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FOREWORD We live in an era of dynamic change-and cumbersome for the dynamiC times that lay dramatic technical advance. One of the most ahead. The modern Louisiana Maneuvers pro important responsibilities of military profes vided the revised means Sullivan sought, and sionals is to anticipate, and accommodate, he chose their evocative name deliberately. change as it occurs. The price of being caught Sullivan envisioned gathering the Army's se unprepared is too often paid in blood. The nior leaders as a corporate Board of Directors subject of this monograph is a conscious de to exercise collective wisdom in steering inno sign to accelerate the pace at which the Army vation. The LAM process relied upon the translated new insights into active capabilities, Army's then burgeoning simulations capabil the modern Louisiana Maneuvers-LAM. ity to inexpensively test new doctrinal and or The modern Louisiana Maneuvers were ganizational ideas-and the effects of new op neither maneuvers per se, nor were they held erational concepts and equipment-without in Louisiana. The original Louisiana Maneu involving extraordinary masses of soldiers and vers were pre-World War II General Headquar equipment or extensive real estate. Exercises ters exercises initiated by General George C. actually "in the dirt" testing new equipment Marshall to prepare the Army for World War and procedures were carefully deSigned to get II. They featured the field-testing of new doc the most possible information from the least trinal and organizational concepts, and of new possible expense and resourcing. The successes equipment and schemes for its employment. of LAM, and the maturation of digital infor They provided practical, hands-on experience mation technologies, led to robust spiral de in leading troops in the field with the most velopment and the Force XXI Campaign that modern of configurations. They force-fed is prodUCing to day's digitized force. change to an institution that otherwise was LAM has been important to the Army of only beginning to shake off its prewar somno the 1990s in producing innovation and in lence. changing the way in which the Army changes. General Gordon R. Sullivan, who became This study is based upon a thorough examina Chief of Staff in June 1991, realized that he tion of documents and upon extensive discus too was tasked to change the Army radically. sions with principal actors. It offers a relevant Sullivan understood that with the Cold War's account of an important initiative and of a com end, declining defense budgets, and a shrink plex period in the Army's history. As you will ing force, he would preside over wrenching find, much of our approach march into the changes throughout the Army. In order to con twenty-first century is directly rooted in the duct those transformations effectively and to results of the modern Louisiana Maneuvers. Simultaneously maintain readiness and sustain modernization, he would need revised means; Washington, D.C. JOHN S. BROWN he was certain that the Army's Cold War pro 21 June 1999 Brigadier General, USA cesses of incremental change would prove too Chief of Military History THE AUTHOR James L. Yarrison received his Ph.D. de moved to the U.S. Army Center of Military gree in Near Eastern studies from Princeton History in late 1991, where he has special University in 1982. A retired Army Reserve ized in chronicling the activities of recent infantry officer, he served in the Office of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army. ThMeo dneL roui Chief of Staff, Army, from 1989 to 1991. He siaMnaan esuis v hies firrst CMH publication. ii PREFACE The preparation of this history of the U.S. document and the relationships that I was Army's modern Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) able to establish with various members of grew out of a requirement that GEN Gordon what is now the TRADOC History Office R. Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the Army, proved invaluable to the process of learn placed upon the Army Center of Military ing about LAM and collecting appropriate History (CMH). The requirement appeared data on its proceedings. Dr. Anne W. as part of his 22 May 1992 Letter of Instruc Chapman of that office contributed might tion on LAM to BG Tommy R. Franks, the ily during LAM's first three years and proved first Director of the new Louisiana Maneu particularly helpful as I labored to produce vers Task Force. In that letter, GEN Sullivan this volume. Dr. James T. Stensvaag, Dr. directed the Chief of Military History to Malone's successor, also provided important "document the proceedings and decisions of assistance at key points. the LAM." The study which follows is the As the LAM Task Force began winding result. up its operations during the first