The Mu¯la¯vidya¯ Controversy Among Advaita Veda¯ntins - Inria

29 Pages·2008·0.39 MB·English

JIndianPhilos
DOI10.1007/s10781-008-9053-9
The Mu¯la¯vidya¯ Controversy Among Advaita Veda¯ntins:
was S´an_kara Himself Responsible?
S. K. Arun Murthi
(cid:1)SpringerScience+BusinessMediaB.V.2008
Abstract The concept of avidya¯ or ignorance is central to the Advaita Veda¯ntic
position of S´an_kara. The post-S´an_kara Advaitins wrote sub-commentaries on the
original texts of S´an_kara with the intention of strengthening his views. Over the
passage of time the views of these sub-commentators of S´an_kara came to be re-
garded as representing the doctrine of Advaita particularly with regard to the
concept of avidya¯. Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, a scholar-monk of Hole-
narsipur, challenged the accepted tradition through the publication of his work
Mu¯la¯vidya¯nira¯sah:, particularly with regard to the avidya¯ doctrine. It was his
contention that the post-S´an_kara commentators brought their own innovations
particularly on the nature of avidya¯. This was the idea of mu¯la¯vidya¯ or ‘root
ignorance’, a positive entity which is the material cause of the phenomenal world.
Saraswati argues that such an idea of mu¯la¯vidya¯ is not to be found in the bha¯s:yas
(commentaries)ofS´an_karaandisfoisteduponS´an_kara.Thispaperattemptstoshow
thatalthoughS´an_karamaynothaveexplicitlyfavouredsuchaviewofmu¯la¯vidya¯,
his lack of clarity on the nature of avidya¯ left enough scope for the post-S´an_kara
commentators to take such a position on avidya¯.
Keywords Adhya¯sa (cid:1) Advaita (cid:1) Avidya¯ (cid:1) Ignorance (cid:1) Mu¯la¯vidya¯ (cid:1) Veda¯nta
Introduction
The concept of ignorance, known as avidya¯, is central to the position of Advaita
Veda¯nta.S´an_karagivesanexpositionaboutthenatureofavidya¯ inhisintroduction
S.K.A.Murthi(&)
SchoolofHumanities,NationalInstituteofAdvancedStudies,
IndianInstituteofScienceCampus,Bangalore
560012,India
e-mail:[email protected];[email protected]
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S.K.A.Murthi
to the Brahmasu¯tras—the introductory section of his Brahmasu¯trabha¯s:ya is
traditionally known as Adhya¯sa-bha¯s:ya.1 The bha¯s:ya (commentary) of S´an_kara
was further commented upon by the Advaita scholars with the intention of
strengthening the viewpoints of Advaita, particularly on the doctrine of avidya¯.
These post-S´an_kara commentators were known as vya¯khya¯nka¯ras. Swami Satch-
idanandendra Saraswati (hereafter SS) in the 1930s and forties introduced certain
ideas challenging the then prevailing tradition, which turned into a controversy,
leadingtoadebateamongAdvaitaVeda¯ntinsregardingthenatureoftheconceptof
avidya¯.2 Michael Comans referring to the importance of this debate remarks, ‘‘In
fact, if there has been a debate internal to the s´a¯n_kara tradition of Advaita over
the last 50 years, it is the dispute between the protagonists of the views of
Sacchida¯nandendra and those who would defend the standard position’’ (2000;
p. 249). This dispute was regarding the idea of ‘‘root ignorance’’ (mu¯la¯vidya¯) as a
substantive(bha¯varu¯pa),indescribable(anirvacan¯ıya)matterenvelopingBrahman
andbeinganobstructionfortherealizationofBrahman.MarthaDohertyhasgivena
lucidexpositionofthismu¯la¯vidya¯ debatewheresheemphasizesthesignificanceof
avidya¯ to the Advaita position.
Theconceptofavidya¯iscrucialtotheAdvaitaposition,forwithoutit,thereisno
non-duality (advaita). The perceived duality is sublated as a reality by the
knowledgeofanunderlyingnon-dualreality.Understandingthedualityasrealis
anerror,whichisafunctionofignorance(avidya¯)ofthenon-dualreality(2005;
p.210).
Further, reviewing the post-S´an_kara commentators’ interpretation of avidya¯, she
shows that they attributed a causal role to avidya¯, which functions as a material
cause in concealing the true nature of Brahman. This is referred to as the ‘‘root
ignorance’’ (mu¯la¯vidya¯) ‘‘in keeping with its causal status’’ (ibid, pp. 213–214).
Theconceptofavidya¯ is alsoequated withma¯ya¯.Itisconsideredtohaveapower
((cid:1)sakti).ItwasSS’scontentionthatsuchanideaofavidya¯ wasalientotheoriginal
S´an_kara commentaries and was foisted on S´an_kara by the later vya¯khya¯nka¯ras.
According to him there was not even an implication of mu¯la¯vidya¯ in the original
commentaries of S´an_kara. He holds the post-S´an_kara commentators, beginning
with the author of Pan˜capa¯dika¯ (supposed to be written by Padmapa¯da) and the
sub-commentator of this work Praka¯s´a¯tman (who wrote the sub-commentary
Vivaran:a) and his protagonists, known as vivaran:aka¯ras, responsible for this
misconstrual of S´an_kara.
