The Military Balance 2005-06, Ch. 06.East Asia and Australasia

56 Pages·2.084 MB·English

Chapter Six
East Asia and Australasia
east and north-east asia shuffle following the resignation of former President
Jiang Zemin from the chairmanship in September
The modernisation and reform of China’s armed 2004. Furthermore, in an unprecedented move,
forces, challenging the US and its allies, is one of the President Hu Jintao appointed three military offi-
main defence and security issues in east and northeast cers to the committee – Admiral Zhang Dingfa, the
Asia. Washington has had concerns about the growth commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy
in Chinese military power for some time. TThhee UUSS (PLAN), the commander of the People’s Liberation
Department of Defense Report ‘The Military Power Army Air Force (PLAAF), and the commander of the
of the People’s Republic of China’, released 19 July Second Artillery. Subsequently, in December 2004, the
2005, demonstrated Washington’s concern at what it new CMC issued its annual defence policy statement
sees as a Chinese military build-up, not only directed which laid out the main areas for modernisation.
towards Taiwan, but also aimed at developing force Although Beijing has established links with
projection capabilities beyond Chinese waters. Taiwanese opposition parties, another focus of the
However, this concern was not, initially, mirrored CMC policy was emphasised by a statement that rela-
in Europe, and the European Union (EU) was fully tions with Taiwan are ‘grim’. Consequently, a Chinese
prepared to lift the embargo on sales of arms and strategy of deploying overwhelming missile supe-
equipment to Beijing, imposed after the Tiananmen riority against the island has developed. In addition
Square incident in 1989. Nevertheless, opposi- to the DF-11 missiles deployed in Jiangxi province,
tion to the lifting of the embargo recently increased and the DF-15 missiles in Fujian, Taipei estimates
following US pressure and a greater realisation in EU that, by 2006, there will be an additional 200 land-
member states of the possible dangers of allowing attack cruise missiles deployed, giving a total of some d
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following a declaration of independence by Taiwan, defence ministry is basing its future missile defence
also caused some European governments to change on the purchase of PAC-3 systems; but these will
their view on the lifting of the embargo. not come into service until 2012. Moreover, China is
Before the release of the Pentagon’s report, US believed to be developing ‘smart’ systems to counter
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, speaking at any ballistic defence missile systems that Taiwan
the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore in June, said might deploy. So-called Shashoujian weaponry aims to
that China’s increased military spending threatens give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a lead over
stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He also said that the US and its regional allies in missile technology.
‘China appears to be expanding its missile forces, As the PLA starts its 11th Five Year Defence Plan,
allowing them to reach targets in many areas in the transformation draws on lessons from coalition oper-
world’. Following this statement, it was reported ations in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly in the
that China had tested a new long-range submarine- areas of information and cyber warfare. It is expected
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on 16 June. The Ju that eight new surveillance satellites – four HJ1A/B
Lang-2 missile, which is believed to be a sea-launched electro-optical satellites and 4 HJ1C radar satellites
version of the Dong Feng-31, was said to have achieved – will be launched between 2006 and 2008. Moreover,
an estimated range of 8,000km, thus allowing Chinese as a partner in the European ‘Galileo’ project, and
missiles to reach areas of the continental US from with its own analogous projects, China is building an
China’s littoral waters. extensive navigation satellite system.
As a sign that reform of the Chinese armed Meanwhile, enhancements in the ground forces
forces is a priority for Beijing, the Central Military are concentrated on amphibious, special forces and
Commission (CMC) underwent a far-reaching re- airborne formations. In particular, a second Airborne
260 ThE MiliTAry BAlAncE 2005•2006
Army may be formed, whilst the first Airborne Army In what was seen as an act of provocation, on 10
is receiving a new type of armoured vehicle which November 2004 a Chinese Han-class submarine entered
can be dropped by parachute. Japanese territorial waters near Taramajima island.
The PLAAF is due to receive more aircraft from Subsequently, on 16 November, Beijing apologised for
Russia, in particular Su-30MKK and Su-27 fighter the incident, which had resulted in Tokyo declaring
aircraft. And the PLAN is due to acquire more a ‘maritime security operation’ for only the second
amphibious assault ships, fast-attack craft, and two time since 1945. However, the incident highlighted the
Project 965EM missile destroyers equipped with the increasing activity of the PLAN in the region.
Moskit anti-ship missile system which will enhance The naming of China as a possible threat in
the anti-ship capability already available on the Japan’s bold National Defense Program Guideline for
Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with FY 2005 and After an official document published by
SSN-22 Sunburn missiles. Moreover, as a sign of the Tokyo in December 2004, further exacerbated tensions
importance of the submarine fleet in Beijing’s strategy, between the two countries. Prior to this, in October,
the PLAN is to bring some eight new Russian Kilo- there were indications that Japan would join the US
class SSKs equipped with SS-N-27 missiles into Missile Defence Initiative (MDI), and in November
service in the next two years; and there are develop- 2004 the US agreed to the Japanese production of the
ments in the SSN fleet with the introduction of the PAC-3 interceptor by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Type 093 expected in 2005. A further indication of the due to start in 2006. The deployment of land-based
priority which is given to the submarine fleet was the PAC-3 systems as part of a layered ballistic missile
appointment of a nuclear submariner, Rear Admiral defence system could start in 2008 to be followed by
Sun Jianguo, as Chief of the Naval Staff in January the deployment of Aegis sea-based systems.
