The Military Balance 2011 (IISS)

407 Pages·20.967 MB·English

The Military Balance 2011
Editor’s Foreword
The Military Balance 2011 is a comprehensive and indepen- include conventional state-on-state conflict, combating
dent assessment of the military capabilities and defence asymmetric threats, counter-insurgency, cyber warfare,
economics of 170 territories. It is also a reference work on humanitarian operations and partner training activities.
developments in global military and security affairs. This increasingly complex environment was indicated in
Operations in Afghanistan remain of central impor- the criticism levelled at the US Quadrennial Defense Review
tance to the military and political establishments of NATO (QDR), both at the time it was published in February
members and other troop-contributing countries, as well 2010 and afterwards by the QDR Independent Panel (also
as those of regional states. As an essay (pp. 9–19) notes, for mandated by Congress). The QDR, the panel said, did not
NATO and the Afghan government the campaign is a race provide the ‘kind of long-term planning document that
against the clock to improve security; expand the Afghan Congress envisioned when it enacted the QDR requirement’.
National Security Forces’ (ANSF) capabilities; develop The panel recommended a sweeping overhaul of the Cold
the capacity of the Afghan state; reduce corruption; and War-era defence framework that was designed to address
persuade ‘reconcilable’ Taliban to lay down their arms. the Soviet Union. While the panel’s conclusions may in part
All of this must be done in time to meet the objective of reflect changing US strategic priorities as China continues
NATO and Afghan President Hamid Karzai that the ANSF to emerge as a potential strategic competitor, the range and
should take responsibility for security operations in all complexity of the security and military challenges faced by
provinces by the end of 2014. the administration may have complicated the presentation
The conflict in Afghanistan has other implications for of a clear set of messages in the QDR.
troop-contributing countries, particularly those affected The range of potential new tasks preoccupying mili-
by the global economic crisis. The nature of the military tary planners is daunting. For some states facing finan-
operations pursued there, with a heavy focus on counter- cial cutbacks, but with an actual or perceived global role,
insurgency, is leading many militaries to reconsider future boosting the capacity of partner nations to improve burden
force structures and procurement strategies. Some countries sharing may be one way of ensuring continued influence:
may feel that the financial and human cost of participation this was one conclusion of the British Strategic Defence and
in the conflict – at least in combat operations – outweigh the Security Review (SDSR) in 2010. Assisting the civil power at
benefits to be derived from such participation, leading to a home or in other countries in responding to humanitarian
desire to reduce troop levels. This is particularly the case emergencies is a task for which some segments of military
where purse-strings are being tightened as part of efforts to forces are suited in terms of their equipment and training.
reduce budget deficits following the 2008–09 financial crisis But are these tasks for which militaries facing budget cuts
– although not all countries are cutting spending. should retain a planning focus or particular capabilities?
Defence planning remains a matter of balancing risk The military dimension of cyberspace has been much
against political priority as well as available and projected discussed over the past year (see the essay pp. 27–32). In
funding. It is normal for these judgements to be based, response to rising concerns over the vulnerability of national
ostensibly at least, on assessments of the likely strategic situ- information and communication technology systems, many
ation decades ahead. This is perfectly understandable, but militaries are developing capabilities for assessing, coun-
it means that nations must retain enough military flexibility tering and, presumably, prosecuting operations in cyber-
and mass to adjust forces should the international environ- space. But this again is a grey area: the boundaries between
ment develop in a way that planners had not foreseen, or civil and military cyberspace are unclear, as is the role that
had placed in the ‘unlikely’ file. Some militaries are trying the military should have in this realm. In a developing
to anticipate such possibilities by developing modular land area with potential national security implications, it is
formations and increasing the acquisition of multi-role air perhaps unsurprising that militaries will seek to explore a
and sea platforms. Some states are also choosing to pursue potential role.
collaborative planning and procurement activities with allies In its new Strategic Concept agreed in November 2010,
in a bid to generate economies of scale. But this is not the NATO recognised cyberspace as an area that the Alliance
case for all nations, especially those whose strategic priori- should address. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh
ties focus on more traditional state-based threats. Rasmussen suggested that NATO could develop its own
The work of force planners is complicated by the range of cyber-defence capacity ‘including a deployable capability to
potential tasks that they now feel obliged to consider, which support Allies under cyber attack’. Pressed on this point in
6 ThE MiliTary BalancE 2011
October 2010, Rasmussen refused to rule out cyber attacks yses of the war in Afghanistan, developments in unmanned
as an Article V issue (where an armed attack against one aerial vehicles, and the military dimension of cyberspace.
