The Military Balance 2005-06, Ch. 09 Complex Irregular Warfare

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Chapter Nine
Complex Irregular Warfare:
The Face of Contemporary Conflict
OVERVIEW technologies central to the RMA approach. Instead
of ‘network-centric warfare’ based upon electronic
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (‘9/11’) pres- sensor-to-shooter networks and precision targeting
aged several new developments in the global conflict systems, advanced forces are enmeshed in what
environment. Although the implications of these took has been described as ‘netwars’ based on agile and
some time to become clear, they have begun to force adaptive human networks. Dealing with this new
specialists and non-specialists alike, within several conflict environment has caused a rethink for many
advanced Western armed forces, to re-think some Western forces.
basic models and assumptions. This essay explores
these new challenges and briefly surveys some of the US dominance
principal responses to them – responses that are likely Transformation, and the associated RMA agenda,
to shape the face of twenty-first century conflict, for at reflected a key feature in the late twentieth-century
least the next few decades. conflict environment: the overwhelming conven-
tional military dominance of the US. In essence, due to
The RMA – now somewhat doubtful the economic and technological superiority resulting
In the last years of the twentieth century, many from its status as the sole remaining superpower,
Western military forces adopted a style of warfare the US has achieved unprecedented dominance in
based on standoff engagement, avoidance of ground conventional military strength. This has rendered
combat and reliance on air and maritime strike. This US forces virtually invincible in traditional, conven-
approach was informed by the notion of a Revolution tional force-on-force conflict, where this superiority
in Military Affairs (RMA) founded on the emerging can be brought to bear. Conventional wars therefore
technologies of stealth, pervasive electronic surveil- tend to be brief, intense and one-sided, resulting in
lance and target acquisition, precision engagement, rapid victory for the US, its allies, or the side in a
and networked communications. It was epito- conflict which best approximates US capabilities.
mised in the US military’s ‘Transformation’ agenda, This was the conflict environment for which most
which sought to replace heavier forces, optimised late twentieth-century militaries planned.
for intensive ground combat, with medium-weight But, perhaps unsurprisingly, America’s actual
forces supported by ‘reach-back’ for precision strike and potential enemies have also taken note of US
and situational awareness. The assumption was that conventional superiority and acted to dislocate it.
all-pervasive surveillance, information operations Non-state actors like al-Qaeda developed so-called
and precision were set to dissipate the ‘fog of war’, ‘asymmetric’ approaches that allowed them to side-
avoiding the need for protracted ground combat, step US military power – either by rendering it func-
and leading to a new era in warfare. Terms like tionally irrelevant, or by operating in environments
‘information dominance’ and concepts such as ‘see where the US cannot bring its conventional superi-
first, act first, finish decisively’ were seen as central ority to bear.
to the future of warfighting. For example, during the 1990s al-Qaeda opera-
The conflict environment of the early twenty- tives moved within the complex human terrain of
first century certainly does represent a new era in local indigenous societies, to attack high-tech US
warfare: but not the era that Western military plan- installations and platforms – the Khobar Towers
ners expected. Instead of pervasive surveillance and facility, the African embassies, the USS Cole – while
information dominance, Western military forces are suffering little or no damage in return. On 9/11, al-
increasingly being drawn into highly complex and Qaeda operatives armed only with box-cutters and
lethal campaigns in urbanised terrain, against irreg- mobile phones outflanked the US military’s high-
ular enemies invulnerable to many of the advanced tech capabilities. The only effective defence on that
412 The MIlITary BalanCe 2005•2006
day was the heroic resistance of unarmed passen- actors or non-traditional methods. Thus, concep-
gers on United Airlines Flight 93 – passengers who, tually at least, US planners recognise the need to
revealingly, had been alerted via private mobile re-orient from the high technology, state-on-state
phone calls. conflict envisioned in the RMA and Transformation
But al-Qaeda was not the only non-state actor to agendas, towards the real-world conflict environ-
adopt an asymmetric approach. While terrorist and ment of complex and diffuse irregular threats.
insurgent movements sought to avoid US power Nevertheless, because of the immense inertia of
via an ‘irregular’ route, others sought to avoid it by the US military–industrial complex, the influence
acquiring capabilities that could pose catastrophic of Congressional and sectional interests, and the
threats, such as weapons of mass destruction sheer psychological difficulty of moving away from
(WMD), disruptive technologies, or a combina- decades of strategic thought, the QDR is likely to
tion of these measures. Thus, North Korea and Iran produce little real change in expenditure, force allo-
sought to deter American conventional power by cation, roles and missions or acquisition policy. The
acquiring nuclear weapons, while Saddam Hussein bulk of US force structure and defence expenditure
pursued similar programmes, converted his conven- will continue to be conventionally focussed.
tional armed forces into a guerrilla cadre and seem-
ingly developed a range of contacts with regional Enduring irregular challenges
and transnational terrorist groups. Evidence also This means that the ‘irregular challenges’ posed by
suggests that the Iraqi security forces laid careful non-state actors or weaker states who seek to avoid
plans and prepared for a scorched-earth insurgency US superiority are likely to be an enduring feature
against potential US invasion. Although the rapid of the conflict environment. Because the US and its
collapse of the resistance organised by the Ba’athist Western partners will remain optimised for high-
regime put an end to these coordinated ‘stay- end traditional warfare in the RMA tradition, any
behind’ partisan operations, today’s Iraqi insurgents smart adversary is likely to use asymmetric means
have been the beneficiaries of the detailed plan- – via WMD, disruptive technologies or irregular
ning and preparation undertaken by the regime. All warfare – to render Western conventional superi-
three nations developed links with trans-national ority meaningless. This was highlighted by the US
terrorism and organised criminal movements, again National Intelligence Council in its December 2004
as a means of balancing and offsetting US conven- assessment paper, Mapping the Global Future, which
tional superiority. included the judgement that:
Consequently, at least for the present, conven-
tional war may have become much less important The key factors that spawned international
as the primary arena for military confrontation. US terrorism show no signs of abating over the
dominance seems to be creating asymmetric ‘avoid- next 15 years … The likelihood of great power
ance behaviour’ by its opponents, and rendering conflict escalating into total war in the next
victory in the conventional phase of a military 15 years is lower than at any time in the past
campaign much less decisive. century ... Lagging economies, ethnic affiliations,
Despite the advantages its enemies gain from intense religious convictions, and youth bulges
asymmetric approaches, the US shows little sign will align to create a ‘perfect storm’, creating
of moving away from a primarily conventional conditions likely to spawn internal conflict. The
approach to conflict. US planners believe America governing capacity of states, however, will deter-
must maintain its conventional dominance because mine whether and to what extent conflicts actu-
it needs to consider the potential for longer-term ally occur. Those states unable both to satisfy the
threats from potential peer or near-peer competi- expectations of their peoples and to resolve or
tors (including, but not limited to China, whose quell conflicting demands among them are likely
projected rise in influence is difficult for some plan- to encounter the most severe and most frequent
ners to interpret as a solely peaceful challenge). outbreaks of violence.
Work being carried out on the US Department of
Defense’s 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) One implication, noted already, is that victory in
has included significant fresh emphasis on ‘Irregular conventional battle may no longer be decisive. If an
Warfare’, defined as warfare involving non-state adversary is seeking to confront an advanced mili-
Complex Irregular Warfare: The Face of Contemporary Conflict 413
tary force through means other than conventional innovative approaches that match the degree of imag-
conflict, then winning the ‘major combat operations’ ination shown by asymmetric adversaries, and allow
phase of a campaign may not decisively end the war. the full range of capabilities to be brought to bear.
For example, during the 2003 Iraq war, the conven- These, then, are the strategic factors that drive the
tional phase – lasting only 23 days – was won over- contemporary conflict environment.
whelmingly by the US-led coalition. But in hindsight
the conventional phase is seen as merely a curtain- The conflict environment
raiser to the truly decisive phase of the operation At the tactical level, although some elements in the
– the attempt to replace the Ba’athist regime with a environment are new, there are continuities between
stable, democratic, Western-oriented government: a previous forms of warfare and the types of conflict
much more problematic enterprise, in the event. now emerging.
Another implication is that, because irregular Armed forces today must deal with many adver-
threats are (at least at present) overwhelmingly land saries beyond their traditional opponents, the
based, ground forces (army, marines, special opera- regular armed forces of nation states. These include
tions forces and elements of air and naval forces that insurgents, terrorists, organised criminals and many
support them) are likely to bear the primary burden other actual and potential adversaries. This creates a
of conflict in the next few decades of the twenty-first multilateral and ambiguous environment, leading to
century. The role of strategic air forces and blue-water vastly increased complexity. Instead of a traditional
navies, although extremely important in shaping the ‘bilateral’ construct – two opposing sides – armed
strategic environment, will be less crucial on a day-to- forces now find themselves in a conflict ‘ecosystem’
day basis in prosecuting complex irregular conflicts. that includes numerous armed or unarmed actors
This is already evident in the demands being placed capable of posing a serious threat to mission success,
upon the US defence establishment, where the army but against whom the application of military force is
and marines are heavily overstretched, suffering at best problematic. Thus, while in a previous era of
battle casualties and personnel wastage and having warfare armed forces sought to capture and control
difficulty meeting recruiting targets. Meanwhile, large territory (a ‘terrain-centric approach’) or to destroy
portions of the US Navy and air force remain under- in battle the main forces of the enemy (an ‘enemy-
utilised, tying up enormous capital and personnel centric approach’) they must now seek to dominate
investment but able to make little meaningful contri- the entire environment, including a variety of dispa-
bution to the overall war effort. rate threat elements, and other challenges which
There are also consequences for the acquisition of are the result of conflict such as humanitarian and
advanced military capability by developed nations. reconstruction tasks.