2005. The commander of the PLAN, Admiral Zhang At the centre of the defence debate in Japan is
Dingfa, is also a submariner. Article 9 of the Constitution, which restricts the
Russia remains the main defence partner for China, deployment of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) on oper-
not just in the supply of new equipment, but also, ations. At a time when there is increasing pressure
increasingly, as a regional security partner. Working to take part in operations overseas, the restrictions
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are increasingly difficult to reconcile with the inter-
(SCO), both countries seek to extend their influ- national role Japan envisages for itself as an aspirant
ence in Central Asia, and to curb US influence in the member of the UN Security Council.
region. Moreover, from 18 to 25 August 2005, exercise As an example of the difficulties caused by Article 9
Peace Mission 2005 was the first bilateral joint training conditions, the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures
exercise to have taken place involving forces of both Law, passed in August 2003, authorised the Japanese
countries. Some 10,000 Russian and PLA military Ground SSeellff--DDeeffeennssee FFoorrcceess ((JJGGSSDDFF)) ttoo ddeeppllooyy oonn aa
personnel took part in the exercise on the Shandong non-combatant mission in Samawah, but the law has
Peninsula. to be renewed in December 2005, and a decision in
Meanwhile, as China builds its relationship with favour of extending the JGSDF mandate will depend
Russia, its relations with Japan have deteriorated. on the security situation. At the same time, the coali-
Anti-Japanese protests started in China in March and tion in Iraq is considering handing over areas of the
led to calls by Tokyo for an official apology, which country, including Samawah, to Iraqi security forces
was not forthcoming. The cause of the anti-Japanese – a fact that will bear heavily on the decision of the
sentiment appears to be Japanese Prime Minister Diet whether to extend the mandate.
Junichiro Koizumi’s annual visit to the Yakuzuni However, the National Defense Program Guideline
shrine (a memorial to the war dead), seen by Beijing for FY 2005 and After indicated a shift in defence
as a sign that Japan is unrepentant for its war record. thinking. The relationship with the US is to be
However, this public argument can be seen against strengthened with commonly agreed objectives,
the wider regional political background with China’s technology exchange, joint training and informa-
economic and military development increasingly tion-sharing amongst the areas to be developed.
challenging Japan’s position in the region, its aspira- Indicating the way forward, the SDF participated
tion to membership of the UN Security Council, and in the Cobra Gold 2005 exercise held in Thailand
its close alliance with the US – another competitor for between 2 and 13 May 2005, the first time its ground
China in the Asia-Pacific region. forces have joined a multilateral training event.
East Asia and Australasia 261
As part of the growing strategic relationship, programme. However, following US Secretary of
a US Army corps headquarters is to be re-located State Condoleezza Rice’s naming of North Korea as
from Washington State to Kanagawa Prefecture. ‘an outpost of tyranny’ in February 2005, Pyongyang
Meanwhile, the future re-alignment of US forces in once again declared that it was not prepared to nego-
Japan, which currently number some 41, 000, is under tiate, and announced on 10 February that it had
review, with the emphasis on Okinawa Prefecture, constructed nuclear weapons, and would suspend its
where 75% of the US force is stationed. participation in the six-party talks indefinitely.
US base re-alignment plans in South Korea have In April 2005 Seoul expressed concern that North
caused civil protest. On 10 July 2005 the US mili- Korea had shut down the Yongbyon reactor, which
tary’s plan to expand its Camp Humphrey base at could allow more nuclear material to be extracted
Pyongtaek met with opposition by some 12,000 locals for its weapons programme. On 11 May, Pyongyang
and anti-war activists demanding the withdrawal of confirmed that this was happening and that it had
US troops from the country; and plans to build bases completed extraction of spent fuel rods in order to
for the future deployment of PAC-3 missiles on the increase its nuclear arsenal. In a further act of provo-
west coast met with more demonstrations. But with cation, North Korea fired a short-range missile into
the re-alignment moving troops and bases away from the Sea of Japan on the eve of a meeting of members
the centre of Seoul – the main focus of anti-US senti- of the International Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
ment – it is hoped that there will be less protest. on 1 May.