or more members in Europe or North America ‘shall be In terms of regional data coverage, the section on Europe
considered an attack against them all’). Instead, he argued, now combines NATO and non-NATO Europe, while Asia
each situation had to be assessed by Allies on a case-by-case combines the previous South and Central Asia and East Asia
basis. But mention of such issues, together with the need to and Australasia sections, in order to better reflect the mili-
balance the divergent perspectives of NATO member states, tary and economic ties across these continents.
opened the Strategic Concept up to the criticism that – like Meanwhile, there has been a change in understanding
the QDR – it was unfocused and vague. of the factors constituting military capability. The Military
As militaries address an ever-expanding range of poten- Balance has traditionally focused on key combat capabilities
tial tasks, it is perhaps to be expected that they face criticism and equipment inventories. However, quantitative indica-
for losing focus on previously core roles. If armed forces are tors are of limited utility as indicators of military capability,
unsure of the range of potential contingencies they will face and we are consequently including more qualitative judge-
in future, the same is true of the policymakers who oversee ments. The Military Balance has historically applied caveats
them. There remains a tendency to try to direct forces, even if to equipment holdings such as ‘serviceability in doubt’,
these are reducing in size, to carry out an increasingly wide ‘combat capable’ and ‘in store’. This year we have adopted
range of tasks. But it is likely that, for some nations, current and added a new defintion for equipment judged obsoles-
force reductions and financial considerations will eventually cent, namely equipment whose basic design is 40 or more
necessitate hard decisions about levels of ambition and stra- years old and which has not been significantly upgraded
tegic priorities. Thus, the currently diffuse defence debate (factors which may limit its usefulness in conflict). So far this
in many countries, while perhaps reflecting contemporary definition has only been applied to guided weapons, but it is
strategic complexity, merely postpones the need for such intended to extend its usage, where relevant, across all mili-
decisions. Many militaries are being asked to do more with tary branches in the future.
less money, and with less focused strategic guidance. The 2011 edition also sees some equipment change cate-
gory in the air and naval inventories. In the air fleets, UAVs
Developments in The Military Balance are now broken down by weight, and transport fleets by
The complexity of global defence debates has over the years role, allowing the reader to determine more easily the partic-
been reflected in the content of The Military Balance. From ular capabilities available to nations using such equipment.
the first edition in 1959, an 11-page pamphlet entitled The For naval forces, a classification system has been developed
Soviet Union and the NATO Powers: The Military Balance, based on full-load displacement rather than role. This will
the book has increasingly enumerated military inventories allow for easier and more useful international comparisons
around the world. It has also displayed a growing appre- of navies according to the tonnage of vessels. (More detailed
ciation of military developments outside Europe and North information can be found in the Explanatory Notes begin-
America as significant in their own right and not simply in ning on p. 483.) For The Military Balance 2012, the IISS will
relation to the Western defence debate. The way the data has engage in a thorough reassessment of the presentation of
been presented has also changed, and this edition heralds a ground forces information.
period of further change to both the way the IISS presents its Looking towards the structure of future editions of
defence data, and the range of data presented. The Military Balance, it is planned to develop and expand
The newly constituted Defence and Military Analysis these qualitative judgements as well as graphical and
Programme at the IISS has implemented several changes tabular features, and to include further innovative means
to this year’s Military Balance. One of the key benefits of the of assessing and displaying defence data. We will of course
book has always been the ability it gives its users to generate retain the core inventory assessments that have proven of
comparisons between the military capabilities and defence such value to defence analysts and policymakers since the
economics of different nations. This remains a central objec- first Military Balance appeared. Indeed, there are arguments
tive in the Institute’s presentation of data within the book. for expanding the range of inventory information presented.
The Military Balance has long contained a reference segment The equipment categories traditionally counted remain
at the back of the book, where presentation of comparative of critical importance in assessing defence capability, but
information on military deployments and manpower, and consideration is being given to adding other categories of
defence economics, for example, has resided. information such as selected logistic assets. How effective
To this we have now added a new segment at the start of are armies, for instance, if they cannot effectively deploy
the book. These tabular and graphical features seek to high- and sustain their personnel or equipment, or force entry,
light key defence issues that are pertinent in light of current overcoming opposition forces, difficult terrain and logistical
defence issues, as well as particularly relevant thematic problems?
issues, inventory developments or comparisons between However, adding further content may mean that the
nations, and defence economic developments, that may not place of existing information has to be questioned. Feedback
have been analysed, presented or extrapolated in similar from readers has always been welcomed. Please address
formats elsewhere. This year’s essays comprise detailed anal- such communications to the editor, at [email protected].
