The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture: Lessons Learned and Lost in America’s Wars

324 Pages·2018·1.712 MB·English

by  Jeannie L. Johnson

The Marines,
CounTerinsurgenCy,
and sTraTegiC CulTure
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The Marines,
CounTerinsurgenCy,
and sTraTegiC CulTure
lessons learned and lost
in america’s Wars
Jeannie l. Johnson
Foreword by Gen. Jim Mattis, US Marines (Ret.)
Georgetown University Press / Washington, DC
 2018 Georgetown University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may
be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval
system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
The publisher is not responsible for third-p arty websites or their content. URL
links were active at time of publication.
Library of Congress Cataloging-i n- Publication Data
Names: Johnson, Jeannie L., author. | Mattis, James N., 1950– writer of foreword.
Title: The marines, counterinsurgency, and strategic culture : lessons learned and
lost in America’s wars / Jeannie L. Johnson ; foreword by Gen. Jim Mattis,
US Marines (ret.).
Description: Washington, DC : Georgetown University Press, 2018. | Includes bibli-
ographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017046605| ISBN 9781626165557 (hardcover) |
ISBN 9781626165564 (pbk.) | ISBN 9781626165571 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Counterinsurgency. | Strategic culture. | United States. Marine
Corps. | Low-intensity conflicts (Military science) | United States—History, Mili-
tary—20th century. | United States—History, Military—21st century.
Classification: LCC U241 .J635 2018 | DDC 359.9/6480973—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017046605
c This book is printed on acid-f ree paper meeting the requirements
of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper
for Printed Library Materials.
19 18 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 First printing
Printed in the United States of America
Cover design by Jeremy John Parker.
Cover image courtesy of the Defense Visual Information Center.
This book is dedicated to Steve, Benjamin, Sam, and Jess for
their wonderful support and significant sacrifice across
the many years necessary to complete this research.
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ConTenTs
Foreword by Gen. Jim Mattis, USMC (Ret.) ix
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction: Learning Counterinsurgency 1
Part I. the StrategIc cultureS of amerIcanS,
the uS mIlItary, and marIneS
1. Know Thyself: Turning the Strategic Culture Tool Inward 15
2. Bounding the Possible: The Impact of US National
and Military Cultures on Counterinsurgency Practice 37
3. Life in the Seams: Establishing Marine Corps Identity
and Role 53
4. Brothers in Arms: Marine Norms and Values 86
5. “We Do Windows”: Marine Norms and Perceptual Lens 115
Part II. marIneS acroSS a century
of counterInSurgency PractIce
6. Setting the Stage: Small Wars and the American Mind 141
7. Contrasting Nation-B uilding in the Caribbean and Vietnam:
Efficiency and Order as Enemies of Democracy 184
8. Counterinsurgency Readiness from Haiti to Vietnam:
The Consequences of Craving Conventional War 202
9. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Experiencing the Learning Curve 217
Conclusion: Lessons Learned and Lessons Lost 256
Bibliography 283
Index 297
About the Author 311
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ForeWord
The last dozen years of war can be examined from many perspectives, but
two points are clear: First, absent a historical framework, we cannot com-
prehend the implications of the type of wars we have fought inconclusively
during the opening years of this century. Second, if we wisely anticipate that
future enemies will move against our perceived weaknesses, then it is critical
that we learn the enduring lessons of counterinsurgency.
In this focused monograph, Jeannie L. Johnson provides a researched
and defined appraisal of the Marine Corps’s institutional incorporation of
the “lessons learned” in its twentieth-  and twenty- first- century counterinsur-
gency operations. Bringing forward a fresh assessment and an occasionally
controversial perspective, she has made a valuable contribution to under-
standing military innovation in a complex world. Ours is a world in which
we are not permitted to fight only the wars for which our nation’s forces
are best suited. With competing missions and varied roles, the Marines
have adapted to the nation’s needs to defeat enemies “in every clime and
place”—from shipboard detachments and landing parties with the US fleet
to counterinsurgency in Central America, from trench warfare in France
to amphibious shock assaults across the Pacific, from extended operations
ashore when grossly outnumbered to counterguerrilla battles in Korea’s
mountains, from counterinsurgency against the Viet Cong to fighting main
force North Vietnamese regular army units, from evacuation of embassies to
humanitarian operations, and from mechanized operations across Middle
East deserts to an amphibious assault over 350 miles into Afghanistan. So,
as we embrace Dr. Colin Gray’s advice to have the fewest big regrets when
the next crises strike, only an open discussion incorporating perspectives
that Dr. Johnson draws together will help us to fight well when the enemy
next moves against our perceived weakness.
America’s history is, of course, rife with counterinsurgency warfare. Pro-
fessor Johnson’s focus on the Marines’ role is an appropriate topic through
which the American experience can be examined. This is not the history one
would expect. Her weaving together threads from various conflicts into a
tapestry showing patterns permits a detached and arguably objective assess-
ment of our country and, in particular, the Marine Corps’s ability to build
on a body of knowledge gained at great cost in treasure, lives, and moral
authority. As such, it is unique in its efforts to examine a subject that will