The Military Balance 2016

501 Pages·2016·11.3 MB·English

by  The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS)

Editor’s Introduction
Modernising military capabilities; familiar
security challenges
A surge in high-profle terrorist atacks at the end of 2015 Nonetheless, it was noteworthy that the UN Security
added to the increasing crises, conficts and sense of uncer- Council in November 2015 adopted Resolution 2249, which
tainty preoccupying the planning stafs of defence minis- said that ISIS constituted an ‘unprecedented’ threat to inter-
tries worldwide. national peace and security, and that UN member states
Major atacks by Islamist terrorists took place in France with the capacity should ‘take “all necessary measures” to
and Mali, and in the air above the Sinai Peninsula, adding to prevent and suppress its terrorist acts on territory under its
earlier incidents in Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan control in Syria and Iraq’. But it was still difcult to see what
and many other locations. Grinding confict and relentless this might mean in practical terms. So, too, it was difcult to
instability continued in Syria, Libya, Yemen and the Sahel, see what might result from the activation of the EU’s mutual
not just acting as a recruiting tool for terrorist groups, but assistance clause, Article 42.7, after a request from France.
also feeding into a narrative used in their sophisticated Undoubtedly, the November atacks placed further stress
information operations. These groups were – together with on French armed forces that had experienced another year
other non-state groups – both driving these conficts and of continual missions, but the EU’s act was frstly political,
deriving energy from them. At the same time, this increas- with France subsequently entering into discussion about
ingly diverse range of actors was making confict resolution what assistance might be required to ensure the decision did
even harder. not remain symbolic.
Heightened instability and savage violence added to This raised a broader issue, over the partnerships that
the factors propelling populations to leave. For instance, it might be required to tackle security crises. Were formal alli-
was apparent that in 2015 a large part of Syria’s middle class ances the best course? What degree of bureaucratic decision-
had had enough of war. Events also indicated that terrorist making process was tolerable? For instance, NATO’s VJTF
groups, perhaps unsurprisingly, took advantage of this vast is intended to create a high-readiness spearhead forma-
population movement. In late year this caused pause for tion as part of the Alliance’s Readiness Action Plan (RAP),
thought in the West, notably in Europe where some coun- but deployment still requires approval through the North
tries had opened their doors to refugees. Europe’s periphery Atlantic Council. Indeed, for some of the security threats
had been in turmoil for years; in 2015, Europe’s ability to worrying NATO’s East European members, what is perhaps
secure its borders came under increased scrutiny. just as important is an improved partnership and beter
Meanwhile, the continued murder of innocents by the cooperation between NATO and the EU. For many of the
nihilistic adherents of ISIS in Syria and Iraq – together with issues that preoccupy NATO’s East – such as hybrid threats
other groups for whom ISIS became the latest franchise of from Russia – the EU possesses many of the capabilities that
choice – reinforced the reality that combating terrorism was NATO does not, including a wide range of development,
a global, not just a regional, issue. security and justice tools. These include the ability to broadly
But without greater cooperation, and agreement on assess Europe’s vulnerabilities, and to produce a ‘risk
some form of strategy for combating ISIS and addressing register’ of areas including critical national infrastructure to
broader instability and state failure, it was unlikely that the help indicate when hybrid actions might be under way.
group would be dismantled any time soon. Russia deployed However, in Europe, there was an uncomfortable reality
combat airpower to Syria in late 2015. Its aircraft might that, while the threats and risks to European security had
indeed have hit ISIS targets but Moscow’s main objective increased, the fnancial and material means to address
was actually to bolster the Assad administration and help them had not. Indeed, while a pledge was made at the 2014
defeat the other rebel groups there. It is likely that to defeat Wales Summit for defence spending to meet a 2% of GDP
the group militarily in Iraq and Syria, ground forces will be target within a decade, the facts starkly illustrated the chal-
required at some point. lenge ahead. At end-2015, four NATO European states met
But in any case ISIS, and the groups around the world this fgure, and for the rest, a combined increase of around
that have pledged allegiance to it, cannot be eradicated US$100bn would be needed to meet that target in 2015.
solely by military means. Tackling these groups will require Meanwhile, without the boost to readiness to which the
multinational atention and the concerted and long-term 2% pledge, and the RAP, might lead, other questions arose
application of policies and tools blending political, mili- including how, then, to efectively deter further Russian
tary, security, information and development capacities, and revanchism. Looking towards the 2016 Warsaw Summit,
agreement on ends as well as means: the track record on boosting collective self-defence might remain an aspiration
such cooperation is mixed at best. for NATO, though achieving it remains a signifcant task.