As noted, the RMA was associated with a focus on This might be termed a ‘system-centric’ approach.
naval and air platforms with networked informa- The targeting methodologies of the RMA era regarded
tion capability to generate precision strike. This has the enemy as a system and sought to remove the links
turned out not to be a particularly workable approach that allowed it to function. But in the new multilat-
for many irregular threats – but the military-indus- eral threat environment, planners have been forced
trial complexes of developed nations are often domi- to recognise that friendly troops, multiple adversaries
nated by these air/maritime platforms because they and neutral populations are all part of a single overall
are more expensive than the capabilities needed to system. For example, in Iraq, actions that target the
oppose irregular threats. In short, there is little money enemy effectively but alienate the population have
for the defence industry in irregular warfare. proven highly counterproductive, while actions to win
Until this pattern changes, Western military over the populace have been stymied by a range of
forces in the twenty-first century will be marked by inchoate enemy groups. Thus neither a terrain-centric
a combination of irrelevance and overstretch. Armies, nor an enemy-centric approach is sufficient as plan-
marines, special forces and their supporting air and ners have found that they must seek ways to dominate
maritime elements will be heavily committed, while the overall environment and all the actual and poten-
strategic air forces and navies will remain largely tial threat elements within it. Most advanced thinking
irrelevant to the contemporary conflict environment. within Western military establishments is beginning
This does not mean such forces should be abolished: to turn toward this system-centric approach. The
rather it speaks of a need for re-balancing and for ‘Systemic Operational Design’ model being developed
414 The MIlITary BalanCe 2005•2006
by Israeli theorist Shimon Naveh seeks to generate mosaic of open spaces (acting as manoeuvre corri-
exactly this type of operational construct. dors, killing areas or compartments) and patches of
Further, military forces are increasingly oper- restricted terrain that prevent movement and deny
ating within complex groupings of friendly elements observation. This means forces can be drawn into
including intelligence services, police and law close combat more readily. In open terrain, a force
enforcement agencies, aid and development agen- might detect the enemy from standoff distance and
cies, private enterprise, contractors and allied mili- avoid it, or engage it only on overwhelmingly favour-
tary forces. Some of these agencies cooperate readily able terms. In complex terrain the ability to detect
with the military and link easily into command and the enemy from standoff range is much reduced,
planning relationships. Many are less easy to coor- meaning that forces can find themselves in close
dinate, imposing immense complexity on planners combat without warning.
and commanders.
Moreover, globalised communications generate Complex human terrain
numerous onlookers, neutral elements, commen- Complex human terrain is where numerous popula-
tators and critics. These include local and inter- tion groups coexist in the same physical space – often
national media, international non-governmental a city or other urbanised area. These might include
organisations (NGOs) such as aid agencies, interna- different ethno-linguistic groups, political factions,
tional institutions, neutral or neighbouring popula- tribes or clans, religious sects, or ideological move-
tion groups and business interests. This creates an ments. These groups may coexist peacefully, ignore
audience for every action by any group in a conflict, each other, or compete (with or without violence).
making the media ‘spin’ associated with combat When military forces operate in this terrain, distin-
action at least as important as the action itself. As guishing between population groups is extremely
troops have learned in Iraq, the insurgents’ objec- difficult and requires sophisticated cultural and
tive in ambushing a convoy may not be to destroy a linguistic understanding. When one or more groups
few armoured vehicles, but rather to capture global are hostile, extreme difficulty arises in preventing
media images of those vehicles burning, in order to harm to non-combatants or bystanders. Applying
influence the global audience. physical force in this environment accepts a high
In addition, the terrain where forces operate is risk of counter-productive unintended consequences.
highly complex. Part of the asymmetric ‘avoidance’ Anticipating the second- or third-order effects of using
approach by adversaries confronted with RMA- force in complex human terrain is therefore important
style precision standoff warfare has been to retreat but difficult – a further complexity inherent in the
into complex terrain, such as population centres or new irregular forms of warfare that are emerging.
