of women that died
in child-birth—The Goddess of Water under various Names and in various aspects
—Ceremonies of the Baptism or Lustration of children—The Goddess of Love, her
various names and aspects—Rites of confession and absolution—The God of fire
and his various names—His festivals in the tenth month Xocotlveti and in the
eighteenth month Yzcali; also his quadriennial festival in the latter month—The great
festival of every fifty-two years; lighting the new fire—The God of Hades, and
Teoyaomique, collector of the souls of the fallen brave—Deification of dead rulers
and heroes—Mixcoatl, God of hunting, and his feast in the fourteenth month,
Quecholli—Various other Mexican deities—Festival in the second month,
Tlacaxipehualiztli, with notice of the gladiatorial sacrifices—Complete Synopsis of
the festivals of the Mexican Calendar, fixed and movable—Temples and Priests
349

CHAPTER X.

GODS, SUPERNATURAL BEINGS, AND WORSHIP.

Revenues of the Mexican Temples—Vast number of the Priests—Mexican Sacerdotal

System—Priestesses—The Orders of Tlamaxcacayotl and Telpochtiliztli—Religious
Devotees—Baptism—Circumcision—Communion—Fasts and Penance—Blood-
drawing—Human Sacrifices—The Gods of the Tarascos—Priests and Temple
Service of Michoacan—Worship in Jalisco—Oajaca—Votan and Quetzalcoatl—
Travels of Votan—The Apostle Wixepecocha—Cave near Xustlahuaca—The
Princess Pinopiaa—Worship of Costahuntox—Tree Worship
430

CHAPTER XI.

GODS, SUPERNATURAL BEINGS, AND WORSHIP.

Maya Pantheon—Zamná—Cukulcan—The Gods of Yucatan—The Symbol of the

Cross in America—Human Sacrifices in Yucatan—Priests of Yucatan—Guatemalan
Pantheon—Tepeu and Hurakan—Avilix and Hacavitz—The Heroes of the Sacred
Book—Quiché Gods—Worship of the Choles, Manches, Itzas, Lacandones, and
others—Tradition of Comizahual—Fasts—Priests of Guatemala—Gods, Worship,
and Priests of Nicaragua—Worship on the Mosquito Coast—Gods and Worship of
the Isthmians—Phallic Worship in America
461

CHAPTER XII.
FUTURE STATE.

Aboriginal Ideas of Future—General Conceptions of Souls—Future State of the

Aleuts, Chepewyans, Natives at Milbank Sound, and Okanagans—Happy Land of
the Salish and Chinooks—Conceptions of Heaven and Hell of the Nez Percés,
Flatheads, and Haidahs—The Realms of Quawteaht and Chayher—Beliefs of the
Songhies, Clallams, and Pend d'Oreilles—The Future State of the Californian and
Nevada Tribes, Comanches, Pueblos, Navajos, Apaches, Moquis, Maricopas,
Yumas, and others—The Sun House of the Mexicans—Tlalocan and Mictlan—
Condition of the Dead—Journey of the Dead—Future of the Tlascaltecs and other
Nations
510

LANGUAGES.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGES.

vi

vii

Native Languages in Advance of Social Customs—Characteristic Individuality of

American Tongues—Frequent Occurrence of Long Words—Reduplications,
Frequentatives, and Duals—Intertribal Languages—Gesture-Language—Slavé and
Chinook Jargons—Pacific States Languages—The Tinneh, Aztec, and Maya
Tongues—The Larger Families Inland—Language as a Test of Origin—Similarities
in Unrelated Languages—Plan of this Investigation
551

CHAPTER II.

HYPERBOREAN LANGUAGES.

Distinction between Eskimo and American—Eskimo Pronunciation and Declension—

Dialects of the Koniagas and Aleuts—Language of the Thlinkeets—Hypothetical
Affinities—The Tinneh Family and its Dialects—Eastern, Western, Central, and
Southern Divisions—Chepewyan Declension—Oratorical Display in the Speech of
the Kutchins—Dialects of the Atnahs and Ugalenzes Compared—Specimen of the
Koltshane Tongue—Tacully Gutturals—Hoopah Vocabulary—Apache Dialects—
Lipan Lord's Prayer—Navajo Words—Comparative Vocabulary of the Tinneh
Family
574

CHAPTER III.

COLUMBIAN LANGUAGES.

The Haidah, its Construction and Conjugation—The Nass Language and its Dialects—

Bellacoola and Chimsyan Comparisons—The Nootka Languages of Vancouver
Island—Nanaimo Ten Commandments and Lord's Prayer—Aztec Analogies—
Fraser and Thompson River Languages—The Neetlakapamuck Grammar and
Lord's Prayer—Sound Languages—The Salish Family—Flathead Grammar and
Lord's Prayer—The Kootenai—The Sahaptin Family—Nez Percé Grammar—
Yakima Lord's Prayer—Sahaptin State and Slave Languages—The Chinook Family
—Grammar of the Chinook Language—Aztec Affinities—The Chinook Jargon
604

CHAPTER IV.