6 THE MILIA R TY B A L A N CE 2016
But diferent models of coalitions and partnerships have, build Russia’s Su-27 and, a few years later, J-11 aircraft
of course, been well tested. Indeed, in the Middle East, states emerged that closely resembled the Su-27. Whether the
there had also formed another coalition, this time to tackle Russians have managed to protect certain components of
the Houthi rebellion in Yemen. Led by Saudi Arabia, this the Su-35 is unclear, as is whether they have instead decided
coalition broadly consisted of GCC states, although other that the sale is more important than the technology at a
nations were involved. In that region, a confuence of crises time when Russia is investing in ffth-generation platforms
meant that there were greater imperatives than before for such as that envisaged to meet the PAK-FA combat-aircraft
practical cooperation among regional states. Facing a near- requirement.
victory by Houthi forces in Yemen in March 2015, these Nonetheless, in a year when China’s armed forces
countries decided to take action themselves. There was a displayed yet more advanced military hardware at the
growing maturity about these military operations, as well September Victory Day parade, the Su-35 announcement will
as a more overt acknowledgement of the risks inherent in only heighten anxiety among certain regional states. China’s
them. For states that increasingly see the armed forces as a 2015 White Paper exemplifed Beijing’s growing emphasis
tool to be used in support of national-security objectives, the on the space and cyber domains, but also the maritime
lessons identifed from deployments – and ensuring that the arena. In Asia, tensions escalated during 2015 over China’s
armed forces learn from them – will be valuable. accelerating construction activities on features it occupied in
Middle Eastern armed forces displayed growing mili- the South China Sea. There was an evident military aspect to
tary activism during the Yemen operation, and although these activities. Regional states concerned by this, and which
a range of precision munitions formed part of regional air had the means, were looking to bolster their capabilities. The
forces’ load-outs, there was sustained criticism over aerial US was doing the same. Washington in 2015 made a point of
targeting, which observers atributed to, among other saying that its ‘rebalance’ was continuing and that it would
things, a dearth of joint terminal atack controllers. Saudi deploy its fnest maritime capabilities forward in the Asia-
Patriot missiles destroyed incoming Scuds fred from Yemen Pacifc, but China’s accelerating capability developments,
and there was a signifcant deployment of combat aircraft including anti-access capabilities, would be likely to compli-
and land forces. However, Iran remained a principal threat cate Washington’s plans for regional contingencies.
driver for regional states and while there was cooperation Aware that its technological edge was being eroded
during the campaign in Yemen, developing this within by the increasing difusion of advanced capabilities,
the GCC for other concerns, such as coordinating missile- Washington looked to innovate and generate a new edge. As
defence assets to counter Iran’s ballistic-missile arsenal, part of the ‘Third Ofset’, the Pentagon created the Defense
remained a slower process. Information Unit–Experimental, to help it leverage best
Further north, Russia’s armed forces were also utilising lessons from Silicon Valley on issues like big data, analytics,
advanced weaponry in Moscow’s new Syria campaign. autonomy and robotics. Innovative technological develop-
Russia had earlier displayed its modernising armed forces ments in the 1970s were, the Pentagon said, more often than
during Moscow’s May Victory Day parade. Kh-555 and not driven by government programmes; much innovation
Kh-101 cruise missiles were among the munitions launched was now being driven by business, and many dual-use
at anti-Assad and ISIS forces by Tu-95MS and Tu-160 stra- capabilities had their origins in the commercial sector.
tegic bombers in November, while Russian naval vessels in But these technologies are not being pursued solely with
the Caspian Sea launched 3M14 Kalibr NK cruise missiles. a view to peer competition; rather, they are seen as having
Other aircraft fying from Russian bases, including Tu-22s, utility across the full spectrum of confict, able as much to
as well as Russia’s forward-deployed air power, used a leverage big-data analytics to trawl social-media posts by a
mix of dumb bombs and GPS-guided weapons. The whole terrorist group, as to generate more efective and devolved
operation would, in time, allow analysts an insight into ISR coverage, or produce systems to beter enable concepts
the performance of Russia’s air force similar to that for its like prompt global strike. In all this, though, there are
ground forces after operations in Ukraine; its risks were laid continuities. Interoperability will always be central within
bare by the downing of an Su-24 in November. However, forces and between allies, and while advanced capabili-
much of Russia’s display of military prowess seemed aimed ties might create military efect, they cannot by themselves
not only at degrading the capability of Assad’s enemies, secure territory and populations. Doing this requires similar
but also at messaging the West and potential customers investments in security as a whole as well as beter policy
of Russia’s high-tech military products, evidenced by the development and improved planning and coordination
quality of the broadcast footage and the similarity of some within and between nations. It also needs sustained invest-
night-time launch shots to those of US Tomahawk cruise- ment in combat training coupled with more specialist skills
missile launches. Indeed, Russia’s defence exports notched across government and the civil sector enabling personnel
up a signifcant success in November, with the contract to burnish profciencies in languages, regional and cultural
inked to sell Su-35 combat aircraft to China. specialisms and intelligence analysis. The goal is for poli-
This would constitute yet another capability enhance- cymakers to receive the best possible military and security
ment for China’s air force, which displays its domestic ffth- advice for each contingency, to complement and inform any
generation combat-aircraft aspirations in the J-20 and ‘J-31’ possible use they might consider making of the increasingly
programmes. Twenty years ago, China agreed to licence- capable toolkit that will be at their disposal.