In September 2004 the US deployed F-117 stealth However, on 16 May North and South Korea held
fighter-bombers, and a squadron of F-15E fighter- their first bilateral talks for nearly a year against the
bombers, to South Korea to exercise its capability to background of a growing food crisis in the north,
respond to a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Another which resulted in a request by Pyongyang for food
deployment from the continental US took place in aid from Seoul. At the same time, North Korea was
March 2005 when some 17,000 troops deployed on preparing to announce its readiness to return to nego-
Exercise Foal Eagle. The exercise is an annual joint tiation; and on 25 July 2005 the fourth round of the
training event, with US and South Korean forces, to test six-party talks started in Beijing, to be adjourned after
defensive plans against an invasion from North Korea. 13 days with very little sign of meaningful progress, d
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and 4-km-wide Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). A study to re-convene in September 2005
to examine the feasibility of the project, believed to
cost some $2bn, is to be completed this year; and, if a soUtheast asia and aUstraLasia
decision to develop the systems is taken, they could
be deployed in 2011. During 2004–05, several Southeast Asian states’
Following the third round of six-party talks in armed forces remained focussed on low-intensity
June 2004, the process of persuading North Korea operations against insurgent groups. In Indonesia,
to give up its nuclear programme through negotia- although the government had ended martial law in
tion stalled. Pyongyang persistently accused the Bush the province of Aceh in May 2004, replacing it with
administration of adopting a ‘hostile policy’ and said a ‘civil emergency’, the armed separatist movement
it would not return to negotiation until this ceased. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) continued to chal-
Moreover, the announcement by the International lenge Jakarta’s rule. After being elected Indonesia’s
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in August 2004 that president in September 2004, Susilo Bambang
South Korea had carried out uranium enrichment Yudhoyono (a retired general) expressed his deter-
experiments in the past had the potential to further mination to end the conflict. Although at the time
exacerbate the situation. However, in the event, the there seemed little immediate prospect of negotia-
IAEA’s inspection report on the South Korean experi- tions, the outlook for peace improved in the wake of
ments prevented the issue becoming a significant the tsunami that devastated Aceh in late December
factor in the context of the North Korean question. 2004. The Indonesian armed forces quickly resumed
In January 2005 North Korea announced that counter-insurgency operations despite the reported
it was prepared to re-start talks on its nuclear loss of thousands of military personnel in the natural
262 ThE MiliTAry BAlAncE 2005•2006
disaster, but international donors of relief and recon- the MILF was postponed, against the background of
struction aid persuaded the Indonesian government a renewed AFP offensive (reportedly supported by
and GAM to recommence peace negotiations. After US special forces) aimed at capturing or killing ASG
five rounds of talks brokered by a Finnish NGO in leader Khadaffy Janjalani and his followers, as well as
Helsinki between late January and mid-July 2005, the a major political crisis in Manila threatening the posi-
two sides agreed a memorandum of understanding tion of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
aimed at ending hostilities and scheduled to be signed While there appeared to be some prospect of
on 15 August. The memorandum covered the ending peaceful settlements in Aceh and the southern
of armed activities by GAM and the withdrawal of Philippines, the situation in southern Thailand dete-
Indonesian troops, apart from garrison forces, from riorated and it became clear that the wave of violence
Aceh. While this appeared to indicate a breakthrough, that began in early 2004 indicated a new upsurge
the key question of whether or not the settlement in separatist activism by Malay-Muslim groups
would allow GAM participation in provincial politics including the Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani
was apparently still undecided, and it remained to be (Pattani Islamic Warriors’ Movement). During 2004-
seen whether the Indonesian armed forces and GAM 05, there were frequent lethal attacks on Thai secu-
field commanders would support the agreement’s rity forces, officials and ordinary Buddhist citizens.
implementation. However, on 15 August GAM rebels Heavy-handedness on the part of the Thai security
and the Indonesian government signed the peace forces, evident in the ‘Tak Bai incident’ in October
accord as planned, ending over 30 years of conflict 2004 when almost 80 Muslim demonstrators died after
in Aceh. According to the peace agreement, Aceh being ‘stacked like bricks’ in army trucks, did little to
will have local self-government and up to 70% of the bring the growing conflict under control. In order to
revenue from Aceh’s natural resources. Additionally, boost military strength in the south while enhancing
the Indonesian government agreed to allow Aceh the army’s capacity for hearts-and-minds operations,
to establish local political parties and to withdraw in February 2005 the Thai cabinet authorised the reac-
some 30,000 Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) troops tivation of the 15th Infantry Division. In July 2005, by
from the province. In return, GAM agreed to disarm which time almost 900 people had been killed over
and demobilise some 3,000 rebels. Meanwhile, the the previous 17 months, the government declared
European Union and Association of Southeast Asian an emergency zone, covering Narathiwat, Yala and
Nations (ASEAN) have sent representatives to Aceh Pattani provinces, together with four districts in
to monitor the implementation of the peace accord. neighbouring Songkhla province, in which it would
In the southern Philippines in October 2004, an inter- have the power to conduct search and arrest opera-
national monitoring team comprising 50 Malaysian tions without warrants, tap phones, impose curfews,
and 10 Bruneian military observers, commanded by ban public gatherings, censor news, restrict travel and
a Malaysian major-general, deployed to Mindanao in expel foreigners.