CALIFORNIAN LANGUAGES.

Multiplicity of Tongues—Yakon, Klamath, and Palaik Comparisons—Pitt River and

Wintoon Vocabularies—Weeyot, Wishosk, Weitspek, and Ehnek Comparisons—
Languages of Humboldt Bay—Potter Valley, Russian and Eel River Languages—
Pomo Languages—Gallinomero Grammar—Trans-Pacific Comparisons—
Chocuyem Lord's Prayer—Languages of the Sacramento, San Joaquin, Napa, and
Sonoma Valleys—The Olhone and other Languages of San Francisco Bay—
Runsien and Eslene of Monterey—Santa Clara Lord's Prayer—Mutsun Grammar—
Languages of the Missions Santa Cruz, San Antonio de Padua, Soledad, and San
Miguel—Tatché Grammar—The Dialects of Santa Cruz and other Islands
635

CHAPTER V.

SHOSHONE LANGUAGES.

Aztec-Sonora Connections with the Shoshone Family—The Utah, Comanche, Moqui,

Kizh, Netela, Kechi, Cahuillo, and Chemehuevi—Eastern and Western Shoshone,
or Wihinasht—The Bannack and Digger, or Shoshokee—The Utah and its Dialects
—The Goshute, Washoe, Paiulee, Piute, Sampitche, and Mono—Popular Belief as
to the Aztec Element in the North—Grimm's Law—Shoshone, Comanche, and
Moqui Comparative Table—Netela Stanza—Kizh Grammar—The Lord's Prayer in
two Dialects of the Kizh—Chemehuevi and Cahuillo Grammar—Comparative
Vocabulary
660

CHAPTER VI.

THE PUEBLO, COLORADO RIVER, AND LOWER CALIFORNIA LANGUAGES.

viii

Traces of the Aztec not found among the Pueblos of New Mexico and Arizona—The

Five Languages of the Pueblos, the Queres, the Tegua, the Picoris, Jemez, and Zuñi
—Pueblo Comparative Vocabulary—The Yuma and its Dialects, the Maricopa,
Cuchan, Mojave, Diegueño, Yampais, and Yavipais—The Cochimí and Pericú, with
their Dialects of Lower California—Guaicuri Grammar—Pater Noster in Three
Cochimí Dialects—The Languages of Lower California wholly Isolated
680

CHAPTER VII.

THE PIMA, ÓPATA, AND CERI LANGUAGES.

Pima Alto and Bajo—Pápago—Pima Grammar—Formation of Plurals—Personal

Pronoun—Conjugation—Classification of Verbs—Adverbs—Prepositions,
Conjunctions, and Interjections—Syntax of the Pima—Prayers in different dialects
—The Ópata and Eudeve—Eudeve Grammar—Conjugation of Active and Passive
Verbs—Lord's Prayer—Ópata Grammar—Declension—Possessive Pronoun—
Conjugation—Ceri Language with its Dialects, Guaymi and Tepoca—Ceri
Vocabulary
694

CHAPTER VIII.

NEW MEXICAN LANGUAGES.

The Cahita and its Dialects—Cahita Grammar—Dialectic Differences of the Mayo,

Yaqui, and Tehueco—Comparative Vocabulary—Cahita Lord's Prayer—The
Tarahumara and its Dialects—The Tarahumara Grammar—Tarahumara Lord's
Prayer in two Dialects—The Concho, the Toboso, the Julime, the Piro, the Suma,
the Chinarra, the Tubar, the Irritila—Tejano—Tejano Grammar—Specimen of the
Tejano—The Tepehuana—Tepehuana Grammar and Lord's Prayer—Acaxée and
its Dialects, the Topia, Sabaibo and Xixime—The Zacatec, Cazcane, Mazapile,
Huitcole, Guachichile, Colotlan, Tlaxomultec, Tecuexe, and Tepecano—The Cora
and its Dialects, the Muutzicat, Teacuaeitzca, and Ateacari—Cora Grammar
706

CHAPTER IX.

THE AZTEC AND OTOMÍ LANGUAGES.

Nahua or Aztec, Chichimec, and Toltec languages identical—Anáhuac the aboriginal

seat of the Aztec Tongue—The Aztec the oldest language in Anáhuac—Beauty and
Richness of the Aztec—Testimony of the Missionaries and early writers in its favor
—Specimen from Paredes' Manual—Grammar of the Aztec Language—Aztec
Lord's Prayer—The Otomí a Monosyllabic Language of Anáhuac—Relationship
claimed with the Chinese and Cherokee—Otomí Grammar—Otomí Lord's Prayer
in Different Dialects
723

CHAPTER X.