Explanatory notes 7
The Military Balance 2011
Preface
The Military Balance is updated each year to provide an UsinG the military Balance
accurate assessment of the military forces and defence
economics of 170 countries. Each edition contributes In order to interpret the data in the country entries
to the provision of a unique compilation of data and correctly, it is essential to read the Explanatory Notes
information, enabling the reader to discern long-term beginning on page 483.
trends through a study of previous editions dating back The large quantity of data in The Military Balance has
to 1959. The data in the current edition are according been compressed into a portable volume by the exten-
to IISS assessments as at November 2010. Inclusion of sive employment of abbreviations. An essential tool is
a territory, country or state in The Military Balance does therefore the alphabetical index of abbreviations for data
not imply legal recognition or indicate support for any sections, which starts on page 491.
government.
attriBUtion and acknowledGements
General arranGement and
contents The International Institute for Strategic Studies owes no
allegiance to any government, group of governments, or
The Editor’s Foreword contains a general comment on any political or other organisation. Its assessments are its
defence matters and a summary of the book. own, based on the material available to it from a wide
The Military Balance comprises the regional trends, variety of sources. The cooperation of governments of
military capabilities and defence-economics data for all listed countries has been sought and, in many cases,
countries grouped by region. There are also three essays received. However, some data in The Military Balance are
at the front of the book on the war in Afghanistan, estimates.
unmanned aerial vehicles, and the military aspects of Care is taken to ensure that these data are as accu-
cyber security. Another essay on the modernisation rate and free from bias as possible. The Institute owes
of the Chinese defence industry is found in the Asia a considerable debt to a number of its own members,
chapter. Throughout, readers will find maps showing consultants and all those who help compile and check
selected deployments in Afghanistan; NATO’s member- material. The Director-General and Chief Executive
ship, cooperation and partnership programmes; new and staff of the Institute assume full responsibility
Russian military districts; Chinese military regions and for the data and judgements in this book. Comments
major formations; how Brazil’s national defence strategy and suggestions on the data and textual material
is affecting its army and navy; and piracy off the coast contained within the book, as well as on the style and
of Somalia. presentation of data, are welcomed and should be
There are also tables depicting aspects of defence communicated to the Editor of The Military Balance
activity, including salient comparative analyses, at: IISS, 13–15 Arundel Street, London WC2R 3DX,
selected major training exercises, non-UN and UN UK, email: [email protected]. Copyright on all informa-
multinational deployments, international defence tion in The Military Balance belongs strictly to the IISS.
expenditure, and the international arms trade. Application to reproduce limited amounts of data
The Chart of Conflict inserted loose into The Military may be made to the publisher: Taylor & Francis, 4 Park
Balance is updated to show data on recent and current Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN.
armed conflicts up to 1 November 2010. Email: [email protected]. Unauthorised use
of Military Balance data will be subject to legal action.
Index of TablEs
Essays sub-saharan africa
1 Selected UAV holdings 2011 ...........................................................24 21 South African Defence Budget by Programme,
2006–12 ...............................................................................................408
North america
2 2010 QDR: Main Elements of the US Force Structure .............43 22 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries,
Sub-Saharan Africa ..........................................................................450
3 DoD’s War Budget Authority by Title FY2009 (US$bn) ..........44
Country comparisons
4 Budget Authority for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global
23 UN Deployments 2010–11 ............................................................452
War on Terror Operations FY2001–FY2011 (US$bn) ...............45
24 Non-UN Deployments 2010–11 ..................................................458
5 US National Defense Budget Authority FY2008–FY2013 .....46
Index of contributing nations ......................................................463
6 Major US Research & Development FY2009–FY2011 ............48
25 Selected training activity 2010....................................................466
7 US National Defense Budget Function
and Other Selected Budgets 1992, 2001–11 .............................49 26 Strategic Forces Comparison .......................................................469
8 US Agency for International Development: 27 Global top ten defence budgets.................................................469
International Affairs Budget ...........................................................50
28 NATO Defence Budgets 2001-10 (in US$m) ............................470
9 Selected US Arms Orders .................................................................70
29 International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure
10 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Canada ...........72 and Military Manpower .................................................................471
12 Europe 30 Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations
0 11 EU Battlegroups 2010–14 .................................................................78 – Leading Recipients in 2009 .......................................................478
2
y 12 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Europe .........162 31 Arms Transfer Agree ments with Developing Nations
ul – Leading Recipients in 2009 .......................................................478
J Russia
04 13 Draft Russian National Defence Expenditure (Rm) ..............181 32 Global Arms Deliveries – Leading Suppliers in 2009 ...........478
09 14 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Russia ..........194 33 Global Arms Transfer Agreements
1: asia – Leading Suppliers in 2009 .........................................................478
at 0 15 China – Estimated Total Military-Related Funding 2009 ....198 34 VMaalurkee ot fS Ghaloreb ably A Srmupsp Tlrieanr, s2f0e0r 2A–g2re0e0m9 .e...n..t..s.. .a..n...d... . ..................478
46] 16 China’s First-Tier, State-Owned Defence Corporations .......203 35 Value of Global Arms Deliveries and Market Share by
2 17 Indian Defence Budget by Function, 2007–10 ......................213 Supplier, 2002–2009........................................................................478
2.
