The Metaphysics of G. E. Moore

190 Pages·1982·11.805 MB·English

by  David O’Connor (auth.)

THE METAPHYSICS OF G. E. MOORE
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES
IN PHILOSOPHY
Editors:
WILFRID SELLARS, University of Pittsburgh
KEITH LEHRER, University of Arizona
Board of Consulting Editors:
JONATHAN BENNETT, Syracuse University
ALLAN GIBBARD, University ofM ichigan
ROBERT STALNAKER, Cornell University
ROBERT G. TURNBULL, Ohio State University
VOLUME 25
DAVID O'CONNOR
Department of Philosophy, Seton Hall University
THE METAPHYSICS OF
G. E. MOORE
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
DORDRECHT: HOLLAND I BOSTON: U.S.A.
LONDON: ENGLAND
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Clp
O'Connor, David, 1949-
The metaphysics of G. E. Moore.
(Philosophical studies series in philosophy; v. 25)
Bibliography: p.
Includes indexes.
1. Moore, G. E. (George Edward), 1873-1958-Mctaphysics.
2. Metaphysics. I. Title. II. Series.
B1647.M74025 110'.92'4 81-22710
AACR2
ISBN-13: 978-94-009-7751-8 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-7749-5
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-7749-5
Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company,
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Copyright © 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
and copyright holders as specified in the preface.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1982
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To Carolyn, Sarah, Jeremy and Adrian
T ABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ~
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION: MOORE AND METAPHYSICS
1. Commonsense Realism 1
2. A Look Ahead 9
3. Realisms 10
CHAPTER II: ARGUMENTS AGAINST IDEALISM 14
1. That British Empiricism is Psychologistic: The Background to
Moore's Break from Idealism 16
2. Moore's Attack upon the Esse est Percipi Principle: First Stage
(1899-1903) 21
3. Moore's Attack upon the Esse est Percipi principle: Second
Stage (after 1910) 30
4. The Theory of Internal Relations 34
CHAPTER III: COMMON SENSE IN METAPHYSICS 46
1. Moore's Meaning/Analysis Distinction as Making a Role for
Common Sense in Philosophy 47
2. Moore's Metaphysical Categories 51
3. Moore's Proof of an External World 55
CHAPTER IV: MOORE'S CONCEPTION OF ANALYSIS 71
1. Ordinary Language, Common Sense and Analysis 71
2. What is Analysed and How? 73
3. The Criteria of Correct Analysis 80
CHAPTER V: SENSE-DATA AND THINGS IN THE MATERIAL
WORLD 86
1. Direct Realism, Phenomenalism and Representationalism 89
2. On the Relation of Sense-Datum Propositions to Material-
Object Propositions 99
vii
viii T ABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER VI: THE STATUS OF ABSTRACT ENTITIES (I) 109
1. Concepts as mtimate Subjects 113
2. For and Against Propositions and Concepts after 1910 119
CHAPTER VII: THE STATUS OF ABSTRACT ENTITIES (II) 136
1. Two Types of Universals: Relations and Relational Properties 138
2. 'The Third Kind of Universal' 142
3. Classes 154
CHAPTER VIII: REVIEW AND MOORE'S DUALISMS 159
BIBLIOGRAPHY 169
INDEX OF PROPER NAMES 175
INDEX OF SUBJECTS 177
PREFACE
In this book, setting aside his consideration of specifically ethical topics, I
try to provide a comprehensive interpretation of Moore's thought. Against
the background of this general interpretation I examine in detail his work
on some of the central problems of metaphysics and, because Moore's being
able to sustain a consistent anti-skepticism is essential to the survival of the
base from which he works on those problems, of epistemology too.
The interpretation of which I speak involves my taking as the centerpiece
of Moore's philosophical work his book, Some Main Problems of Philosophy,
written in 1910 as the text of a lecture series but left unpublished for over
forty years thereafter. That book is aptly titled, for the issues with which
Moore deals in it are indeed among the main problems of philosophy. Not
least of these are the problems of formulating a general categorial deSCription
of the world and then of defending that formulation. However, while I will
discuss Moore's work in light of its contribution to this project of taking
metaphysical inventory, it is important to note that he, in common with
many other major figures in contemporary analytical philosophy, did not
approach specific philosophical puzzles with a view to possibly integrating
solutions to them into a comprehensive theory about reality as a whole, that
is, into what might be called a metaphysical system. As is well known, Moore
worked piecemeal on philosophical issues and tended to leave grand schemes
unschemed, Yet the issues in metaphysics (and epistemology) upon which
he worked are not unrelated and, furthermore, his work on those problems
was not inordinately inconsistent over the span of his career. Hence we can
usefully cluster both the problems on which he worked and his work itself
and come up with basic patterns in Moore's thought on some of the central
questions of philosophy. It is in virtue of doing this that I offer here what
earlier I referred to as a comprehensive interpretation of Moore's work. Now
the integrated character of Moore's thought of which I speak and for which
I argue in this book is not indicative of any master plan on Moore's part and
this for the reason that Moore never had, or sought to have, such a plan. In
short, what I propose about Moore is a picture of his work as a coherent