LANGUAGES OF CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN MEXICO.

The Pame and its Dialects—The Meco of Guanajuato and the Sierra Gordo—The

Tarasco of Michoacan and its Grammar—The Matlaltzinca and its Grammar—The
Ocuiltec—The Miztec and its Dialects—Miztec Grammar—The Amusgo, Chocho,
Mazatec, Cuicatec, Chatino, Tlapanec, Chinantec, and Popoluca—The Zapotec
and its Grammar—The Mije—Mije Grammar and Lord's Prayer—The Huave of
the Isthmus of Tehuantepec—Huave Numerals
742

CHAPTER XI.

THE MAYA-QUICHÉ LANGUAGES.

The Maya-Quiché, the Languages of the Civilized Nations of Central America—

Enumeration of the Members of this Family—Hypothetical Analogies with
Languages of the Old World—Lord's Prayers in the Chañabal, Chiapanec, Chol,
Tzendal, Zoque, and Zotzil—Pokonchi Grammar—The Mame or Zaklopahkap—
Quiché Grammar—Cakchiquel Lord's Prayer—Maya Grammar—Totonac
Grammar—Totonac Dialects—Huastec Grammar
759

ix

x

THOUGHT AND
EXPRESSION.

CHAPTER XII.

LANGUAGES OF HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA, AND THE ISTHMUS OF DARIEN.

The Carib an Imported Language—The Mosquito Language—The Poya, Towka,

Seco, Valiente, Rama, Cookra, Woolwa, and other Languages in Honduras—The
Chontal—Mosquito Grammar—Love Song in the Mosquito Language—
Comparative Vocabulary of Honduras Tongues—The Coribici, Chorotega,
Chontal, and Orotiña in Nicaragua—Grammar of the Orotiña or Nagrandan—
Comparison between the Orotiña and Chorotega—The Chiriquí, Guatuso, Tiribi,
and others in Costa Rica—Talamanca Vocabulary—Diversity of Speech on the
Isthmus of Darien—Enumeration of Languages—Comparative Vocabulary
782

THE NATIVE RACES

OF THE

PACIFIC STATES.

MYTHOLOGY, LANGUAGES.

CHAPTER I.

SPEECH AND SPECULATION.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAN AND BRUTES—MIND LANGUAGE AND SOUL-LANGUAGE—ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE: A GIFT OF THE CREATOR, A

HUMAN INVENTION, OR AN EVOLUTION—NATURE AND VALUE OF MYTH—ORIGIN OF MYTH: THE DIVINE IDEA, A FICTION OF
SORCERY, THE CREATION OF A DESIGNING PRIESTHOOD—ORIGIN OF WORSHIP, OF PRAYER, OF SACRIFICE—FETICHISM AND THE
ORIGIN OF ANIMAL-WORSHIP—RELIGION AND MYTHOLOGY.

Hitherto we have beheld Man only in his material organism; as a wild though intellectual animal. We have watched the
intercourse of uncultured mind with its environment. We have seen how, to clothe himself, the savage robs the beast;
how, like animals, primitive man constructs his habitation, provides food, rears a family, exercises authority, holds
property, wages war, indulges in amusements, gratifies social instincts; and that in all this, the savage is but one remove
from the brute. Ascending the scale, we have examined the first stages of human progress and analyzed an incipient
civilization. We will now pass the frontier which separates mankind from animal-kind, and enter the domain of the
immaterial and supernatural; phenomena which philosophy purely positive cannot explain.

The primary indication of an absolute superiority in man over other animals is the faculty of speech; not those mute or
vocal symbols, expressive of passion and emotion, displayed alike in brutes and men; but the power to separate ideas,
to generate in the mind and embody in words, sequences of thought. True, upon the threshold of this inquiry, as in
whatever relates to primitive man, we find the brute creation hotly pursuing, and disputing for a share in this progressional
power. In common with man, animals possess all the organs of sensation. They see, hear, feel, taste, and smell. They
have even the organs of speech; but they have not speech. The source of this wonderful faculty lies further back,
obscured by the mists which ever settle round the immaterial. Whether brutes have souls, according to the Aristotelean
theory of soul, or whether brute-soul is immortal, or of quality and destiny unlike and inferior to that of man-soul, we see
in them unmistakable evidence of mental faculties. The higher order of animals possess the lower order of intellectual
perceptions. Thus pride is manifested by the caparisoned horse, shame by the beaten dog, will by the stubborn mule.
Brutes have memory; they manifest love and hate, joy and sorrow, gratitude and revenge. They are courageous or
cowardly, subtle or simple, not merely up to the measure of what we commonly term instinct, but with evident exercise
of judgment; and, to a certain point, we might even claim for them foresight, as in laying in a store of food for winter. But
with all this there seems to be a lack of true or connected thought, and of the faculty of abstraction, whereby conceptions
are analyzed and impressions defined.

