The Meaning of Education

119 Pages·1966·3.258 MB·English

by  Stephen Ross (auth.)

THE MEANING OF EDUCATION
THE MEANING OF
EDUCATION
by
STEPHEN ROSS
THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V. 1966
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book
or parts thereof in IZI!JI form
ISBN 978-94-017-5659-4 ISBN 978-94-017-5940-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-5940-3
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1966
Originally published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands in 1966
Softcover reprint o/the hardcover 1st edition 1966
Contents
I. Philosophy and Education
II. The Generic Sense of Education 11
III. The Nature of Experience 24
IV. The Honorific Sense of Education 38
V. Formal Education 49
VI. The Art of Education 54
VII. Training and Education 59
VIII. Communication, Interest, and Discipline 64
IX. Society and Education 75
X. Education and Life 98
Index 113
I
Philosophy and Education
Implicit in any discussion of education is a philosophy of education,
a theory of educational principles, aims and values, a conception of the
nature of education and its value for the human individuaL Modern
educational writings have paid due tribute to the value of philosophy
for education, and yet considering the great influence educational
philosophies have had on technical theories of education it is unfortu
nate that most recent writings in this area have suffered from serious
limitations, and consequently have been of very little philosophic worth.
Modern philosophies of education have tended to devote themselves
to relatively specialized educational problems and have shown very
little concern for larger philosophic issues. The sense of illumination
and excitement a profound philosophic vision can bring has seldom
been aroused in educational philosophy, and the result has been a
serious gap between its philosophic value and its immediate educational
ramifications. The ultimate result of such a schism may well be the
depreciation of the philosophy of education, and its replacement by
practical principles of educational purpose.
I am by no means criticizing the basically practical focus of educa
tors, who quite rightly are primarily interested in concrete matters of
educating children. Yet a comprehensive philosophy of education can
contribute greatly to such endeavors, by focussing and directing them.
However, the immediate demands of a subject matter may well inter
fere with the greatest comprehensiveness of formulation and breadth
of vision, resulting in a philosophy of education which is neither deeply
self-critical, nor broad in its conceptions - and, precisely because its
range has been so limited, of little educational significance. In order
to provide whatever unique contribution educational philosophy has
to offer, it must preserve its value as philosophy, as the exploration of
important and fruitful concepts and the relations between them. Its
generality and comprehensiveness must be as great as possible;
otherwise it can serve no purpose of any value. Only insofar as
Philosophy and Education
it is successful as philosophy can it be of educational significance.
The great problem of educational philosophy is that it is really in a
peculiarly secondary position, for the important philosophic work in the
field of education properly belongs to other areas of philosophy. A
philosophy of education ca:n be successful only as it reflects a coherent
philosophy of society and of knowledge. The important philosophic
matters of education are not how to teach-this is a matter of psycho
logy-but involve the relationship between social and epistemological
concepts and values. A philosophy of education rests upon a philosophy
of society and of knowledge.
In ordinary usage, it is clear that we feel that in education, knowledge
is imparted, that a sense of value, of social norms, of individual dignity
and freedom are communicated. Even in this superficial and untechnical
sense, we are immediately brought face to face with questions of the
nature of knowledge, of communication, of the structure and norms of
society and their relationship to a human individual. And these ques
tions are made even more difficult by the educational setting, for many
traditional answers become somewhat confused in the context of
education. If education is to provide knowledge, and knowledge is the
ability to make warranted and true statements, what of abilities to do,
to make, to paint, to wax poetic? What of the values of citizenship,
of social norms? How do these relate to knowledge? Can they be
imparted as we impart information or skills?
A philosophy of education is in a rather anomalous position, for
while it can contribute important material to social and epistemological
philosophy, it is in a sense an outgrowth of them, and is in many ways
much more complex than either of them (and they are enormously
complex). A philosophy of education which pretends to begin with and
restricts itself to educational matters actually evades the important
problems of education, and ultimately is but a stunted and distorted
version of a philosophy of education.
If we consider, for example, the educational philosophies of Plato
and Dewey, it is clear that they both face education in the context of
a commitment to a philosophy of knowledge, society and existence.
Their philosophies of education are not separated or even separable
from their general philosophic positions, but are permeated with the
same values and conclusions. Education for both has a social function,
and for both this function is closely tied to their conceptions of man
and of existence. Both find that education plays a fundamental role
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Philosophy and Education
which is derived from a deep sense of the nature of man, his place in a
social, ethical world.
In the last analysis, a profound metaphysical commitment must be
made explicit if a philosophy of education is to adequately face its
problems. The ramifications of a philosophy of education reach out into
all areas of philosophy, and cannot be isolated without completely
destroying it. Any attempt to formulate an adequate definition of
education immediately becomes involved in larger problems of social
philosophy and epistemology, making it impossible to deal with educa
tional issues narrowly and circumspectly. This can be seen clearly if we
merely begin to consider the nature of education, to attempt to define
what it means to be educated, and what means are to be considered
part of "education." In order to show this, I would like to consider two
possible approaches to education, to see just how far they lead and
what issues they raise, to show that they are inadequate precisely
because they ignore the larger social and human setting of education.
At the very least, to be educated is to be endowed with certain skills,
to be able to do certain things, to be able to accomplish certain tasks.