network of arguments and positions on various topics constructed on the
basis of what I describe in the rust chapter as conunonsense realism.
I recognize that the reading of Moore which I offer in this book differs
from that of other commentators. Nevertheless, I show how an interpretation
ix
x PREFACE
such as I give is both true to Moore's work and holds together all the major
strands of what otherwise might seem, and sometimes has been seen, only to
be an uncoordinatable series of reflections on diverse problems. A final point
on this topic: while it is true that the integrated nature of Moore's thought for
which I argue is a unity in interpretation, and not one designed or striven for
by Moore himself, it does not follow therefrom that no such unity exists.
As a philosopher, Moore's fIrst interest was always in the details of argu
ments. It seems to me that in this attention to the 'small print' of philosophi
cal thought, in his recognition of the very many questions of detail which
have to be settled before any theory can be said to have been formulated
or upheld, and in his ability conSistently to identify weaknesses in arguments
(whether his own or those of others), lies much of Moore's merit as a philoso
pher. And, if there is truth in the view that Moore tended, betimes, not to see
woods for trees, at least he never can be said not to have seen trees for woods.
And, it seems to me, the latter is much the greater philosophical failing.
Without the help of various people I seriously doubt that this book would
have come into existence, at least in its present form. So I am happy to ac
knowledge their help and to record my indebtedness to them. I am especially
indebted to my former teacher, Professor T. L. Prendergast, who read an
earlier draft of this book and whose encouragement and criticism both kept
me going in the face of and saved me from many a difficulty. I am in debt
also to Professor Jonathan Bennett without whose illUminating criticisms the
defects of this book would be more and worse than they are. Professors A. J.
Ayer and A. R. White and Dr C. Lewy all read portions of an early draft and
their comments and suggestions I have found helpful. My thanks are due also
to my former and present colleagues, R. J. Bombardi, J. J. Strom and W. J.
Radtke and to several of my students in PH 51 at Seton Hall University for
conversations in the course of which various ideas advanced in these pages
were worked out. My gratitude is due to the trustees of the Smith Scholarship
Foundation for a grant enabling me to spend part of the 1977-78 academic
year in Cambridge and to The Research Council of Seton Hall University for
fmancial support. Last, but not least, I should like to mention my gratitude
to my wife Carolyn, without whose help in such a large variety of ways there
would be nothing for which to thank any of the others mentioned.
Quotations from The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, Paul A. Schilpp. ed.,
are by permission of Open Court Publishing Company, La Salle, Illinois, and
from Some Main Problems of Philosophy, Philosophical Papers, Lectures on
Philosophy, and The Commonplace Book of G. E. Moore by permission of
Humanities Press Inc., Atlantic Highlands, N.J.
Seton Hall University DAVID O'CONNOR
May, 1981
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: MOORE AND METAPHYSICS
In the course of this book I will make frequent use of the word 'metaphysics'.
Indeed I will maintain that that word rightly can be used to classify a signifi
cant part of Moore's philosophical work. Some clarification in advance may
be needed.
As I will use it here the word 'metaphysics' has no connotation of a
visionary world-view, the so-called Weltanschauung of transcendent philos
ophy. Without attributing to Moore any such general outlook, I use the
word here as a name for the study of the reasons for and against saying
that certain sorts of items are or are not, might be or could not possibly
be, constituents of the universe. By 'metaphysics' as used here I mean the
effort systematically - but non-speculatively and non-experimentally - to
arrive at a general understanding of the basic constitution and structure of
the world and of the limits of our knowledge. I use 'metaphysics' as a title
for the branch of philosophy concerned in a general way with saying what
there is (and is not) and with justifying such claims. In a word, bearing in
mind the restrictions I have made, I use 'metaphysics' interchangeably with
'ontology'. Consistent with the meaning of the word as I have sketched it, I
will show that questions of metaphysics held career-long interest for Moore
and that he made valuable contribution to their clear understanding and
sometimes to their answer.
1. COMMONSENSE REALISM
In the first chapter of what arguably is Moore's best and most important
book - Some Main Problems of Philosophy - he maintains that one of
philosophy's major tasks is that of undertaking anew the job of providing
'a general description of the whole Universe'.' As Moore conceives of it,
this general description will take the form, first, of establishing the reality
of those things which, ordinarily, we would say that we know to be in the
world, second, of deciding whether there are other things in the world of
which we lack knowledge, in a strict sense of that term, and third, of con
sidering the kinds of relations which obtain between the various items thus
taken for real things. It is plain that this conception is of a metaphysics