1TraditionconsidersBrahmasu¯tratobeoneofthetriplecanonicaltextsofVeda¯ntaphilosophyapart
fromtheUpanis:adsandtheBhagavadg¯ıta¯.S´an_karahaswrittencommentariesonallthesetexts.However
itshouldbenotedthathenevercallsthesu¯trasofBa¯da¯ra¯yanaconstitutingthetextasBrahmasu¯tra.He
callsthemasS(cid:1)a¯r¯ırakaM¯ıma¯m: saorVeda¯ntaM¯ıma¯m:sa.
2Hepublishedin1929aSanskrittextMu¯la¯vidya¯nira¯sah: inwhichheopposedthisideaofmu¯la¯vidya¯
foisted on the S´an_kara’s texts by later commentators. Subsequently he published another book titled
S(cid:1)an_karaSiddha¯ntainKannadain1940.Intheprefacetothelatterworkhewritesthathehaspresented
therethemostimportantpointsoftheSanskrittreatiseMu¯la¯vidya¯nira¯sah:.D.B.Gangollihasrendereda
free English translation of S(cid:1)an_kara Siddha¯nta, which was published in 1996 by Adhyatma Prakasha
Karyalaya.Itisthistranslationthathasbeenconsultedforthepresentpaper.Pagenumberreferencesto
thisworkofSSaretothistranslatedworkandareindicatedas(1940,Tr.Gangolli).
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TheMu¯la¯vidya¯ Controversy
Suchacharacterizationofavidya¯ thatisnottobefoundinS´an_karabha¯s:yas,SS
contends, is duetothe total neglect byS´an_kara scholarsofa certain method which
S´an_karaadoptedinhisexegesis.Thisisthemethodofadhya¯ropaapava¯danya¯ya
(methodofdeliberatesuperimpositionandsubsequentrescission/abrogation).Inhis
magnum opus Veda¯nta-prakriya¯-pratyabhijn˜a¯, where he describes the nature of
this method in detail, he writes,
Brahman or the absolute Reality ever remains the same, unaffected by the
superimposition of avidya¯ or its removal. It is for this reason that the s´ruti
utilizes different devices suited to remove particular impositions and this
accounts not only for the special instances of the ‘Adhya¯ropa-apava¯da’
method… (1964; pp. 54–55)
Avidya¯ andma¯ya¯ arethespecialinstanceorapplicationofthemethodasheseesit
(1971; pp. 41–48). Referring to these terms he says,
These terms are used in Vedanta for the particular kind of wrong knowledge
and the objective phenomena respectively, only as a device to introduce the
reader (by means of Adhya¯ro¯pa¯pva¯da) to the transcendental entity or the
Witnessing principle called Atman, and not for formulating theories which
the system undertakes to defend (ibid, p. 45).
SS lays great emphasis on this method. Understanding this method, for him,
constitutes the cornerstone of the teaching and unfoldment of Veda¯ntic vision.
Commenting on how SS was influenced in this regard, Doherty writes, ‘‘The pre-
occupation with methodology and the narrow insistence on one defining method
was a significant part of the legacy that Satchidanandendra inherited from these
authors’’ (2005; p. 231). What is this method of exegesis that is special to S´an_kara
Veda¯ntaandwhyisthismethodadopted?Theverynatureandtopictobedealtwith
by Veda¯nta necessitates, so it is argued, the adoption of such a method.
SS shows that S´an_kara has made explicit reference to such a method in his
Bhagavadg¯ıta¯bha¯s:ya as follows:
This in accordance with the knowers of the traditional method who say: that
which is devoid of specific features is to be explained by the method of
deliberate superimposition and rescission.3
Thepeculiarityofthismethodconsistsinadoptingatwo-standpointapproachforthe
exposition of Brahman. The two standpoints are the empirical or the transactional
standpoint(lokad:rs::tiorvyavaha¯rad:rs::ti)andthetranscendentalorthe‘‘reallyreal’’
standpoint(parama¯rthad:rs::tior(cid:1)sa¯strad:rs::ti).Thenotionoftwostandpointsisvery
centraltothismethod.Inhisexposition,S´an_karaconvenientlyshiftsfromoneposition
totheotherinthesameoccasionanditsometimesbecomesverydifficulttomakeout
3In the Bhagavadg¯ıta¯bha¯s:ya passage on sloka XIII.13, S´an_kara says: tatha¯ hi sam: prada¯yavida¯m:
vacanam:-‘adhya¯ropa¯pava¯da¯bhya¯m: nis:prapan˜ca prapan˜cyate’ (Panoli 1990; p. 169). I have one
commenttomakehere.Adhya¯ropaapava¯daisamethodologicalprinciple.Brahmasu¯trasknownasthe
nya¯yaprastha¯naisthetextwhichexpoundstheprinciplesofVeda¯nticexegesisandmethods.Soitwould
havebeenmoreappropriateforS´an_karatomakeareferencetosuchamethodinthistext.Itissurprising
thatS´an_karahasnotmadeanymentiontosuchamethodinhisBrahmasu¯trabha¯s:ya.