Chapter One
Armoured fghting vehicles: renewed
relevance; technological progress
The year 2015 saw the hundredth anniversary of the nology armoured forces could comprehensively over-
frst prototype tank, a vehicle originally designed match less modern armoured forces. However, initial
to provide infantry with fre support and to breach operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were followed by
barbed wire and cross trenches. In 1918, two years long-running and complex insurgencies and subse-
after British tanks frst appeared on the batlefeld, quent counter-insurgency campaigns where inter-
the United Kingdom was developing armoured national forces at frst struggled to adapt. Indeed,
personnel carriers (APCs) to transport accompanying counter-insurgency activities in Iraq and Afghanistan
infantry. Subsequent decades saw a steady growth often saw fghting as intense as that experienced in
in the roles undertaken by armoured fghting vehi- the Second World War and the Korean War. Infantry
cles (AFVs), as well as in the numbers felded, and was essential, as were the armoured infantry fghting
they dominated ground combat in some theatres of vehicles (AIFVs), APCs or Mine-Resistant Ambush-
confict in the twentieth century. Protected (MRAP) vehicles in which troops travelled.
There have been signifcant developments in the Along with tanks, they provided useful supporting
capabilities and tactics deployed to defeat AFVs, but frepower.
there have also been considerable advances in the The unanticipated scale and resulting casual-
technical sophistication of the vehicles themselves, ties from the improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
as well as their frepower, protection and mobility. used by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan – when
Indeed, though their continued utility has sometimes coupled with the unpopularity of the wars – meant
been questioned, AFVs remain vital capabilities for that force protection became the top priority for the
military forces, and in an increasingly complex and US and coalition armies (see The Military Balance
contested security environment will continue to 2015, p. 19). This in turn led to the development and
constitute one of the principal means of delivering felding of new equipment, including new heavy
military efect on land. protected patrol vehicles – such as the US MRAP –
and a wide variety of counter-IED materiel, including
Armour since 9/11: threat and response specialist armoured vehicles, armoured excava-
AFVs have played a signifcant role in military tors and, in the fnal stages of the NATO-led ISAF
operations over the past decade, including in the mission in Afghanistan, full-sized remotely operated
2003 American-led invasion of Iraq, the 2006 war armoured vehicles.
in Lebanon between Israel and Hizbullah, the 2008 Indeed, an action–reaction dynamic developed
confict between Russia and Georgia, and the war between insurgents deploying greater frepower and
in Afghanistan since 2001. They have also been more sophisticated IEDs, on the one hand, and design
employed in such theatres as the 2013 French inter- and technological measures intended to beter protect
vention in Mali, the repeated wars between Israel and AFVs, on the other. But these increasing require-
Hamas, and wars in eastern Ukraine and Syria. AFVs ments for additional protection, electronic jammers,
are also employed by many forces deployed on inter- remotely operated external weapons and air condi-
national peacekeeping and peace-support missions, tioning meant that armoured vehicles got heavier. In
mainly to improve protection. the US Army, for example:
The First Gulf War in 1990–91, the initial stages of
the US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and • The M1 Abrams main batle tank (MBT)
the 2011 international intervention in Libya, showed received upgraded belly armour, reactive
the vulnerability of AFVs to an opponent with air tile armour, improved protection for the
superiority and precision weapons. The opening driver’s seat and gunner’s hatch, and elec-
stages of 2003’s Operation Iraqi Freedom showed that tronic countermeasures (ECM). As a conse-
well-trained, modern and networked high-tech- quence, the vehicle’s weight increased from
8 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2016
62 tonnes to 71–76 tonnes, depending on the tion against mines and roadside bombs by
variant. defecting the blast wave.
