The Mismeasure of the Self: A Study in Vice Epistemology

241 Pages·2021·1.557 MB·English

by  Alessandra Tanesini

The Mismeasure of the Self

The Mismeasure
of the Self
A Study in Vice Epistemology
ALESSANDRA TANESINI
1
3
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OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,4/5/2021,SPi
Contents
Acknowledgements ix
1. TheMeasureandMismeasureoftheSelf 1
PART I. THE PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTELLECTUAL VICE
2. IntellectualVirtuesandVices:Sensibilities,ThinkingStyles,
andCharacterTraits 21
3. AttitudePsychologyandVirtueEpistemology:ANewFramework 48
PART II. VIRTUES AND VICES OF INTELLECTUAL
SELF-EVALUATION
4. IntellectualHumility,ProperPride,andProperConcernwith
Others’Esteem 73
5. Superbia,Arrogance,Servility,andSelf-Abasement 96
6. Vanity,Narcissism,Timidity,andFatalism 119
PART III. EPISTEMIC HARMS AND MORAL WRONGS
7. HarmsandWrongs 141
8. Wrongs,Responsibility,Blame,andOppression 168
9. TeachingIntellectualVirtues,ChangingAttitudes 193
References 205
Index 224
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,4/5/2021,SPi
Acknowledgements
ThisbookbringstogetherseveralstrandsofresearchthatIhavepursuedoverthe
past five years. I have been helped in my thinking on these topics by a great
number of people to whom I have a large debt of gratitude. Jon Webber intro-
ducedmetothetopicofattitudepsychology,andhasofferedcommentsonseveral
chaptersofthisbook.HeatherBattaly,QuassimCassam,andIanJamesKidd(aka
the Vice Squad) have informed my thinking throughout, and put up with any
intellectual vices I exhibited in my conversations with them. Paul Bloomfield,
Brent Madison, Quassim Cassam, and Charlie Crerar have given invaluable
feedback on drafts of the manuscript. Greg Maio has been extremely generous
with his expertise about attitude psychology. His comments on Chapter3 have
savedmefrommakingblunders.IamgratefultoMichaelP.Lynchfornumerous
conversations, and to Brad Hooker to help me think about admiration. Thanks
also to Mark Alfano, Natalie Ashton, Michel Brady, Michael Croce, Christian
Millar, Kristján Kristjánsson, Matthew Jenkins, Aidan McGlynn, Nancy Snow,
Maria Silvia Vaccarezza, Jennifer Cole Wright, and to one further anonymous
reader for Oxford University. I have delivered talks based on this material to
numerous universities, thanks to all the organizers and the audiences for their
valuablefeedback.
Whilstnoneofthematerialincludedherehasbeenpublishedbefore,Ihavefirst
airedmanyoftheideasdefendedinthisbookinvariousarticles.Themotivational
accountofvicepresentedinChapter2isbasedon‘EpistemicViceandMotivation’.
Metaphilosophy,49(3),(2018),350–367.Chapter3isbasedon‘AttitudePsychology
and Virtue Epistemology: A New Framework’ in N. Ballantyne and D. Dunning
(eds), Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: New Perspectives from the Crossroads of
Epistemology and Psychology, Oxford University Press, forthcoming. Chapter4
overlaps with research first discussed in ‘Intellectual Humility as Attitude’,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(2), (2018), 399–420 and ‘Caring
for Esteem and Intellectual Reputation: Some Epistemic Benefits and Harms’,
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 84 (2018), 47–67. Some of the ideas
developed in ‘Intellectual Servility and Timidity’. Journal of Philosophical
Research, 43 (2018), 21–41 are revisited in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Chapter9 is
based on ‘Teaching Virtue: Changing Attitudes’, Logos & Episteme, 7(4), (2016)
503–527and‘ReducingArroganceinPublicDebate’inJ.Arthur(ed.),Virtuesin
thePublicSphere(pp.28–38).London:Routledge,2019.Iwouldliketoexpressmy
gratitude to these journals and publishers for allowing me to borrow from my