They have also a language, such as it is; indeed, all the varieties of language common to man.
What gesture-language can be more expressive than that employed by the horse with its ears
and by the dog with its tail, wherein are manifestations of every shade of joy, sorrow, courage,

fear, shame, and anger? In their brutish physiognomy, also, one may read the language of the emotions, which, if not so
delicately pictured as in the face of man, is none the less distinctive. Nor are they without their vocal language. Every
fowl and every quadruped possesses the power of communicating intelligence by means of the voice. They have their

2

3

ORIGIN OF
LANGUAGE.

noise of gladness, their signal cry of danger, their notes of anger and of woe. Thus we see in brutes not only intelligence
but the power of communicating intelligence. But intelligence is not thought, neither is expression speech. The language of
brutes, like themselves, is soulless.

The next indication of man's superiority over brutes, is the faculty of worship. The wild beast, to escape the storm, flies
howling to its den; the savage, awe-stricken, turns and prays. The lowest man perceives a hand behind the lightning,
hears a voice abroad upon the storm, for which the highest brute has neither eye nor ear. This essential of humanity we
see primordially displayed in mythic phenomena; in the first struggle of spiritual manhood to find expression. Language is
symbol significant of thought, mythology is symbol significant of soul. The one is the first distinctive sound that separates
the ideal from the material, the other the first respiration of the soul which distinguishes the immortal from the animal.
Language is thought incarnate; mythology, soul incarnate. The one is the instrument of thought, as the other is the essence
of thought. Neither is thought; both are closely akin to thought; separated from either, in some form, perfect intellectual
manhood cannot develop. I do not mean to say with some, that thought without speech cannot exist; unless by speech is
meant any form of expression symbolical, emotional, or vocal, or unless by thought is meant something more than mere
self-consciousness without sequence and without abstraction. There can be no doubt that speech is the living breath of
thought, and that the exercise of speech reacts upon the mental and emotional faculties. In brutes is found neither speech
nor myth; in the deaf and dumb, thought and belief are shadowy and undefined; in infants, thought is but as a fleeting
cloud passing over the brain. Yet for all this, deaf mutes and children who have no adequate form of expression cannot
be placed in the category of brutes. The invention of the finger-alphabet opened a way to the understanding of the deaf
and dumb; but long before this is learned, in every instance, these unfortunates invent a gesture-language of their own, in
which they think as well as speak. And could we but see the strangely contorted imagery which takes possession of a
gesture-thinker's brain, we should better appreciate the value of words. So, into the mouth of children words are put,
round which thoughts coalesce; but evidences of ideas are discovered some time before they can be fully expressed by
signs or sounds. Kant held the opinion that the mind of a deaf mute is incapable of development, but the wonderful
success of our modern institutions has dissipated forever that idea.

The soul of man is a half-conscious inspiration from which perception and expression are inseparable. Nature speaks to
it in that subtle sympathy by which the immaterial within holds converse with the immaterial without, in the soft
whisperings of the breeze, in the fearful bellowings of the tempest. Between the soul and body there is the closest
sympathy, an interaction in every relation. Therefore these voices of nature speaking to nature's offspring, are answered
back in various ways according to the various organisms addressed. The animal, the intellectual, the spiritual, whatsoever
the entity consists of, responds, and responding expands and unfolds. Once give an animal the power to speak and
mental development ensues; for speech cannot continue without ideas, and ideas cannot spring up without intellectual
evolution. A dim, half-conscious, brutish thought there may be; but the faculty of abstraction, sequences of thought,
without words either spoken or unspoken, cannot exist.

It is not at all probable that a system of gesture-language was ever employed by any primitive
people, prior or in preference to vocal language. To communicate by signs requires no little skill
and implies a degree of artifice and forethought far beyond that required in vocal or emotional

language. Long before a child arrives at the point of intelligence necessary for conveying thought by signs, it is well
advanced in a vocal language of its own.

In mythology, language assumes personality and independence. Often the significance of the word becomes the essential
idea. Zeus, from meaning simply sky, becomes god of the sky; Eos, originally the dawn, is made the goddess of the
opening day. Not the idea but the expression of the idea becomes the deity. And so, by these creations of fancy, the
imagination expands; in the embodiment of the idea, the mind enlarges with its own creation. Then yet bolder metaphors
are thrown off like soap-bubbles, which no sooner take form in words than they are also deified. Thus soul and thought
and speech act and react on one another, all the evolutions of conception seeking vent in sound or speculation; and thus
language, the expression of mind, and mythology, the expression of soul, become the exponents of divine humanity.