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S.K.A.Murthi
which point of view is being adopted. I will critically take up for discussion this
methodofadhya¯ropaapava¯dalater.
ThecontroversyamongtheS´an_karascholarsontheissueofmu¯la¯vidya¯continued
and a symposium was organized (Veda¯ntavidvadgos::th¯ı)4 to debate and settle the
issue. No settlement was reached as each side (those who favoured the view that
mu¯la¯vidya¯ wasinherentinS´an_kara’sexpositionwereknownasmu¯la¯vidya¯va¯dins)
debated fiercely giving their own arguments and textual citations for or against the
view.Itisnotmyintentionheretoreopenthisdebateonmu¯la¯vidya¯andtakesidesin
thiscontroversy.5Myobjectiveinthispaperistousethiscontroversyasafoiltoraise
certain critical philosophical issues that are problematic for S´an_kara Veda¯nta. The
problematicalissuesthatconcernmeareparticularlywithreferencetothemethodof
adhya¯ropa apava¯da and the two-standpoint approach. It is the contention of this
paperthatthereisnotmuchinthemethodthataffordsclaritytotheconceptofavidya¯
asclaimedbySS.Insteadthegapsintheunderstandingofavidya¯ remain.
Ra¯ma¯nuja¯ca¯ryaalsorecognizedthatavidya¯ wasthecentraltenetoftheAdvaitic
thought of S´an_kara and noted the deep philosophical problems inherent in the
avidya¯ doctrine. He therefore treats this as the fundamental thesis of the opponent
(maha¯pu¯rvapaks:ha) in the beginning of his S(cid:1)r¯ı-bha¯s:ya (Grimes 1990; p. 21).6
Thoughitisalsomyattemptinthispapertoshowthephilosophicalweaknessofthe
avidya¯ doctrine,Igoonestepfurther,specifically,toshowhowthisweaknessledto
thepostulationofmu¯la¯vidya¯ ofpost-S´an_karacommentators.Moreoverthereisone
more point of difference between Ra¯ma¯nuja’s criticism of the avidya¯ doctrine of
AdvaitaVeda¯nticthoughtandmycriticism.Ra¯ma¯nujabaseshiscritiquemainlyon
the post-S´an_kara commentators’ enunciation and defense of avidya¯ doctrine and
assumes these tobe the correct representationof the avidya¯ doctrine of Advaita. It
can be argued by SS and his followers that Ra¯ma¯nuja’s criticism is not a direct
critiqueofS´an_kara’sdoctrinebecausethesepost-S´an_karacommentators,according
to them, did not represent correctly the stance of S´an_kara, particularly with regard
to the avidya¯ doctrine. They can, therefore, contend that it is these post-S´an_kara
commentators’viewthatwascriticizedbyRa¯ma¯nujaandthatS´an_karastillremains
4SwamiSatchidanandendraSaraswatiissuedanappeal(Vijn˜apti)toallscholarsin1961andcalledfora
debateonthisissue.DohertyreferstothisVijn˜apti(2005;p.212,fn.9)andgivesthenamesofscholarsfor
andagainsttheviewsofSS(ibid,p.213,fn.10)inthatdebate.She,inthesamepaper,makesareferenceto
anotherdebateinitiatedbyS:rnger¯ıS´a¯rada¯P¯ı:thain1976tosettletheissueofmu¯la¯vidya¯(p.223).Itisclear
fromDohertythatSringeriP¯ı:thawasagainsttheviewsofSSonmu¯la¯vidya¯.ButD.B.Gangoliwhomshe
alsocitesinsomeothercontextinthesamepapermentionsthattheS:rnger¯ıJagadguruhadvisitedSSandgot
clarifiedSS’sviewandwasfullysatisfiedwithit(1997;p.30).Thenwhatwastheneedfororganizinga
debatebyS:rnger¯ıP¯ı:thaafterthepassingawayofSS?Itappearsthereissomeapparentcontradictionhere.
5Thisdebatecontinuestilldateonalowkeyinprivatecirclesandonlyrestrictedtoscholarsofolder
generationwithinthestateofKarnataka(erstwhileMysorestate).ThemainfollowersofthisviewofSS
wereVeda¯ntas´iroman:iS.VittalaSastri,VedaBrahmaSriH.S.Laksminarasimhamurthy,SriDevarao
KulkarniandD.B.Gangolli.Howeverhisfollowersdidnotseriouslypursuewithvigouronthisissue
though they were committed to such a view. When the author of this paper in his personal talk with
Laxminarasimhamurthyhad raised the issue of mu¯la¯vidya¯, hesaid thatthe fightwhich ensued in the
debatebetweenthe twosides was sobitterthathe doesnotwantto rake upthe issueanymore. The
monasticinstitutionslikeSringeri,consideredtobethecentreofAdvaiticlearningusealltheirpowerand
influencetosuppresssuchintellectualdebates.
6S(cid:1)r¯ı-bha¯s:yaisRa¯ma¯nuja¯ca¯rya’scommentaryonBrahmasu¯tragivingtheVis´his::ta¯dvaita’sviewpoint.
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immune to these criticisms.7 In contrast here, I take SS’s own interpretation of
S´an_kara and then provide my own argument to show that such an interpretation is
also not philosophically tenable (See footnote 16).