2 18 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Asia ...............283 36 Arms Deliveries to Middle East and North Africa,
6.1 Middle East and North africa by Supplier .........................................................................................479
21 19 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, 37 Selected Operational Military Satellites 2011 ........................480
8. Middle East and North Africa .......................................................337 Reference
7
1 latin america and the Caribbean 38 List of Abbreviations for Data Sections ...................................491
[
by 20 SLaetleinc tAemd eArrimcas a Pnrdo ctuhree Cmaernibtbs eaannd .D....e..l.i.v...e..r..i.e..s..,. . .......................392 39 General Principles of Naval Abbreviations
d 40 Index of Country/Territory Abbreviations ...............................495
e
d
a 41 Index of Countries and Territories .............................................496
o
nl Index of FIGUREs
w
o
D
1 US Defence Expenditure (Budget Authority) as % of GDP .....44 8 Middle East and North Africa Regional Defence
Expenditure as % of GDP ...............................................................294
2 NATO Europe Regional Defence Expenditure as % of GDP ....79
9 Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Defence
3 UK–France Warship and Aircraft Inventory Trends
Expenditure as % of GDP ...............................................................344
2000–10 ..................................................................................................81
10 Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Defence Expenditure
4 Non-NATO Europe Regional Defence Expenditure
as % of GDP ........................................................................................397
as % of GDP ...........................................................................................83
11 UN Forces 2010 (Deployed %, in countries with
5 Estimated Russian Defence Expenditure as % of GDP ........180
over 2,000 deployed) ......................................................................465
6 South and Central Asia Regional Defence Expenditure
12 Non-UN Forces 2010 (Deployed %, in countries
as % of GDP ........................................................................................215
with over 2,000 deployed) ............................................................465
7 Southeast Asia and Australasia Regional Defence
13 Regional share of UN deployed armed forces 2010 ............465
Expenditure as % of GDP ...............................................................219
Index of Maps
1 Afghanistan ...........................................................................................19 4 China: Military Regions and Major Formations .....................197
2 NATO’s Members, Cooperation and Partnership 5 Brazil’s National Defence Strategy:
Programmes ..........................................................................................75 Army and Navy Plans ......................................................................346
3 Russian Military Commands .........................................................175 6 Piracy off the Coast of Somalia ....................................................403
Chapter Two
Comparative major defence statistics
Key nations’ defence budgets 2008–11
(as a percentage of GDP, US$bn)
US China
696.3 Defence budget 693.6 Defence budget 692.8 60.1 Defence budget 70.4 Defence budget 76.4
(4.9) Defence as % of GDP (4.9) Defence as % of GDP (4.7) (1.4) Defence as % of GDP (1.4) Defence as % of GDP (1.3)
2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11
GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP
14,264 14,119 14,624 4,422 4,984 5,733
2
1 UK Japan
0
y 2 (721.7.)4 DeDfeenfceen aces %bu odf gGeDtP (26.80).5 DeDfeenfceen aces %bu odf gGeDtP (25.56).5 (406.9) DeDfeenfceen aces %bu odf gGeDtP (510.0.)3 DeDfeenfceen aces %bu odf gGeDtP (512.0.)8
ul
J
4
0
4 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11
1 GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP
1: 2,670 2,179 2,255 4,926 5,075 5,387
0
at
]
6
4
2
2.
2 France Germany
1
6. 44.6 Defence budget 46.0 Defence budget 42.6 43.3 Defence budget 43.5 Defence budget 41.2
1 (1.6) Defence as % of GDP (1.7) Defence as % of GDP (1.6) (1.2) Defence as % of GDP (1.3) Defence as % of GDP (1.2)
2
8.