other cluttered environments that degrade Western
target acquisition systems, allowing the enemy to Complex informational terrain
survive ‘precision’ strikes that often hit uninvolved Complex informational terrain is when multiple
bystanders. With the increase of urbanisation sources or transmission paths for communications,
throughout much of the developing world, such data or information (including news media) exist in
complex terrain is becoming much more common- a common operating environment. A force operating
place – particularly in the world’s littoral zones, in such an environment will be unable to control the
those coastal areas where the majority of the global information flow in its area of operations. Again, this
population lives. most often occurs in urbanised terrain, where all sides
This ‘complex terrain’ includes complex physical in a conflict may use the same mobile phone transpon-
terrain, complex human terrain and complex infor- ders or satellite relays, and gain tactical information
mational terrain: from news media operating in the same physical area.
Complex terrain is thus composed of phys-
Complex physical terrain ical, human and informational elements which
Examples of complex physical terrain include urban- interact in a mutually reinforcing fashion, leading
ised areas, littoral regions, crop cultivation, swamps to extremely high-density operating environments
and estuaries, jungles and mountains. Notably, more and enormous friction upon military operations.
than 75% of the world’s population lives in complex Thus, such operations tend to rapidly become
physical terrain. Such terrain typically comprises a ‘bogged down’ and stalemated.
Complex Irregular Warfare: The Face of Contemporary Conflict 415
Approaches to complexity enduring reality of limited conflicts or ‘small wars’
Complexity is nothing new. Military operations – the types of conflict that have emerged as central
have always been complex undertakings, and many to early twenty-first century warfare. The industrial
of the same factors that impact on current opera- technology available to twentieth-century nation-
tions have existed for a long time. What is new in states, combined with the severe consequences of
today’s conflict environment is that, because of the defeat, and even of warfare itself, led many states
ease of international movement and communica- to adopt an industrial approach to the application
tion inherent in globalisation, an agile adversary can of force. They focused on combat operations against
jump between regions and theatres of conflict, using the armed forces of enemy nation-states, and left the
successes at one level to offset defeats at another. rest of the conflict environment alone. This approach
Thus, al-Qaeda bears many similarities to the regarded war primarily as an engineering problem
Nizariya sect of early Islam, the group known in rather than a human one.
popular culture as the ‘Assassins’. Like the Assassins, A more recent approach, advanced by the US
al-Qaeda is led by a charismatic, elusive figure hiding Marine Corps General Charles Krulak in 1998, is
in a remote mountain fastness. Like the Assassins, al- known as ‘Three Block War’. This approach acknowl-
Qaeda operatives infiltrate open societies and target edges the need to conduct many diverse tasks simul-
‘apostate’ leaders for destruction. Like the Assassins, taneously, and seeks to manage the complexity by
their interpretation of Islam differs in significant doing these tasks at different times, with different
respects from that of the mainstream Muslim world, forces or in different places in an overall Area of
but exercises a seductive power over alienated youth Operations (AO).
and other key groups. But unlike previous fanatical Because of the exponentially increasing
sects, al-Qaeda has access to global communications, complexity described above, the industrial-age
financial networks, movement routes and propa- approach is inadequate for today’s conflict environ-
ganda channels. The ‘old man of the mountains’ is ment. Instead, in an extension of ‘three-block war’,
able to exercise effective global propaganda influ- forces are finding that they must conduct diverse
ence and broad strategic control over a far-flung tasks with the same elements, at the same time, in
movement. Thus, enabled by globalisation and its the same place, and with the ability to control their
tools, today’s Assassins are a vastly more powerful entire environment in a ‘system-centric’ fashion,
and flexible irregular opponent than their predeces- while reacting to local, regional and global events.
sors in the fanatical sects of early Islam. In a sense, the three blocks of the USMC concept
Similarly, the war on terrorism seems increasingly have merged into a single block, albeit a much more
to comprise three levels. At the global level is a clan- diverse one. This ‘diversity’ is the next key element
destine and counter-clandestine operation against of the tactical environment.
al-Qaeda core leadership, while there is also a series
of four regional counterinsurgency campaigns (in
North Africa, the Middle East, South/Central Asia A hundred flowers have bloomed...
