THE MULTITUDE AND HEGEMONY ANDY KNOTT A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of ...

326 Pages·2012·1.66 MB·English

by  Knott Andy

THE MULTITUDE AND
HEGEMONY

ANDY KNOTT

A thesis submitted for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy at the
University of Brighton

August 2011
ABSTRACT

This project critically interrogates the conceptualisation of the
multitude in the works of Hardt and Negri. It challenges two of their
central claims. Firstly, their assertion that early modernity is best
understood through the lens of the conceptual battle between
Hobbes and Spinoza, in terms of the people versus the multitude.
Secondly, their contention that the multitude is the primary agent
of radical politics in the twenty-first century.
In terms of early modernity, this project examines the role
the multitude plays in the thought of three republican theorists,
Marsilius of Padua, Machiavelli and Spinoza. These theorists provide
an equivocal account of the multitude, but also develop a coherent
political project. This involves placing articulation – through
consent, communication and the common notions – at the forefront
of a new, mass, participatory and egalitarian politics. These three
theorists do not oppose the people to the multitude, nor sovereignty
to democracy, as Hardt and Negri claim. Rather, they develop a
mobile account of political sovereign power founded on articulation.
Hardt and Negri identify the multitude as the emergent agent
of a contemporary communist politics. This identification is based
on their reading of Spinoza’s conceptualisation of the multitude,
alongside broad historical developments in the second half of the
twentieth century. They again oppose democracy to sovereignty,
and express this opposition through hostility towards traditional
organisational forms of the left, in particular, political parties and
trade unions. Instead, they embrace the network as the appropriate
form of organisation for the multitude.
As in my discussion of the early modern period, this project
argues that contemporary politics cannot be understood through the
sovereignty-democracy dichotomy theorised by Hardt and Negri.
Instead I defend an account of hegemony, which draws on Laclau’s
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conceptualisation of articulation in political struggles. This entails
developing a mobile account of sovereign power, allied to the
development of Gramsci’s account of hegemony. I demonstrate the
conceptual links between Machiavelli’s account of consent and more
recent accounts of hegemony. Machiavelli’s account of consent, in
turn, is indebted to Marsilius’ earlier contribution to this debate, and
serves as a guide for Spinoza’s subsequent development of a new
form of politics based on communication and the common notions.

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CONTENTS

Introduction 1
i. Political subjects, subjectivation and the multitude 5

PART I

I.1 Marsilius of Padua 17
i. Political subjects 19
Marsilius’ use of the term multitude 22
ii. Key features of Marsilus’ politics 29
Historical development 30
The six economic ‘parts’ 33
The rule of law and the ‘legislator humanus’ 35
iii. Consent 39
Enter consent 40
Consent and the state 42
The continual polity 45
iv. Conclusion 47

I.2 Machiavelli 50
i. Moltitudine 53
ii. Machiavelli’s project 65

I.3 Spinoza 87
i. The multitude 90
The multitude in Spinoza’s political texts 93
Other political subjects in Spinoza 98
Jus sive potentia 100
Individualism or relationalism? 103
The multitude and reason 108
ii. Democracy, democratisation 111
Democracy and monarchy 116
‘Situation zero’ and the ‘global situation’ 119
Democracy and sovereignty 122
iii. Communication and the common notions 129
Communication 129
Common notions 133
Commentaries on the common notions 141
iv. Conclusion 143

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PART II

II.1 Multitude, political subjects, subjectivation 148
i. Eras and epochs 151

  ii. Operaismo, autonomia, constituent power 164
Tronti, operaismo, autonomia 164
Constituent power 169
iii. ‘Being-against’: refusal, exodus, desertion, flight 177
iv. Political organisation 179
v. Definitions, comparisons and contrasts 187
vi. Immaterial labour 192
vii. Assemblage 197
viii. The ‘incommunicability’ thesis 201
ix. Democracy and democratisation 205

II.2 The common and hegemony 209
i. The common in Hardt and Negri 213
ii. Gramsci and hegemony 227
iii. The common or hegemony? 238

Conclusion 258

Notes 263

Bibliography 290

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Acknowledgments

This is a collaborative effort that is much richer due to the
contribution of others. The mistakes, however, are all my own
responsibility. I would like to acknowledge the substantive
contributions made by particular people.
Bob Brecher has assisted with clarity and structure of
argument. Tom Hickey has provided rigour, precision and guidance
with material. One of the central arguments of this thesis is that “to
think is to think ever less alone”. This applies most prominently to
Mark Devenney, who has contributed in countless ways, including
conceptual clarity, consistency of argument, and a deep
understanding of, rich insights into, and an enthusiasm for political
philosophy and especially contemporary political theory.
My parents, Ken and Jean, have provided love and support for
too long to mention. Finally, Jane and Elliott have contributed
patience in abundance, love, affection and lightened the load
whenever necessary.

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I declare that the research contained in this thesis, unless otherwise
formally indicated within the text, is the original work of the author.
The thesis has not been previously submitted to this or any other
university for a degree, and does not incorporate any material
already submitted for a degree.