• The weight of the Bradley AIFV increased Many of these enhancements are now being retro-
from 25 tonnes to almost 41 tonnes. Despite fted to the entire Abrams, Bradley and Stryker feets
improved suspension, this additional weight as part of extensive mid-life update programmes; it
meant that ground clearance was reduced is envisaged that all three vehicles will provide the
from 46cm to 28cm. core US AFV capability for the foreseeable future. The
• Stryker wheeled APCs received additional US is also to replace the many 1960s-era M113 APCs
armour and ECM, and many were upgraded still in service in support roles with a new Armoured
so that the hull was altered to a ‘double-V’ Multi-Purpose Vehicle based on reworked Bradleys.
confguration, designed to improve protec- Additionally, the ubiquitous un-armoured HMMWV
noit om VFA naisuR asinred
In 2015, midway through an ambitious rearmament T-15 heavy IFV
programme, Russia unveiled prototypes of three new Armata also forms the basis for the T-15 heavy IFV, with
armoured vehicle platforms: Armata, Kurganets-25 and the engine relocated to the front to provide troop-
Bumerang. If accepted for serial production these could carrying capability and access at the rear. The T-15 is
form the mainstay of Russian armoured forces in future Russia’s latest attempt to produce a heavy IFV, after the
decades, replacing diverse Soviet-era legacy systems. lighter BMP-series IFVs were found lacking in both ar-
Each platform provides the base for multiple variants mour and frepower during the conficts in Afghanistan
which, while they share common components and sub- and Chechnya. Providing MBT-level protection comple-
systems, will perform distinct roles in their respective mented by APS, the T-15 uses the Epoch Almaty remote
weight and mobility classes. Some commonality also turret armed with a 30mm automatic cannon, 7.62mm
exists across the three platforms’ weapon systems. For coaxial machine gun and four Kornet ATGM launchers.
example, the observed Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)
T-16 ARV
variants of each carry the same Epoch Almaty remote
The T-16, also known as BREM-T, is an Armoured Re-
turret. This increased level of standardisation ofers
covery Vehicle (ARV) based on the Armata platform. It
benefts in terms of production, maintenance and op-
features improved defensive armament over its prede-
eration.
cessors, mounting a 12.7mm remote weapons station.
Armata
2S35 SPG
There are reportedly a dozen variants of the heavy
It is believed that the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV Self-Propelled
tracked Armata platform under consideration or de-
Gun will also be based on Armata, although the ob-
velopment. Many will likely perform non-combat roles,
served 152mm gun turret intended for the 2S35 has
and only the following four variants have yet been ob-
yet to be seen integrated with the Armata chassis.
served:
Kurganets2- 5
T-14 MBT
The lighter tracked Kurganets-25 platform has been ob-
On its entry into service, Armata in its principal T-14
served in both the APC and more heavily armed IFV vari-
MBT variant will be the frst all-new Russian tank for
ants, although others are expected. On service entry, it
40 years; hitherto, Moscow has relied primarily on up-
will gradually replace the ageing BMP-series of vehicles
graded T-72 variants. Its crewless turret is a revolution-
and potentially other tracked series such as the MT-LB.
ary development for an operational tank, potentially
delivering better protection for a crew now situated Bumerang
in a smaller compartment embedded within the front The 8x8 wheeled, amphibious Bumerang, projected as
chassis. Not having a crew in the turret might also en- a BTR-80 series replacement, also appears initially in the
able the placement of a larger-calibre gun, with re- APC and IFV roles, with the same weapons stations as the
ports that the current 125mm smooth-bore main gun tracked Kurganets-25 system. In a signifcant departure
could be later upgraded to 152mm. The prototypes from its predecessors, it has a front-mounted engine en-
also integrate a hard-kill APS, designed to physically abling troop ingress at the rear of the vehicle. This is in con-
intercept incoming projectiles such as ATGW and RPG trast to the more exposed, and often criticised, side access
rounds. on the BTR-60/-70/-80 series.
Armoured fghting vehicles 9
light utility vehicle, which initially received ad hoc from the outset with integral APS, as observed on its
and later systematic armour retrofting in Iraq and Armata T-14 prototype displayed in 2015.
Afghanistan, is to be replaced by the fully armoured
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. Contemporary feets
A similar emphasis on AFV protection can be seen Developing new AFVs can be expensive and tech-
in other NATO armies. The latest German Leopard 2A7 nologically demanding; after costly wars in Iraq and
MBT incorporates similar upgrades to those planned Afghanistan and the 2008 global fnancial crisis, the
for the M1 Abrams. Improved protection was fted to US and many NATO countries have cancelled or
UK Warrior AIFVs employed in Afghanistan, which delayed new AFV types – including the US Future
increased the vehicles’ base weight from 27 tonnes to Combat System and the UK Future Rapid Efects
40 tonnes by 2010. Furthermore, Warrior is to undergo System. Today, it remains difcult to get the require-
a mid-life update (the Warrior Capability Sustainment ment right, and to develop an efective platform that
Programme), which includes modular armour ofers both value for money and upgrade potential.
allowing diferent confgurations for diferent threat In future, increasing complexity, as well as tactical
environments, improved digitisation, a new turret and technical ambition, may make this task harder
and the fting of the new CT40 weapon system. still.