and Southeast Asia) and numerous security actions The conflict environment has always included
against localised threats in dozens of countries. All terrorists, rural guerrillas, bandits, tribal fighters
of these phenomena have existed separately before and mercenaries. But today it also includes drug
– during the Cold War period of ‘wars of national traffickers, multinational corporations, private
liberation’, for example. But in today’s environment, military companies, unarmed protesters, environ-
again enabled by the tools of globalisation, an agile mental groups, computer hackers, rioters, militias,
enemy can offset defeats at the regional or local level people smugglers, pirates, religious sects, urban
with global ‘armed propaganda’, or can offset global guerrillas, media and diplomatic alliances. Many of
defeats by effective media ‘spin’ on local activities. these groups are not ‘threats’ in the sense of armed
The simultaneous interaction of multiple types of opposition, and applying military force against
threat across the global, regional and local levels of many of them would be problematic in legal, moral
the world system creates unprecedented complexity and technical terms. Today’s most prominent threat
in the new conflict environment. is from transnational terrorists, potentially armed
In the twentieth century, the world wars and the with WMD. But the other threats – including nation-
Cold War dominated perceptions, obscuring the more state armed forces – remain and must be addressed
416 The MIlITary BalanCe 2005•2006
simultaneously. Along with the asymmetric ‘avoid- Combatant/non-combatant
ance behaviour’ described earlier, diversity is a The distinction between combatants and non-combat-
major cause of ‘asymmetric warfare’. ants is eroding. The use of contractors in the battlespace,
The globalised environment has also seen a diffu- and the application of the national effects-based
sion of conflict, so that it no longer fits into the rela- approach (NEBA) to warfighting, has meant that civil-
tively neat traditional conceptual boundaries of ians who do not directly engage the enemy neverthe-
twentieth-century conflict: less generate critical war-winning effects. The enemies
against whom we are currently engaged clearly regard
Levels of war these ‘non-combatants’ as legitimate targets. In any
Combat has diffused across the strategic, operational case, the traditional distinction between combatants
and tactical levels of war so that actions at one level and non-combatants is blurring.
have a direct effect at another. This has always been
possible, but is now the norm – mirroring the inter- Privatisation of conflict
action of local, regional and global elements in the Accelerating this blurring is the increasing privatisa-
conflict environment. The actions of junior leaders in tion of conflict. Even a decade ago, leading private
combat, or the demeanour of individual soldiers in military companies (PMCs) struggled to achieve
humanitarian operations, can be broadcast by inter- legitimacy, being tainted in the public imagination by
national media and affect the course of an operation the stigma which is attached to the concept of merce-
within minutes. This means that the strategic, opera- naries. Today, PMCs are an essential and increas-
tional and tactical levels of war are being compressed. ingly legitimate and accepted element of conflict.
Indeed, the operational level of war may be disap- Providing VIP protection, logistic support, intel-
pearing, ‘squeezed out’ by the direct interaction of ligence support, facilities, advisory and consulting
tactical actions with strategic outcomes. services, such private-enterprise groups have become
a fundamental part of the Western way of war. This
State/non-state actors is a symptom of military forces that, in the post-Cold
Non-state actors have always been part of warfare. War era, were subjected to efficiency programmes
However, the characteristics of state and non-state that effectively removed any spare capacity to fill
actors are becoming increasingly similar. Non-state the types of tasks now being undertaken by contrac-
actors now operate sophisticated weapons systems, tors. Nevertheless, the employment of PMCs and
may control territories and populations, and possess private security companies (PSC) will continue to
lethality and technological sophistication that was once be constrained by their comparative lack of account-
the preserve of states and their regular armed forces. ability when compared to regular forces.
Conventional/special operations Elements of national power
Capabilities that once resided exclusively in special Traditionally, national strength was defined in terms
operations forces are proliferating to the wider of political, military, economic, social, informational
combat forces of advanced militaries. Every soldier and industrial power, and the military’s job was to
in contemporary conflict requires capabilities such provide the ‘military’ aspect of national power and
as individual initiative, cultural sensitivity, linguistic (in most Western democracies) studiously ignore the
competence, mastery of sophisticated weapons and rest. This no longer applies to every situation – all
sensors, and a capacity for small-group independent elements of national power are being coordinated
operations – characteristics traditionally associated and integrated by governments into a single national
with special forces. Meanwhile, special operations ‘whole of government’ or ‘whole of nation’ effort.
forces are conducting conventional tasks such as Military forces no longer ‘own’ war, rather they are
screening, defence and large-scale assault, and simul- one component in a national response.
taneously developing more unconventional skills.