support of the fragile ceasefire between the Armed Separatist insurgency continued to challenge the
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Moro Islamic authority of Myanmar’s State Peace and Development
Liberation Front (MILF). In December, a small number Council (SPDC) regime. The ousting of the relatively
of Libyans joined the team. However, along with pragmatic chief of military intelligence (MI) and
continuing disagreement over the political format of prime minister, General Khin Nyunt, in October 2004,
any settlement, alleged links between MILF elements followed by the subsequent purge of the MI apparatus,
on the one hand and terrorist groups – notably Jemaah threatened to worsen the internal security situation.
Islamiah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) - on From 1989, Khin Nyunt had negotiated ceasefires in
the other, continued to complicate the peace process. border regions with 17 ethnic minority insurgent
The AFP mounted airstrikes against the severely groups including the United Wa State Army (UWSA),
depleted ASG and its JI associates in November 2004 the Kachin Independence Organisation and the New
and January 2005, but failed to eliminate its leader- Mon State Army. Some ‘ceasefire groups’, including
ship. In February, an attack by the renegade ‘Nur the UWSA and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
Misuari faction’ of the Moro National Liberation (DKBA), even agreed to fight alongside the regime’s
Front provoked a major ‘punitive action’ by the AFP, forces. In return for halting their open rebellions, the
which subdued the rebellion. In late July 2005, a ninth ceasefire groups were allowed to keep their weapons,
round of peace talks between the government and control territory and operate business concessions
East Asia and Australasia 263
with extensive cross-border trade. Approximately troops likely to follow in April 2006. In January 2005,
two dozen insurgent groups continued their rebel- New Zealand deployed a fresh 120-strong military
lions; though, at the time of Khin Nyunt’s removal, a contingent to the Provincial Reconstruction Team in
delegation from the Karen National Union, the oldest Afghanistan’s Bamiyan province.
and largest ethnic rebel group, was in Yangon for In March 2005, Thailand despatched 177 military
ceasefire talks. While the SPDC claimed there would engineers to the UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi
be no change in policy towards the ceasefire groups, for a six-month tour.
the regime presented them with a 13-point memo- The tsunami which followed the major earthquake
randum demanding a formal ceasefire, under which off Aceh on 26 December 2004 had disastrous conse-
they would be forced to renounce armed struggle, quences for several parts of Southeast Asia, most
cease recruiting, end military training, stop collecting importantly Aceh in Indonesia, and the area around
revenue and assist Yangon’s anti-narcotics campaign. Phuket in southern Thailand (where the Royal
In return, they would receive subsistence funding and Thai Navy’s major Phang Nga base was hard hit,
would be given roles as local armed police. In the face leaving a frigate and other vessels badly damaged).
of this ultimatum and the loss of familiar MI contacts, The disaster provoked unprecedentedly large relief
some ceasefire groups began considering resuming efforts spearheaded by military forces from within
their insurgencies. There were particular problems and without the region, incidentally highlighting
with Karen, Karenni and Shan groups. Ceasefire talks their rapid deployment capabilities. The US made the
with the KNU broke down in April 2005 and by early most important contribution, deploying more than
June fighting had reignited. In April, the SPDC – in 15,000 personnel under Operation Unified Assistance.
conjunction with the UWSA – launched a major offen- Though US forces also played significant roles in Sri
sive against the Shan State Army (SSA). The SPDC Lanka, the Maldives and Thailand, American relief
blamed the KNU and SSA for bomb attacks in Yangon operations – in which US Navy and Marine Corps
in May, but these may have resulted from continuing helicopters played prominent parts – were centred
factional disputes within the SPDC. on Aceh. Under Operations Sumatra Assist and Flying
The military contingents from the Phillipines Eagle, respectively, Australia and Singapore each
and Thailand were withdrawn from Iraq in July deployed more than 1,000 personnel to Aceh. Japan d
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Singapore deployed a KC-135 tanker aircraft to the New Zealand, Pakistan, Spain and the UK were
Gulf from June to September 2004, and an amphib- prominent amongst other countries sending forces
ious vessel from December 2004 to March 2005. to Aceh (for more details see Strategic Survey 2004/5,
Australia demonstrated its staunch support for its pp. xxvi-xxvii). US, Australian and Singapore forces
US and British allies in Iraq, deploying an additional were also involved in relief operations after a major
450 troops and 40 ASLAV APCs to protect Japanese earthquake struck the Indonesian island of Nias, off
military engineers and train Iraqi security forces in the Sumatra, in late March 2005.