Other states with signifcant armoured feets are AFVs often now serve for much longer than was
also adding more sophisticated protection. Israel, predicted when they entered service, and often in
for instance, has long emphasised protection as a very diferent roles and theatres than at frst envis-
primary requirement for its AFVs and has deployed aged – as shown in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
the Namer heavy APC with tank levels of protection This means that capability upgrades have increased
based on the Merkava MBT chassis. Earlier, it felded in importance. Indeed, many countries are contin-
the Achzarit heavy APC based on the T-55 hull, and uing to upgrade existing vehicles, even as they move
the Nagmachon and Nakpadon based on the Centurion to procure replacements. The British Army, for
Sho’t hull. example, is upgrading its Challenger 2 MBT feet and
However, improved protection for AFVs now has contracted to purchase the new Ajax armoured
takes many forms. While reactive armour has long reconnaissance vehicle. France, meanwhile, has intro-
been employed to counter incoming projectiles, duced the VBCI wheeled AIFV and has an ambi-
Israel has been among the states pioneering the use tious programme for new wheeled APCs and combat
of active protection systems (APS). An APS can take reconnaissance vehicles. Germany is introducing the
the form of ‘hard-kill’ or ‘soft-kill’ systems: the former Boxer wheeled APC and tracked Puma AIFV. Both
consists of a device designed to physically intercept countries have agreed to jointly develop a new MBT
an incoming projectile; the later involves the use of to replace the Leclerc and Leopard 2. Poland has ambi-
systems like ECM or electro-optical interference to try tious plans for a wide range of new wheeled and
to disrupt or degrade ofensive capabilities. tracked AFVs.
The Israel Defense Forces have responded to While some of these programmes are driven by
Hizbullah’s efective use of anti-armour weapons, feet requirements, others are motivated by geopo-
and anti-armour threats faced in recent Gaza litical priorities. The Ukraine crisis has not only had
campaigns, by fting the Trophy APS to its already an efect on European defence spending, it has also
heavily armoured Merkava MkIV MBT (see The infuenced some European states’ armoured ambi-
Military Balance 2015, p. 312). On operations, Trophy tions. Germany has bought back 100 Leopard 2 tanks
has proved capable of destroying incoming rocket- from manufacturer KMW, Lithuania is reportedly
propelled grenade (RPG) warheads and Kornet anti- interested in acquiring Boxer APCs and Latvia is
tank guided weapons (ATGW). purchasing ex-British Army Scimitar and Spartan
However, Israel is far from the frst nation to armoured reconnaissance vehicles.
employ APS on armour. Russia was at the forefront of Armour is also a key area of capability develop-
these developments in the 1970s, with its Drozd hard- ment in other parts of the world. Even with modest
kill system reportedly tested on some tanks deployed additional AFV purchases and upgrades announced
to Afghanistan, and later capabilities like the Arena in 2014–15, US and European AFV industries have
hard-kill and Shtora soft-kill systems. Today, Russia considerable excess production capacity and have
is believed to be the frst nation to design a vehicle been increasing eforts to export AFVs to Latin
10 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2016
America, the Middle East and Asia. These have met armoured forces. For example, successful felding of
with some success, including the sale of US, French APS has the potential to change current armour/anti-
and German AFVs to Egypt and Gulf states. However, armour dynamics, with systems such as the Israeli
the export endeavours of Western AFV manufac- Trophy displaying the ability to engage incoming
turers often have to compete with locally produced ATGW and unguided anti-armour weapons with
systems as well as vigorous Russian and Chinese hard-kill capabilities. Current APS may be countered
eforts to export their AFVs. by simultaneous volleys of ATGW or RPGs fred to
Both Russian and Chinese AFVs are highly compet- overmatch defences, but the overall efectiveness
itively priced. Although often less well protected than of these weapons will be considerably reduced by
their Western counterparts, they have traditionally modern APS.