Special and conventional operations are becoming Disaggregated battlespace
increasingly integrated, occurring on the same terrain In complex terrain, in the face of multiple adaptive
and relying upon intimate cooperation between threats, the traditional notion of ‘battlespace’ needs
conventional combat forces, special operations forces refinement. It is more accurate to describe a force’s
and inter-agency elements. ‘mission space’ in which ‘battle spaces’ erupt with
Complex Irregular Warfare: The Face of Contemporary Conflict 417
little warning. Even against a more conventional been apparent since the industrial revolution, but is
enemy, the effect of complex terrain is to create a series now accelerating. Lighter, cheaper and more lethal
of ‘mini-battles’ between individuals or small semi- weapons allow smaller, more dispersed teams to
autonomous teams. The geographical space between generate battlefield effects that once required large
these battlespaces is not empty: it contains non- numbers of troops. Companies now perform the same
combatants and uncommitted potential combatants, tasks, and have equivalent lethality, as the battalions
as well as key infrastructure for population support. of 50 years ago or the brigades of the early twentieth
This means individual and small team combat capa- century. However, the manpower-intensive nature of
bilities are increasingly important. It is not enough for operations at the low end of the operational spectrum
the overall force to possess key capabilities – it must continues to mean that technical solutions leading to
be able to bring them to bear at the critical place (a manpower reductions are limited – humanitarian,
small team engagement in complex terrain) and time peacekeeping and policing, for example, all require
(a fleeting, unexpected encounter). In a disaggregated the extensive use of manpower.
battlespace, this factor generates a necessity to prolif-
erate capabilities and control to individuals, smaller Deductions from the environment
teams and sub-units. In essence, then, the contemporary conflict envi-
Traditionally, defence forces focused on the threat ronment reflects the consequences of globalisation,
posed by conventional weapons fielded by regular which has created and empowered a diverse range
opponents. Today, a vast array of new, highly lethal of enemies of the West; and US conventional domi-
weapons is proliferating. The most prominent nance, which has caused those adversaries to seek
lethality issue remains the threat of global terrorists asymmetric arenas and unconventional means with
armed with weapons of mass destruction, but many which to confront the West. This renders developed
extremely lethal capabilities have propagated into nations less likely to suffer a conventional military
the hands of individuals. These include thermobaric attack, but more likely to face ambiguous and asym-
weapons, long-range heavy calibre sniping systems, metric threats, including terrorism. These factors
advanced explosive and booby-trapping devices, have produced a complex, diverse, diffuse and lethal
laser eye damage weapons, and an enormous range environment. There are numerous stakeholders; the
of other lethal but concealable weapon systems. terrain (in physical, human and informational terms)
Importantly, many of these weapons can be is complex; the range of threats is diverse; traditional
carried, concealed and operated by one person. This conceptual distinctions have diffused, and indi-
means unprecedented levels of lethality are now viduals now have the capability to inflict strategic
available to individuals rather than larger organi- defeat through high-lethality weapons.
sations. This, in turn, implies that land forces can Several Western armed forces have drawn similar
encounter individuals with extremely high lethality, deductions about the conflict environment. Key
without warning, in any type of operation. Even deductions have been that:
planned humanitarian or peace enforcement opera- • land forces must become better at orches-
tions can rapidly turn into a series of highly lethal trating effects in an agile, whole-of-govern-
combat engagements, with little or no warning, as ment manner across the full range of
troops encounter irregular adversaries armed with military operations in complex terrain.
high-lethality systems. • there is a requirement to raise the strategic
Because individuals with concealable high defeat threshold for deployed land forces,
lethality have little tactical signature and can be and become more adaptable and agile in
encountered in a range of scenarios, predicting the performing, and transitioning between, a
level of lethality likely to be encountered during wide range of tasks and environments.
operations becomes problematic. This has major • there is a need to improve force protection
implications because it means that each individual through instantaneous access to firepower,
engagement – even in a supposedly ‘low-intensity’ protection and mobility, improved situ-
operation – can produce a mass-casualty situation ational awareness and stealth.
with strategic implications. • there is a need to prepare individuals and
Increasing lethality has contributed to a reduc- small teams for a disaggregated, ambiguous,
tion in force density on the battlefield. This trend has lethal and highly complex battlespace.
418 The MIlITary BalanCe 2005•2006
Some national responses have cooperated closely in developing a doctrine for
Many conventional forces have already responded ‘manoeuvre operations in the littoral environment’
to the new environment, or are seeking to orient to – essentially an advanced form of maritime coastal
the increasing complexity of twenty-first-century raiding optimised for expeditionary operations
warfare. However, the three nations that have been against irregular threats – which seems well suited
most heavily committed to military operations in the to the current environment.