Since it is the contention of SS that the lack of understanding of the method
of adhya¯ropa apava¯da, based on its central doctrine of two standpoints, was
responsible for this idea of mu¯la¯vidya¯ it becomes imperative to first examine this
methodcriticallyandseeifitreallystandsupasamethod.Inmycriticalestimateof
this method I show that it does not. If it does not then the above contention of SS
regardingmu¯la¯vidya¯ doesnotholdwater.Ithentakeupfordiscussionthenatureof
avidya¯ as expounded by S´an_kara and how it led to the postulation of avidya¯. In
keepingwiththeabovestructureofmypresentationtheproblem,Itherefore,divide
the paper into two parts as follows:8
(I) I begin part I with the origin and nature of mu¯la¯vidya¯ and then give a brief
sketch of the traditional method of teaching adopted by S´an_kara as spelt out
by SS. I provide a summary of this method as, according to SS, an under-
standing of this method is important for the delineation of the avidya¯-ma¯ya¯
conceptandtheintroductionofthiscompletelymistakenideaofmu¯la¯vidya¯,
contradictory to S´an_kara, could have been avoided by this understanding.
(II) InpartIIIproceedtogivemycriticalestimateofsuchamethodandthenshow
itsfutilityfor Veda¯nticexegesis anditsirrelevance forthe delineationof the
avidya¯-ma¯ya¯ concept. I then show that S´an_kara had left some gaps in the
understandingofavidya¯ thatledthepost-S´an_karacommentatorstopostulate
thismu¯la¯vidya¯.Inotherwordsmymainargumentinthispaperis:Ifitisthe
contentionofSS thatthe idea ofmu¯la¯vidya¯ is somethingthatthe later com-
mentatorsfoistedonhisdoctrinethenIwouldliketosuggestthatS´an_karawas
himselfresponsibleforthisduetohislackofclarityonthenatureofavidya¯.
My critique of S´an_kara’s exposition of avidya¯, particularly its philosophical
aspects, appears in the second part. However, this critique would not be effective
without critically engaging with certain issues regarding the method of S´an_kara
Veda¯ntainthefirstplace.ThereforeIbeginthesecondpartwithmycritiqueofthe
7AsuggestiontothateffecthasbeenmadebyDevaraoKulkarnibutwithreferencetoDvaita-Veda¯ntins.
He opines that if mu¯la¯vidya¯ is admitted within S´an_kara Veda¯nta then ‘‘the defects raised by Dvaita-
Vedantinsareimpossibletoberefuted’’(1989;pp.67–68).Accordingtohim,‘‘thesedefectswillnot
effect(sic)theAdhyasavadaofShankara…’’(ibid,p.68).Asimilarbutanindirectsuggestionhasbeen
made by Vittala Sastri where he avers that mu¯la¯vidya¯ ‘‘if admitted as part of the Adwaitic doctrine,
reducesitintoaformofDwaitaphilosophy’’(1980;p.36).Hefurtherremarks,‘‘Itmaybenotedherethat
itisonthescoreofthistheoryofOriginalmatterorMayathattheAdwaiticdoctrinehashadtosuffer
severalonslaughtsinthehandsofitscritics.Perhaps,itmaynotbeanexaggerationtosaythat,thiskind
ofinterpretationhasoccasionedthebirthoftheschoolsofVisistadwaita…andDwaita...’’(ibid;p.36).
K.B. Ramakrishna Rao voices certain strong doubts held by SS with regard to the consequences of
holding to the idea of mu¯la¯vidya¯ in his (Rao’s) introduction to Vittala Sastri’s Mu¯la¯vidya-bha¯s:ya-
va¯rttika-viruddha¯ (a Kannada publication) that ‘‘the twisted sub-commentaries were responsible to a
great extent to give rise to other systems of Veda¯ntic schools like Ramanuja’s Vis´his::ta¯dvaita and
Madhva¯ca¯rya’sDvaita’’(Sastri1975;p.10).
8I am extremely grateful to the anonymous referees for suggesting this structure that affords a more
rigorous link between the two parts and also clearly opens up the problem of avidya¯ in Advaita
Veda¯nta—thethemeofthispaper.
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S.K.A.Murthi
method.IfIcanshowthatthereisnothingmuchthatthismethodofVeda¯ntaoffers
thenmycriticalargumentsregardingtheproblemsinherentintheconceptofavidya¯
in S´an_kara’s exposition are placed on firm grounds.
Part I
Idea of M(cid:2)ul(cid:2)avidy(cid:2)a: Genesis and Nature9
Theideaofmu¯la¯vidya¯ orrootignorance,anindescribablesubtlematterenveloping
the Bra¯hmic nature, is not be found in S´an_kara. SS firmly holds the view that
S´an_kara’selucidationofavidya¯ inhisbha¯s:yashasbeencompletelymisinterpreted
and a totally distorted picture of avidya¯ doctrine is presented by the post-S´an_kara
commentators. The controversy of mu¯la¯vidya¯ hinges around the fact that post-
S´an_kara commentators equated ma¯ya¯ with avidya¯. He holds Pan˜capa¯dika¯ as the
earliest :tika (gloss), which sowed the seeds of this distortion, and he cites the
Pan˜capa¯dika¯ toshowhowcertainwordsweredistortedbythesub-commentator.10
The compound word mithya¯jn˜a¯na is resolved into the words mithya¯ and
ajn˜a¯na.Bytheword‘mithya¯’ismeantanirvacan¯ıya(undefinable)andajn˜a¯na
means the inert potentiality of avidya¯ as opposed to jn˜a¯na or consciousness.