But what then is Language, what is Myth, and whence are they? Broadly, the term language may be applied to whatever
social beings employ to communicate passion or sentiment, or to influence one another; whatever is made a vehicle of
intelligence, ideographic or phonetic, is language. In this category may be placed, as we have seen, gestures, both
instinctive and artificial; emotional expression, displayed in form or feature; vocal sounds, such as the cries of birds, the
howling of beasts. Indeed, language is everywhere, in everything. While listening to the rippling brook, the roaring sea,
the murmuring forest, as well as to the still small voice within, we are but reading from the vocabulary of nature.

Thus construed, the principle assumes a variety of shapes, and may be followed through successive stages of
development. In fact, neither form nor feature can be set in motion, or even left in a state of repose, without conveying
intelligence to the observer. The countenance of man, whether it will or not, perpetually speaks, and speaks in most
exquisite shades of significance, and with expression far more delicate than that employed by tongue or pen. The face is
the reflex of the soul; a transparency which glows with light, divine or devilish, thrown upon it from within. It is a portrait
of individual intelligence, a photograph of the inner being, a measure of innate intelligence. And in all pertaining to the
actions and passions of mankind, what can be more expressive than the language of the emotions? There are the soft,
silent wooings of love, the frantic fury of hate, the dancing delirium of joy, the hungry cravings of desire, the settled
melancholy of dead hopes. But more definitely, language is articulate human speech or symbolic expression of ideas.

How man first learned to speak, and whence the power of speech was originally derived, are questions concerning

4

5

6

SCIENCE OF
PHILOLOGY.

VARIATIONS OF
LANGUAGE.

which tradition is uncommunicative. Even mythology, which attempts the solution of supernatural mysteries, the
explanation of all phenomena not otherwise accounted for, has little to say as to the genesis of this most potential of all
human powers.

Many theories have been advanced concerning the origin of language. Some of them are exploded; others in various
stages of modification remain, no two philologists thinking exactly alike. The main hypotheses are three; the subordinate
ones are legion. Obviously, speech must be either a direct, completed gift of the Creator, with one or more independent
beginnings; or a human invention; or an evolution from a natural germ.

Schleicher conceives primordial language to be a simple organism of vocal gestures; Gould Brown believes language to
be partly natural and partly artificial; Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart give to man the creation and development of
speech by his own artificial invention. According to Herodotus, the Phrygians and the Egyptians disputed over the
question of the antiquity of their languages. Psammetichus thereupon confided two babes to the care of goats, apart from
every human sound. At the end of two years they were heard to pronounce the word bekos, the Phrygian for bread. The
Phrygians therefore claimed for their language the seniority.

In ancient times it was thought that there was some one primeval tongue, a central language from
which all the languages of the earth radiated. The Sythic, Ethiopic, Chinese, Greek, Latin, and
other languages advanced claims for this seniority. Plato believed language to be an invention of

the gods, and by them given to man. Orthodox religionists did not hesitate to affirm that Hebrew, the language of
Paradise, was not only given in a perfected state to man, but was miraculously preserved in a state of purity for the
chosen Israel. After the dispersion from Babel, such nations as relapsed into barbarism became barbaric in speech. And
in the roots of every dialect of both the old world and the new, the Fathers were able to discern Hebrew analogies
sufficient to confirm them in their dogma. Indeed other belief was heresy.

There were others who held that, when gesture-language and the language of the emotions were found insufficient for the
growing necessities of man, by common consent, it was agreed that certain objects should be represented by certain
sounds, and that so, when a word had been invented for every object, language was made.

Another doctrine, called by Mr. Wedgwood, its enthusiastic advocate, 'onomatopœia,' and by Professor Max Müller the
'bow-wow' theory, explains the origin of language in the effort of man to imitate the cries of nature. Thus, for dog the
primitive languageless man would say bow-wow; to the rivulet, the wind, the birds and beasts, names were applied
which as far as possible were but reproductions of the sounds made by these elements or animals.

Thus philology up to a comparatively late period was a speculation rather than a science. Philosophers sought to know
whence language came rather than what language is. But when the great discovery concerning the Arian and Semitic
families was made, comparative philologists went to work after the manner of practical investigators in other branches of
study, by collecting, classifying and comparing vocabularies, and therefrom striking out a path backward to original
trunks. Catalogues of languages were published, one in 1800 by Hervas, a Spanish Jesuit, containing three hundred
dialects, followed by Adelung and Vater's Mithridates, from 1806-17. But not until Sanscrit was made a subject of
European study did it become apparent that affinities of tongues are subject to the laws that govern affinities of blood.
Then it was that a similarity was discovered, not only between the Sanscrit and the Greek and Latin tongues, but
between these languages and the Teutonic, Celtic, Iranic, and Indic, all of which became united in the great Arian family.
At the same time, the ancient language of the Jews, the Arabic, and the Aramaic—which constitute the Semitic family—
were found to be totally different from the Arian in their radical structure. From these investigations, philologists were no
less convinced that the Indo-European languages were all of the same stock, than that the Semitic idioms did not belong
to it. The doctrine of the Fathers therefore would not stand; for it was found that all languages were not derivations from
the Hebrew, nor from any other known central tongue.