new century have been the countries with Anglo- In Britain, November 2003 saw the publication
Saxon traditions – Australia, Britain and the US. of a Future Land Operating Concept (FLOC), which
Each has responded to the new environment in a called for smaller, more manoeuvrable units to be
broadly similar manner, but with key differences of known as ‘agile mission groups’. Like the earlier
emphasis. Australian concept, the FLOC emphasised the need
Perhaps due to its tradition of unconventional to control the overall environment in an area of
warfare, or perhaps because of its small size and operations, rather than simply target the main forces
resultant agility, the Australian Army was one of of a regular enemy. Over time, the FLOC appears to
the first Western forces to adapt to the new condi- have evolved toward an approach which some have
tions. In addition, the Australian experience in late termed ‘C-DICT’ – Countering Disorder, Insurgency,
twentieth-century conflicts, particularly in East Criminality and Terrorism. This approach reflects
Timor, appears to have provided an early ‘wake-up key British experiences in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan
call’ as to the nature of the new environment. As a and Iraq, as well the experience of domestic crises
result, Australia was the first to publish a compre- such as the 2001 foot and mouth disease outbreak,
hensive analysis of the new conflict environment all of which called upon the armed forces to deal
and its implications. The doctrine paper Complex effectively with multiple disparate threats simul-
Warfighting, first produced in June 2003, argued taneously and in the same area of operations. It
that land forces needed capabilities to operate in also explicitly adopts a ‘systems-centric’ approach,
a range of complex terrain environments, in small calling on the land forces to dominate all sources of
semi-autonomous teams that could ‘swarm’ to conflict and threat in the environment.
provide mutual support while seeking to dominate In practical terms, the British experience of coun-
the overall environment by influencing and control- terinsurgency in Northern Ireland appears to have
ling population groups (including numerous enemy given British forces an edge in countering the Iraqi
groups). It identified the future threat as coming insurgency, and in dealing with Afghan irregulars.
from increasingly well-armed, networked irregular The British made a much more substantial contri-
insurgent and terrorist opponents. Interestingly, the bution to both Afghanistan and Iraq than did the
Australian concept envisaged combined arms teams Australians, and were able to apply their greater
comprising both traditional and non-traditional practical experience in counterinsurgency to good
elements, with protected mobility and a high level of effect. Australia subsequently made major increases
situational awareness, operating within a joint inter- in its troop commitment to Iraq, and it is reason-
agency setting. able to assume that the close working relationship
Australian forces operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, between British and Australian forces in-theatre will
the Solomon Islands, East Timor and elsewhere lead to a continuing close alignment in these two
already appear to be applying the concept – adopting nations’ approaches to complex irregular warfare.
integrated combined-arms actions at the small-team The American approach has been somewhat more
level, with evidence of ‘swarming’ tactics and a diverse. Both the US Army and the US Marine Corps
highly advanced application of inter-agency teams, are heavily committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
particularly in the Solomon Islands operation. More both have produced new conceptual approaches
recently, the Australian government announced to dealing with the contemporary conflict environ-
a programme of ‘Hardening and Networking the ment. Because of its size and, arguably, because it
Army’ which seeks to create an army structure opti- took some time for key leaders and planners to
mised for small-team distributed operations in a recognise the true nature of the irregular challenge
high-threat environment, in predominantly urban- in Iraq, the US Army was slower to adapt than either
ised environments. In addition, because Australia the US Marines or their major coalition partners, the
lacks a marine corps, the Australian Navy and Army British and Australians.
Complex Irregular Warfare: The Face of Contemporary Conflict 419
The US Marines quickly produced an update to evolutionary development rather than the more
their iconic Small Wars Manual, a classic of irregular radical approaches envisaged by the Australians,
warfare doctrine first published in 1940. The new the British and the US Marines.
update was a well-considered analysis that drew The US Army concept for a Modular Army,
on many of the same observations about the conflict which envisages smaller, more agile units of action
environment, and made some extremely sound able to work more effectively in an urbanised, popu-
recommendations for adapting to it. However, US lated environment of complex terrain, appears to
Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan have often tended be a serious attempt to orient the US Army to the
to fall back on well-proven concepts from an earlier demands of the new environment. It is supported
counterinsurgency era, applying techniques such as by an Army version of Distributed Operations,
combined action platoons in their area of responsi- which envisages larger teams and less small-unit
bility. These have proved less effective than hoped, autonomy, but greater combat weight, than the US
because of the increasing complexity and lethality Marine version of the concept. The US Army also
of the conflict environment, and because the enemy appears to have benefited from its relatively late
was not a single mass movement but a loosely start in adjusting to complex irregular warfare, by
aligned movement of anti-occupation forces. drawing from coalition and joint partners’ concepts
A second Marine initiative – the concept for in developing its own. For example, large portions of
Distributed Operations – is currently being devel- the new US future land warfighting concept appear
oped. Although the details are classified, it appears to be have been drawn directly from the Australian
to involve a similar response to that developed by Complex Warfighting doctrine, while other passages
the British and Australians (with whom the US echo the Marines’ Distributed Operations and Small
Marines have long cooperated extremely closely). Wars concepts.