been lighter, simpler and easier to use. This has made Current APS are unable to defeat high-velocity
them very atractive globally. For example, the large anti-tank projectiles fred from guns – a situation
Indian armoured forces are almost entirely equipped likely to continue for some time. Consequently,
with Russian AFVs, while Pakistan makes great use armies that have to counter AFVs fted with APS will
of Chinese systems. African armed forces also have fnd the guns on tanks and the cannons on AIFVs of
signifcant amounts of Russian and Chinese armour. increasing importance. As such, there is a potential
Many African armies consider AFVs heavier than 30 for an action–reaction dynamic emerging in AFV and
tonnes unsuited for African roads and bridges, and anti-armour technology and tactics.
their armoured forces’ missions might not require AFV feets in the US, NATO allies and Russia
the levels of protection seen in Western systems. That greatly reduced in number after the Cold War.
said, the fact that many of these systems are decades However, as long as NATO perceives Russia’s
old also indicates that Cold War politics, as well as modernising AFV capability as a potential threat
capability requirements, played some part in feet – whether or not in Russian service – Western AFV
development. feets are unlikely to further reduce. This is particu-
However, Russia is now displaying prototypes larly true of tank feets. In fact, the so-far relatively
of a new range of AFVs that appear both beter modest increases in modern AFV holdings in Europe
protected and heavier than its previous systems. The may continue.
Armata system, in particular, is a radical departure Globally, the modernisation of AFV feets is likely
from previous Russian tank designs (see p. 167.). to continue with a combination of upgrade and
replacement. Overall – given emerging technical
stnempole v ed e rutu F developments – armoured warfare, armoured forces
If it is successfully introduced into service, Armata and AFVs are likely to still constitute key land-force
will have considerable impact, not least on NATO capabilities for the foreseeable future.
C hina’s ballistic missil es:
more systems; improved designs
At its September 2015 military parade commemo- range of 3,500 kilometres, emerged on the Chinese
rating the 70th anniversary of victory in the Second internet shortly after that. China is also reported to be
World War, China showed several new or upgraded continuing to test what could be a MIRV-ed version
ballistic-missile systems for the frst time. The appear- of the DF-31, known as the DF-31B, which also uses a
ance of weapons including the DF-26 intermediate- new transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle.
range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the DF-5B (US
reporting name: CSS-4 Mod. 3) liquid-fuelled inter- MIRV progress
continental ballistic missile (ICBM) served as a The development and adoption of MIRV-ed warheads
reminder that Beijing is continuing to make signif- could be part of an efort to ensure a second-strike
cant strides in ballistic-missile research and develop- capability sufciently damaging to be a credible
ment (R&D). deterrent. The US DoD assessed in its 2015 report
Given the lack of transparency concerning China’s that: ‘China will likely continue to invest consider-
strategic weapons, there has been long-standing able resources to maintain a limited, but survivable,
uncertainty over the nature of its strategic R&D proj- nuclear force to ensure the PLA [People’s Liberation
ects, whether it was capable of bringing them all to Army] can deliver a damaging responsive nuclear
fruition and what impact these programmes would strike.’ A further example of this efort is the WU-14
have on the structure and capability of the country’s hypersonic glide vehicle, which increases the chal-
nuclear forces. The limited deployment of the DF-31A lenge for China’s opponents of defending efectively
(CSS-10) ICBM and long-running difculties with against a mixed strike possibly comprising ballistic
the JL-2 (CSS-NX-14) submarine-launched ballistic- re-entry vehicles and glide bodies.
missile (SLBM) programme, for example, served to The WU-14 project also poses an interesting ques-
underscore this caution. tion about future elements of China’s overall ICBM
In recent years, however, it has become increas- programme. Hypersonic glide vehicles – ultra-high-
ingly clear that China continues to make headway speed warhead carriers – will almost certainly be
in the technical ambition of its strategic systems. The signifcantly heavier and larger than the current
JL-2, successor to China’s frst SLBM, the JL-1, is on re-entry vehicles used on ICBMs. In Russia, the devel-
the brink of a frst operational deployment on board opment of a hypersonic vehicle, the so-called ‘Project
one of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 4202’, likely served as a trigger for the development
Jin-class ballistic-missile submarines, according to the of the Strategic Rocket Forces’ liquid-fuelled Sarmat
US Ofce of Naval Intelligence. The US Department of ICBM. None of the Chinese solid-fuelled ICBMs
Defense (DoD) also claimed in its 2015 annual assess- currently in production or development are capable
ment of Chinese military capability that the DF-5B of carrying such a vehicle. It remains unclear whether
ICBM had been deployed with a multiple indepen- China will look to a liquid-fuelled system, such as the
dently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capability. DF-5, as the basis for an operational delivery system
A key system absent from the 2015 parade was for the WU-14.
the solid-fuelled DF-41 (CSS-X-20) ICBM, which Alongside an improved ballistic-missile arsenal,
remains in the test and development phase. This is there are growing indications that Beijing intends to
a road-mobile ICBM that will almost certainly be create a more capable air element of its nuclear triad.