7
1
y [ 20G0D8–P09 20G0D9–P10 20G1D0–P11 20G0D8–P09 20G0D9–P10 20G1D0–P11
b
d 2,863 2,656 2,587 3,659 3,339 3,346
e
d
a
o
nl
w
o
D Saudi Arabia Russia
38.2 Defence budget 41.3 Defence budget 45.2 40.5 Defence budget 38.3 Defence budget 41.4
(8.1) Defence as % of GDP (11.0) Defence as % of GDP(10.4) (2.4) Defence as % of GDP (3.1) Defence as % of GDP (2.8)
2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11
GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP
469 376 434 1,680 1,236 1,488
India Brazil
28.4 Defence budget 34.4 Defence budget 38.4 23.3 Defence budget 28.0 Defence budget 34.7
(2.3) Defence as % of GDP (2.8) Defence as % of GDP (2.5) (1.5) Defence as % of GDP (1.8) Defence as % of GDP (1.7)
2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11
GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP
1,223 1,231 1,545 1,579 1,592 2,039
34 The MiliTary BalanCe 2011
Aggregate combat power
Economic Manoeuvre Projection China France India Russia UK US
Modern main battle tanks Aircraft cruisers (10 per unit)
Defence Budget, (1,000 vehicles per unit) 1 1 1 1 11
2010–11 (US$bn) 2,450
Cruisers/destroyers Frigates (25 vessels per unit)
254
(25 vessels per unit)
76.4 42.6 38.4 41.4 56.5 692.8 444 13 65
China France India Russia UK US 13 11
1,300
10 12
325
6,242 25 7
7 17
Defence Budget (%GDP) Modern armoured infantry fighting vehicles
81 31
(1,000 vehicles per unit)
Nuclear-powered submarines
2,390 Principal amphibious ships
12 1.3 1.6 2.5 2.8 2.5 4.7 232 6 (25 vessels per unit) 1 (25 vessels per unit)
0 China France India Russia UK US 6
uly 2 Active manpower (100,000 per unit) 1,105 1 4
4 J 2,285,000 4,960 25 1
4 0 526 6,452 7 7
1 238,591
1: 57 31
0
at 1,325,000 Fourth-generation tactical aircraft HHeeaavvyy//mmeeddiiuumm ttrraannssppoorrtt aaiirrccrraafftt Tanker and multi-role tanker/transport aircraft
6] (500 ac per unit) ((110000 aaiirrccrraafftt ppeerr uunniitt)) (100 aircraft per unit)
4 1,046,000
2
2.
12 178,470
6. 13 29 6 20 22
1
2 1,563,966
78. 591 254 244 897 189 62 56 24 162 50 538
1
[ Strategic
y 3,324 746
b
ed ICBM (Launchers)
ad (25 per unit) 168Fifth-generation tactical aircraft ISTAR
o 66
nl Attack helicopters
w 6 to 10 (250 hel per unit) Airborne early-warning and control aircraft Heavy unmanned aerial vehicles
o
D 30 (100 aircraft per unit) (50 aircraft per unit)
376
20
3 4 5
336
450
66
239
Bomber aircraft (25 per unit) 1,404 8 7 2 20 6 104
Heavy/medium transport helicopters
132 (500 hel per unit) Imagery satellites Electronic-/signals- Navigational satellites
306
(5 per unit) intelligence satellites (5 per unit)
251 162 (5 per unit)
117 15 8 8
155
624 3
Ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarines (10 per unit) 180 1 2
36
2,366
2
3 4 4
Modern MBT/AIFV: ISD post 1980
Fourth-generation aircraft: ISD post 1980 (includes upgraded third generation designs) 6
Fifth-generation aircraft: those designed with low-observable characteristics as a
14 14 fundamental design driver 17 32
Comparative major defence statistics 35
Economic Manoeuvre Projection China France India Russia UK US
Modern main battle tanks Aircraft cruisers (10 per unit)
Defence Budget, (1,000 vehicles per unit) 1 1 1 1 11
2010–11 (US$bn) 2,450
Cruisers/destroyers Frigates (25 vessels per unit)
254
(25 vessels per unit)
76.4 42.6 38.4 41.4 56.5 692.8 444 13 65
China France India Russia UK US 13 11
1,300
10 12
325
6,242 25 7
7 17
Defence Budget (%GDP) Modern armoured infantry fighting vehicles
81 31
(1,000 vehicles per unit)
Nuclear-powered submarines
2,390 Principal amphibious ships
1.3 1.6 2.5 2.8 2.5 4.7 232 12 6 (25 vessels per unit) 1 (25 vessels per unit)
China France India Russia UK US 0 6
Active manpower (100,000 per unit) 1,105 uly 2 1 4
2,285,000 4 J4,960 25 1
526 4 0 6,452 7 7
238,591 1
1: 57 31
0
1,325,000 Fourth-generation tactical aiat rcraft HHeeaavvyy//mmeeddiiuumm ttrraannssppoorrtt aaiirrccrraafftt Tanker and multi-role tanker/transport aircraft
(500 ac per unit) 6] ((110000 aaiirrccrraafftt ppeerr uunniitt)) (100 aircraft per unit)
1,046,000 4
2
2.
