The Moality of Happiness This page intentionally left blank The Morality of Happiness Julia Annas New York Oxford 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NewYork10016 OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford ItfurtherstheUniversity'sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwidein OxfordNewYork AucklandBangkokBuenosAiresCapeTownChennai Dar esSalaamDelhiHongKongIstanbulKarachiKolkata KualaLumpurMadridMelbourneMexicoCityMumbaiNairobi SãoPauloShanghaiTaipeiTokyoToronto Oxfordisaregisteredtrademark ofOxfordUniversityPress intheUK andincertainothercountries Copyright©1993byJuliaAnnas Firstpublishedin1993byOxfordUniversityPress,Inc. 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NewYork10016–4314 FirstissuedasanOxfordUniversityPresspaperback,1995 OxfordisaregisteredtrademarkofOxfordUniversityPress Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced, storedinaretrievalsystem,or transmitted,inanyform orbyanymeans, withoutthepriorpermissioninwriting ofOxfordUniversityPress, oras expresslypermittedbylaw, or under termsagreedwiththeappropriate reprographicsrightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproduction outsidethescopeoftheaboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment, OxfordUniversityPress,attheaddressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisbookinanyotherbindingorcover andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer Annas, Julia Themoralityofhappiness/ JuliaAnnas. p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN0-19-507999-X;0-19-509652-5(pbk) 1. Happiness.2. Ethics, Ancient.I.Title. BJ171.H35A561993170'.938–dc2092-37003 Preface and Acknowledgments Duringtheyearsithastakentowritethisbook,manypeoplehavehelpedmeinmanyways.Iamverygratefultothem all, and apologize to those who have been inadvertently omitted. Paperscontainingmaterialwhicheventuallybecamepartofthebook(usuallyinmuchalteredform)havebeengivenat theUniversityof Dayton AristotleConference; the Boston Area Colloquium in AncientPhilosophy; the Universityof Texas at Austin AncientPhilosophyWorkshop; the Spindel Conference on Aristotleat Memphis State University;the political philosophy seminar at Princeton University; a conference on Tradition and Innovation in Epicureanism at Duke University; University of Oklahoma; University of Arizona; Columbia University; Brown University; Johns Hopkins University; the University of California at Riverside; Brigham Young University; the Social Philosophy and Policy conference on the Good Life and the Human Good; a conference on contemporary perspectives on Greek ethics at the University of Nevada at Reno; the ethics colloquium at New York University; Cornell University; the conference in honour of Gregory Vlastos at the University of California at Berkeley; the Chapel Hill colloquium in philosophy. Iam trulygratefulfor thepatienceandhelpfulnessofmydiscussantsandaudiencesonalltheseoccasions. Many of these papers have been published; they are listed in the Bibliography. As I wrote the book I have frequently made use of these published articles, but in no case does the book present material unchanged from the article. In some cases I have rethought or recast what was presented in the article. In other cases the article is a study of a particular issue, and I have drawn from this only what was needed to make or support a case which is part of the book's overall structure. Thefollowinghavereadportionsofthebook,andhavemadevaluablecomments,forwhichIamverygrateful:Nancy Sherman, David Gill, David Furley, David Keyt, Gisela Striker, Mark McPherran, Anthony Price, Christopher Laursen, Dan Blickman, Marcia Baron, Brian Leiter, Jeffrie Murphy. Terry Irwin, Christopher Gill and Nicholas White have read the entire manuscript of a penultimate version of the book, and made extensiveand valuablecomments. I am very gratefulfor these, and for the patienceand good willof thereadersofalongmanuscript.Thebookhasgreatlyimprovedasaresult.Itmaybethatithasnotimprovedenough insubstance, and onsomeoccasionsIhavehad tobecontented withnoting a problemor disagreementina footnote, rather thanarguing outtheissueinthetext.Thebook, as Iemphasize, is nota comprehensivestudyofancientethics, but a selectivestudy of one aspectof it, and sometimes I havehad to notelimitations and continue, rather than risk a loss of focus. But on many issues the book has improved immeasurably as the result of this friendly advice and criticism. I am extremely grateful to the following peoplefor lettingme see their work before publication:WilliamFortenbaugh for his new edition of the fragments of Theophrastus, Voula Tsouna McKirahan for her new edition (with Giovanni Indelli) vi PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS oftheEthicaComparetti,PaulVanderWaerdtandPhillipMitsisfor theiressaysonnaturallawforAufstiegund Niedergang der Römischen Welt, Malcolm Schofield for his book on the Stoic idea of the city, David Sedley for part of his commentary on the Anonymous Commentator on the Theaetetus, Fred D. Miller for his book on nature, justice and rights in Aristotle's Politics. I am particularly grateful to Nicholas White for lettingme read an early versionof his own bookonmoralityinancientandmoderntheories,whichcomplementsmyownatmanypointsandhasbeenavaluable help. I have greatly benefitted from the writings of the following on ancient ethics: Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, Giuseppe Cambiano, JohnCooper, Christopher Gill,Anna Maria Ioppolo, Terry Irwin, Mark McPherran, Phillip Mitsis, Martha Nussbaum, Gisela Striker, Mario Vegetti, Nicholas White, Bernard Williams. They willprobably thinkthat I have not learnedenough,butIamgratefulforwhatIhavelearned.TwoworkswhichIfoundatalatestageofwritingthebook, and whichI havefound illuminating and complementary tomy own concerns, are GiuseppeCambiano's Il ritorno degli antichi and Nicholas White's book on ancient and modern ethics. The following have been published too late for the book to benefit: Malcolm Schofield, ‘Natural Law’ and Antonina Alberti,‘Lateoriaepicureadellaleggeedellaguistizia’,bothintheProceedingsoftheSixthSymposiumHellenisticum; Guido Bastianini and A.A. Long, ‘Hierocles’, 60 in Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici greci e latini, Parte I, vol 1**, Firenze 1992; A. Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life, Oxford UniversityPress 1992; T. Irwin, ‘Aristippus against Happiness,’ The Monist 74(1991),55–82;R.B.Louden,MoralityandMoralTheory,OxfordUniversityPress,1992;G.Trianosky,‘WhatIsVirtue Ethics All About?’, American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1990), 335–44; M. Slote, From Morality to Virtue, Oxford University Press, 1992; D. Sedley, ‘The Argumentative Structure of Epicurean Ethics’. And I would also like to thank the following for their help: André Laks, Richard Kraut, John Cooper, Paul Vander Waerdt, David Glidden, Jerry Santas, Michael Slote, David Glidden, Pierre Keller,Jerry Schneewind, Tom Christiano, Richard Bett, Ezequiel de Olaso, Howard Wettstein. The picture on the jacket, Puvis de Chavannes' Inter artes et naturam, struck me as containing some interesting themes whichare relevanttowhatIam tryingtodointhisbook. Thetitlemeans ‘Betweenthearts(orskills)and nature’, and setsthisthemeinaclassicalbackgroundinwhichcontemporaryfigurestakepart.Muchofthisbookisconcernedwith thesetwothemesinancientethics. Natureiswhatisuniversalandunavoidableinhumanbeings, anditisalsowhatwe aim to achieve in ethics as an ideal which goes beyond what is merely conventional and picked up from our own traditions and society. The skills and arts are modes in which we reflect intellectually and thereby become able to transform and improve the merely given material in us. Virtue, which I shall argue is the locus of morality in the ancient theories, is onesuch skill; it is by virtue of our rationalitythatwe become ableto transform, rather than being dominated by, our human nature. Puvis had aesthetic rather than moral achievements in mind, but the point remains—in this respect, ancients and moderns are doing the same thing, and their theories are mutually intelligible. They meet on common ground. The fact that Puvis' contemporary figures seem dated and part of the past to us merelyunderlinesthepointthateachgenerationismoderninitsownway,andmustmakeitsowninterpretationofthe PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vii ancients to find them intelligible.The fact that we tend to find Puvis' classical form of Symbolism somewhat stiffand remote is also interesting. We find it easier to respond to a Symbolist like Gauguin, who rejected his own artistic tradition for a non-Western one—how well he understood it, or succeeded in rejecting his own artistic assumptions, beinganother matter. (Gauguin,who admired Puvis, said ‘He is a Greekwhereas I am a savage, a wolfwithout a lead in the forest.’) It is in fact quite hard for us to respond to the classical visual tradition in an artist who is making a seriousintellectualengagementwithit.Butitisworththeeffort;andIhopethatthesamegoesfor myownintellectual engagement, in this book, with the ancient tradition of moral philosophy. This is very much my ‘Arizona book’; it was conceived, worked on and brought to its penultimate versionin the first five years I spent at the University of Arizona, from 1986 to 1991. I am most grateful to my colleagues in the PhilosophyDepartment,andtotheSocialandBehavioralSciencesResearchInstituteforgenerousrelieffromteaching during that period. I am also grateful for a most friendly and supportive atmosphere. I would like to thank John and Carol Armstrongforextensivehelpinpreparing theindices. Thebook is dedicated tomy husband, David Owen,and to our daughter Laura, whohave helped me with love and support during the book's gestation, and at all other times. J.A. Tucson, Arizona March 1993 This page intentionally left blank Contents Introduction, 3 I. The Basic Ideas 1. Making Sense of My Life as a Whole, 27 2. The Virtues, 47 1. Having the Virtues, 47 2. The Affective Aspect of Virtue, 53 3. The Intellectual Aspect of Virtue, 66 4. The Structure of Moral Reasoning: Rules and Insight, 84 5. Virtue and Right Action, 108 6. Ordinary and Extraordinary Virtue, 115 7. Virtue and Morality, 120 II. Justification and the Appeal to Nature 3. Nature and Naturalism, 135 4. Aristotle: Nature and Mere Nature, 142 5. The Stoics: Human Nature and the Point of View of the Universe, 159 6. Antiochus: The Intuitive View, 180 7. The Epicureans: Rethinking What Is Natural, 188 8. The Sceptics: Accepting What Is Natural, 201 1. Pyrrho, 203 2. The Sceptical Academy, 205 3. Later Pyrrhonists: Sextus, 207 9. Uses of Nature, 214 III. The Good Life and the Good Lives of Others 10. The Good of Others, 223 11. Finding Room for Other-Concern, 227 1. The Cyrenaics, 227 2. Epicurus, 236 3. The Sceptics, 244 12. Self-Concern and the Sources and Limits of Other-Concern, 249 1. Aristotle on Friendship and Self-Love, 249 2. The Stoics on Other-Concern and Impartiality, 262 3. The Aristotelian Response, 276 4. The Debate, 288
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