Adhya¯sahas thisavidya¯-(cid:1)sakti(powerofavidya¯)foritsnimitta(cause),i.e.,
upa¯da¯naormaterialcause.11
He says ‘‘S´an_kara alone, clearly defined the undifferentiated seed of differentiated
names and forms of the universe as Ma¯ya¯ or Prak:rti…It is a tragic travesty of
S´an_kara’steaching, introduced bythe earliest sub-commentatoronS´an_kara’sSu¯tra
9Dohertyhasmadeaclearandcompactpresentationofthesourcesoftheideaofmu¯la¯vidya¯inherpaper
(2005;pp.213–218).Imakeaverybriefreferencetothegenesisinthecontextofourmainarguments.
10Pan˜capa¯dika¯ istheprincipalsub-commentaryofS´an_kara’sBrahmasu¯trabha¯s:yaandconsideredby
thescholarsasa:tikaorgloss.RamachandraRaoopinesthatonecancharacterizethisworkasava¯rttika
asitsatisfiesthefollowingdescriptiongiventoava¯rttika-
ukta¯nuktadurukta¯na¯m: cinta¯ yatrapravartate|
tam: grantham: va¯rttikam: pra¯huh: va¯rttikajn˜aman¯ıs:in:ah: ||
i.e.itmakesclearwhatissaidandleftunsaidorimperfectlysaidintheearlierworklikebha¯s:yasand
makesitperfectbysupplyingtheomissionsoftheoriginalwork.AccordingtohimPan˜capa¯dika¯ ‘‘not
onlyexplainswhatS´an_karahasexplicitlymentioned,butelaboratesonwhatthegreatteacher merely
suggested; and it introduces several new ideas and arguments not found in the work on which it is a
gloss’’(1978;p.20).SSalsoholdsasimilaropinioninthisregardandconcursthattheworkcanbecalled
ava¯rttikainhisKannadapublication(1998;p.57).
Pan˜capa¯dika¯ is believed to be written by Padmapa¯da, one of the direct disciples of S´an_kara. SS
contends(1940,Tr.Gangolli;p.8)thatsuchabeliefisgatheredfromtextslikeMa¯dhav¯ıyaS(cid:1)an_kara
Vijaya and that there is no evidence in the Pan˜capa¯dika¯ text itself to attribute the authorship to
Padmapa¯da.AnEnglishtranslationofthisworkwaspublishedbytheOrientalInstitute,Barodaunderthe
general editorship of B. Bhattacharyya of Gaekwad Oriental Series. Bhattacharyya in his foreword
attributes a second work by the name a¯tmabodha Vya¯khya¯na to Padmapa¯da (Venkataramiah 1948;
p.ix).However,SScontendsthatthelatterworkwasnotmuchwidelyknownorpublished(1966;p.8).
11mithya¯jn˜a¯nanimittaiti|mithya¯catadjn˜a¯nam: camithya¯jn˜a¯nam: |mithya¯itianirvacan¯ıyata¯ucyate|
ajn˜a¯namiticajada¯tmikaavidya¯(cid:1)saktih: jn˜a¯naparyuda¯senocyate|tannimittah: tadupa¯da¯naityarthah: ||
(SS1966;p.19).
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Bha¯shya, who makes avidya¯ and ma¯ya¯ identical…’’ (1974; pp. 73–74) and cites
from Pan˜capa¯dika¯ to show how avidya¯ and ma¯ya¯ is confounded.12 The passage
gives a description of avidya¯ which is considered to be synonymous with ma¯ya¯,
prak:rti, agrahan:a, avyakta etc. It covers the Brahman transforming it into j¯ıva
(1974; pp. 73–74).
There are two sub-schools of S´an_kara Veda¯nta; Vivaran:a prastha¯na and
Bha¯mat¯ı prastha¯na.13 SS opines that it is the Vivaran:a prastha¯na that gives in
detail the‘theory ofmu¯la¯vidya¯’(1940, Tr.Gangolli;p.9).Itis thevivaran:aka¯ras
who have stated that mu¯la¯vidya¯ is the upa¯da¯na ka¯ran:a (material cause) of adh-
aysa¯.14 In the analysis of the nature and concept of avidya¯ these post-S´an_kara
commentators bring their own innovations. SS draws upon the Pan˜capa¯dika¯,
Vivaran:a, Bha¯mat¯ı and its sub-commentary Kalpataru, and presents the essential
nature of avidya¯ according to each of the prastha¯nas that can be summarized as
follows (1940, Tr. Gangolli; pp. 11–22):
Avidya¯ according to Vivaran:a:
(a ) Avidya¯ is beginningless (ana¯di), existing in the Brahman and is indefinable
1
or indescribable (anirvacan¯ıya) as either reality (sat) or unreality (asat).