178,470 12
6. 13 29 6 20 22
1
1,563,966 2
591 254 244 89778. 189 62 56 24 162 50 538
1
Strategic [
y 3,324 746
b
ICBM (Launchers) ed
(25 per unit) 168Fifth-generation tactical aircrafadt ISTAR
66 o
Attack helicopters nl
6 to 10 (250 hel per unit) w Airborne early-warning and control aircraft Heavy unmanned aerial vehicles
o
30 D (100 aircraft per unit) (50 aircraft per unit)
376
20
3 4 5
336
450
66
239
Bomber aircraft (25 per unit) 1,404 8 7 2 20 6 104
Heavy/medium transport helicopters
132 (500 hel per unit) Imagery satellites Electronic-/signals- Navigational satellites
306
(5 per unit) intelligence satellites (5 per unit)
251 162 (5 per unit)
117 15 8 8
155
624 3
Ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarines (10 per unit) 180 1 2
36
2,366
2
3 4 4
Modern MBT/AIFV: ISD post 1980
Fourth-generation aircraft: ISD post 1980 (includes upgraded third generation designs) 6
Fifth-generation aircraft: those designed with low-observable characteristics as a
14 14 fundamental design driver 17 32
36 The MiliTary BalanCe 2011
Middle East air power
Air power in the Gulf region came increasingly into focus in 2010 as concern over Iran’s nuclear programme continued to mount. Iran
The US Central Command, which takes the lead on Gulf security for Washington, in January 2011 held its first ‘Regional Combat- Selected guided weapons: Short and medium-range air-launched ASMs including Sattar (20km
ing Weapons of Mass Destruction’ symposium. A�endees included officials from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and range) and Zoobin (25km range) air-to-surface missiles as well as the C-802KD (anti-ship) missile
Qatar. The US has substantial air assets based in theatre, as well as the air element of the US Navy’s 5th Fleet. with a range of 120–200km. Ra’ad long-range anti-ship missile at least in development (range
Israel also retains the option of a direct strike should broader diplomatic efforts fail to provide guarantees that Iran’s aim in 300km plus) — possible land-attack variant.
future will be limited to nuclear-power generation. Any effort directly to curtail Iran’s nuclear programme by targeting related Mig-29, F-14, F-7M, F-5‡
sites would almost certainly involve a significant element of air power. This raises questions over Tehran’s ability to directly, and Fighter 189*
indirectly respond to any air strikes against its nuclear facilities. This graphic shows selected elements of the relative air power of
the states in the region along with key air-to-surface and surface-to-air weapons systems.
Su-24 Mirage, F-1E, F-4D/E, Su-25
Tehran
FGA 108*
SYRIA
S-75 (SA-2)‡ (40km), 2K12 (SA-6) (22–25km),
Mersad (I-HAWK) (40km)
Syria Damascus I R A Q MR SAM
Selected guided weapons: Kh-25 (AS-b Karen) short-range ASM, Kh-27 I R A N
(AS-12 Kegler) and Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle) medium-range anti-radiation missiles. ISRAEL
Tel Aviv Amman S-200 (SA-5) (150km plus)
Mig-29, MiG-23‡, MiG-25‡ LR SAM
012 Fighter 258*Cairo JORDAN *Some in store, servicability concerns.
2
y Su-24, Su-22, MiG-23, MiG-21‡
Jul FGA 309* KUWAIT Qatar Kuwait
4 Selected guided weapons: Exocet Selected guided weapons: AGM-65 Maverick short-range
01:14 0 MR SAM 92KK3172 ((SSAA--161) ()2 (325–k2m5k),m S)-75 (SA-2)‡ (40km), Kuwait City aFGnAti-ship missile Mira1g2e 2000 AFGSAM, range of laser-guideFd/A b-1o8mbs.39
at E G Y P T
6] S-200 (SA-5) (150km plus) Manama I-HAWK (40km), Aspide 2000 (24km)
4 LR SAM BAHRAIN
2 QATAR MR SAM
2. *Some in store, servicability concerns.