southern province of al-Muthana in April 2005. This In the wake of the controversial US proposal for a
deployment brought total Australian troop numbers Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) during
in Iraq to approximately 950, most of the forces the first half of 2004 (for details see The Military Balance
already present being involved in protecting diplo- 2004–2005, p. 165), Southeast Asian states continued
mats and training Iraqi forces. Reports in July 2005 to indicate their recognition of the need to counter
suggested that Britain was negotiating with Canberra piracy and potential maritime terrorism, particularly
to transfer its military command in southern Iraq to in the Malacca Strait, more effectively. Significant
Australia in order to free UK forces for redeployment measures involving regional states included two
to Afghanistan. Japanese initiatives: the Asia Maritime Security
In July, Canberra announced that it would be Initiative 2004 (AMARSECTIVE 2004), under which
sending troops to Afghanistan again, after a two- the heads of Asian coast guards, meeting in Tokyo in
and-a-half-year hiatus. Plans called for 150 Special June 2004, agreed to intensify collaboration against
Air Service personnel and commandos to deploy in piracy, sea robbery and maritime terrorism; and the
September 2005 for 12 months, with 200 engineering Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
264 ThE MiliTAry BAlAncE 2005•2006
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia few major equipment purchases, Indonesia’s defence
(ReCAAP), concluded in Tokyo in November 2004. ministry is planning to reinforce substantially military
Under ReCAAP, an Information Sharing Centre deployments in hitherto relatively lightly defended
will be established in Singapore. In March 2005, the eastern Indonesia. A third Kostrad (army strategic
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (effectively reserve) division will be formed, with its headquar-
the country’s coast guard) became operational under ters in Papua, which will also provide the base (to be
the command of a one-star naval officer and assumed completed in 2008) for a fourth marine brigade. Air
responsibility for law enforcement in Malaysia’s terri- defence facilities in Papua will also be expanded.
torial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone. Also in The Ninth Malaysia Plan (covering the 2006-10
March, Singapore introduced tighter maritime secu- period) will mainly fund equipment already ordered
rity regulations, under which escort teams including for Malaysia’s armed forces, including Su-30MKM
armed naval personnel will board commercial vessels fighters, PT-91 main battle tanks, and Scorpene
assessed as vulnerable to terrorist attack, while they are submarines. While additional funds may be made
in national waters. Meanwhile, piracy has remained available to purchase F/A-18F combat aircraft and A-
a serious problem in the Malacca Strait. Although no 400M transport aircraft, other planned procurement
attacks were reported in the two months following the programmes – notably for AWACS aircraft – will
December 2004 tsunami, possibly because of the deter- probably be deferred until after 2010.
rent effect of the large international naval presence in Singapore’s defence ministry announced in April
the strait, violent attacks resumed in March 2005. 2005 that the Eurofighter Typhoon had been dropped
At the beginning of 2005, Australia’s govern- from the shortlist of types competing to fill the air
ment announced an initiative aimed at strength- force’s Next Fighter Replacement (NFR) requirement;
ening national maritime security and particularly at this left the Boeing F-15T and Dassault Rafale in the
reducing the threat from seaborne terrorism. Through competition. If the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is delayed,
a Joint Offshore Protection Command, established Singapore’s air force might require more than the 20
in April 2005, the Australian Defence Force will be NFR aircraft originally envisaged. A second air force
tasked with all offshore counter-terrorist prevention, competition involves provision of a commercially
interdiction and response; the Customs Coastwatch operated basic flying training school in Australia
organisation will remain responsible for maritime and from 2008. Singapore’s navy is also preparing for
coastal surveillance. Security patrols in the vicinity of new equipment: the first two of its six 3,200-tonne
Australia’s oil and gas fields in the Timor Sea and on Formidable-class frigates had been launched by early
the North West Shelf have been introduced urgently, 2005; the type will enter service from 2007. The frig-
and two additional Armidale-class patrol vessels will ates will carry S-70B multi-mission helicopters, six of
be acquired for patrolling the latter area. Intrinsic to which were ordered in January 2005. In mid-2005,
Canberra’s initiative is the concept of a 1,000 nautical Singapore reportedly began negotiations for two
miles Maritime Identification Zone around Australia, Swedish Västergötland-class submarines. Singapore’s
aimed at providing early warning of potential mari- seven F-16A/B fighter aircraft were transferred to
time terrorist threats. The concept provoked criticism Thailand in late 2004. Under a memorandum of
by Indonesia and Malaysia because of its apparent understanding signed in November 2004, Singapore’s
implications for their sovereignty. air force will be allowed to deploy as many as 20
Incremental modernisation of regional armed aircraft for training at Thailand’s Udon Thani air base
forces continued during 2004–05. In Indonesia, for up to six months annually.