MIRV-capable. Further evidence of progress on this An article in the ofcial China Daily newspaper in July
signifcant project could be gleaned from an August 2015 discussed the air force’s need for an advanced
2014 comment on the website of the Shaanxi provin- long-range bomber. At present, China manufactures
cial government’s environmental-monitoring centre, the Xian H-6K bomber, an upgraded version of the
which mentioned a second stage in the expansion of Russian Tu-16 Badger. The H-6K has been fted with
production capacity at a facility associated with the the Russian D-30KP2 turbofan engine, and has a modi-
DF-41. Photos of the DF-26 IRBM, with an estimated fed airframe and an improved avionics suite. It also
12 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2016
carries the DH-20 land-atack cruise missile, which frms’ precise business focus is complicated because
may be nuclear-capable. The H-6K, however, is an some strategic-weapons companies are atempting
interim solution, and there is widespread speculation to expand their activity in the realm of conventional
that China is working on a new bomber programme. tactical weapons. Unlike the conventional-weapons
The scale of China’s strategic-weapons R&D sector, though, the strategic-weapons industry is
currently places it more on a level with the United centralised and relatively free from competition,
States and Russia than the United Kingdom and enabling it to concentrate eforts on a limited number
France, although its warhead holdings, assuming a of programmes. Meanwhile, conventional-weapons
conservative estimate, are not much larger than those producers expend signifcant resources developing
later states. Many of China’s missiles appear to be competing systems. However, corporate entities that
equipped with conventional warheads. Progress in compete in tactical-weapons development often work
China’s missile-development projects, however, together on strategic systems.
including the deployment of MIRVs, will likely result
in its warhead stocks increasing. Whether Beijing will snoit asinag ro y e K
adhere to what it views as a minimum credible deter- The Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics
rent remains an open question, although there is litle (CAEP) is responsible for the design and produc-
evidence that it has any intention to eventually move tion of nuclear weapons. With 23,000 employees,
towards parity with the US and Russia. Changes in according to the CAEP website, it appears to be larger
China’s strategic deterrent will also have implications than the two US nuclear-weapons-related national
for how it stores its warhead stockpile. For decades laboratories combined. But like those facilities (the
it has been assumed that warheads and delivery Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national labo-
systems were held separately, with warhead storage ratories), CAEP is responsible for many research proj-
and maintenance overseen by a unit of the Second ects that are not directly related to nuclear-weapons
Artillery known as Base 22. Such an approach might programmes. CAEP projects include, for example,
have been appropriate when the country’s primary tactical-weapons-related laser technology, while
deterrent force was built on a liquid-fuelled ICBM, others are purely civilian in nature. But there is a
but introducing a sea-based nuclear component botleneck in China’s nuclear-weapons complex: the
implies that Beijing will have to consider changes in main warhead fnal-assembly facility.
warhead holdings and management. This plant, called Factory 903 or the Sichuan
Institute of Materials and Technology, is located 40km
paeces sno cige t ro w- a t rt S from the city of Myanyang and employs more than
China’s strategic-weapons industry is undergoing 1,000 staf. It has an aggressive and rigorous recruit-
signifcant change. While R&D capacity might be ment policy designed to employ some of China’s
broadly comparable to that of the US or Russia, the best scientists; around one-ffth of its staf hold PhDs,
sector has hitherto been dependent on a limited and it boasts at least three members of the Chinese
number of key production facilities. These appear Academy of Engineering.
smaller in scale than similar facilities in Russia, The China Aerospace Science and Technology
and they have run a large number of diferent Corporation (CASC) and China Aerospace Science
programmes. This began to change at the beginning and Industry Corporation (CASIC) cooperate at the
of the decade. Existing facilities were expanded, and heart of Chinese strategic-ballistic-missile manu-
corporate restructuring led to additional resources facture, though they are rivals in the tactical-missile
being concentrated in the sector. sector. Both are highly diversifed industrial corpo-
The sector’s two main branches are the nuclear- rations that garner signifcant revenue from the
weapons industry and the missile industry. The scale commercial sector, and are divided into several
of both can be assessed broadly by using publicly so-called ‘academies’ – specialised subsidiary compa-
available materials on Chinese corporate, educational nies. Together, they produce a variety of space
and HR services websites, which contain information systems and most of China’s tactical missiles.
on the number of employees, locations and profle of Though many CASC and CASIC industrial units
work of each enterprise. It is easier to track develop- are involved in China’s strategic programmes, the
ments in the missile industry, as it is more open in few that have strategic projects as their principal task
its commercial activities but overall, assessment of require special focus, specifcally the 4th Academy of
China’s ballistic missiles 13
CASIC, responsible for the overall design and fnal Academy of Aerospace Solid Propulsion Technology
production of long-range solid-fuelled missiles, and Also known as CASC’s 4th Academy, this concern
the handful of research institutes and factories in the produces large-diameter rocket motors for solid-
1st and 4th Academies of CASC. fuelled ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles.