2 Doha
1 SAUDI ARABIA Abu Dhabi Patriot PAC-2 (100km)
6. Riyadh
1 Israel LR SAM
2
8. Selected guided weapons: Short-, medium- and long-range air-launched U A E Muscat
7 weaponry include Spice family of precision-guided bombs (Spice 2000 range
[1 60km plus). Delilah lightweight long-range missile (250km). Popeye I (80km),
by Popeye II (75km) stand-off missiles. Turbojet or turbofan powered variant of Oman Bahrain
d Popeye also developed (deployment status unknown – likely several hundred Selected guided weapons: AGM-65
de kilometre range). Unconfirmed reports of a submarine and possibly Saudi Arabia Maverick short-range ASM, Exocet and F-5
oa air-launched cruise missile with ‘strategic’ range. The IAF inventory also Selected guided weapons: AGM-65 Maverick short-range ASM, N Harpoon medium-range anti-ship missiles. Fighter 12
Downl i1n,c0l0ud0eksg -ac lsaisgsn ipfiecnaenttr antuinmgFb- 1we5ra ,o rFhf- 1ef6aredes-.f aGlal bprrieecl ifsaiomni-lgyu oidf eadn btio-smhbips mfitistseidle ws.ith Ampoliassrssmiilbe lm yo erindd eiturhmeed- r ofarrndogemer otahfn et4 iU-5r0Kadk, imdaet).ilo ivVnea rmryiei sstsytai loetuf. sSp ruteoncrcmisei roStnah-iangd.u oi(dRwea dnc grbueoi mseb s. M A FGA F-16, Ja2g6uar FGA F-16 21
Fighter 168 F-15, F-5‡ O
Fighter 98
I-HAWK (40km range)
F-15, F-16
MR SAM
FGA 227 F-15, Typhoon, Tornado
FGA 161
B-707, G-550
E-3
AEW 4
AEW 5 United Arab Emirates Explanatory note
KC-707, KC-130 Selected guided weapons: Hakeem family of boosted Fighter combat aircraft tasked primarily for the air-to-air role
Tanker 9 KE-3A, KC-130 precision-guided weapons (range 50km). Exocet anti-ship FGA fighter ground attack aircraft with a strike capability and some air-to-air
Tanker 15 missile. Black Shahine variant of tSheo ScCoALtrPa E G(/YSteormm eShna)dow capability (may be limited to self-defence)
cruise missile. (Range possibly in the order of 450km).
I-HAWK (40km) AEW Airborne early warning aircraft fitted with an air-surveillance radar with some
MR SAM I-HAWK (40km) F-16, Mirage 2000 command-and-control capability © IISS
MR SAM FGA 142 Tanker Aircraft intended for air-to-air refuelling
Patriot PAC-2*, Arrow 2* (90km) MR SAM Medium-range surface-to-air missile system with an indicative maximum range in
LR SAM Patriot PAC-2 (100km) I-HAWK (40km range) the order of up to 75km
LR SAM MR SAM LR SAM Long-range surface-to-air missile system with an indicative maximum range
*ABM capable greater than 75km
Comparative major defence statistics 37
Air power in the Gulf region came increasingly into focus in 2010 as concern over Iran’s nuclear programme continued to mount. Iran
The US Central Command, which takes the lead on Gulf security for Washington, in January 2011 held its first ‘Regional Combat- Selected guided weapons: Short and medium-range air-launched ASMs including Sattar (20km
ing Weapons of Mass Destruction’ symposium. A�endees included officials from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and range) and Zoobin (25km range) air-to-surface missiles as well as the C-802KD (anti-ship) missile
Qatar. The US has substantial air assets based in theatre, as well as the air element of the US Navy’s 5th Fleet. with a range of 120–200km. Ra’ad long-range anti-ship missile at least in development (range
Israel also retains the option of a direct strike should broader diplomatic efforts fail to provide guarantees that Iran’s aim in 300km plus) — possible land-attack variant.
future will be limited to nuclear-power generation. Any effort directly to curtail Iran’s nuclear programme by targeting related Mig-29, F-14, F-7M, F-5‡
sites would almost certainly involve a significant element of air power. This raises questions over Tehran’s ability to directly, and Fighter 189*
indirectly respond to any air strikes against its nuclear facilities. This graphic shows selected elements of the relative air power of
the states in the region along with key air-to-surface and surface-to-air weapons systems.