however, continuing restrictions on defence spending Since 1995, the AFP Modernisation Act has guided
caused postponement of plans to expand the air force’s development of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
fleet of Su-30MK combat aircraft. Five additional However, progress towards upgrading capability
Korean-built KT-1B basic trainers were ordered. The has been painfully slow, mainly because of funding
December 2004 tsunami highlighted severe shortcom- shortages. In light of urgent operational require-
ings in the Indonesian armed forces’ logistic capabil- ments imposed by the need to counter both Muslim
ities, and prompted the US government to relax its separatist rebels and Maoist insurgents belonging
arms embargo to allow direct commercial sales of to the New People’s Army, in early 2005 the AFP
some defence items and services, including spares began implementing a five-year Capability Upgrade
for C-130 transport aircraft. But while there were Program (CUP), focussed on acquiring basic indi-
East Asia and Australasia 265
vidual and unit equipment, aimed particularly at vessels and air warfare destroyers. It will also fund
enhancing the mobility, firepower and communi- up to 2,560 stand-off air-to-ground missiles to equip
cations of counter-insurgency forces and costing the air force’s F/A-18 and AP-3C combat aircraft
approximately US$600mn between 2005 and 2010. from 2007. A decision on whether to acquire the F-
Vietnam took delivery of a further four Su- 35 Joint Strike Fighter will be deferred from 2006 to
30MK2V multi-role combat aircraft in November 2008. According to Defence Minister Robert Hill, the
2004. Two Polish-built PZL M28 Skytruck maritime option of purchasing some STOVL variants of the
patrol aircraft were delivered the following month; F-35 for potential operation from the new amphib-
up to 10 more may follow by 2007. ious ships has not been ruled out. Deliveries of the
Australia’s 2005–06 defence budget, announced in army’s 22 Eurocopter Tiger attack helicopters began in
May 2005, included provision for tactical UAVs for December 2004. In June 2005, 12 NH90 utility helicop-
the army, upgrades for F/A-18 combat aircraft, new ters were ordered for the army for delivery from 2007;
special forces equipment, and the initial stages of New Zealand has selected the same type to replace its
the navy’s acquisition of new amphibious transport UH-1s from 2009.
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266 ThE MiliTAry BAlAncE 2005•2006
Cbt engr 1 regt (integrated); 2 regt
australia Aus
Force Support 2 bn; 1 bn (integrated)
Australian Dollar Combat Service Support 3 regt (CIS); 2 bn; 1 bn
2003 2004 2005
A$ (integrated)
GDP A$ 783bn 837bn
Joint Support 1 regt (CIS)
US$ 512bn 598bn AD 1 regt
per capita US$ 25,968 30,059
Special Operations command
Growth % 3.4 3.2
inflation % 2.8 2.3 ForCes by roLe
Public Debt % 19.5 20.5 1 Special Operations HQ
SF 1 regt (SAS)
Def exp A$ 18.6bn 20bn
Cdo 2 bn (1 reserve)
US$ 12.2bn 14.3bn
Incident Response 1 unit
Def bdgt A$ 15.8bn 16.3bn 17.4bn
US$ 10.3bn 11.6bn 13.2bn Training command 3,160
US$1=A$ 1.53 1.4 1.32
reserve Organisations
Population 20,090,437
land command 17,200 reservists
Ethnic groups: Asian 4%; Aborigines <1%
ForCes by roLe
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 div HQ, 6 bde HQ
Male 10% 4% 3% 3% 24% 6% Recce 2 regt; 1 sqn
Female 10% 3% 3% 3% 23% 7% Inf 13 bn
APC 1 regt
capabilities
Cdo 1 regt
aCtiVe 52,872 (Army 26,035 navy 13,167 Air Fd arty 3 regt; 3 indep bty
13,670) Cbt engr 3 regt
Engr construction 2 regt
reserVe 20,800 (Army 17,200 navy 1,600 Air
Fd Engr 3 (fd) sqn
2,000)
eQUiPMent by tyPe