14.8.2011
vii
INTRODUCTION

This project critically interrogates the Hardt and Negri account of
‘the multitude’ in two parts. Part I examines historical accounts of
the multitude, considering the deployment of the term in three early
modern republican theorists, Marsilius of Padua, Niccolò Machiavelli
and Baruch Spinoza. It then turns to the contemporary account of
the multitude provided by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in Part
II.1 The historical examination provides an account of the multitude
that differs from that provided by Hardt and Negri in the early
modern period. I contend that they have misread – or, better still,
engaged in a partial reading of – the role that the multitude plays in
early modern thought. Their reading is inspired by an inversion of
Hobbes’ account of the multitude, rather than a careful reading of
the role the multitude plays in the thought of Spinoza, whose
political thought should be understood as a continuation of Marsilius
and Machiavelli, rather than as a reaction to Hobbes. Their reading,
inspired by an inversion of Hobbes, develops a simplified account of
the multitude in early modern thought. This simplified historical
misreading serves as the foundation for their contemporary political
project. Their project insists that we should not only break with the
key political subjects of modernity – the people and the proletariat
– but also to abandon political subjects tout court. Political subjects,
for Hardt and Negri, are closed, rigid and immobile entities. They
contrast these qualities with the open, plural, inclusive, mobile
characteristics that comprise the multitude. Their multitude, in
other words, is always in excess of itself, and its activity constitutes
an infinite process of political subjectivation. It is this continual
process that Hardt and Negri conceive will initiate a thoroughgoing
political transformation in the ‘time-to-come’.2
The partial reading that Hardt and Negri provide of the
multitude at the outset of modernity centres around a series of
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contrasting choices, which essentially amount to one and the same
choice: Hobbes or Spinoza; transcendence or immanence; the
people or the multitude; sovereignty or democracy. An exploration
of the role of the multitude and other political subjects in Marsilius,
Machiavelli and Spinoza allows us to recognise that Hardt and Negri
provide a partial reading that fits with their contemporary political
intervention.
More importantly, what emerges from an examination of
these three theorists’ political thought is a common concern with
how to forward a republican politics. This is where the second term
of the title of this project enters. This second term is hegemony.
Hegemony is not a term that features in the language of any of
these three theorists. Yet, key phrases emerge that are pivotal to
their thought, and can be understood as a precursor to, or
anticipation of, the concept of hegemony. These key phrases are
consent in Marsilius, the contrast between consent and force in
Machiavelli, and communication and the common notions in
Spinoza. Hegemony is most closely associated with Antonio
Gramsci. This theory will be briefly introduced later in this chapter,
and expanded on in II.2.
The history of ‘the multitude’ predates the early modern
period, yet it has received scant attention in commentaries. This
project represents a step towards addressing this lack. The long
history of the multitude can be traced back as far as ancient Egypt;
it also features in classical Greek texts – Aristotle deployed the
term, for example;3 it appears regularly in the bible. The focus of
this project is on two periods: the transitional period between the
medieval era and modernity; and the contemporary one. Within
modernity, however, the multitude disappears from view – despite
occasional vivid cameos, such as the “swinish multitude” of Edmund
Burke4 – as the dominant political subjects of this period (the
individual, the people and the proletariat) garnered increasing
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attention. It is only in the contemporary era – or what in Empire,
Hardt and Negri refer to as postmodernity – that the multitude
returns to political discourses.
How, then, are we to understand the multitude? The four
theorists under consideration – Marsilius, Machiavelli, Spinoza and
the collaboration of Hardt and Negri – provide markedly different
accounts. While Hardt and Negri are contemporary theorists, the
first three provide accounts of politics in early modernity. A brief
summary of these three theorists’ view of the multitude is as
follows. Marsilius is a clear advocate of the multitude. Machiavelli
envisions only a limited and occasional role for the multitude, and is
an advocate of the people. Spinoza is a qualified advocate of the
multitude, but not a celebrant as Hardt and Negri present him. All
three, however, present an account of politics in which articulation
– considered broadly – is central. Marsilius achieves this through
the concept of consent, Machiavelli through the force-consent
couplet, and Spinoza through the common notions and his
philosophy of communication.
Linked in to both articulation and hegemony is the account of
sovereignty that emerges from these three early modern republican
theorists. I have termed this account a mobile account of sovereign
power. This has been formulated to avoid and move beyond the
problematic presentation of sovereignty provided by Hardt and
Negri, which contrasts democracy with sovereignty (a contrast
which operates in a similar manner to a number of others in their
theory, including immanence-transcendence, multitude-people and
Hobbes-Spinoza). The mobile account of sovereign power that
features in Marsilius, Machiavelli and Spinoza is an alternative
account to the fixed account of sovereignty that Hobbes develops in
the seventeenth century. It also differs from the vehement
opposition to sovereignty that is characteristic of Hardt and Negri,
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