half of As the Louisiana Maneuvers got under 1996, the Chief of Military History at that way, I was assigned the task in mid-1992 time, BG John W Mountcastle, decided that of covering LAM events and gathering in writing the history of LAM should be begun formation for an eventual CMH history of and brought as qUickly as possible to a con the process. It quickly became apparent that clusion. This work is the product of that documenting LAM's proceedings, collect decision, though realizing it proved rather ing, sharing, and storing information, and more arduous than the decisionmakers first preparing and supporting preparation of an envisioned. General Mountcastle took a per eventual history would require close and sonal interest in the project and both gUided continuous cooperation between CMH and much of its progress and facilitated its the TRADOC Command Historian's Office. completion. Others at CMH provided both To ensure that this occurred, the then-Chief support and assistance as I produced the of Military History, BG Harold W Nelson, study. Dr. David W Hogan, Jr., worked negotiated a Memorandum of Understand closely with me as I prepared the initial draft ing with the TRADOC Command Historian, and helped to ensure that I clarified for the Dr. Henry O. Malone (signed 10 and 13 lay reader a number of passages that were August 1992, respectively), which laid out mired in "bureaucratese." Dr. Terrence J. the roles that CMH and the TRADOC Com Gough read and commented helpfully upon mand Historian's Office would play. This the second draft and has provided useful iii suggestions and comments throughout the GEN (Ret.) Gordon Sullivan and the production process. Ms. Catherine Heerin many others who spoke with me and who and her editorial team edited the manuscript took the time to proVide comments and sug and helped to smoothe a number of passages. gestions deserve recognition. GEN Sullivan, Ms. Teresa Jameson succeeded in transform of course, was the author of these Louisiana ing the very rough collection of graphics I Maneuvers and without his vision and per hoped to use into illustrations that are both severance not much of what resulted from useful and legible. them would have happened. In addition, he The efforts of the former members of the ensured that I received access to him and to LAM Task Force have proven both extremely portions of his papers that are still closely helpful and absolutely crucial to bringing the held and encouraged others of his colleagues study to its current state. In addition to those to share their thoughts and experiences with whom I interviewed either individually or in me. I have listed those who permitted me to a group setting or who provided answers to interview them in the last appendix and have specific questions, I must recognize Mr. sought to recognize throughout the text and Charles M. Valliant, the Task Force's Deputy notes their insights and contributions both Director. Chuck ensured, first of all, that the to LAM and to this effort. Task Force's records were gathered from its My point in laying out the preceding ac directorates' various locations and transferred knowledgments is that, although I wrote the to me in all their volume. He also was instru monograph and am solely responsible for its mental in bringing about the "hotwash" group contents and faults, I could not have gotten interview that took place in May 1996 and it to this point without a great deal of ear provided extensive, thoughtful comments and nest cooperation, good advice, and extra ef correctives as I worked through the various fort on the part of a great many others. The drafts, seeking to get the story right. I have years from 1991 through 1996 were a very tried, where I could, to recognize at least some rich and complex period in the Army's his of the contributions to this history of the many tory, and this study addresses only cursorily other members of the Task Force who made a small part of what happened during those LAM work. Any attempt at a list of Task Force years. LAM and the Force XXI Army await a alumni who helped me risks omitting some fuller treatment. one. I hope that all those who did assist me will accept my thanks. JAMES L. YARRISON iv THEM ODERNL OUISIANMAA NEUVERS CHANGINGT HEW AY WE CHANGE ExectuivSeum mary GEN Gordon R. Sullivan took office as velop and field the M1 tank as an example Chief of Staff of the United States Army on of the institutionalized slowness that con 21 June 1991. The Army of which he be cerned him. Sullivan found himself con came Chief had just completed playing a fronted with a number of conditions that central role in the allied victory over Iraq in greatly taxed the Army: the end of the Cold Operation DESERSTT ORM and had been the War; large, congreSSionally mandated reduc primary instrument of America's