TK • MBT • LEOPARD 1 101: 71 1A3 (excl variants);
organisations by serViCe 30 in store
APC 619
army 26,035 APC (T) 364: 245 M-113 (to be upgraded); 119 in store
(to be upgraded)
land command APC (W) • ASLAV 255: 255 ASLAV-25 (being delivered)
ForCes by roLe ARTY 566
1 Land HQ, 1 Deployable Joint Force HQ, 1 Logistic TOWED 270
Support Force HQ 105mm 234: 109 L-118 Light Gun; 125 L-5/M-2A2
Air Lift 1 regt 155mm 36: 36 M-198
MOR 296: 296 81mm
Army 2 bde HQ; 1 bde HQ
AT • RCL 651
(intergrated)
106mm • M-40 74: 74 M-40A1
Armd 1 regt (integrated)
84mm 577: 577 Carl Gustav
Recce 1 regt (integrated); 1 regt
AIRCRAFT • TPT 6: 3 Beech 200 Super King Air (on
Armd recce hel 1 regt lease); 1 Beech 350 Super King Air (on lease); 2 DHC-6
Surv 3 (regional force) unit Twin Otter (on lease)
(integrated) HELICOPTERS
Mech inf 1 bn ATK 22: 22 AS-665 Tiger (delivery from July 2004)
EW 1 regt SPT 40
CH-47 6: 6 CH-47D Chinook
Mot Inf 1 bn; 1 bn (integrated)
S-70 34: 34 S-70 A-9 (S-70A) Black Hawk
APC 1 indep sqn
UTL 55
Lt inf 2 bn BELL 206 • BELL 206B 38: 38 Bell 206B-1 Kiowa (to
Para 1 bn be upgraded)
Med arty 1 regt UH-1 17: 17 UH-1H Iroquois
Fd arty 1 regt (integrated); 1 regt AD • SAM 48
Avn 1 bde HQ; 1 (surv) sqn TOWED 18: 18 Rapier B1M
MANPAD 30: 30 RBS-70
Spt 1 (joint support) regt (CIS)
RADAR • LAND 21: 7 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty, mor);
East Asia and Australasia 267
14 RASIT (veh, arty) naval Systems comd
AMPHIBIOUS • CRAFT 15: 15 LCM
Navy 1 HQ
navy 13,167; 1,600 reservists (total 14,767)
air Force 13,670; 2,000 reservists (total 15,670)
eQUiPMent by tyPe 2 comds – air,trg
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6: Flying hours 175 hrs/year on F/A-18 Hornet FGA ac; 200
6 Collins each with UGM-84C Harpoon tactical USGW, 6 hrs/year on F-111 Aardvark bbr ac
single 533mm TT each with 1 Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT
ForCes by roLe
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 10
Air cbt 1 gp (1 ftr/tac wg (1 OCU, 3 ftr sqn with 55 F/A-
FFG 6:
18A Hornet; 16 F/A-18B Hornet), 1 recce/strike
6 Adelaide (capacity either 2 AS-350 Ecureuil spt hel/S-
wg (2 FGA/recce sqn with 17 F-111C Aardvark; 4
70B Seahawk ASW hel) each with 2 S-70B Seahawk ASW RF-111 Aardvark; 1 EC-130H Compass Call; 2 EP-3C
hel, 2 Mk32 triple 324mm each with Mk 32/Mk 46, 1 Orion), 1 tac trg wg (1 FAC flt with 4 PC-9A, 2 trg
Mk 13 GMLS with SM-1 MR SAM, RGM-84C Harpoon sqn with 33 Hawk MK127))
tactical SSM, 1 76mm gun
MP 1 gp (3 MP sqn (incl OCU) with 19 AP-3C Orion/
FF 4: P-3C Orion*; 3 TAP-3B Orion)
4 Anzac each with 1 S-70B-2 Seahawk ASW hel (being
SAR S-76 (civil contract) at 4 air bases
replaced by SH-2GA Super Seasprite), 2 triple 324mm
Airlift 1 gp (1 Tkr/Tpt sqn with 4 B-707 (tkr/tpt), 1 Tpt sqn
ASTT (6 eff.) each with Mk 32/Mk 46, 1 32 cell Mk 41
with 7 Beech 300 Super King Air (navigation trg), 1
VLS (32 eff.) with up to 32 RIM-7NP Sea Sparrow SAM,
(VIP) Tpt sqn with 2 B-737 BBJ; 3 CL-604 Challenger,
1 127mm gun
2 Tpt sqn with 14 DHC-4 Caribou, 2 Tkr/Tpt sqn
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PCO 15: 15
with 1 EC-130H Compass Call; 11 C-130H Hercules;
Fremantle 12 C-130J Hercules)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9
Trg Flg trg schl with 58 PC-9A
MHC 6: 6 Huon
AD 1 airfield def wg (3 air sqn ); 1 surveillance and
MSA 3: 2 Bandicoot; 1 Brolga
response gp with 3 tactical radar and with radar
AMPHIBIOUS
coord centre located at Edinburgh (S. Australia)
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPH 2:
with 1 Jindalee OTH-B AD radar located at
2 Kanimbla (capacity 450 troops; 2 LCM; either 4 UH-60
Alice Springs; 1 at Laverton (W.Australia); 1 at