(b1) It is also termed as avya¯k:rta (unmanifest), ma¯ya¯, prak:rti, na¯maru¯pa etc.,
which covers the essential nature of Brahman orself.It is the material cause
of the appearance of the world.
(c ) Avidya¯ doesnotsignifyanabha¯va(non-substantive)butisajn˜a¯nawhich is
1
opposite(virodha)ofknowledge.Inotherwords,asDohertyputsit,thenan˜
does not indicate abha¯va¯rthe but only virodha¯rthe. It is of a substantive
nature.
12‘‘yeyam: (cid:1)srutism:rt¯ıtiha¯spuran:es:u ‘na¯maru¯pam:’ avaa¯k:rtam: , ‘avidya¯’, ‘ma¯ya¯’, ‘prak:rti’, ‘ag-
rahan:am: ’,‘avyaktam’,‘tamah:’,‘ka¯ranam: ’,‘layah:’,‘(cid:1)saktih:’,‘maha¯suptih:’,‘nidra’,‘aks:aram: ’,‘a¯ka¯
(cid:1)sam: ’-iticatatratatrabahudhag¯ıyatecaitanyasyasvataeva¯sthitalaks:an:abrahmasvaru¯pta¯vabha¯sam:
pratibadhya j¯ıvatva¯pa¯dika vidya¯karmpu¯rvapu¯rvaprajn˜a¯sam: ska¯rcitrabhittih:, su:supte praka¯
(cid:1)sa¯ccha¯danaviks:epasam:ska¯rama¯traru¯pasthitih: ana¯dirvidya¯…’’(SS1966;pp.47–48).
13The Vivaran:a school of thought, according to scholars, is said to begin from the Pan˜capa¯dika¯ of
Padmapa¯da. Some of the major texts that follow this school are (i) Pan˜capa¯dika¯ Vivaran:a byPraka¯
S(cid:1)a¯tman(ii)Tattvad¯ıpana,acommentaryonPan˜capa¯dika¯ Vivaran:a,byAkhan:da¯nanda(iii)Vivaran:a
PrameyaSan:grahabyVidya¯ran:ya.SomeofthemajortextsoftheBha¯mat¯ıschoolbeginningwiththe
Bha¯mat¯ıofVa¯caspatimis´hraare(i)KalpatarubyAmala¯nanda(ii)ParimalabyAppayyaD¯ıks:ita.
14Doherty (2005) traces the idea of causal nature of avidya¯ to Mandanamis´ra’s Brahmasiddhi. She
opinesthatthetermmu¯la¯vidya¯ wasintroducedbyVa¯caspatimis´hraofBha¯mat¯ıPrasthana.Itappears
thatthereisslightdifferenceherewithSS,ashementionsclearlyattwoplacesinhis(1940,Tr.Gangolli;
pp.10,18)thattheBha¯mat¯ıka¯radoesnotacceptmu¯la¯vidya¯ explicitly.Thoughthereisnomentionof
mu¯la¯vidya¯ inBha¯mat¯ı,SSmaintainsthataccordingtoAmalananda,thecommentatorofKalpataru—a
sub-commentary on Bha¯mat¯ı—the Bha¯mat¯ıka¯ra has accepted the mu¯la¯vidya¯ doctrine. Ramachandra
RaoalsonotesthatMandanamis´ramentionsofaview‘‘holdingnescienceasthematerialcause…buthe
does notsubscribeto it’’ and‘‘it is undoubtedly Padmapa¯da thatwas responsiblefor the phenomeno-
logicallyvalidconceptionthatnesciencewasbothpositiveandconstructive(bha¯va-ru¯pa).TheVivaran:a
schooldevelopedthisconceptionandunraveleditsimplications’’(1978;p.21).WhenIsummarizethe
natureofavidya¯bythesetwomajorschoolsitwillbeshownthatmu¯la¯vidya¯,inasense,wasacceptedby
Va¯caspatimis´hra.
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S.K.A.Murthi
(d1) Another significant feature of this school is that the Vivaran:a invokes valid
means of knowledge to establish this bha¯varu¯pa avidya¯.
Avidya¯ according to Bha¯mat¯ı:
(a ) Itlocatestheanirvacan¯ıyaavidya¯ inthej¯ıva(soul)andtalksoftwoavidya¯s;
2
the ka¯ran:a¯vidya¯ (causal ignorance) and the ka¯rya¯vidya¯ (effect ignorance
like misconception or wrong knowledge). The non comprehension is the
Ka¯ran:a¯vidya¯ which is ana¯di.
(b2) This avidya¯ is the cause of sam: sa¯ra (transmigratory existence).
(c ) At the time of pralaya (dissolution of the world) there is a subtle potency
2
resting in the ka¯ran:a¯vidya¯. It is in this sense one can say that Bha¯mat¯ı
accepts the notion of bha¯varu¯pa avidya¯, though mu¯la¯vidya¯ has not been
explicitly acknowledged.
(d ) Though Bha¯mat¯ı does not invoke the valid means of knowledge to
2
establish this bha¯varu¯pa avidya¯, its sub-commentary Kalpataru follows
Vivaran:a in this regard.
