UUnniivveerrssiittyy ooff KKeennttuucckkyy UUKKnnoowwlleeddggee Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy Philosophy 2017 TThhee MMeettaapphhyyssiiccss ooff PPeerrssoonnhhoooodd iinn PPllaattoo''ss DDiiaalloogguueess Daniel T. Sheffler University of Kentucky, [email protected] Author ORCID Identifier: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9308-2679 Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2017.142 RRiigghhtt cclliicckk ttoo ooppeenn aa ffeeeeddbbaacckk ffoorrmm iinn aa nneeww ttaabb ttoo lleett uuss kknnooww hhooww tthhiiss ddooccuummeenntt bbeenneefifittss yyoouu.. RReeccoommmmeennddeedd CCiittaattiioonn Sheffler, Daniel T., "The Metaphysics of Personhood in Plato's Dialogues" (2017). Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy. 16. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/16 This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SSTTUUDDEENNTT AAGGRREEEEMMEENNTT:: I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to register the copyright to my work. RREEVVIIEEWW,, AAPPPPRROOVVAALL AANNDD AACCCCEEPPTTAANNCCEE The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements above. Daniel T. Sheffler, Student Dr. David Bradshaw, Major Professor Dr. Clare Batty, Director of Graduate Studies THEMETAPHYSICSOFPERSONHOODINPLATO’SDIALOGUES DISSERTATION Adissertationsubmi(cid:308)edinpartialfulfillment oftherequirementsforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy intheCollegeofArtsandSciences attheUniversityofKentucky By D.T.Sheffler Director: Dr. DavidBradshaw,ProfessorofPhilosophy LexingtonKentucky Copyright©D.T.Sheffler2017 ABSTRACTOFDISSERTATION THEMETAPHYSICSOFPERSONHOODINPLATO’SDIALOGUES While most scholars know, or think they know, what Plato says about the soul, there is less certainty regarding what he says about the self. Some scholars even assert that the ancient Greeks did not possess the concepts of self or person. This dissertation sets out to examine those passages throughout Plato’s dialogues that most clearly require some notion of the self or the person, and by doing so to clarify the logical lineaments of these concepts as they existed in fourth century Athens. Because Plato wrote dialogues, I restrict myself to analyzing the concepts of self and person as they appear in the mouths of various Platonic characters and refrainfromspeculatingwhetherPlatohimselfendorseswhathischaracterssay. In spiteofthisrestriction,Ifindanumberofstrikingideasthatsetthestageforfurther philosophical development. After an introductory chapter, in Chapters 2 and 3 I arguethattheidentificationofthepersonwiththesoulandtheidentificationofthe humanbeingwiththecompositeofsoulandbodymakepossibleaconceptualsplit betweenpersonandhumanbeing. InChapter4,Iarguethatthetripartiteaccount ofthesoulsuggestsanidealidentificationofthepersonwiththerationalaspectof the soul rather than the lower aspects of one’s psychology. Finally, in Chapter 5 I argue that the analogical link between rationality in us and the rational order of thecosmosleadstotheconclusionthatthetrueselfis,insomesense,divine. KEYWORDS:Plato,Platonism,self,person,personhood D.T.Sheffler April17,2017 THEMETAPHYSICSOFPERSONHOODINPLATO’SDIALOGUES By D.T.Sheffler Dr. DavidBradshaw DissertationDirector Dr. ClareBa(cid:308)y DirectorofGraduateStudies April17,2017 ForRose ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IamespeciallygratefultotoDavidBradshawforagreeingtoactasmyadvi- soronthisproject. Hehasundoubtedlyputmorehoursthananyoneelseintohelp- ingmecompleteitandpushingmetowardexcellenceindoingso. Iamalsograteful toEricSandayforhisinvaluablecoursesonPlato,whereIlearnedtoread,andfor agreeingtoserveonmycommi(cid:308)ee. TimothySundelltaughtmemorethananyone elseaboutanalyticphilosophyandencouragedmetothinkrigorouslyaboutlogic. Robert Rabel taught me to love Greek poetry and I will never forget the enthusi- asmwithwhichhemarchedusthroughtheArgonautica. Iwouldalsoliketothank Keith Buhler and Eric Peterson for being kind fellow travelers through graduate school. Outside the academy, I am profoundly grateful to my wife, Rose, for her love, friendship, support, and comfort. Writing this dissertation would not have been possible apart from the beautiful culture that my parents and extended fam- ily have created around me all my life. Finally, I would like to thank Jack Luckey andBillyHendersonforteachingmewhatitmeanstolovewisdomandimparting someoftheirstome. iii TableofContents Acknowledgments iii 1 PreviousScholarship,Terminology,andMethod 1 1.1 PreviousScholarshiponGreekThoughtAboutthePerson . . . . . . 2 1.2 PreviousScholarshiponPlato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.3 CoreConcepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.4 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 1.5 DivisionofChaptersandSelectionofTexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2 Body,Soul,andSelf 32 2.1 Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.2 Alcibiades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2.3 SoulasSubjectattheBeginningofthe Phaedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2.4 UsandHumansintheRecollectionandKinshipArguments . . . . . 57 2.5 ThePollutedversustheIdealSelf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 2.6 HistoricallyAvailableNotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 3 AfterlifeandMetempsychosis 74 3.1 IfYouCanCatchMe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 3.2 CapabilityandIntelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 3.3 TheMythoftheGorgias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 3.4 TheMythofthePhaedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 3.5 TheMythofEr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 3.6 TheMythofthePhaedrus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 4 Tripartition 115 4.1 Self-Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 4.2 ExplainingInternalConflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 4.3 TheHumanBeingWithin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 4.4 WhatSurvives? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 5 ΝοῦςandtheDivineinUs 154 5.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 iv 5.2 Divinityand Νοῦςinthe Timaeus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 5.3 DivineΝοῦςinthe Philebus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 5.4 OurDivinityinthe Phaedrus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 5.5 Self-KnowledgeandtheDivineinthe Alcibiades . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 Bibliography 206 Vita 209 v Chapter1 PreviousScholarship,Terminology,andMethod AnyonewhohastheleastfamiliaritywiththephilosophyofPlatowillhaveheard somethingorotheraboutthesoul. Theliteratureonthetripartitetheoryofthesoul alone runs to many thousands of pages. Many undergraduate students will have some notion, more or less vague, that Socrates preaches an opposition between bodyandsoulbeforehedies. Despitetheeasewithwhichwespeakaboutthesoul in Plato’s dialogues, however, we may find it rather difficult to speak about the self. WemayintelligiblyaskwhetherallthethingsSocratessaysabouthissoulare thingshewouldsayabouthimself. Beforewecananswerthisquestionandengage in the serious business of working out Plato’s theory of the person or the self, we mustconfrontatrickyhistoricalproblem. Ononeinterpretationofintellectualhis- tory the concept of the self or the person only arises within the context of modern, especiallypost-Cartesian,thought. Onanotherinterpretationofthishistory,these concepts come from Christian theological reflection. Both interpretations pose a difficult problem for the scholar who wishes to work out Plato’s theory of the self, since it may be that such a scholar would simply be searching in vain, anachronis- ticallyimposingupontextsaconceptthatwouldbeforeigntotheirauthor. Hence, anysuchinterpretiveprojectmustfirstaskwhethertheseconceptsareavailableto 1
Description: