The Marines In Vietnam 1954-1973 An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography PCN 19000309300_1

207 Pages·2006·8.09 MB·English

First Division Marines debark from a UH-
34D helicopter of HMM-163 in the early
morning of 11 October 1967, to begin
Operation Medina. This search-and- destroy
operation was a joint U.S. -South Viet-
namese effort conducted in an area 12 miles
south of Quang Tri city. (Department
of Defense [USMC] Photo A421900)
THE MARINES IN VIETNAM
1954-197 3
An Anthology an d
Annotated Bibliography
Second Edition
HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D .C.
1985
Volumes in the Marine Corps
Vietnam Series
The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973, An Anthology and Annotated
Bibliography, 1974; reprinted 1983
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964, The Advisory and Combat
Assistance Era, 1977
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, The Landing and theBuildup, 1978
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, An Expanding War, 1982
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1984
In Preparation
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, January-May 1968
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, June-December 1968
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970-1971
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1971-1973
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1973-1975
Functional Histories Series
Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam, 1962-1971, 1985
U.S. Marine Corps Aviation In Southeast Asia, 1962-1975, in preparation
Library of Congress Card No. 77-604776
PCN 190 003093 00
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword
The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973, An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, based on ar-
ticles that appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review, and Marine Corps
Gazette, has served well for 14 years as an interim reference on the Vietnam War . It has both com-
plemented and supplemented our official histories on Marine operations in Vietnam. Since its
publication in 1974, however, events in Vietnam and the appearance of additional significant ar-
ticles in the three periodicals have made both the anthology and bibliography somewhat dated . This
expanded edition extends the coverage of the anthology to 1975 and the entries in the bibliograph y
to 1984.
The editors have added 10 articles to the 13 that appeared in the first edition . One article on fire
bases in the original has not been included. The format remains basically the same . The first 16 ac-
counts give a chronological presentation of the Marine participation in the Vietnam War, from on e
lone Marine advisor in 1954, through the buildup and withdrawal of major forces, the "Easter Of-
fensive" of 1972, the evacuation of U .S. citizens from both Phnom Penh and Saigon, and the
Mayaguez incident in May 1975. In the second group, the remaining six articles are arrange d
topically. They concern aviation, logistics, civil affairs, Navy medical support, amphibious doctrine ,
and maritime support. Part II of the publication is an annotated bibliography of articles fro m
1954-1984, prepared by the Vietnam writers in the Histories Section . Although recognizing that
many fine articles pertaining to Marines in Vietnam have appeared in numerous other periodicals ,
the History and Museums Division, because of limitations of time and resources, confined its atten-
tion to the three aforementioned publications .
I wish to thank the editors of the Proceedings, Review, and Gazette for their support and coopera-
tion in permitting the reproduction of these articles . These publications made a significant con-
tribution to the record of the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War by originall y
publishing these articles. Reproducing these pieces in our anthology will yield a further dividend .
S:'
5F,dl-
e sove&!n
E. H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Director of Marine Corps History and Museum s
iii

Prefac e
The opening article of this anthology concerns itself with the beginnings of the Marine involve-
ment in Vietnam following the Geneva Accords in July 1954, which ended the French war with th e
Communist Viet Minh and resulted in the de facto partition of the country at the 17th Parallel . Col-
onel Victor J. Croizat, who served as the first U .S. Marine advisor to the South Vietnamese Marine
Corps, discusses the origins of both the South Vietnamese Navy and Marine Corps . Although
authorized in October 1954, the first headquarters of the Vietnamese Marine Corps was no t
established until the following May. By this time, the French political and military influenc e
throughout South Vietnam was waning and the American influence increasing . Thus Colonel
Croizat concludes that the South Vietnamese Marine Corps, unlike the Navy (which had bee n
established by the French in 1952), has been "almost wholly a creation of the United States . . . .
The initial consolidation of Corps units into two battalions, the later formation of a three-battalion
regiment, and the eventual evolution of the brigade structure all owe their realization to the U .S.
advisory effort." However, he also notes that ". . . the decisions that have brought them to their pre-
sent status were made by the Vietnamese themselves ."
A new phase of Marine participation began in 1962, six years after Colonel Croizat's departure i n
1956. Following President Kennedy's decision in January 1962 to expand the U .S. advisory effort
with the establishment of the U .S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the first
Marine tactical unit deployed to Vietnam in April . Marine helicopters belonging to Marine Medium
Helicopter Squadron-362 (HMM-362), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Archie J . Clapp, lifted
off the deck of the USSPrinceton(LPH-5) and landed at the Soc Trang base located in South Viet-
nam's Mekong Delta. Organized into a task element code-named Shufly, the Marine helicopter s
provided support to the South Vietnamese units combating the Viet Cong . Lieutenant Colonel
Clapp in the second article appearing in this series describes the experiences of his squadron in a
counter-insurgency environment.