This makes plausible the conception of education as endowment with
skills, so that methods of education become methods of endowment,
of transmitting know-how, of communicating to the individual ways
of doing, skills for accomplishing certain tasks. The success of education
is measured by the number and value of the skills imparted. An educa
tion is successful if its methods succeed, for example, in enabling a child
to do arithmetic, and is a failure if the child, for whatever reason, is
unable to add, subtract, or divide. The question of interest is reducible
simply to a question of means for imparting skills. If it is necessary
that an individual be interested in order to be receptive to processes
of learning, interest must be aroused. If adequate learning can take
place without interest, by rote, discipline, repetition, then interest can
be dispensed with. There are no difficulties connected with the concep
tion of a well-educated man. The more skills he possesses, the better
educated he is. The only problem of education is that of psychology
how to impart skills best.
Despite the apparent limitations ofthis position, it is a common one,
and plays an important role in criticisms of existing modes of education.
Whatever the ultimate goals of education may be, one of the most
important measures of education is actual information, know-how,
skill at whatever task is presented, whether response to examinations,
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Philosophy and Education
practical difficulties, or complex scientific and evaluational problems.
A man who is unskilled is uneducated to that extent, whatever his
other virtues and accomplishments.
As a criterion of education, possession of skill is very important.
But there are certain problems connected with the conception of
acquisition of skills that are very difficult to handle. In the first place,
what does it mean to possess a skill? Is it to be measured by the amount
of information at one's fingertips, the ability to perform well on a school
examination, or perhaps the ability to handle practical probl~ms which
are external to the process of schooling? Are we not led to conceive of
education as the parroting of facts, without regard for the largeness of
connections grasped and understood? Implicit in the conception of
education as the endowment of skills is an emphasis on technical
facility, on practical rather than "theoretical" skills ("theoretical
skills" seems absurd).
This doctrine of education as the teaching of skills simply seems to
ignore the contexts in which skills operate, the world in which we live.
Surely skill at examinations is not really education except in a
minimal sense, and yet there is no room in this theory for evaluation of
different educational subject matters and techniques. Education is not
simply a matter of the endowment of skills, but of the choice of this or
that ability, this or that training. There are social aims, social values,
involved in the educational system which cannot be left unquestioned.
There are always choices of curriculae, subject matters, courses which
are determined by social needs, social purposes, conventional decisions,
rather than by any desire to impart information.
But there is an even more important question-and that is whether
all that we call education involves only the endowment of skills. There
are aspects of education which cannot in any sense be considered skills.
The sense of citizenship, of social convention, of accepted morals, of
values and principles that are inherent in any functioning society and
which must be imparted to its members if the society is to remain
stable, are essential to an educational system. 'Whether or not such
values, norms and principles are explicitly set forth by a formal system
of education, they are communicated to individuals in quite explicit
and direct ways. Education may involved the endowment of skills,
but it also involves the moralization and socialization of men until they
become full members of society. This is a fact of human existence.
But such socialization and moralization is not the acquisition of
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Philosophy and Education
skills, except in a very distorted manner of speaking. Perhaps it can be
said that moral behavior is acting morally in certain situations, that
citizenship involves learning the skills of being a citizen. This has its
suggestive qualities, for there are skills involved in being a citizen.
But being moral, or being a member of society, are not skills-they are
states of being. A citizen can do certain things-but he is a citizen by
virtue of the fact that he does them. A moral man is not moral insofar
as he can act morally, but insofar as he does not (and often cannot) act
immorally.
In other words, if education involves simply the acquisition of skills,
then education can only teach what it is to be a citizen. But it cannot
make men citizens. For citizens, moral and social beings, are not simply
men with certain skills. They are certain kinds of men, with character
istic modes of f1.lllctioning. And it appears that the formal educational
system as well as the informal educational properties of life and the
environment are the determinant factors in their experience. Education
not only imparts skills, but endows men with characteristically human
abilities as well, in significant, unmistakable ways.
Not only, however, is the skill conception of education inadequate
to aCC01.lllt for the social force of education, but it also overlooks some
of the most important dimensions of human experience. The conception
of skill suggests know-how, knowledge in the sense of a proper response
to a given situation, but a determinate and specifiable response. In this
sense, control of information or techniques or the routine manipulation
of the environment may be considered skillful. But none of the im
portant activities of men simply involve the repetition of information,
nor the routine use of techniques. In every significant human achieve
ment we find novelty and inventiveness, the arrangement of old mate
rial in new ways, the selection of material in new, 1.lllprecedented forms.
The ability to invent, to respond freshly yet significantly, is necessary
to all important human activities, and is one of the most vital human
abilities. Art, music, and science all involve a dimension of inventive
human activity which cannot be reduced in any sense to skills attained,
to material grasped, to information acquired.
The skill-theory of education presupposes a fixed universe, fully
grasped, ordered and understood. Only in such a world can it be claimed
that everything that is taught is a skill. The sense of novelty and fresh
ness of viewpoint, of new possibilities opened by education, is ignored,
and education is seen as the impartation of fixed skills, particular facts
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