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Jean-François Caron The Moral Dilemmas of Fighting Terrorism and Guerrilla Groups Facing Contemporary Terrorism Edited by Jean-François Caron Volume 2 Jean-François Caron The Moral Dilemmas of Fighting Terrorism and Guerrilla Groups ISBN 978-3-11-075748-4 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-075756-9 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-075758-3 ISSN 2749-1188 e-ISSN 2749-1196 Library of Congress Control Number: 2022946317 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: Lorado / iStock / Getty Images Plus Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com Contents Introduction 1 Chapter 1 The Difficulty of Defining Terrorism 5 Chapter 2 Assessing the Morality of Guerrilla Warfare 30 Chapter 3 How to Combat Terrorism? 54 Chapter 4 The Status of Captured Terrorists 84 Chapter 5 Can Terrorism be Used in Exceptional Circumstances? 99 Conclusion 119 Bibliography 120 Index 127 Introduction MostofuslivingintheWestbecameacquaintedwiththerealityofterrorismasa clearandpresentdangeronlyinthelast20yearsafterthe9/11attackstriggered numerousattacksagainstciviliansbyindividualswhohadpledgedallegianceto AlQaedaortheIslamicStateofIraqandtheLevant(ISIL).Inthisregard,wecan thinkofthe2004attacksinMadrid’scommutertrainsysteminwhich193people diedandaround2,000wereinjured;orsimilarattacksthattookplaceoneyear later in London’s public transport system that killed 56 people and injured an- other784andthe2015Parisattacksthatkilledandinjured130and416innocent people, respectively. However,itwouldbeamistaketoconcludethatterrorismisacontemporary phenomenon.Ashighlightedbythemostfamousanalystofthistypeofpolitical violence,WalterLaqueur,ifweareto thinkofterrorism as distinct fromregular warfare(which is a mistake,but moreon this later), attacks bysmallgroups of irregular fighters against state actors or civilians go back to time immemorial (Laqueur & Wall, 2018, p. 27). As amazing as it sounds, it must be stressed thatdespiteitslongevityandthefactthatithasbeenwidelydiscussed,terrorism remains awidely misunderstood reality.The fact that the international commu- nitystilldoesnotagreeonacommondefinitionofterrorismisprobablythemost obvious testimony in this regard.The primary objective of this book is to shed somelightonthenatureofterrorismbyexplaininghowdistinctiveitisfroman- otherwell-knownformofirregularwarfarethatitistoooftenconfoundedwith, namelyguerrilla. Terrorismisusuallyassociatedwithbarbaricentitiesthathavenoconsider- ationforinnocentpeople’slivesandwhoseactionsareoftenthoughttobeirra- tional and commanded bydivinity.Guerrillawarfare is,for its part, linkedwith groupsthathavemorenobleaims,suchasthosefightingfornationalliberation. Asproofofthisdistinctivemannerofassessingthesetwoformsofpoliticalvio- lence,manyindividualswholedandwereinvolvedinthelatterformofwarfare arenowcelebratedasheroesinmanysocieties¹,whileterroristsdonotsharethe same historical fate (for a reason that is far from being a subjective matter, as I will discuss in this book). However, although tempting and rather common in people’s viewpoint, this manner of distinguishing terrorism from guerrilla byfocusingontheirrationalityoftheformerandthenoblecharacterofthelatter  Inthisregard,wecanrefertoMichaelCollinswhoplayedapivotalroleinthecreationofthe Irish Republicandwaspositivelydepicted in the 1996 award-winningbiographical movie, in whichhewaspersonifiedbyactorLiamNeeson. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110757569-001 2 Introduction ishighlyproblematic.Indeed, historyhasproventhattheresorttoterroristtac- ticshassometimesbeentheresultofawell-thoughtrationaldecisionbygroups thatwerealsofightingfortheirnationalliberation,whilemanygroupsanimated byreligiousbeliefsrefusedtoresorttothistypeofviolence.Inreturn,terrorism was also aprivilegedtacticof non-religiousgroups,whichmakesthe use of rational/irrational, barbaric/noble aims, and religious/non-religious dichotomies inappropriatetoolsindefininganddistinguishingbetweenthesetwotypesofvi- olence. Another mistake would be to limit terrorism as an inherent tactic of non- state actors. There is a common misconception in this regard which is largely the result of the double standards used by states that have given themselves the monopoly over legitimate violence as a mean to always find noble ways of justifying their resort to war in opposition to non-state entities often presented asrogue,criminal,andimmoralintheiraimsandmeansofaction.Additionally, we should not forget that from an etymological perspective the word terrorism