Then too, the subordination of tongues to the laws of evolution became apparent. It was discovered that language was in
a state of constant change; that, with all its variations, human speech could be grouped into families, and degrees of
relationship ascertained; and that, by the comparison of vocabularies, a classification at once morphological and
genealogical could be made. Varieties of tongues, as numberless as the phases of humanity, could be traced back
towards their beginnings and resolved into earlier forms. It was discovered that in the first order of linguistic
development, words are monosyllabic. In this rudimentary stage, to which the Chinese, Tibetan, and perhaps the
Japanese belong, roots, or sounds expressive only of the material or substantial parts of things, are used. In the second
stage, called the polysynthetic, aggregative, or agglutinate, a modifying termination, significant of the relations of ideas or
things to each other, is affixed or glued to the root. To the agglutinate languages belong the American and Turanian
families. In the third, called the inflectional stage, which comprises only the Arian and Semitic families, the two elements
are more perfectly developed, and it is only in this stage that language can attain the highest degree of richness and
refinement.

While these stages or conditions are recognized by all, it is claimed on one side that although
settled languages retain their grammatical character, every agglutinate language must once have
been monosyllabic, or radical, and every inflectional language once agglutinate; and on the other

side it is averred that the assertion is incapable of proof, for no historical evidence exists of any one type ever having
passed from one of these stages to another. Now if speech is a perfected gift of the Creator, how happens it that we find
language in every stage of development or relapse, from the cluckings of Thlinkeets to the classic lines of Homer and of
Shakspeare? In his physiological structure, so far as is known, Man is neither more nor less perfect now than in the days

7

8

9

UNIVERSALITY OF
SPEECH.

of Adam. How then if language is an organism, is it, unlike other organisms, subject to extreme and sudden change? In
animated nature there are two principles; one fixed and finished as an organism, subject to perpetual birth and decay, but
incapable of advancing or retrograding; the other, elemental life, the germ or centre of a future development. The one
grows, the other unfolds. We have no evidence that instincts and organic functions were more or less perfect in the
beginning than now. If therefore language is an instinct or an organism, a perfect gift of the Creator, how can it exist
otherwise than in a concrete and perfect state like other instincts and organisms?

The absurdity that human speech is the invention of primitive man—that upon some grassy knoll a company of half-clad
barbarians met, and without words invented words, without significant sounds produced sounds significant of every
object, therein by mutual consent originating a language—may be set aside. Of all conjectures concerning the origin of
language, the hypothesis that words are an artificial invention is the least tenable. And what is most surprising to us, at the
present day, is that such men as Locke and Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart could for a moment have entertained the
idea. Obviously, without language there could be no culture, and without culture, words never could have been invented.
Words are the symbols of objects and ideas. Certain words may be arbitrarily selected, and, by the tacit agreement or
general concurrence of society, may be made to signify certain things. And in this sense words may originate
conventionally. But though words may have been conventionally selected, they were never selected by conventions. We
then have the discoveries of modern philologists, not only to positively deny the infallibility of the common-origin theory,
but to bring forward a number of other claimants for the greatest antiquity, as well entitled to a hearing as the Hebrew.

Diversity in the origin of speech does not of necessity imply diversity in the origin of race. Thus
with a unity of race, circumstances may be conceived in which independent tongues may have
arisen in different localities; whereas with a diversity of race, but one language hypothetically may

have been given to all. A common origin is probable, a diversity of origin is possible; neither can be proved or
disproved. The radical differences in the structure of the three great types, the monosyllabic, the agglutinate, and the
inflectional; and the inherent heterogeneities of the several families of the same type, as of the Chinese and Siamese, of
the American and Turanian, or even of the Arian and Semitic, would seem to present insurmountable obstacles to the
theory of a common origin; while on the other hand the wonderful mutations of types and trunks, the known
transformations of language, and the identifications by some philologists, of the same stock in each of the three
progressional stages, render the theory of a unity of origin in language equally probable. Therefore the question of unity
or diversity of tongues, as we speak of unity or diversity of race, can be of but little moment to us. Language shows the
connection between nations widely separated, leads us back beyond tradition into the obscure past, follows the
sinuosities of migrations, indicates epochs in human development, points towards the origin of peoples, serves as a guide
in following the radiation of races from common centres. Yet a similarity in the sound, or even in the construction of two
words, does not necessarily imply relationship. Two totally distinct languages may have borrowed the same word from a
third language; which fact would never establish relationship between the borrowers. When like forms are found in
different languages, in order to establish a relationship, historical evidence must be applied as a test, and the words
followed up to their roots.