success in tions in Army funding; concomitantly large freeing Panama from its dictator, Manuel reductions in the size of the force; and a se Noriega, during Operation JUSTC AUSiEn late ries of contingency deployments. He thus 1989. This Army, too, had been a mainstay concluded that in addition to reshaping the of U.S. victory in the Cold War and had suc Army, he would need to change the way the cessfully rebuilt itself after the Vietnam War, Army changed itself and to do so in ways under the leadership of visionary thinkers that permitted him to lead positively rather like Creighton W Abrams, William E. DePuy, than merely react to circumstances. This Edward C. Meyer, Donn A. Starry, and Carl monograph seeks to document how the E. Vuono. Army thought about change during this very GEN Sullivan was himself a wide-rang turbulent period in its history and to cap ing thinker who followed in the tradition of ture for those who follow some of the ways these officers. He saw clearly, as did a num in which Sullivan reached his decision to ber other Army leaders, that the 1991 Army mount the modern Louisiana Maneuvers and must qUickly become a very different force how they worked. from the one that had won the Cold War and Over the course of his first several months DESETRS TORM. He was particularly concerned in office, Sullivan labored to rewrite the about the processes to effect change that the Army's basic operational doctrine and to Army had developed over the course of the develop a process that would produce a new Cold War. However successful these pro force structure. The new force structure cesses had proven to be in that context, would have to be more appropriate to the Sullivan believed that they were too inflex CONUS-based, force-projection Army he ible and deliberately slow to enable the Army and his advisers saw emerging-more modu both to make the changes it needed then and lar, more lethal, more easily deployed. He to react qUickly and agilely to future require sensed from the beginning that he must be ments for change. He frequently cited the able to lead the Army through the wrench fifteen years the Army had required to de- ing changes that many foresaw over the next several years and to maintain the Army's ef I was fostering innovation and growth in fectiveness as a fighting force. To accomplish extraordinary ways . . . I made it part of my that, he would need a vehicle that permit office to Signal that I-not merely my staff ted him to exercise positive leadership. was going to be personally involved." The Concepts-Based Requirements Sys During the last months of 1991 and the tem (CBRS), which the Army had developed beginning of 1992, the Chief of Staff worked during the Cold War, was oriented on dol with his colleagues and advisers to develop lars and the Program Objective Memoran a concept for iterative experimentation that dum (POM) process. CBRS governed nearly would make extensive use of computer all Army change processes and had done so based simulations to test proposed doctrine, successfully throughout that conflict. Tied procedures, organizations, and equipment. as it was into the Defense Department's Plan He relied in this work upon his staff and ning, Programming, and Budgeting System upon his senior commanders, notably GEN and into the congressional funding process, Franks, the u.S. Army Training and Doctrine CBRS and the mechanisms that supported it Command (TRADOC) Commander, within would likely continue to govern most Army whose command much of the original analy modernization for the foreseeable future. sis of the concept's viability took place. Sullivan determined, however, that CBRS Sullivan's objective was to evolve a process would not suffice as a leadership vehicle for that would enable the Army to arrive at so the new era. lutions that had been proven in simulation As he engaged in this process of "discov before changing policies or doctrine, buy ery learning," seeking such a vehicle, ing equipment, or reorganizing forces. The Sullivan sought advice and good ideas from result of this effort, and of the interplay of a vast array of colleagues, former subordi creative tensions among the Army's senior nates, and consultants. To name all of those leaders that contributed to the evolution of with whom he discussed these and related LAM, was a strategically agile process that matters is not possible. He certainly did con involved those leaders as a corporate Board sult GENs Dennis ]. Reimer, Frederick M. of Directors in gUiding the Army into the Franks,] .H. Binford Peay III,jimmy D. Ross, 21st century. The personal extension of the Leon E. Salomon, john H. Tilelli, GEN (Ret.) Chief of Staff's Office organized to make LAM Carl E. Vuono, MGs Lon E. Maggart and work was the LAM Task Force, headquar William A. Stofft, and BG Harold W Nelson. tered