The third article, co-authored by Jack Shulimson, the Senior Vietnam Historian in the Histor y
and Museums Division, and Major Edward F. Wells, a platoon leader in Vietnam and a former
historical writer with the division, gives a general overview of the commitment of major Marine
combat units to the war during the period 1965-71 . The Marines provided the first major U .S.
ground units sent to Vietnam and implemented a strong pacification program . By 1967, the 3d
Marine Division was strung out in fixed defensive positions along the Demilitarized Zone dividing
the two Vietnams and fighting a more or less conventional war against the North Vietnamese Army .
The 1st Marine Division continued the counterinsurgency war in the Da Nang area of operations .
Shulimson and Wells observe that after defeating the North Vietnamese regulars in the "DMZ" i n
1968-69, Marine operations focused more clearly on the pacification campaign south of Da Nang :
"After four years of inconclusive combat . . . the United States began its disengagement from Viet-
nam. Marines were among the first to leave ."
In the next four articles, Brigadier General Edwin H . Simmons, currently the Director of Marine
Corps History and Museums, who served in various staff and command billets during two tours i n
Vietnam, presents, in contrast to the Shulimson and Wells piece, detailed annual accounts o f
Marine operations.
General Simmons in his first article traces the evolution of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigad e
into the III Amphibious Force (III MAF). Lieutenant General Lewis W . Walt's III MAF by April
1966 consisted of two Marine divisions and a reinforced aircraft wing and was responsible for all U .S.
operations in I Corps Tactical Zone, the five northern provinces of South Vietnam . During this
period, the Marine role expanded from a limited defensive mission for the Da Nang Air base in ear-
ly 1965 to a fully balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification .
v
General Simmons discusses the resulting development in command relations and the so-called dif-
ferences between the "Army" and "Marine" strategies. During 1966 the Marine effort was hampered
by two events. The first was the political upheaval caused by the removal of General Nguyen Chan h
Thi, the I Corps Tactical Commander . The second event was the infiltration through the DMZ of
regular North Vietnamese battalions and regiments into Quang Tri Province . The 3d Marine Divi-
sion deployed north into Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces to meet this new challenge in Opera-
tions Hastings and Prairie while the 1st Marine Division assumed responsibility for the thre e
southern provinces of I Corps (Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai) .
In the second of his four articles, General Simmons continues the narrative of Marine operation s
through 1967. He discusses the controversies over the "McNamara Wall," the M-16 rifle, and the
CH-46 helicopter as well as covering the major operations and the continuing buildup . By the end
of the year, Marine strength in Vietnam had risen from approximately 68,000 in January to ove r
77,000. In his concluding paragraph, General Simmons declares : "There was reason for optimism as
1967 ended. The enemy had elected to make the northern provinces of I Corps Tactical Zone th e
main battle area and each time he had attempted to take the offensive he had been badly beaten .
With the movement of U .S. Army troops into I Corps, an acceptable troop density had been achiev-
ed. Pacification efforts . . . appeared to be regaining momentum ."
Quoting General Westmoreland, General Simmons calls 1968 the year of decision . The year
opened with the enemy's Tet offensive with strong strikes at Da Nang, Hue, and just south of the
DMZ. In countering this sudden conflagration, U .S. forces in I Corps reached 52 battalions (24
Marine and 28 U.S. Army). General Simmons comments that Lieutenant General Robert E .
Cushman, Jr., General Walt's successor, was commanding the equivalent of a field army . In his arti-
cle, General Simmons discusses the expansion of allied forces, command relationships and changes ,
as well as describing the big battles such as the defense of Khe Sanh . He concludes with the observa-
tion that the first half of 1968 was marked by the greatest combat activity of the war but that afte r
August the enemy "gave up on his pursuit of military victory through large-scale attacks an d
reverted to small-unit attack and harassment with mortar and rocket fire ." By the end of the year ,
the Marines along with their South Vietnamese allies were making significant progress in pacifica-
tion and the Marines began reducing some of their forces . The number of Marine infantry battalions
declined from 24 to 21 at year's end . III MAF strength was down from a peak of 85,250 in
September to approximately 81,000 at the end of December .
In his last article, General Simmons portrays the retraction of Marine Corps forces from Vietna m
following 1968. The year 1969 opens with substantial Marine forces still conducting large operations
while supporting the South Vietnamese pacification efforts. By the end of June, however, President
Nixon had announced the first redeployment of American forces . Beginning with the departure of
the 9th Marines, the entire 3d Marine Division was out of Vietnam by the end of the year .