Black Hawk utl hel or 3 SH-3H Sea King utl hel) Longreach (N. Queensland) d
LCSR1L A •CT oFHLbTS r6 uT2:k 0 61 :( :cB1 a4apl iLakCcpiaMtpya 5n0 0 troops; 2 LCM; 2 LCVP) eAQIBRUBCiPRRM •Ae FnFT-t1 11b41y0 2 tc2yo: Pm1e7b aFt- 1c1a1pCab Aleardvark; 5 F-111G Aardvark ast Asia anAustralasia
in store E
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18
FGA 104
AGHS (SVY) 2: 2 Leuwin
F/A-18 71: 55 F/A-18A Hornet; 16 F/A-18B Hornet
AO 2: 1 Success; 1 Westralia
Hawk MK127 33
AT 5 RECCE 4: 4 RF-111C Aardvark
Craft 5 MP 19: 19 AP-3C Orion/P-3C Orion*
TRV 3 EW 4
TRG 1: 1 AXS EC-130 2: 2 EC-130H Compass Call
FaCiLities ELINT • EP-3 2: 2 EP-3C Orion
Base 1 located at Sydney, 1 located at Darwin, 1 located at TPT 53:
Cairns, 1 located at Stirling, 1 located at Jervis Bay, 1 B-707 4 (tkr)
located at Noura, 1 located at Flinders B-737 2: 2 B-737 BBJ
Beech 300 Super King Air 7 (navigation trg)
cOMFlOT C-130 23: 11 C-130H Hercules; 12 C-130J Hercules
CL-604 Challenger 3 DHC-4 Caribou 14
Navy 1 HQ
TRG 65: 62 PC-9A; 3 TAP-3 Orion
Maritime comd HELICOPTERS • UTL: some S-76 (civil contract)
RADAR • AD RADAR 6
Navy 1 HQ located at Stirling
OTH-B 3: 3 Jindalee located at Alice Springs
Tactical 3
naval Aviation 990
MSL • TACTICAL •
HELICOPTERS
ASM: some AGM-142 Popeye; some AGM-84A Harpoon
ASW 23
AAM: some AIM-120 AMRAAM; some AIM-9M
S-70B 16: 16 S-70B-2 Sidewinder; some ASRAAM
Sea King MK50 7
SPT • AS-350 12: 12 AS-350BA Ecureuil Paramilitary
268 ThE MiliTAry BAlAncE 2005•2006
Australian customs Service
brunei Bru
ε6 naval vessels
AIRCRAFT
Brunei Dollar B$ 2003 2004 2005
TPT 9
BN-2 ISLANDER 6: 6 BN-2B Islander GDP B$ 8.79bn 8.89bn
DHC-8 Dash 8 3 US$ 5.1bn 5.2bn
UTL 3: 3 F406 Caravan II per capita US$ 14,123 14,249
HELICOPTERS • UTL • BELL 206 1: 1 Bell 206L
Growth % 3.1 1.1
LongRanger
inflation % 0.3 0.9
dePLoyMent Def bdgt B$ 474m 502m 592m
US$ 272m 294m 357m
aFghanistan
US$1=B$ 1.74 1.71 1.66
UN • UNAMA 1 obs
Population 372,361
CyPrUs
Ethnic groups: Muslim 71%; Malay 67%; Chinese 16%; non-Malay
UN • UNFICYP 15 civ police indigenous 6%
east tiMor
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
UN • UNOTIL 2 obs
Male 15% 5% 4% 5% 22% 1%
egyPt
Female 14% 4% 4% 4% 19% 2%
MFO 25 staff
capabilities
iraQ
Army 850 (Peace Support) aCtiVe 7,000 (Army 4,900 navy 1,000 Air 1,100)
Air force
Paramilitary 7,500
AIRCRAFT • MP • P-3 1: 1 P-3C Orion
reserVe 700 (Army 700)
MaLaysia
Army 115
1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours) organisations by serViCe
Air force 12
army 4,900; 700 reservists (total 5,600)
MiddLe east
UN • UNTSO 12 obs ForCes by roLe
Inf 3 bn
PaPUa new gUinea
Spt 1 bn (1 armd recce sqn, 1 engr sqn)
Army 38 1 Trg unit
Reserves 1 bn
soLoMon isLands
eQUiPMent by tyPe
RAMSI 530+ (Op Anode) police/
AIRCRAFT • TPT 2: 2 DHC-4 Caribou TK • LT TK 20: 20 Scorpion (16 to be upgraded)
APC • APC (W) 39: 39 VAB
sUdan
ARTY • MOR 24: 81mm 24
UN • UNMIS 3, 6 obs AT • RL • 67mm: some Armbrust
Foreign ForCes navy 1,000
New Zealand Army: 9 (navigation) trg ForCes by roLe
Singapore Air Force: School with 27 S-211 trg ac (flying SF 1 sqn
trg) located at Pearce; School with 12 AS-332 Super Puma
eQUiPMent by tyPe
Spt/AS-532 Cougar utl (flying trg) located at Oakey; 230 air
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6+
United States USPACOM: SEWS located at Pine Gap;
MISC BOATS/CRAFT: some boats
comms facility located at NW Cape; SIGINT stn located at
PFI 3: 3 Perwira† (sid)
Pine Gap; 59; 31
PFM 3: 3 Waspada each with 2 MM-38 Exocet tactical
SSM
AMPHIBIOUS • CRAFT 4: 4 LCU
air Force 1,100
ForCes by roLe
Tpt 1 sqn with 1 CN-235M
Trg 1 sqn with 4 PC-7 Turbo Trainer; 2 SF-260W Warrior; 2
Bell 206B JetRanger II