Stripped of technicalities, the question before us is reduced to a few simple propositions. All men speak; there never yet
was found a nation without articulate language. Aside from individual and abnormal exceptions, no primitive tribe has
ever been discovered, where part of the people spoke, and part were speechless. Language is as much a part of man, as
any physical constituent; yet unlike physical organs, as the eye, the ear, the hand, language is not born with the individual.
It is not in the blood. The Caucasian infant stolen by Apaches, cannot converse with its own mother when restored to
her a few years after.

Therefore speech is not an independent, perfected gift of the Creator, but an incidental acquirement. Furthermore
language is an attribute of society. It belongs to the people and not to the individual. The child before mentioned, if
dropped by the Apaches among the bears and by them nurtured and reared, is doomed to mutism or bear-language.
Man was made a social being; speech was made as a means of communicating intelligence between social beings; one
individual alone never could originate, or even preserve a language.

But how then happens it, if man did not make it, and God did not give it him, that human speech is universal? With the
organism of man the Creator implants the organs of speech. With the elemental and progressional life of man the Creator
implants the germ of speech. In common with the element of progress and civilization, innate from the beginning, speech
has developed by slow degrees through thousands of cycles and by various stages, marching steadily forward with the
forward march of the intellect. Comparative philology, in common with all other sciences, accords to man a remote
antiquity. Bunsen estimates that at least twenty thousand years are required for a language to pass from one rudimentary
stage to another.

The mind receives impressions and the soul intuitions, and to throw them off in some form is an absolute necessity.
Painful impressions tend to produce bodily contortions and dolorous sounds; pleasant impressions to illumine the features
and to make musical the voice. And not only is this compressed emotion destined to find expression, but to impress itself
upon others. Emotion is essentially sympathetic. Why certain objects are represented by certain sounds we can never
know. Some think that between every word and the object or idea which it represents, there was in the first instance an
intimate relationship. By degrees certain natural articulations became associated with certain ideas; then new names were
suggested by some fancied analogy to objects already named. Everything else being equal, similar conditions and
causations produce similar impressions and are expressed by similar sounds. Hence a certain uniformity between all
human tongues; and a tendency in man to imitate the sounds in nature, the cries of animals, the melodies of winds and

10

11

12

13

MYTHOLOGY.

ALL MYTHS
FOUNDED ON FACT.

waters, accounts for the origin of many words.

From giving expression in some outward form to our inward emotion there is no escape. Let us now apply to the
expression of feeling and emotion the same law of evolution which governs all social and intellectual phenomena, and
from a language of exclamations, we have first the monosyllabic noun and verb, then auxilliaries—adverbs, adjectives,
prepositions and pronouns—and finally inflections of parts of speech by which the finer shades of meaning may be
expressed.

The spontaneous outbursts of feeling, or the metaphorical expressions of emotion, arising instinctively and acting almost
simultaneously with the conception or impression made upon the mind, develop with time into settled forms of speech.
Man speaks as birds fly or fishes swim. The Creator supplies the organs and implants the instinct. Speech, though
intuitive, is more than intuition; for, as we have seen, speech is a social rather than an individual attribute. Darwin
perceives in language not only a spontaneous generation, but a natural selection of grammatical forms; the best words,
the clearest and shortest expressions, continually displacing the weaker. So words are made to fit occasions, and
dropped as soon as better ones can be found.

Languages are not inherited, yet language is an inheritance. Language is not artificially invented, yet languages are but
conventional agreements. Languages are not a concrete perfected gift of the Creator, yet the germ of language is
ineradicably implanted in man, and was there implanted by none but man's Creator. This then is Language: it is an
acquisition, but an acquisition from necessity; it is a gift, but, when given, an undeveloped germ; it is an artifice, in so far
as it is developed by the application of individual agencies.

Here, for a while, we will leave Language and turn to Mythology, the mythos 'fable' and logos
'speech' of the Grecians.

Under analysis mythology is open to broad yet significant interpretations. As made up of legendary accounts of places
and personages, it is history; as relating to the genesis of the gods, the nature and adventures of divinities, it is religion;
placed in the category of science, it is the science of fable; of philosophy, the philosophy of intuitive beliefs. A mass of
fragmentary truth and fiction not open to rationalistic criticism; a system of tradition, genealogical and political,
confounding the subjective with the objective; a partition wall of allegories, built of dead facts cemented with wild fancies
—it looms ever between the immeasurable and the measurable past.