Throughout 1970 and early 1971, other Marine units left Vietnam in succeeding increments . On 14
April 1971, III MAF Headquarters departed for Okinawa, leaving behind the 3d Marine Am-
phibious Brigade. Two months later, the brigade was deactivated . Residual Marine forces in Viet-
nam consisted of approximately 500 Marines, most of whom were performing essentially liaison, ad-
visory, staff, and guard functions . Approximately 60 officers and men were advisors with the Viet-
namese Marine Division which played a large role in the defensive actions incidental to the Nort h
Vietnamese 1972 Easter offensive and in the later South Vietnamese counteroffensive . During this
period, Marine helicopters from the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade on board Seventh Fleet ship -
ping supported the Vietnamese Marines . Two Marine fixed-wing aircraft groups, MAGs-12 and -15 ,
returned to Vietnam and supported the South Vietnamese forces . MAG-12 operated from Bien Hoa
and MAG-15 later redeployed to Nam Phong in Thailand .
The next three accounts depict specific operations during 1968 and 1969 . Captain George R.
Christmas commanded Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines during the recapture of Hue i n
1968. In his article, Captain Christmas concludes that the major lesson of the Battle of Hue wa s
"that imagination and aggressiveness are the best weapons in our arsenal ." Major General Raymond
vi
C. Davis took over the command of the 3d Marine Division in May 1968 . He and Lieutenant Harold
W. Brazier, his aide, describe the 3d Division's victory over the North Vietnamese 320th Division in
August 1968 through the employment of fire bases and mobile tactics . In the last of these three ar-
ticles, 1st Lieutenant Gordon M . Davis portrays the 9th Marines Operation Dewey Canyon in the
vicinity of the A Shau Valley near the Laotian border during January-February 1969 . The operation
involved the use of fire bases and mobile forces but ended "as a conventional regiment-in-the-attac k
with all three battalions on line ."
Following a period of relative calm after the withdrawal of major U .S. combat forces from South
Vietnam, the North Vietnamese launched their "Easter Offensive" on 30 March 1972. The next two
articles treat the Marine Corps and South Vietnamese Marine Corps response to this unexpected at -
tack. In the first piece, two U.S. Marine advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps in 1972, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Gerald H . Turley and Captain Marshall R. Wells, tell how the Vietnamese Marines
met the challenge of the North Vietnamese onslaught . Vietnamese Marines fought bravely and
retreated in good order. By 1 May, the North Vietnamese had captured Quang Tri City and th e
South Vietnamese had established a new defensive line to the south on the My Chanh River. The
South Vietnamese Marine Division manned these defenses and was one of the spearheads in th e
South Vietnamese counteroffensive on 28 June . On 15 September, Marine forces recaptured Quang
Tri City's Citadel and organized resistance within the city collapsed . Lieutenant Colonel Turley and
Captain Wells conclude their article with this apprasial of their Vietnamese counterparts : "Viet-
namese Marines, short in stature, rich in courage and full of determination, stood tall in the eyes o f
all Marines."
Colonel Albert R. Pytko views the Easter Offensive from the perspective of the U .S. Marine air
response. He describes the deployment of Marine fixed wing aircraft to Vietnam, Thailand, and to
carriers of the Seventh Fleet in order to support the South Vietnamese ground forces in their suc-
cessful containment of the North Vietnamese advance . Colonel Pytko continues his narration of
Marine air operations against the North Vietnamese through January 1973 when a cease fire wa s
reached with North Vietnam.
As a result of the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, a Joint Casualty Resolution Center was establishe d
at Da Nang Air Base to resolve outstanding cases of Americans still missing in action or known dead ,
but whose bodies had not been recovered . Lieutenant Colonel Richard H. Esau served in that assign-
ment and provides a subtly haunting description of his return to Da Nang in August 1973 and o f
the attendant feelings of frustration and futility.
The next three articles deal with the climatic events of 1975 and the fall of Cambodia and Sout h
Vietnam. Colonel Sydney H. Batchelder, Jr., and Major David A. Quinlan, both participants in the
events they portray, write about the planning and evacuation of U .S. personnel from Phnom Penh
in April 1975 when the Khmer Rouge took over Cambodia. In the next article, Brigadier Genera l
Richard E. Carey and Major Quinlan, once again as co-author, recount the planning and action s
leading to the evacuation of Americans from Saigon, a few weeks after the fall of Phnom Penh .
Because of the length of the original three-part article, the editors have taken the liberty of presen-
ting an abridgement in this edition . This shortened version still manages to convey the immediac y
and intensity of those dramatic days . The last article of the three, '"Mayday' for the Mayaguez," tells
of the rescue of the seized ship off Cambodia through five different viewpoints— that of the patro l
squadron commander, the captain of the destroyer escort, the Marine company commander, th e
operations officer of the Marine battalion, and the commander of the guided missile destroyer .