at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Based on his discussions, his sense of The LAM process, which functioned from Army history, and particularly his reading mid-1992 to mid-1994, was a cyclic exer of Christopher Gabel's ThUe. ASr.y mG HQ cise with several definite steps. The Task Manesuo vf1e 49r1(p ublished in fall 1991) , Force first solicited issues and good ideas Sullivan decided that to change the way the from the Army's major commands. It next Army changed he needed to engage in a presented the issues to a General Officer "Louisiana Maneuvers" (LAM) of his own. Working Group (GOWG), composed of GO He said that he took the name from representatives of the commands submitting GEN George C. Marshall's pre-World War the issues, that discussed and approved or II General Headquarters exercises in Loui disapproved the various issues and priori siana, Texas, and the Carolinas because, "I tized them before forwarding them to the was compelled by the power of Marshall's Board of Directors (BoD). The BoD then con ideas and by his intent to conduct experi sidered the issues forwarded from the ments that would be the basis for design GOWG, considered other issues proposed by ing new units and battlefield processes . . . . BoD members, and approved selected issues Borrowing Marshall's title was a signal that for experimentation and investigation dur business as usual was not good enough, that ing that year's LAM cycle. The BoD also pri- vi oritized the allocation of LAM seed monies eminence into the 21 century. Involvement st and assigned proponency for the issues, fix in the LAM process helped bring to fruition ing a single command with responsibility for a number of Army programs, some of which developing the issue investigation plans and had begun before LAM had opened for busi for coordinating with the LAM Task Force ness but received critical additional impe and other interested agencies. tus from that involvement. Inclusion in LAM The culmination of these investigative accelerated various logistics-enhancement experiments each year was to be a General programs, such as Total Asset Visibility, that Headquarters exercise (GHQx), which would were designed to remedy problems identi involve Headquarters, Department of the fied during DESERT STORM. The TRADOC Army (HQDA), and the MACOM headquar AMC effort to "own the night" led to several ters. Although planned initially to begin in productive results, including the decision to Fiscal Year (FY) 1994, the first, warm-up integrate horizontally across the force the de GHQx actually took place in FY 1993, meld velopment of Second Generation Forward ing the HQDA portion of the exercise with Looking InfraRed and other night-fighting experimentation in two theater CINCs' ex technologies. Contemporaneous with this ercises. GHQx's of increasing sophistication effort was one centered upon digitizing the were conducted in each of the succeeding battlefield, using automated, interactive ex two years, producing significant, instructive changes of positional and other information insights on all phases of the conflict cycle to provide a common, relevant picture of the for the headquarters involved. battlefield. The development and emplace Sullivan's use of the LAM process and his ment of these digital linkages would enable reliance upon its results for important deci the forces so eqUipped to operate more re sions caused discomfort for a number of his sponsively, to anticipate their own and their colleagues. Many of these officers placed opponents' next moves, to gain better pro great trust in the CBRS, given its past suc tection through greater dispersion, and to cesses, and Sullivan's use of a different pro avoid fratricide through better combat iden cess, not initially tied to the POM, gener tification. Still another effort, worked ated considerable debate among them. The through the Army Space and Strategic De Chief knew that these discussions were in fense Command, was the quick but deliber tended to produce the best possible result ate testing and packaging of several commer for the Army in a time of constrained re cially available, off-the-shelf, space-based sources and that this result could be achieved communications technologies for the use of only by a full airing of opposing views and contingency forces. The first package went attainment of a consensus. He never saw the to Army forces deployed in Somalia. All these various disagreements as resulting from dis initiatives, as well as a number of other, loyalty; rather, he believed they produced a equally vital efforts, benefited from their in healthy, creative tension that was vital to vestigation as issues in the LAM process, achieving the best result. He encouraged this from their continuing viSibility with the se tension and the discussions and saw both