It envisages a network of small teams, linked to a A key element of the US Army approach is the
responsive system for offensive fire support and a innovative use of ‘tactical blogs’ such as the secure
pervasive surveillance, reconnaissance and informa- website ‘companycommand.com’. These sites allow
tion network, able to respond in an agile manner to serving junior commanders to rapidly share lessons
changing threats in a rapidly evolving conflict space. learned, operational insights and tactical tips, leading
The teams could coalesce into larger organisations in to a much faster – albeit unofficial – adaption cycle
the face of large-scale threats, or disperse to cover a in dealing with changing adversary tactics. The
wide area with a low-profile presence. The concept army has been highly innovative in supporting this
dovetails with the Marines’ well-developed concepts bottom-up initiative and seeking to leverage it into a
of Sea Basing, Operational Maneuver from the Sea greater degree of tactical agility. This is perhaps the
and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, which remain most impressive army contribution to the current
some of the most advanced amphibious concepts in conflict environment.
existence. Like Sea Basing, Distributed Operations Thus, while their approaches have differed in
also represents a very sophisticated approach to detail, the principal Anglo-Saxon nations engaged
the current conflict environment. The Marines’ in the current range of conflicts have all adopted
well-regarded Center for Emerging Threats and approaches that emphasise small-team, protected,
Opportunities has also produced several interesting networked operations in complex terrain, against
and useful new approaches to ‘cultural intelligence’ agile irregular enemies, as the basis for future
and the problem of complex human terrain. combat. Their approaches to current operations
The US Army responded to the challenge of irreg- reflect the practical application of these concepts to
ular conflicts by producing, for the first time since differing degrees, while acquisition programs also
the early 1960s, a new doctrine for counterinsur- look set to re-orient major military forces toward the
gency. Issued in October 2004, Field Manual-Interim new environment.
3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations draws Beyond the three nations described here in detail,
heavily on classical counterinsurgency approaches many other defence forces are in a process of re-orien-
from the 1960s, but has been updated to reflect some tation to the new environment. Notably, the French
key aspects of twenty-first-century operations. The ‘counter-war strategy’ adopts a similar approach to
details are again classified, but in general terms the dominating the entire conflict environment in order
doctrine appears to be a relatively conservative, to return it to peaceful conditions, while the notion
420 The MIlITary BalanCe 2005•2006
that ground combat occurs in a ‘viscous medium’ importance as means to shape the strategic context in
mirrors the Anglo-Australian emphasis on terrain which future conflict will be fought. But the day-to-
and population complexity. The German Army is day prosecution of these conflicts will be increasingly
pursuing a similar series of concepts, while seeking irregular, asymmetric and ground based, fought in
to optimise only part of its force for this type of complex human and physical terrain against a back-
operation, and Scandinavian armies – already well drop of vastly increased individual lethality.
experienced in this form of operation – are adapting As a result, many Western planners – notably in
quickly along the same lines. the British and Australian ground and special forces
and in the US Marine Corps, which have long tradi-
COnClUSIOnS tions of combat in low intensity warfare – have begun
a process of evolution toward smaller, more agile
The conflict environment of the early twenty-first mission teams. For the US Army, which has histori-
century differs markedly from that envisaged in cally concentrated on developing conventional high-
the late twentieth-century RMA debates, with their intensity capabilities and doctrine, the process may
emphasis on precision standoff engagement and all- take longer and be less easily accomplished.
pervasive networked information systems. Instead, Reflected in warfighting concepts, acquisition
the wars that have emerged have been irregular programmes and actual operations, the trend towards
conflicts in which adversaries have deliberately developing smaller mission teams is deliberately opti-
sought to negate Western conventional superiority mised for operations in complex, urbanised, popu-
by retreating into complex terrain and adopting lated areas marked by pervasive media presence and
asymmetric approaches to offset technological mili- globalised communications. However, such evolu-
tary power. While air power played an important tion is, of course, only likely to spur co-evolution by
supporting role in these conflicts, ground forces the various irregular forces opposing Western armies
have increasingly been required to grapple at close – a process of continuing adaptation that looks set to
quarters, relatively unsupported, with messy and continue well into the new century, as each actor adapts
ambiguous conflict situations on the ground. and seeks to offset the actions of actual or potential
This is not to say that the precision air and mari- adversaries. Moreover, since the US military is likely
time engagement envisaged in the RMA approach, to remain primarily conventionally focused, even in
or the notion of network-centric warfare, has been the wake of the 2005 QDR, most adversaries are likely
overtaken by events. These remain key elements in to continue to seek irregular asymmetric approaches
the Western way of war and are likely to retain their to offset Western conventional superiority.