"Like the traditional 'Hey Rube' distress call of circus folk, the 'Mayday' of the Mayaguezsummoned
ships, aircraft, sailors, and Marines to rescue ." This incident served to mark the end of the unhappy
U.S. participation in the war in Southeast Asia.
In contrast to the chronological organization of the previous series, the next six articles are arrang -
ed topically. They touch upon such specialized aspects of the Marine war in Vietnam as amphibiou s
doctrine, Marine civil affairs, logistics, Marine aviation and medical support .
General Keith B. McCutcheon, an outstanding Marine aviator of three wars, covers the entire.
vii
spectrum of Marine aviation in Vietnam from the introduction of Lieutenant Colonel Clapp' s
squadron in 1962 to the redeployment of Marine aviation which began in 1969-70 . During the Viet-
nam War, General McCutcheon served as Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in
1965-1966 and returned to Vietnam to command III Marine Amphibious Force in March 1970 . He
was slated to become Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps prior to his illness which cause d
him to leave Vietnam in December 1971 and to die in July 1972. In this comprehensive article,
General McCutcheon describes the buildup of Marine aviation ; the building of the Chu Lai SATS
(Short Airfield for Tactical Support) field ; the introduction of new types of aircraft into the war ; and
helicopter and fixed-wing operations. He presents an even-handed account of the command and
control questions over Marine air which eventually led to the adoption of the "Single Manager Con-
cept." Under this latter concept, the Seventh Air Force became the "single manager" of all U .S. air
in South Vietnam although III MAF retained operational control of its aviation assets . General Mc-
Cutcheon declared: "The system [single management] worked . Both the Air Force and the Marines
saw to that. . . . MACV as a whole received more effective air support, and III MAF continued t o
receive responsive air support from its own units ."
Amphibious doctrine was another sensitive area and required extensive cooperation between th e
Marines and the other services . Lieutenant Colonel Peter L . Hilgartner, who served with the Seventh
Fleet Special Landing Forces as well as on staff positions at Headquarters Marine Corps and th e
Pacific Fleet, discusses the application of amphibious doctrine to the Vietnam War . He concludes
that the doctrine as outlined in NWP-22B/LFM-01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, proved
adequate for the Vietnamese situation although requiring certain modifications ; the major one be-
ing that ComUSMACV was "accorded extensive control and . . . allowed to prescribe virtually ever y
important aspect of the employment of amphibious forces, from specifying the mission t o
delineating the characteristics of the amphibious objective area ."
Although less controversial than doctrinal questions, logistics was of overriding importance in the
war. Colonel James B. Soper, who served as a logistics officer on the Fleet Marine Force Pacifi c
(FMFPac) staff, discusses the development of the Marine logistic effort in the Western Pacific fro m
the first landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade in 1965 to the expeditionary redeploy-
ment of forces in the latter stages of the war . He concludes: "At the beginning, it was the opera-
tional and logistic status of FMFPac that permitted the early employment of its units . In the end, it
was the same capabilities that permitted FMFPac to be redeployed at the earliest and to re-establis h
itself as the country's force in readiness."
Another facet of the Marine war in Vietnam was its pacification effort. Lieutenant Colonel
Donald L. Evans, a civil affairs officer in Vietnam who later headed the Civil Affairs Branch at
Headquarters Marine Corps, describes the Marine campaign to deny the enemy the vital support o f
the people. He declares that such tactics as the Combined Action Program, civic action, and the I
Corps Joint Coordination Council served to extend South Vietnamese governmental control in th e
heavily populated coastal regions of I Corps.
In the next article of this anthology, Commander Frank C . Collins, Jr., USN, who served on the
staff of the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, discusses the role that agency played in the logisti c
support of Marine forces in I Corps . The Naval Support Activity provided the Marines with
common-type support as well as operating all of the ports in the five northern provinces of Vietnam .
In addition, its Seabees were responsible for much of the construction effort in support of th e
Marines. The author notes that the motto of the Naval Support Activity was "They shall not want ."
The Marines of III MAF did not lack for combat logistic, maritime, and construction support .
Of all the supporting units in Vietnam, none was more welcome and more necessary to combat
Marines than the "Doc." Commander Frank O. McClendon, Jr., MSC, USN, who served in several
responsible positions during the Vietnam War, including special assistant to the Surgeon General o f
the Navy, describes Navy Medical Support in Vietnam with an emphasis on resources and facilities .
Because of considerations of space, the editors have abridged the account, but believe the resul t
does justice to the author's intent.