as nior leadership through the deliberations of positive and productive for himself and the the BoD, and from the positive gUidance institution. these senior leaders proVided at each session. The first two years of LAM, mid-1992 to Over this period, as well, the views of the mid-1994, saw the LAM process developed senior leadership evolved so that many of and emplaced. Using the process, Sullivan the initial issues were seen to be important and the rest of the Army's senior leaders were aspects of broader, more inclusive, more able to focus the institution's attention on a basic issues. One example of this evolution number of high-priority programs that was the qUick inclusion of "owning the would help to ensure the U.S. Army's pre- night" under the topic of "continuous op- vii erations" as one of its important subsidiary supporting headquarters. In actuality, the aspects. All of these efforts were aided im ADO axis served to wrap the other two ef measurably by GEN Franks' development forts together. and chartering of TRADOCs six Battle Labs, BG David Ohle, who replaced MG Franks which organized and conducted equipment as the Director of the LAM Task Force, also and organization-specific experiments that received a change of mission once the BoD contributed, in most cases, to the resolution decided during its 12-14 July 1994 sessions of LAM issues. to implement the Force XXI Campaign Plan. LAM's first two years of full operation In addition, Sullivan announced that he coincided with BG Tommy R. Franks' stew would relocate the LAM Task Force from Fort ardship of the Task Force as its Director. Monroe to the Washington, D. c.,ar ea to During that period, the Task Force itself was manage and integrate the campaign's open located primarily at Fort Monroe, Virginia, ing phases using a revised LAM process. In with a directorate at Fort Leavenworth, Kan the end, the Task Force headquarters and sas, closely tied to the National Simulations parts of two directorates moved to the Pen Center there. Indeed, the Task Force created tagon, while outlying directorates operated its own simulation center at Fort Monroe to at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Fort Mon demonstrate the emerging potential of simu roe, and Fort Leavenworth. lations for the work of the maneuvers. The The LAM Task Force qUickly devised and Task Force also maintained a liaison office implemented a procedure for deconflicting, in the Pentagon. integrating, and synchronizing the many By the beginning of 1994, Sullivan had actions that had to occur across the Army begun to prepare the Army and the LAM for the Force XXI Campaign to succeed. For Task Force to open the Force XXI Campaign example, the Task Force instituted a Syn to redesign the Army for the 21st century. chronization Working Group (SWG) as a The Task Force drafted the plan, envision colonel-level forum deSigned to precede the ing a campaign that would proceed along GOWG in the revised LAM-cum-Force XXI three axes. The main thrust, called Joint Process. These SWG meetings became un Venture, incorporated the efforts of all the wieldy, informational gatherings, with reso Army's commands and agencies under lution of many issues taking place outside TRADOC leadership to redesign the oper their venues, in part because the SWG had ating force. Key to the Joint Venture effort no authority over the allocation or expendi was the designation of the 2d Armored Di ture of funds. Also, the staffs within HQDA vision as the Army's Experimental Force and the MACOMs who ordinarily coordi with control and coordination mechanisms nated staff actions qUickly assumed respon deSigned to avoid the hazards that befell the sibility for coordinating the parts of the Force earlier, institutionally isolated 9th Infantry XXI Campaign within their purview, much Division/High Technology Test Bed. A sup as Sullivan had envisioned. The DCSOPS, porting thrust was to be the Institutional! who began his own more frequent, more TDA axis in which the VCSA would over empowered, less unwieldy Force XXI syn see the redesign of the TDA Army so that it chronization meetings only a month after the could better support the revamped operat campaign opened, led the way in this nor ing force. The third axis included the ac malization of campaign coordination. tivities of the newly organized Army Digi As a result of reorienting the LAM pro tization Office. This office, under the aus cess to further the Force XXI Campaign and pices of the Chief of Staff, sought to develop concentrating its attention on prosecuting and acquire the hardware and software nec that campaign, the Army let the portion of essary to digitize the operating force and to the process that had worked well in its first link that force digitally with the various two years fall into disuse. Issues considered viii