Located in Xi’an, it is the major national centre of
Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) expertise for solid-fuelled-propulsion development

Also known as CASC’s 1st Academy, CALT has in general and is likely responsible for the frst- and
28,000 staf and its primary role is the manufacture second-stage motors of the DF-31 and DF-41 ICBMs
of space-launch vehicles. CALT used to be respon- and the JL-2 SLBM. In fact, it concentrates on ICBM
sible for China’s liquid-fuelled ballistic-missile and SLBM work. Like CALT, the CASC 4th Academy
programmes and, while Beijing appears to have has one key R&D facility – Research Institute 41 –
halted production of liquid-fuelled systems, existing which is responsible for the design of solid-fuelled
weapons such as the DF-4 and DF-5 still require rocket motors and also conducts independent R&D
maintenance and upgrade. This work is carried out projects on tactical missiles. Its Research Institute 42
by CALT’s Factory 211, which is also known as the is responsible for the development of new types of
Beijing Space Machinery Factory. The plant is also solid fuel, while Institute 43 develops and produces
responsible for the fnal assembly of the solid-fuelled composite materials and components used in the
JL-2 SLBM and DF-31 ICBM. CALT’s involvement construction of solid-rocket motors. The main produc-
in submarine-launched systems dates back to 1986, tion facilities, located in Xi’an, are Factory 7414, which
when it was given development responsibility for the is responsible for fabricating metal components for
JL-2 – even though it lacked experience in submarine- engines, and Factory 7416 (Xi’an Aerospace Chemical
launched systems (the JL-1 SLBM had been devel- Propulsion Plant), which is responsible for the fnal
oped by CASIC’s 4th Academy). assembly of rocket engines.
Work on ICBMs is, for CALT, a task now second
only in importance to the production of space-launch China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation
systems, and the frm is now responsible for the fnal (CASIC)
assembly of solid-fuelled ICBMs. CALT does not Like CASC, CASIC is a diversifed organisation that is
produce engines for solid-fuelled rockets, however; similarly subdivided into specialised academies and
production of these is split between the CASIC 6th research organisations. CASIC’s 4th Academy is the
Academy and the CASC 4th Academy. CALT’s key main centre of expertise for the development of solid-
research facility, the 1st General Design Bureau, fuelled missiles and is responsible for the overall
remains one of the centres of expertise in ballistic- design and fnal assembly of solid-fuelled IRBMs.
missile design. Other important contributors, all The 4th Academy developed the JL-1 SLBM and the
Beijing-based, include: Research Institute 12, special- DF-21, China’s frst mobile solid-fuel medium-range
ising in missile-control systems; Research Institute 14, ballistic missile (MRBM), and is likely responsible for
responsible for strategic-missile re-entry vehicles; and the new DF-26 IRBM. Indeed, its production facili-
Research Institute 15, which produces ground-launch ties are perhaps the main determinant for the pace of
equipment, including TELs. growth in China’s IRBM inventory.
Another signifcant production facility is Factory The concern was merged with CASIC’s 9th
519 – located in Changzhi, in Shanxi Province – which Academy in 2011; the later was responsible for
is responsible for the production of launch equipment the DF-11 (CSS-7) short-range missile system. The
for both space-launch vehicles and ballistic missiles. merger tripled the size of the 4th Academy. The new
Indeed, while CALT production and research facili- corporation was still known as the 4th Academy, but
ties play an important role in strategic-weapons it changed its name to the ‘CASIC Sanjiang Group’
production programmes, with some also working on and moved to Wuhan. The company has the capa-
projects being implemented by CASIC, its production bility to design, assemble and produce a number of
capabilities now appear to be mostly dedicated to the critical subsystems for solid-fuelled ballistic missiles,
space programme. For instance, Factory 211’s main including some types of re-entry vehicle.
responsibility is the fnal assembly of Long March Medium-diameter solid-fuelled rocket motors
rockets, and the facility assembled 122 space-launch used on ballistic missiles are the responsibility of
vehicles between 1970 and 2012. CASIC’s 6th Academy, headquartered in the Inner