Comans makes an interesting remark about such characteristics of avidya¯, which
the later commentators had developed. Summarizing Hacker’s thought he endorses
hisviewthatthepost-S´an_karaAdvaitinsdoawaywiththeconceptofna¯maru¯pabut
thecapacitiesofna¯maru¯paintheformof(cid:1)saktiisnowattributedtoavidya¯.‘‘Thus
avidya¯ is said to be the material cause (upa¯da¯na) and indeterminable (anirva-
can¯ıya)…’’ (2000; p. 248). SS strongly maintains that the above characteristics of
avidya¯ werethatofthepost-S´an_karacommentatorsandnotthatofS´an_karahimself.
These characteristics of avidya¯, over a period of time, have been absorbed by the
tradition.ItisthistraditionthathascometorepresenttherealpositionofAdvaitato
whichSSstronglyobjects.15SSholdsthatthepost-S´an_karacommentatorslostsight
ofthemethodofadhya¯ropaapava¯danya¯yaandthereforetheirapproachtoavidya¯
ledthemtotheideaofmu¯la¯vidya¯.Inowturntogiveabriefsketchofthismethod,
which I will take up for critical review in the next part.
Tradition of S´an_kara Veda¯nta and its Method of Teaching16
The Nature of Avidya¯, Vidya¯ and the Two-Standpoint view
S´an_kara in his introduction to Brahmasu¯trabha¯s:ya starts with this concept of
avidya¯.ItisimportanttorealizeherethatS´an_karatriestoshowtheessentialnature
15Grimesalsomentionsthesixaspectsofavidya¯,whataccordingtohim,atypicalAdvaitatradition
holdsthatismoreakintowhattheseprastha¯nashold.Theyareasfollows(1)itisbeginningless(ana¯di)
(2)itcanbeterminatedbyknowledge(jn˜a¯na-nivartya)(3)itisapositiveentity(4)itsontologicalstatus
isneitherrealnorunreal(anirvacan¯ıya)(5)ithastwopowersofconcealmentandprojection(6)itslocus
iseitherBrahmanorj¯ıva(1990;p.21).
16ForthissectionIhaveconsultedSS’sEssaysonVedanta(1971)andVeda¯nta-Prakriya¯-Pratyabhijn˜a¯
(1964).Formoredetailsofthismethodthereaderscanconsulttheseworks.ItisSS’scontentionthat
S´an_kara’smethodology(prakriya¯)hasnotbeenunderstoodandthathasgivenrisetosuchconfusionsas
mu¯la¯vidya¯.ThereforeitwasmoreappropriatetotakeSS’sinterpretationofS´an_kara,atleastforthispaper,
andthenshowitsphilosophicalweakness.
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TheMu¯la¯vidya¯ Controversy
of avidya¯ but does not formulate an account or a theory of this avidya¯ or error. In
his Adhya¯sa-bha¯s:ya he clearly mentions that avidya¯ is of the nature of adhya¯sa
(superimposition): ‘‘This superimposition (of the self and the not-self on each
other), the wise consider to be avidya¯.’’17 Superimposition is the mixing up of the
attributesoftwodifferentthingsinourcognitionandS´an_karaalsoreferstoitasthe
transference of the properties of one of them on the other. In the beginning of
Adhya¯sa-bha¯s:ya he clearly affirms that we are already having misconception or
errorasanaturalfactleadingusdothemixingupoftheselfandthenot-selfi.e.we
areengagedintheactofsuperimposition.Itisbecauseofthissuperimpositionfrom
the beginning that the world of duality is generated leading to an empirical or the
practical (vya¯vaha¯rika) world. Our day-to-day transactions and conduct are based
upon this empirical world of multiplicity that is infected with error. This world is
realonlyfromthestandpointoftheempiricalrealm.Thereisonlyapartialrealityor
truthattachedtosuchaworld.Butfromthetranscendentalorthe‘‘reallyreal’’point
of view there is only one reality that is Brahman, the self of all, which is non-dual
and distinctionless and is the underlying reality behind the phenomenal Universe.
Thequestionthatariseshereis:Howisitthatinspiteofthefactthatthenon-dual
Brahman being the really real and one without a second, that we see this world of
multiplicity?Itisbecausewearealreadyseeingthisworldonlyfromtheempirical
standpoint, which is steeped in avidya¯.18 The opposite of avidya¯ is vidya¯. The
discrimination between the unreal and the real, which one acquires as ignorance is
wipedoff,istermedasvidya¯.Thatthesetwoareofoppositenatureisstressedinthe
(cid:1)sa¯stras: ‘‘avidya¯ and vidya¯ are wide apart and are mutually opposed to each
other.’’19‘‘Thediscernmentofthetruenatureofreality,asitis,iscalledvidya¯.’’20
This distinction, for S´an_kara, alsoarises only due toavidya¯. S´an_kara uses theterm
lokad:rs::tiorempiricalviewtodescribethecircumstanceoftheindividualwho,due
to avidya¯, attributes a partial reality to this empirical world. Every individual
alreadyhasthisavidya¯,whichS´an_karasaysisanaturaltendency(naisargika),and
thereby sees the world of duality conducting his day-to-day transactions.
Theotherviewistheparma¯rthad:rs::ti,whichgivesacompletevisionofreality,
andthisiscontrastedwiththepartialviewasthe‘‘really real’’view.Thecomplete
visionofrealitynegatesallthedistinctions,whichtheempiricalworldhadcreated.
Thisview isspoken ofasknowledgeorvidya¯ oftheonenon-dualBrahman thatis
absolutely real. The Advaita tradition of S´an_kara represents the notion of reality
fromitsownmetaphysicalperspectiveandiscloselytiedtowhatitconsiderstobe
thenotionofknowledge.Realityisdefinedasthatwhichdoesnotchangeinallthe
threeperiodsoftime.Thenotionofrealitysodefineddependsuponourknowledge
of the same. If it ever remains constant then it is not subject to any sublation or
contradiction. Reference to reality is then based on the cognition that one has. The
17tametamevam: laks:anam: adhya¯sam: pan:dita¯ avidyetimanyante(S´an_kara1980;p.19).
18ItisspecialtoS´an_karaVeda¯ntathatthephenomenalworldisthoughttobethereduetoavidya¯.The
avidya¯doctrinehasbeenasubjectofcriticismbyotherlaterschoolsofVeda¯nta.JohnGrimeshasgivena
listofpolemicalworkswithregardstotheavidya¯ doctrineofAdvaita(1990;pp.3–4).
19du¯rmetevipar¯ıtevis:uc¯ıavidya¯ ya¯ cavidyetijn˜a¯ta¯ |intheKa:thaUpanis:ad1-II-4(Panoli1995a;
p.189).
20tadvivekenacavastusvaru¯pa¯vadha¯ran:am: vidyama¯huh: |(S´an_kara1980;p.19).
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S.K.A.Murthi
characteristic of valid knowledge, therefore, in this tradition has for its object
something that is uncontradicted (aba¯dhitatva).21 The real is that which is unsub-
latable. The changing nature of an object is open to be falsified or contradicted in
ourfutureexperience.TherearepassagesofS´an_karawheresuchadefinitionofreal
is given.22 Brahman the self of all, is the only changeless reality and therefore the
knowledge of Brahman is uncontradictable or unsublatable. These two standpoints
oflokad:rs::tiandparma¯rthad:rs::tiarecentraltotheadhya¯ropaapava¯damethod,a
teaching device that is specially adopted to reveal the nature of the Self.
The Adhya¯ropa Apava¯da Method—Why is this Method Adopted?
The Upanis:ads, which are treated as (cid:1)sa¯stras, purportedly teach the real nature of
Brahman. But Brahman the Absolute is not something that is given to description
becausedescriptionsarealwayscarriedoutintermsofsubject-predicatedistinctions
ofanobjectiveworldandthereforethoughtandspeech,theessentialcomponentsof
anydescription,whichrelyondistinctionsandchopuptheworldcannotcaptureor
reveal the Brahman—the very self of ours. These words and thoughts can operate
only in the empirical world of distinct objects.
This teaching of Brahman is meant for those in bondage that arises due to error
riddenempiricalworld.Knowledgeascommonlyunderstoodintheempiricalworld
isobtainedbyoperating,whatinVeda¯nticparlanceisknownasthevalidmeansof
knowledge (prama¯n:a). In the empirical world it is presupposed that there is a
person who obtains the knowledge (prama¯t:r) and the knowledge thus obtained of
anyobjectisofthetype‘thisissuchandsuch’.Suchknowledgeisalwaysbasedon
distinctionsthatareacceptedintheempiricalworld.Buttheknowledgeorintuition
ofBrahmantheabsoluteisnotofsuchatype.Therearenodistinctionssuchasthe
knower,theobjectknownandthemeansofknowledge.Infactwordsandthoughts
becomeineffectiveinrevealingthisknowledge.Therefore,the(cid:1)sa¯strasintheireffort
toteachthetruenatureofrealitymakeuseofbothlokad:rs::tiand(cid:1)sa¯strad:rs::ti.This
two-standpointapproachisemployedinthemethodofadhya¯ropaapava¯danya¯ya,
a pedagogic device through which a¯tman is revealed. This is done by making a
temporary or a deliberate ascription or superimposition (adhya¯ropa) of a certain
characteristic from the empirical point of view and subsequently rescinding
(apava¯da) the same from a different standpoint.
How does this Method Work?
The nature of avidya¯ according to S´an_kara is superimposition (adhya¯sa). All
distinctionslikeknowershipetc.aresuperimposedona¯tman.Butthesedistinctions
are really not the property of the a¯tman. S´an_kara uses superimposition itself as a
devicetoremovethepropertythatdoesnotbelongtoa¯tman.Thisistheessenceof
21Veda¯nta-Paribha¯s:a¯, a systematic text of Advaita epistemology, defines knowledge as such
(Adhvar¯ındra2000;pp.4–5).
22yadvis:aya¯ buddhih: na vyabhicarati tat sat, yadvis:aya¯ buddhih: vyabhicarati tad asad iti sad-
asadvibha¯gebuddhitantresthite|intheBhagavadg¯ıta¯bha¯s:yaII.16(Panoli1989;p.57).Otherpassageson
thedefinitionofrealistobefoundinTaittir¯ıyaUpanis:adbha¯:sya(2-1)andBrahmasu¯trabha¯s:ya(2-1-11).
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