Thick black clouds, portentous of evil, hang threateningly over the savage during his entire life. Genii murmur in the
flowing river, in the rustling branches are felt the breathings of the gods, goblins dance in vapory twilight, and demons
howl in the darkness.

In the myths of wild, untutored man, is displayed that inherent desire to account for the origin of things, which, even at
the present time, commands the profoundest attention of philosophy; and, as we look back upon the absurd conceptions
of our savage ancestry with feelings akin to pity and disgust, so may the speculations of our own times appear to those
who shall come after us. Those weird tales which to us are puerility or poetry, according as we please to regard them,
were to their believers history, science, and religion. Yet this effort, which continues from the beginning to the end, is not
valueless; in it is embodied the soul of human progress. Without mythology, the only door at once to the ideal and inner
life of primitive peoples and to their heroic and historic past would be forever closed to us. Nothing so reflects their
heart-secrets, exposes to our view their springs of action, shadows forth the sources of their hopes and fears, exhibits
the models after which they moulded their lives.

Within crude poetic imagery are enrolled their religious beliefs, are laid the foundations of their systems of worship, are
portrayed their thoughts concerning causations and the destinies of mankind. Under symbolic veils is shrouded their
ancient national spirit, all that can be known of their early history and popular ideas. Thus are explained the fundamental
laws of nature; thus we are told how earth sprang from chaos, how men and beasts and plants were made, how heaven
was peopled, and earth, and what were the relative powers and successive dynasties of the gods. Heroes are made
gods; gods are materialized and brought down to men.

Of the value of mythology it is unnecessary here to speak. Never was there a time in the history
of philosophy when the character, customs, and beliefs of aboriginal man, and everything
appertaining to him, were held in such high esteem by scholars as at present. As the ultimate of

human knowledge is approached, the inquirer is thrown back upon the past; and more and more the fact becomes
apparent, that what is, is but a reproduction of what has been; that in the earlier stages of human development may be
found the counterpart of every phase of modern social life. Higher and more heterogeneous as are our present systems
of politics and philosophy, every principle, when tracked to its beginning, proves to have been evolved, not originated.

As there never yet was found a people without a language, so every nation has its mythology, some popular and
attractive form for preserving historical tradition and presenting ethical maxims; and as by the range of their vocabularies
we may follow men through all the stages of their progress in government, domestic affairs and mechanical arts, so, by
beliefs expressed, we may determine at any given epoch in the history of a race their ideal and intellectual condition.
Without the substance there can be no shadow, without the object there can be no name for it; therefore when we find a
language without a word to denote property or chastity, we may be sure that the wealth and women of the tribe are held
in common; and when in a system of mythology certain important metaphysical or æsthetic ideas and attributes are

13

14

15

16

VALUE OF
MYTHOLOGY.

ORIGIN OF BELIEF.

wanting, it is evident that the intellect of its composers has not yet reached beyond a certain low point of conception.

Moreover, as in things evil may be found a spirit of good, so in fable we find an element of truth. It is now a recognized
principle of philosophy, that no religious belief, however crude, nor any historical tradition, however absurd, can be held
by the majority of a people for any considerable time as true, without having in the beginning some foundation in fact.
More especially is the truth of this principle apparent when we consider that in all the multitudinous beliefs of all ages,
held by peoples savage and civilized, there exist a concurrence of ideas and a coincidence of opinion. Human
conceptions of supernatural affairs spring from like intuitions. As human nature is essentially the same throughout the
world and throughout time, so the religious instincts which form a part of that universal humanity generate and develop in
like manner under like conditions. The desire to penetrate hidden surroundings and the method of attempting it are to a
certain extent common to all. All wonder at the mysterious; all attempt the solution of mysteries; all primarily possess
equal facilities for arriving at correct conclusions. The genesis of belief is uniform, and the results under like conditions
analogous.

We may conclude that the purposes for which these fictitious narratives were so carefully preserved and handed down
to posterity were two-fold—to keep alive certain facts and to inculcate certain doctrines.

Something there must have been in every legend, in every tradition, in every belief, which has
ever been entertained by the majority of a people, to recommend it to the minds of men in the
first instance. Error absolute cannot exist; false doctrine without an amalgam of verity speedily

crumbles, and the more monstrous the falsity the more rapid its decomposition. Myths were the oracles of our savage
ancestors; their creed, the rule of their life, prized by them as men now prize their faith; and, by whatever savage
philosophy these strange conceits were eliminated, their effect upon the popular mind was vital. Anaxagoras, Socrates,
Protagoras, and Epicurus well knew and boldly proclaimed that the gods of the Grecians were disreputable characters,
not the kind of deities to make or govern worlds; yet so deep rooted in the hearts of the people were the maxims of the
past, that for these expressions one heretic was cast in...