derivesfromtheFrenchword‘terreur’whichwasaclearlyaffirmedpoliticaltac- ticusedbyFrenchrevolutionarieslikeRobespierreorSaint-Just,thusmakingita formofviolencethatisnotsolelyrestrictedtonon-stateactors².Furthermore,in thepast,evencontemporarydemocraticstateshaveexplicitlychosentoresortto indiscriminate tactics that aimed at terrorising their enemies, as was the case with WinstonChurchill’sordertohisAirCommandtobombGermancities dur- ingWWII.Consequently,thesecommonmisconceptionscallfor abetter assessment of the uniqueness of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Withtheseclarifications,itwillbeeasiertounderstandtheinherentimmor- ality of terrorism and how it differs from guerrilla warfare.Thus, the apparent moral superiority of the latter over the former should not necessarily lead us toconcludethatresortingtoguerrillaasaformofviolenceisalwaysmorallyac- ceptable.Incontrast,iftheactofkillingcansometimesbejustifiedinthistype ofwarfare,thiscanonlybealast-resortoptionandonlywhenthesituationhas reachedacertainextreme.Asaresult,theco-calledsuperiorityofguerrillaover terrorism doesnotgivecarte blanche to theformerwhenitcomestoviolentac- tions.This type of violence also comes with its own string of moral questions that cannot be ignored.The first two chapters will focus on the distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare as well as the moral limits of the latter. Additionally,althoughitmaylooklikeastraightforwardaffairbetweengood andabsoluteevil,thewaragainstterrorismorecomplexandbringsinitswake many ethical dilemmas,that is, a confrontation between two moral categorical  Initspeakperiod,laterreurledtotheexecutionofaround40,000peopleinasinglemonth. Introduction 3 imperativesinwhichrespectforonewillinevitablyleadtoviolationoftheother. Asarguedelsewhere(Caron,2014),battlefieldmercykillingisprobablythebest exampleofsuchaclashbetweentwomoralnorms.Indeed,inthesesituations, soldiersareforcedtochoose,ontheonehand,toabidebythemoralobligation not to kill avulnerable human being; and on the other hand, not tolet this in- dividualenduretheterriblesufferingresultingfromwhatappearstobealethal wound.Insuchsituations,whateverthedecisiontakenbysoldiersconfrontedby this dilemma will be, the outcome will necessarily be morally questioned by somewhowillcometobelievethattheother alternativeshouldhaveprevailed. Unfortunately,whenitcomestothesecategoricalmoralimperatives,peoplewho arefacingthemarecaughtina“catch-22”asitisimpossibletohierarchisethem and reach an agreement that one decision is better than the other based on a rational assessment of the situation. Inthecaseofterrorism,Iseethreedilemmasofthissortthatareappearing tobeopposedtostates’obligationstoprotectthelivesoftheircitizens.First,itis the responsibility of states to protect the lives of their citizens that are directly threatened by terrorist organizations. Abiding by this obligation therefore calls foractionontheirpart.Inreturn,asisevidentfromAfghanistanandIraq,fight- ingterrorism seems tocomeat the expense of a disproportionate numberofci- vilians’ lives abroad.This has led authors to argue that Western states simply transfertheriskfromtheirowncivilianstothosewhohavethemisfortuneofliv- ing in countries or areaswhere terrorists are operating.Consequently,this ‘risk transfer’ishighlyproblematicfromamoralperspective(aswellasfromapolit- icalperspectiveasthesemilitaryinterventionswereunabletoeveneradicatethe terrorist threats they were promising to achieve) which seems to be creating a situation where states fighting this sort of threat are condemned to violate a moral imperative no matter what theydecide todo:either wait and let theirci- vilians be killed first by terrorists or transfer that risk to civilians abroad as if ‘their lives’ are less important than‘our lives’. Second,thestatusofcapturedterroristsraisesasimilardilemma.Again,for the sake of respecting their obligation to protect the lives of their civilians, are statesallowedtousemethodsoftortureagainstcapturedterroristswhomaypos- sess sensitive information aboutupcomingattacks? It is not surprising that tor- tureisanendemicrealityinmanyauthoritarianandtotalitarianstates,butthe9/ 11attackshavealsoledLiberalstatestoengageinwhathasbeenlabelledas‘en- hanced interrogation techniques’: a euphemism that poorly hides the fact that thesemethodsarenothinglessthantorture.However,theresorttothesetechni- queshas oftenbeen justifiedthroughthelens ofa‘tickingbomb scenario’,that is,whenastateisfacingaterroristthreatthatcannotbepreventedinaconven- tionalandlawfulmanner.Theethicaldilemmahereisthechoicebetweendoing