Su-24 Mirage, F-1E, F-4D/E, Su-25
Tehran
FGA 108*
SYRIA
S-75 (SA-2)‡ (40km), 2K12 (SA-6) (22–25km),
Mersad (I-HAWK) (40km)
Syria Damascus I R A Q MR SAM
Selected guided weapons: Kh-25 (AS-b Karen) short-range ASM, Kh-27 I R A N
(AS-12 Kegler) and Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle) medium-range anti-radiation missiles. ISRAEL
Tel Aviv Amman S-200 (SA-5) (150km plus)
Mig-29, MiG-23‡, MiG-25‡ LR SAM
Fighter 258*Cairo JORDAN 012 *Some in store, servicability concerns.
2
Su-24, Su-22, MiG-23, MiG-21‡ y
FGA 309* Jul KUWAIT Qatar Kuwait
4 Selected guided weapons: Exocet Selected guided weapons: AGM-65 Maverick short-range
MR SAM 92KK3172 ((SSAA--161) ()2 (325–k2m5k),m S)-75 (SA-2)‡ (40km), 01:14 0 Kuwait City aFGnAti-ship missile Mira1g2e 2000 AFGSAM, range of laser-guideFd/A b-1o8mbs.39
E G Y P T at
S-200 (SA-5) (150km plus) 6] Manama I-HAWK (40km), Aspide 2000 (24km)
LR SAM 4 BAHRAIN
2 QATAR MR SAM
*Some in store, servicability concerns. 2.
2 Doha
SAUDI ARABIA 1 Abu Dhabi Patriot PAC-2 (100km)
6. Riyadh
Israel 1 LR SAM
2
Selected guided weapons: Short-, medium- and long-range air-launched 8. U A E Muscat
weaponry include Spice family of precision-guided bombs (Spice 2000 range 7
60km plus). Delilah lightweight long-range missile (250km). Popeye I (80km), [1
Popeye II (75km) stand-off missiles. Turbojet or turbofan powered variant of by Oman Bahrain
Popeye also developed (deployment status unknown – likely several hundred d Selected guided weapons: AGM-65
kilometre range). Unconfirmed reports of a submarine and possibly Saudi Arabia de Maverick short-range ASM, Exocet and F-5
air-launched cruise missile with ‘strategic’ range. The IAF inventory also Selected guided weapons: AGM-65 Maverick short-range ASM, oa N Harpoon medium-range anti-ship missiles. Fighter 12
i1n,c0l0ud0eksg -ac lsaisgsn ipfiecnaenttr antuinmgFb- 1we5ra ,o rFhf- 1ef6aredes-.f aGlal bprrieecl ifsaiomni-lgyu oidf eadn btio-smhbips mfitistseidle ws.ith Ampoliassrssmiilbe lm yo erindd eiturhmeed- r ofarrndogemer otahfn et4 iU-5r0Kadk, imdaet).il oivVnea rmryiei sstsytai loetuf. sSp ruteoncrcmisei roStnah-iangd.u oi(dRwea dnc grbueoi mseb s. Downl M A FGA F-16, Ja2g6uar FGA F-16 21
Fighter 168 F-15, F-5‡ O
Fighter 98
I-HAWK (40km range)
F-15, F-16
MR SAM
FGA 227 F-15, Typhoon, Tornado
FGA 161
B-707, G-550
E-3
AEW 4
AEW 5 United Arab Emirates Explanatory note
KC-707, KC-130 Selected guided weapons: Hakeem family of boosted Fighter combat aircraft tasked primarily for the air-to-air role
Tanker 9 KE-3A, KC-130 precision-guided weapons (range 50km). Exocet anti-ship FGA fighter ground attack aircraft with a strike capability and some air-to-air
Tanker 15 missile. Black Shahine variant of tSheo ScCoALtrPa E G(/YSteormm eShna)dow capability (may be limited to self-defence)
cruise missile. (Range possibly in the order of 450km).
I-HAWK (40km) AEW Airborne early warning aircraft fitted with an air-surveillance radar with some
MR SAM I-HAWK (40km) F-16, Mirage 2000 command-and-control capability © IISS
MR SAM FGA 142 Tanker Aircraft intended for air-to-air refuelling
Patriot PAC-2*, Arrow 2* (90km) MR SAM Medium-range surface-to-air missile system with an indicative maximum range in
LR SAM Patriot PAC-2 (100km) I-HAWK (40km range) the order of up to 75km
LR SAM MR SAM LR SAM Long-range surface-to-air missile system with an indicative maximum range
*ABM capable greater than 75km